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as such; therefore, navigable rivers, being highways of commerce, do not afford the requisites of natural boundaries. ...
5. A state without free access to the sea is dependent on its neighbors and lacks an element of independence.
6. A state enjoys its right of participation in pacific international intercourse, subject to its observance of its contractual obligations and of the principles of humanity, honor and social and commercial integrity regarded as essential in the conduct of individuals.
7. Evolution of states is subject to the general processes of evolution, and implies adjustment of organisms to environment and a coalescing of apposite tissues. ...
9. Racial, industrial and political impulses within any state in course of time have always yielded to each other. Compromise is a conscious acceptance of such natural adjustment of tendencies.
10. Preference should therefore be given, ceteris paribus, and where it works without violent resistance, to the status quo.
National character is also an important cause of international misunderstandings.
In England the average intellect is dull, but honest. School life is based on the development of character and a robust sort of honor which easily takes the external form of arrogance. The reputation abroad of British diplomacy is, however, and therefore, that though arrogant, it is straightforward, well-meaning and trustworthy. In Germany, diplomacy has endeavored to follow the English example, but the basis is different. Early training in that country is occupied with the acquisition of exact knowledge and habits of intellectual accuracy, and the average German has a much more effective culture than the Englishman. The development of character is neglected and boys do not acquire in school that individual sense of honor which distinguishes English training. In many cases they are encouraged to play the part of traitor to each other. ... From the point of view of general culture, the French diplomatist is superior to both the English and German, and he has the intellectual and social gifts of most Frenchmen which makes him a favorite in every milieu into which he tumbles. As a diplomatist he is "to the manor born," and if the pursuit of diplomacy were exclusively one of making friends for one's country, which it largely is, the French diplomatist would be easily first. In dealing with difficulties when they arise, however, French diplomatists are not equal to the cool-headed and obstinate Englishmen or to the accurate, but more or less unscrupulous, diplomatists of Germany. The diplomacy of the United States is based on a different principle from that of England, France or Germany, viz., that of more or less permanency of the staff and subjection of the diplomatic chiefs to the party system (pp. 32-35).
The author thinks that Washington's Farewell Address is the necessary starting point of any study of American foreign policy.
Washington's successors have drawn as much inspiration from it as from the Constitution itself. When the Cuban war brought the annexation of the Philippines, authors and politicians on both sides appealed to it, but never at any time was the morally binding nature of the Farewell Address called into question (p. 64).
Objections are stated at considerable length to the view of the “most favored nation" clause in treaties, taken by the Supreme Court of the United States in Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, namely, that the clause does not forbid giving special commercial privileges for a valuable consideration (pp. 100-107).
Sir Thomas thinks that Danzig is too distinctively German to be permanently detached from Germany, but that if such detachment is to be essayed, it might be possible now to establish a free dock or harbor in its territorial waters (p. 112).
The secret Treaty of Bucharest, made August 4/17, 1916, which pledged Roumania to declare war against Austria-Hungary, and placed her own territorial integrity under the guarantee of the Allies, is given at length (p. 118).
The author regards a homogeneous language as the only feasible type of nationality (p. 142).
Who is capable of speaking at the present day with any certainty of race apart from language !
Historically speaking, nationality is a political fact based on the existing circumstances of modern state development in which geographical and economic considerations, commercial outlets, the course of navigable rivers, mountain ranges, mineral resources and all the material requirements of existing communities working out their own salvation amid the contending rivalries of their neighbors are creating common interests, a common policy, and a common language out of sheer necessity (p. 153).
The suggestion is made that
It is in the joint interest of national finance and international peace that henceforward all production of articles of no use except for purposes of war shall be state monopolies, a fair indemnity to be paid to present owners, in which any exceptional rate of profit made during the present war or in preparation for it shall be debited in reduction of the gross amount payable (p. 185).
Sir Thomas looks hopefully to future advances in international law.
