it is to exist, be on the plan of the British Empire and not on the plan of our American ideals." He objects to the sacrifice of our principles by subordinating "the rule of law to a rule of force.'

It must be observed that the President took with him to Paris, in his train of 1200 or 1300 international experts (mainly parochial), not one constitutional lawyer of accepted eminence in that branch. He was better served in international law, but was not docile on that subject.

Chapter III deals with. "The President's Hostility to the Senate." Dr. Hill says, "Mr. Wilson did not really believe in democracy. When it served him he approved it, but when it denied him what he wanted he tried to outwit it. In temperament he was an imperialist." He finds "no plenipotentiary of any country had ever been accompanied by such an apparatus for the making of peace. Bound by no instructions, restrained by no power of review or recognized control at home, the President was, as he assumed, "Acting in his own name and by his own proper authority." "Constitutionally he had a partner in the solemn process of treaty making 'by and with' whose 'advice and consent' he was required to act." Dr. Hill closes this chapter thus: "The issue presents a conflict between representative and autocratic democracy, and it is not untimely to be reminded that the Roman Republic was transformed into the Empire by the simple process of conferring all the highest offices upon Cæsar."

Chapter IV deals with "The Struggle of the Senate for its Prerogative"which Dr. Hill stoutly maintains, as, it may be added, does the great weight of the highest constitutional authorities, including Mr. Root, Mr. Justice Hughes, Mr. W. D. Guthrie of New York, and Lord Grey of Falloden, to say nothing of the eminent lawyers who are members of the Senate itself.

Chapter V deals with "The Eclipse of Peace through the League." Its closing paragraph is as follows:

The statesmen at Paris were ready in March, 1919, to declare immediate peace, for which the whole world was longing; but since that time there has been projected across the luminary of peace the silhouette of a solitary implacable figure, sternly forbidding the proclamation that the great war is ended, unless it conforms to the mandate of a single will.

Chapter VI is entitled "The Covenant or the Constitution." Dr. Hill says "The evidence all goes to show and new evidence is daily coming to light that at the Peace Conference at Paris the Constitution of the United States was virtually a sealed book both to the Supreme Council and to the American delegation," and to the absolute lack of adequate counsel for that paramount subject we have already alluded.

Chapter VII is entitled "The Nation and the Law," and consists in substance of the admirable address delivered before the American Bar Association at Boston, September 4, 1919, and heretofore fully discussed in this journal in the account of that meeting submitted by this reviewer. It may be pointed out that it quotes, with fine effect, the Declaration of Independence as to the English King, and directs it against another "he has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution and unacknowledged by our laws, giving his assent to these acts of pretended legislation."

The eighth and last chapter is entitled "The Solemn Referendum." Concerning this, Dr. Hill says:

When, therefore, President Wilson, having personally negotiated a treaty involving a reversal of the traditional policies of the United States, extending far beyond the usual conditions of making peace, and even setting up a mechanism of super-government capable of acting with and upon sovereign states in a manner which subordinates the constitutional powers of Congress, and having failed to obtain the consent of the Senate to its ratification, appeals to the electorate as a means of enforcing acceptance of the treaty, he is proposing a course of action which is extra-constitutional, anti-constitutional and legally futile.

Among the dangers pointed out in this chapter is the fact that "There is not in the entire Treaty of Versailles a single line that prevents the League, which possesses the explicit right of self-amendment, from making any changes its members may think it expedient to make in its powers or its conditions of membership." He points out that the President threatened to throw overboard the whole work accomplished at Paris, unless his colleagues in the Supreme Council would accept his personal dictum as final, yet insists that the Senate should not interpose the slightest modification, and Dr. Hill suggests that it is inconsistent to urge that our sacred honor is pledged to ratify that which he so lightly threatens to throw to the winds. This chapter closes as follows:

Honestly formulated the President's proposal of a "great and solemn referendum" submits the question "Shall the President of the United States alone conclude treaties without the advice and consent of the Senate?" The next step might easily be "Shall the President make laws without the sanction of Congress?"

The pertinence of this is apparent when we reflect that, under our Constitution, treaties are laws of the highest authority, ranking with federal statutes and expressly overriding State constitutions and State laws.

