Mr. Harrison thus sums up, at page 24, Austin's teaching on the analysis of sovereignty and law:

1. The source of all positive law is that definite sovereign authority which exists in every independent political community, and therein expresses de facto the supreme power, being itself unlimited, as a matter of fact, by any limits of positive law.

2. Law is a command relating to the general conduct of the subjects, to which command such sovereign authority has given legal obligation by annexing a sanction, or penalty, in case of neglect.

Further on at page 28 he adds:

Shortly stated, the theory of Austin as to sovereignty amounts to this: The force of all law is derived from that ultimate sovereign authority which in every independent political community actually exercises an unlimited power of command and is habitually obeyed by the bulk of the community. Now this proposition seems to me perfectly true, and in fact to be almost a truism, if we understand it in the sense in which it is said; i.e., as true for the lawyer from the point of view of formal and scientific law. And for that very reason, it is of such signal use in clearing the brain for the student who comes to law from the study of morals or other branches of social science. But from the point of view of a complete social philosophy, from the point of view of scientific history and scientific politics, the proposition requires so much qualification and correction, that it ceases to be a complete account of the matter at all.

Touching Austin's analysis of law, Mr. Harrison tells us (page 37):

We have spoken of Austin's definition of sovereignty. We will pass to the second of his leading propositions, the definition and analysis of law. In this he is the editor and expositor of Bentham, who himself follows Hobbes. Gathering up their statements, the combined results amount to this: Law is a general command, which the determinate Sovereign, or supreme political authority of a State, has imposed as an obligation on all, or a part of its subjects, and which command it enforces by a sanction. Austin insists that law involves always these three elements, which in law are correlative and mutually imply each other: (1) command, (2) obligation, (3) sanction; and the whole depends on the sovereign authority of an independent political community, such sovereign being possessed of unlimited power.

This analysis of law is open to observations similar to those already made as to the proposition about sovereignty. That is to say, it must be understood from the point of view of the lawyer, and as being only one of the aspects of the question.

These conceptions, it appears, are essentially those of Bodin (1581). To Mr. Harrison's comprehensive criticism of Austin's work, Professor Lefroy has added (pages 149-173) a series of illuminative notes, together with well chosen extracts from Holland, Bluntschli, Pollock, Bryce, Prof. W. Jethro Brown, Mr. Holdsworth (History of English Law), Mr. Justice Markby, Mr. J. Neville Figgis, Prof. Salmond, and others.

To the reviewer it is a pleasure to note Mr. Harrison's appreciative paragraph (at page 21) touching Blackstone:

it being conceded that Blackstone wrote and thought in the age of vague commonplace about the ultimate sanction of law and of mysterious veneration of the British constitution, it is to be regretted that Austin should fill the mind of the beginner with contempt for a work like the Commentaries on the Laws of England, which is not only in itself a masterly work of art, but is still the only available attempt to cast into a literary form a comprehensive panorama of English law as a whole. Austin was absorbed in keeping his grasp with rigid

tenacity on certain coherent conceptions. Blackstone was occupied in arranging the complex labyrinth of English law into such an artistic composition as should at once impress the imagination of his lay readers. And this he has undoubtedly succeeded in accomplishing— and he alone has succeeded.

Lecture III, "The Historical Method," seems to the reviewer in all respects admirable. It was written in 1879, or ten years after the appearance of Dr. Stubbs' Constitutional History and precisely when Freeman's historical labors were producing their notable harvest. "The historical method in law," says Mr. Harrison (pp. 71, 80, 86),

...

is the special resource and almost the discovery of our immediate time, and it is important for the lawyer to recognize its proper use and its available limits. The historical method, it is true, can give us nothing of the existing state of the law as we want it for daily practice. What is the practical conclusion to which I would point? It is that the historical method is one of the resources of jurisprudence, not the substantive part of it, and in no sense an independent part of it. It would be possible to have a very great and varied knowledge of the history of any legal system, and yet never to grasp it at all as a coherent and symmetrical scheme. For the lawyer the great interest always must be what is the law as it is. How it has become what it is, is a very useful inquiry. But this will become positively confusing if the subordinate inquiry is ever allowed to stand on equal terms with the main inquiry-the law as it is, as it is at any given time.