Law is the one stable element in the life of communities. Even bad law is better than disrespect for it, because the alternative for bad law is not necessarily good law, and the stability of law is the common basis of all social and commercial intercourse. To labor anything so obvious is supererogation, and I need only add that what is true of the domestic intercourse of nations can only be true of intercourse between nations. To say that international law is dead is, therefore, about as true as to say that an inundation or an earthquake puts an end to engineering and architecture. Far from it, the need of a law binding on nations, and which nations will respect and may even be forced to respect, is inherent to the idea of that Society of Nations to which the peoples of the world are looking forward as a safeguard against lawless ambitions, whether of potentates, statesmen, bureaucracies, oligarchies or democracies. ... The reaction in the case of the recent war is toward sanctions for the enforcement of the law of nations, and hence to the conception of a Society of Nations capable of enforcing respect for it (pp. 188, 189).
The author urges suitable provision for a broad and general education in international law. For this purpose he proposes the creation of professional chairs in “the Universities of London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Petrograd, New York, and Tokio” (p. 198).
He warmly favors the extension of the principle of neutralization.
The principle of neutralization is still one of the most promising of modern political developments for restriction of geographical areas exposed to the calamities of war. If one aggressive state broke its promise, other states respected theirs, at any rate as regards Belgium and, on the whole, the de facto situation is favorable to reliance on good faith being observed where the terms of a treaty leave no room for equivocation. With the interdiction of secret treaties and the control of foreign policy by the respective parliaments of the high contracting parties to the coming settlement, international affairs may be brought into line with the ordinary straightforward rules of conduct by which honest private citizens consider themselves bound, and neutralization by treaty or proclamation may become one of the different processes of law by which war may eventually become as obsolete as duelling” (p. 209).
Sir Thomas is not an unqualified admirer of democratic government.
The break-up of the three greatest instances of empire may result in eventual federation of all three as a League of Nations for defence against the reaction which may be in course of evolution in countries which have hitherto been the home of political freedom, for seldom if ever in history has victory been of advantage to popular liberties. This union for selfpreservation against external neo-aggressive tendencies may present material features of great importance for the future of democracy throughout the world (p. 252).
This horoscope presents a possibility worth careful thought. Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary, confederated for the preservation of a democratic world, would certainly bring a strong force into world-politics.
Attention is drawn to the differences between the French and English editions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, for League the French having substituted Société, a more inclusive term.
SIMEON E. BALDWIN.
The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty. By
Bernard M. Baruch. New York and London: Harper & Bros., 1920, pp. 353.
This book is of particular interest as furnishing information not hitherto made public regarding the negotiations of the reparation and economic sections of the Peace Treaty. Mr. Baruch in a note preface to the volume states that he alone is “responsible for the statements made in this volume," but in view of the position he occupied at the Peace Conference as Economic Adviser to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, and member of the Economic Drafting Committee, of the Reparation Commission, of the Economic Commission and of the Supreme Economic Council, and the fact that, as he himself states, he has confined himself in this book to a discussion of only those matters with which he was "directly concerned in the making of the treaty,” his book is of historic value.
The negotiations concerning the reparation clauses and the economic clauses are dealt with separately, and the provisions of the treaty itself dealing with these matters are included in the volume, which also contains an addenda comprising the addresses made on behalf of the American, French and British delegates on the principles of reparation. The addresses of these delegates are particularly enlightening as to the divergent views held by several of the governments regarding the principles of law and equity to be applied in assessing the reparation demanded from Germany.
It appears that the American delegates contended that reparation should be based strictly upon the so-called contractual obligations imposed upon Germany through President Wilson's pre-armistice negotiations, as approved by the Allied Powers, in addition to the obligations arising by operation of law for admittedly illegal acts.
The obligations imposed by the pre-armistice negotiations were that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and made free, and that Germany must make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population
of the Allies and to their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.
The British contended that inasmuch as Germany's invasion of Belgium was an illegal act because in violation of the Belgian Treaty of Neutrality, the necessary result of which was to involve the other Powers in the war, Germany was under obligation to make compensation for all the consequences of that illegal act, including the entire war costs incurred, not only by Belgium, but by all the Allied and Associated Powers as well.
In support of the British contention that Germany should bear the entire war costs, the French delegation advanced the additional argument that the armistice agreement of November 11th superseded the pre-armistice agreement, and they were at liberty to enlarge the terms of that agreement for the reason that “Germany surrendered on November 11th because she was conquered, and not because she found acceptable and equitable the conditions of President Wilson and of the Associated Powers."