In the epilogue which closes the volume (save for the documents subjoined), Dr. Hill admirably says:

There is in American policy no element of aggression or urgency of unsatisfied claims. In truth-and it is a statement which those who are disposed to criticise the course of the United States may well ponder-the chief question for American policy to decide is how much it shall freely grant to other nations for which it expects nothing in return.

He points out that without the League "the United States would still be free to render any service to the world which this nation may be justly called upon to render."

Dr. Hill's arguments will probably not alter the views of President Wilson, but they are cogent, scholarly and vigorously presented, and constitute a most valuable contribution to the great controversy. The New York Times Book Review (September 5), a hostile publication, devotes five columns to them, and prints a humorous cartoon of Dr. Hill and President Wilson bestriding the globe. It says, "It is the familiar Republican argument, but it is stated with a force, clearness and plausibility which do not always characterize that argument. . It is the Republican case put as strongly as possible; much more strongly put, of course, than Senator Harding has or can put it."

.

Dr. Hill's book must take its place as the authoritative and classical state

ment of rational grounds of opposition to the League and Mr. Wilson's foreign policy. It will win warm support from all who still attach themselves to the foreign policy initiated by Washington, and adhered to by every President until the present incumbent; to all who trust and adhere to the system of checks and balances by which our Constitution safeguards public weal and private liberty; to all who believe that the Declaration of Independence of European control, which was the act of origin for this nation, ought not to be abrogated or substantially impaired; by all who believe that a highly punitive power cannot be the parent of eternal repose; to all who feel that the final surrender of autonomy by this nation cannot be made in return for a minor place in a European committee which shall be world controlling.

It will convince those who feel that the United States, having rescued Europe from an overwhelming danger of its own creation, ought not to be coerced into binding itself in one and the same instrument, to forever protect the independence of Europe and forever surrender its own.

CHARLES NOBLE GREGORY.

Democracy and the Eastern Question. The Problem of the Far East as demonstrated by the Great War, and its relation to the United States of America. By Thomas F. Millard. New York: The Century Co., 1919, pp. ix, 446. $3.00.

The author of this book is a well known American journalist who has spent many years near the sources of Far Eastern political information. His views are frankly and aggressively anti-Japanese; he regards Japan as an ambitious military power with a government constructed on the Prussian plan and dominated by a political philosophy learned in Germany, with a foreign policy which aims at the complete economic and political control of China and the closing of the "open door."

Mr. Millard may be wrong, but he has no doubts. He believes that Japan is a menace to the peace of the world, and he says so bluntly and backs his assertions with personal testimony and ample quotations from newspapers and public documents. He is certain also that it is the duty of the United States to protect China from the aggressive designs of Japan even to the extent of war.

The book is based on selected facts and is as one-sided as the ordinary argument of an advocate. Criticism is rather disarmed by the prefatory statement that the book "is not non-partisan or an impartial discussion of the subject,” and that the author "has not encumbered the book by giving much of the contrary side of events and of the contrary arguments." There is thus an implication that there is another side. Mr. Millard's books on Oriental politics are all valuable, and it is well for the American public to have material to counteract the pro-Japanese propaganda.

The reader's reactions to such a book will be determined by his previous conceptions of the purposes and spirit of Japan's foreign policy. If he has been an exchange professor or a distinguished visitor to Japan and been sub

jected to official and academic hospitality, he will regard Mr. Millard's book as prejudiced and designed to disturb the friendly relations of the two countries. If his experience has been that of the average American or British business man in the Far East, he will accept the book as stating correctly conditions and tendencies.

The subjects discussed are: The Real Character of Japan, Japan's Policy in the Great War, China and the War, The Corruption of a Nation, China and Economic Imperialism, The Open Door, The Siberian Question, and The Solution. An appendix of 80 pages contains texts and other relevant matter which has not until recently been readily accessible. As the book was written before the Peace Conference completed its work, the Siberian and Shantung questions are, of course, not fully developed.