And he well continues (page 87):

...

all this points to making the historical inquiry merely an instrument of jurisprudence, and never to take it for jurisprudence itself. Scientific jurisprudence should tend always to look at a system of law complete as a working whole at any given time. The sympathies will be always toward the rational and scientific modes of classification; to the final type of any system, not to its rudimentary forms. The historical inquiry unrestrained constantly tends on the other hand toward the anomalous, the accidental, the initial type of the institution. The only way to guard against this is to use the historical method in jurisprudence strictly and simply as an instrument. [p. 89] The historical method is thus a potent and fruitful instrument of jurisprudence, but it is very far from being the last word of jurisprudence. That must always be looked for in the analysis and consolidation of the actual doctrines of law under systematic titles. [p. 90]. The root of the matter, I suppose, is the scientific analysis and distribution of legal doctrines and statutes, and their consolidation into a symmetrical and practical whole. This is doubtless a great, and possibly a far distant work; but it is one that is impossible without a real and sound jurisprudence. And the methods of such a jurisprudence will probably be found to be three, of which no one should exclude or can supersede the others—the analytic, the historical and the comparative.

...

Lectures IV and V contain a careful examination of the development of the science which we term the "Conflict of Laws" or "Private International Law." At the outset of any study of this highly complex and important system, it is necessary clearly to differentiate it from international law or the law of nations. In the celebrated case of Hilton v. Guyot, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States at October term, 1894 (159 U. S. 113, 163), Mr. Justice Gray said: international law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense-including not only questions of right between nations, governed by what has been appropriately called the law of nations, but also questions arising under what is usually called private international law, or the conflict of laws, and concerning the rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one nation by reason of acts, private or public, done within the dominions of another nationis part of our law. and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice, as

often as such questions are presented in litigation between man and man, duly submitted to their determination.

The most certain guide, no doubt, for the decision of such questions is a treaty or a statute of this country. But when, as is the case here, there is no written law upon the subject, the duty still rests upon the judicial tribunals of ascertaining and declaring what the law is, whenever it becomes necessary to do so in order to determine the rights of parties to suits regularly brought before them. In doing this, the courts must obtain such aid as they can from judicial decisions, from the works of jurists and commentators, and from the acts and usages of civilized nations. (Fremont v. United States, 17 How. 542, 557; The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170, 188; Respublica v. De Longchamps, 2 Dall. 111, 116. Moultrie v. Hunt, 23 N. Y. 394, 396.)

No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent to which the law of one nation, as put in force within its territory, whether by executive order, by legislative act, or by practical decree, shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation, depends upon what our greatest jurists have been content to call "The Comity of Nations." Although the phrase has been often criticized, no satisfactory substitute has been suggested.

In a subsequent paragraph of the opinion, Mr. Justice Gray took occasion to refer (p. 215) to the question of remittance or renvoi of a cause from the courts of a country to which it had been thought proper to send it to the forum where it originated, citing a case determined at Paris by the Cour de Cassation in 1819, where the expression is used "obtint son renvoi devant les tribunaux Américains." Renvoi was discussed at length a few years later (1904) by Mr. J. P. Bate in his Notes on the Doctrine of Renvoi.

Not merely, however, must we mark well the fundamental distinctions between the law of nations and the conflict of laws, but we must find an appropriate designation for our science. This has scarcely as yet been done. Yet the necessity for such a science becomes obvious if we consider that transactions are continually being brought for decision before all courts of justice, which in whole or in part depend for their legal quality on the laws of a state different from that which has to try them. There is here no essential conflict but merely ambiguity, arising from the fact that more than one set of coördinate laws apparently apply to the case. The phrase of Savigny is strictly exact: Private international law marks the limitation of legal rules in respect to place. Our author proposes the term Intermunicipal Law, and would describe this science as "The law of compound jurisdiction" (p. 131). It does not seem, however, that "Intermunicipal" is likely to prove satisfying. Again we may employ the term "Private International Law" because our science rests upon "the doctrine of the equal sovereignty of friendly nations and the desire of civilized states to treat their neighbors civilly as well as politically, with equal justice." The applicable law, nevertheless, is municipal, since it springs from judicial determination and has no concern with diplomatic relations or with the intercourse of governments or states. It is not international. It is, as Mr. Harrison shows, indeed, somewhat older than modern international law, since we can trace its principles to the famous Legist Bartolus of Sasso Ferrato in the March of Ancona.

Mr. Harrison follows the development of our science through the writings of Argentræus (D'Argentré) of Brittany (1608), Rodenburg of Utrecht (1653),

Paul and John Voet, Ulrich Huber (1606) whose brief but really immortal De Conflictu Legum is a world landmark in legal science, and Hert, professor at Giessen, who termed his little treatise (1668) De Collisione Legum.

