a court following the principle of equality, all those backward nations would have a vote.

Some nations which are included within the theory of equality are countries in which the principle of ex-territoriality is still applied, and they will have a vote, and the proposal is that because equality has been accorded to them they are to have an equal voice in constituting this court, although it has been necessary to maintain ex-territorial tribunals in these countries inasmuch as the principles of their jurisprudence are so different from those obtaining in the greater part of the civilized world. And this is so to maintain the rights of foreign nations under international law, notwithstanding the theory of equality.

What I have said relates only to the weight and value of opinion in these backward nations. There is, however, another thing to be said; the nations will not come to the constitution of this court with minds that are tabulæ rasæ.

The experience of ordinary life and of nations shows that there will be combinations. I say not that there may be, but that there will be. Human nature has not changed radically. The men who ought to be in this court are the men who should be sought by somebody competent to offer to them the appointment. We will have to seek them and urge them to consent to exile themselves from their homes, to abandon their careers, to commit their future; and the men who ought not to be there will be the men who will intrigue to get there, the selfseeking men, the men who cannot rise to the highest places in their own courts will seek places in this court, and they will seek support, while the best spirits will quietly go on with the performance of their own duties. That is certain.

Who can go back home and say that this is not so? And what will be the response? People are asked to create a court and to give their consent to create a power which may be exercised in the way that I have described, to control them. It is not so that governments perform their duty and maintain their proper rights. If they are to consent away that power they must see that the power they consent away will be guarded, and for the reasons which I have stated very crudely. We must adjust the differences of opinion in some practical way or we will have no court.

Remarks of June 22, 1920

Reflecting upon the suggestion of Mr. de Lapradelle and his reference to me, some of his suggestions seem to meet the requirements of the situation. I have made a memorandum in which I have sought to follow the idea Mr. de Lapradelle has expressed and to incorporate the most valuable propositions in the plan submitted to the meeting by the president:

1. Election by Assembly and Council.

2. Qualification, juridical eminence and character.

3. Lists of persons deemed to have qualifications to be furnished before meeting of Assembly by the members of Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague-the members appointed by each nation to propose not less than two nor more than four names, one-half to be from nations other than that by which the proposers are appointed.

4. Votes on the list thus formed as provided by Lord Phillimore. 5. So far as vacancies may not be filled by election from this list, other names may be proposed by Assembly or Council and voted upon in like

manner.

6. In all elections the electors to be under honorable obligation to regard the qualifications stated and to seek adequate representation in the Court for the different systems of jurisprudence.

I assume two fundamental propositions: That the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague which now exists should remain, not be superseded-and that the new court should form a part of the judicial system of which the old court is a part.

There are four different functions to be allotted to these two different judicial institutions:

(1) to determine questions of strict law and questions arising from contracts; (2) to determine questions depending upon the principles of justice applicable in the absence of rules of strict law or contract provisions :

(3) to determine facts which are unknown or are disputed; (4) conciliation.

These four points are to be provided for in this system of which the old court is part and the new court will be part.

We must first consider that this new court must be provided for as a part of the system of which the League of Nations is part. We cannot accept the invitation of the Council and recommend a plan for a court which is not going to form a part of that system.

I think that the participation of members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration is very desirable, because we have in that list men who are recognized in each country as being specially familiar with the subject with which the court is to be familiar, and with the personnel in other countries which are interested. Such a provision appropriates the initiative of the Norwegian Parliament in the work of the Nobel Committee. In the selection of the persons to whom the peace prize is to be given, the award is made upon lists furnished by previous recipients of the award. Professors of international law and other persons specially selected are called upon each year to propose names. Here we have a special class of persons who are called upon to propose names. If we look into the working of the government of each country in domestic questions, we see that it would not make a great difference whether the government of this country or that proposed names through a purely political officer who had only the idea of domestic politics in his mind, and who had to accomplish some object of domestic politics. Every court is subject to that. It is, however, very desirable that we should make such dispositions that the persons in each country who make this suggestion for the International Court shall be persons who are not what is called "playing politics," but who have the international mind; that is what I take it we wish to accomplish by the selections proposed by the heads of universities.

I think that the participation of the members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration rather comes at the beginning than at the end as suggested by M. de

Lapradelle. If it comes at the end, it would be as arbitrators to determine a difference between the Council and the Assembly.

It is only the final decision which is important. The pressure of necessity will be more valuable than the power of decision by someone else. The legislation of the world practically is accomplished in the same way; differences between two opinions are recognized under the pressure of necessity; there must be a law on such and such subject, and the advocates of the opinions which differ are compelled to reconcile their differences, because there must be a law. Here must be justice, and if the electors do not agree they are condemned for incapacity. If the members of the Court have the opportunity to propose this list, the origin of it will be a guarantee of qualification; and if the electors cannot agree upon one named, the opportunity to propose names outside the list will guarantee that someone be found.