It is unfortunate that Japan has so conducted her foreign affairs as to forfeit much of the good will of the Western world. Her methods are criticized and condemned by practically every recent British and American writer on Far Eastern affairs. There must be some reason for this almost universal condemnation. It cannot be entirely without justification. The American people generally, while always ready to assume the worst of European monarchies, feel kindly toward Japan. They have always been rather proud of their country's part in forcing Japan on to the international stage. During her war with Russia the bravery and heroism of her soldiers were idealized and her Bushido philosophy was contrasted favorably with American materialism. They were indeed "a wonderful little people." After the Treaty of Portsmouth a different note began to be heard. Possibly there was another side to the shield. The cherryblossom and chrysanthemum conception of Japan was shaken by the new foreign policy, and it finally dawned on Europe and America that there had arisen in the East a powerful military empire with definite political and economic ambitions and a will to realize them by methods learned in Germany.

The old relations between the United States and Japan came to an end with the Treaty of Portsmouth. The Japanese public believed that they had won a great victory and that Russia would be enforced to pay the expenses of the war. Although victorious in the field, Japan was, in fact, on the verge of defeat. Witte understood the situation and Komura knew that a renewal of the war meant ultimate disaster for Japan. On the advice of President Roosevelt, an indemnity was waived and Komura returned to face a Tokio mob and inaugurate the foreign policy which has since been consistently followed. Its object is beyond question the domination of the Far East through the economic and political control of China and the consolidation of the yellow races under the leadership of Japan. To this everything has been subordinated.

Mr. Millard makes it very clear that the United States has never had a definite policy in the East. Her influence has been negative rather than positive, and no one ever believed that she would back her protestations with force. However, her record is free from aggressive acts. She has joined with the other Powers in diplomatic pressure on China for equal treatment and commercial advantages. When the use of force became necessary, she always virtuously withdrew until the "outrage" was consummated and then coolly demanded

her share of trade to the disgust of those who had borne the brunt of the battle.

The Manchurian neutralization suggestion was treated with scant respect. President Taft's administration supported American bankers in their demand to participate in Chinese loans. Russia and Japan, neither with any money to loan, edged into the combination. But after the inauguration of President Wilson, diplomatic support was withdrawn and America became again merely an interested spectator. The recent change of policy and America's participation in the new consortium encourages one to believe that the United States will have a serious part in the rehabilitation of China. There is no doubt but that Japan somewhat arrogantly resents this American activity. Millard shows that whenever brought face to face with Japan in the East, American diplomacy has failed. What will the future bring forth?

He finds no "democracy" in the Mikado's empire and no hope of there being any so long as the Japanese worship the head of the state as a divine being and submit to the leadership of a military caste. Japan's diplomatic strategy is directed to the control of China. Every major move so far made by her seems to have been successful; every demand on China has been granted or withdrawn to be resubmitted on a favorable occasion. By the Lansing-Ishii agreement, Japan secured recognition of her "special interests" in China. Her diplomacy is definite, positive and backed by force. According to Mr. Millard, the United States must abandon the Orient or fight for a position of equality. The reader will find all the arguments in favor of that view of the situation in this book.

CHARLES BURKE ELLIOTT.

The League of Nations. By the Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick Pollock, Bt. London : Stevens & Sons, 1920, pp. xv, 251.

The first four chapters of this volume treat respectively of "The Older European Order," "Methods of International Arbitration," "The Hague Tribunal," and "The League in Sight." The four remaining chapters consist of a commentary on the Covenant of the League, article by article. There is an appendix containing the draft of February, 1919, the text of the Covenant as finally adopted, the official commentary, and several other documents bearing on the subject.

Anything on the League of Nations from so eminent a jurist as Sir Frederick Pollock is worthy of attention. It should be said at the outset that he is in full sympathy with the League of Nations. He traces the origin of the movement for a League from the first organization of the American League to Enforce Peace, for which he gives credit to Ex-President Taft and Mr. Theodore Marburg, to the failure of the last German offensive in the autumn of 1918, when, he says, "it was clear that the speculative stage of the great problem was already past," and the only question was whether the League should be a part of the Treaty of Peace or reserved for future consideration. The plan of the American Government, he says, prevailed when the terms of the armistice.