Later, and in France, development was carried on during the first half of the eighteenth century in the works of D'Aguesseau, Bouhier, Froland, and Boullenois; in 1834 there appeared the work of Story on the conflict of laws. During the next twenty-five years the subject was ably treated in England by Phillimore and Westlake, and has been discussed in more recent years by many others in England and on the Continent as well as in our own country.

As a preliminary study in a great subject, it would be difficult to point the student to more truly illuminating pages than those of Mr. Harrison. Few in number as are these pages, they would appear to deserve well the rank of a classic and can scarcely be too highly praised.

GORDON E. SHERMAN.

American World Policies. By David Jayne Hill, New York: George H. Doran Co., 1920, pp. 257.

Dr. Hill's views, as to the foreign policies of the administration of Mr. Wilson, were expressed with some fullness in his previous volume, Present Problems in Foreign Policy, and in many notable magazine articles and platform addresses. In fact, Dr. Hill has won a principal place in the great discussion as a protagonist against Mr. Wilson. No public official, no party leader, has spoken and written more copiously or with greater weight. He has brought to his task long official experience in international affairs, and years of European study in international history, if we may use the term. He has conducted his discussions with great dignity and moderation. No one's contribution to this vital question has in consequence been more widely considered or respectfully received.

It is, of course, no matter of surprise to find the present work a vigorous, systematic and comprehensive assault on most that has been accomplished or proposed by the present administration in foreign affairs, and especially as to the League of Nations. The opening paragraph of the preface of this new book indicates the gravity of the situation as Dr. Hill conceives it.

"American participation," he says, "in an attempt to reorganize the international relations of the entire world with the expectation of permanent peace by means of a punitive treaty requiring military force to execute it, presents the most serious problem that has ever arisen in connection with the foreign affairs of our country."

He points out that the Covenant of the League of Nations "is not a general 'Association of Nations' of a pacific character to secure international justice, but a limited defensive alliance for the protection of existing possessions, regardless of the manner in which they were acquired by their rulers, wholly indifferent to the wishes of the population thus held in subjection, and controlled by a small group of great Powers whose supremacy is based solely upon their magnitude and military strength," and he adds, "It hardly needs to be stated

that a League of this character does not embody the American conception of what such an association should be." He insists "there must be substituted the enforcement of peace by conformity to International Law as a body of just and equal rules for the conduct of nations in their relations with one another."

In this volume he aims to submit to the friends of the League "a satisfactory statement of the reluctance felt in the United States by those who are deeply interested in the peace of the world to accept without change the Covenant of the League as it was prepared at Paris under the pressure of more immediate interests." He says, that in speaking of Americanizing the Treaty of Peace, no change to give the United States an advantage over other nations is meant, but, "What we mean by it is a refusal to participate in any compact that would destroy or pervert our national character by subjecting our action to a control not in harmony with our principles as a nation." He adds, "It is timely for our friends in England, Canada, Australia and elsewhere to know that the best service we can render them is to continue to be ourselves."

His discussion is contained in eight chapters and an epilogue, covering some 188 pages, and he prints at the close eight documents, including President Wilson's Points, The Covenant of the League of Nations, Ex-Senator Root's letter to Senator Lodge, and the various Reservations of the Senate.

The first chapter is entitled "Disillusions Regarding the League." He finds that Europe, as Washington pointed out, possesses "a set of primary interests," with which we, a constitutional republic without dynastic or colonial interests or imperial traditions, have no relations, and that no European Power "is ready to give up any territory or any advantage it now possesses no matter where it is held or at whose disadvantage," that it was an interest common to all "that, henceforth, the world should be governed by definite principles of justice, and not controlled by private diplomatic bargains;" that the conference at Paris wholly ignored these considerations; and that secret compacts between France, Great Britain, Russia, Italy and Japan, made as late as March, 1917, at the very time China was urged to become an ally and belligerent for the common good, yet bargaining away her undoubted rights among themselves, have been brought to light.

Chapter II deals with "The Un-American Character of the League." Dr. Hill finds the League not only does not accept international law; it deliberately abrogates it. There are to be henceforth no "Neutral rights for which this Republic throughout its history has stood." He finds the Covenant "the work of politicians and not the work of jurists. They have created an organ of power but not an institution of justice." "By this covenant every war becomes a world war." He points out the "Imperial character of this League" and says General Smuts, with Lord Robert Cecil, its principal author, declares expressly that it "is modeled on the British Empire, including its Crown Colonies and Protectorates." He shows how different are the conceptions of liberty in Great. Britain and the United States. The British Parliament, restrained by no constitution, governs absolutely millions of men, including whole nations, against their will. America made a revolution to establish the doctrine that liberty is a natural, inherent, personal attribute. He asks, "Why should the League, if