The question was referred for settlement to the Supreme Council, and it was finally decided that the only direct war expenditures of the governments which should be included (except in the case of Belgium, which is to receive compensation for its entire war losses), were their expenses for pensions and separation allowances. The principle governing the decision of the Supreme Council in drawing this seemingly illogical distinction between the entire costs of the war and the cost only of pensions and separation allowances is not disclosed. The practical result of the decision, Mr. Baruch estimates, was to increase the amount of indemnity to be apportioned to Great Britain approximately from 19% to 40% of the total amount Germany can be made to pay, and it is pointed out that unless the amount which can be collected from Germany exceeds the wildest dreams of what she will be able to pay, the nations whose territories were occupied and devastated will receive considerably less than if the restitution Germany is called upon to make excluded all direct war expenses of the governments, which the United States delegates contended would have been more in accordance with hitherto accepted international law principles.
There seems to have been no disagreement, however, among the respective delegations as to the necessity for enforcing respect for international law by exacting from Germany penalties sufficiently heavy to deter any nation in future from violating the international obligations imposed upon it by treaty or by the accepted law of nations. The provisions of the treaty imposing these penalties deal with political questions, commercial and industrial subjects from the standpoint of international relations, and private rights in various aspects, and they involve technical and difficult questions of domestic law, of international law, and of international practices. Mr. Baruch's comments on these provisions and his explanation of conflicting views and interests which had to be harmonized in order to reach an agreement, are valuable contributions to a proper understanding of the meaning and purpose of the treaty.
In addition to expounding the treaty provisions, Mr. Baruch also calls atten. tion to several subsidiary agreements or understandings reached by the Allies among themselves outside of the treaty, which were intended to establish their respective interests and participation in the spoils of war. For instance, Mr. Baruch states that the Allied and Associated Powers adopted the general principle that they would share in Germany's reparation payments in proportion to their allowed claims, except that they agreed to give to Belgium a priority in certain payments to permit its immediate restoration. He also states that they adopted the further principle of joint and several liability as between Germany and Austria-Hungary. The purpose in adopting these principles was that “all of the assets of the enemy states should be pooled into one fund, and that all of the Allied and Associated States should share in this fund in proportion to their approved claims."
Another subsidiary agreement entered into by the Allied and Associated Powers related to the disposition of the German ships. As to these ships the French proposal was “to allocate to the Allied and Associated Powers in proportion to their respective war losses, and to place in a pool for that purpose, all ships which on August 1, 1914, flew the German flag. This would have resulted in the pooling of all ships condemned by prize court (chiefly British) and ships seized in the Western Hemisphere (chiefly by the United States and Brazil)."
The British proposed “the pooling of all ships which on the date of the coming into force of the treaty were entitled to fly the German flag. This, in the British opinion, would have pooled ships seized by the United States, Brazil, Cuba, etc., without prize court decisions, and would have left undisturbed the title to ships which had been passed through the (British] prize court.”
The American delegates proposed that “title to all German ships seized during the war should be confirmed in the captor nation, and that only the remaining German ships be placed in the pool.”
Mr. Baruch states that “President Wilson declined to accede to any proposition that would involve the surrender by the United States of ships which had been taken over by act of Congress," and the “problem was finally solved by agreeing to place all the belligerents on an equality. The right was recognized to retain seized German tonnage upon the condition that payment be made for reparation account up to the fair value of the ships retained in excess of those apportioned to replace war losses."
So far as concerns the United States, all of these agreements, like the treaty itself, must be understood as requiring the advice and consent of the Senate before ratification.
The reparation and economic clauses of the treaty deal with matters which vitally affect the whole world, as they furnish the terms upon which Germany makes restitution and resumes commercial relations with the other nations which have ratified the treaty. Therefore, until such time as the official records of the Peace Conference are made public, Mr. Baruch's book will be of special value to all interested in learning the inside history of the economic and reparation provisions of the treaty and the conflicting interests of the various countries which were harmonized in the drawing of those provisions.
Mr. Baruch treats the subject in an absolutely dispassionate manner, making full allowance for human frailties, and offers as an excuse for much of the