The last proposal that in all elections the electors are under an honorable obligation to regard the qualifications stated and to seek adequate representation on the court for the different systems of jurisprudence is, I think, a view in which we all agree. It seems to me that it also includes valuable ideas which have been proposed by a member of the committee.

I claim no patent or copyright upon those various proposals, and admit that they are "stolen property."

NOTES ON WORLD SOVEREIGNTY

BY ROBERT LANSING

Former Secretary of State of the United States

[EXPLANATORY NOTE.-These Notes on World Sovereignty were intended to be a third series to follow and supplement the Notes on Sovereignty in a State, which were published in two series in Volume I of THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. This third series was not published at the time, however, because the logical application of the theory to the world as a whole seemed too speculative and to lack the practical value of the two series published in 1907. However, the discussion seems less academic and more pertinent to present day philosophic thought concerning the political relationship between nations than it did fourteen years ago.

The Notes here printed for the first time, are identical with the manuscript prepared in 1906. Possibly some changes might be appropriately made in the text in view of the new conditions which have arisen since the Notes were written, but it has seemed best to complete the three series in their original form and as of the time when they were written.-ROBERT LANSING, December, 1920.]

INTRODUCTORY

Having reviewed in the preceding Notes1 the characteristics and qualities of the sovereignty which finds expression in a state, it is proposed to consider now the more extensive type of sovereignty which affects politically the entire human race and territorially the whole earth, and to which reference was made in the Introductory Note. The reason for considering the lesser form first has been stated, and the soundness of that reason will become more apparent in the course of the succeeding argument.

The conception of the type of sovereignty which is manifested in the external and internal relations of a state, is necessarily limited by the point from which it is viewed. Thus far in the discussion that viewpoint has been the state as the highest form of a political organism in that it has attained complete development. In dealing with sovereignty in a state in its external sphere of activity, that is, in the relations between the sovereigns of different states, it was necessary to rest upon the assumption that these sovereigns were equal and equally independent. An assumption, however rational it may be, is never satisfactory and never conclusive; but from the standpoint of the state, the correctness of this assumption could neither be established nor disproved. Still the truth of an assumption relating to man as a political being and not as a moral being

1 This JOURNAL, Vol. 1 (1907), pp. 105, 297.

must be capable of demonstration by historical facts. If the point of view is insufficient, it must be widened or a new one taken which will be comprehensive enough to embrace all that has been assumed, so that it may be tested by positive evidence. It is intended to do that in these Notes-to widen the horizon of the discussion.

This more comprehensive point of view is the one already referred to, namely that which sees in the world but a single social organism all-inclusive and universal, which minimize the sovereignties in states, affects their realities, and raises the question whether such sovereignties are real or artificial. Confessedly, if there exists a sovereignty that is superior to the sovereignty in a state, it has not yet developed into the positive type which is manifest in a political state and which history and experience recognize. It is still unformed and necessarily a theoretical conception. Nevertheless, it will be seen, as the nature of sovereignty is viewed from the broader standpoint, that powerful political and moral influences are at work in the world to change the theory into practice. Among these influences, the most potent is the increasing realization by civilized peoples of the interdependence and mutual responsibility of states in their political and economic relations.

This realization compels the conviction that the entire human race ought to be considered, and in fact is, a single community, which awaits the further development of modern civilization to complete its organization and make of all mankind a great, universal political state. There is, therefore, sufficient ground for an examination of sovereignty from this standpoint; and it will be found that, though there has been no formal recognition of the existence of such sovereignty, the great states of the civilized world have recognized, perhaps unconsciously, its existence in the applied law of nations, just as they have recognized it in the sphere of morals by giving binding effect to the principles of humanity.

THE IDEA OF A WORLD COMMUNITY AND WORLD SOVEREIGNTY

Since it is possible to conceive of the human race as one body composed of a large number of political groups including millions of individuals, or as one body with these individuals as units, and, in either case, as a community, it follows from the very nature of things that in this unorganized mass of humanity there must be a certain body of individuals possessing a physical might sufficient to compel obedience by every member of the human race throughout the world. Such superior physical might constitutes sovereignty, and, since its only limit is the earth, it may properly be termed World Sovereignty.

The objection may be made that this physical force has never been subjected to organization and has never been exerted, and that having remained without definite manifestation it is purely hypothetical and its existence theoretical rather than actual. But the existence of such supreme force is self-proving. Since each human being possesses a measure of bodily strength, the union of the physical strength of all the human beings in the world must represent the collective might of mankind. Divide that collective might unequally and a preponderance rests with a certain body of individuals and a lesser portion of such physical power with the remainder of the race. The possessors of the preponder