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actually engaged in superintending the business of his house in their concerns in this country.”

The judge here seems to regard the business carried on by the partnership in S. Bartholomew's and in America as one individual house. It may have contributed to this that Mr. Kraft had no fixed counting-house in America, so that the great preponderance may have lain with the center of the business at S. Bartholomew's. Or the American business may not have been of a general character. From the English case of The Ann, a copy of the record of which is in the Inner Temple Library36 we gather that both Elbers and Kraft customarily resided in S. Bartholomew's and were Swedes by national allegiance.

THE AINA (June 21, 1854, Spinks, 316). Here Lushington, D.C.L.,87 gave it as his opinion that where a neutral “continues to reside in the enemy's country for purposes of trade, he is considered as adhering to the enemy, and is disqualified from claiming as a neutral altogether." This is clearly too wide, and quite inconsistent with Stowell's opinion in The Anna Catharine. If he has a house of trade in the enemy's country, it does not matter whether he resides there. If he has not, but resides there for the purpose of carrying on his own foreign trade, he is at perfect liberty to do so; provided, he has no intention of remaining permanently. The dictum was not necessary to the decision.

IV. CONCLUSION The authorities are scanty, so far as the facts of trading go. The principles are vague and elusive. Possibly the whole subject requires reexamination, and the elements of (1) soil, (2) manufacture, (3) distribution, (4) expenditure of profits (domicile), taken into scientific account. Meanwhile it would be a pity that the subject of house of trade should be relegated to the list of those of which it is dangerous to venture on a definition,- like Fraud and Reasonableness. Merchants ought to be able to know where they stand, and should not be exposed to the fluctuations of belligerent prejudice.

36 Folio Prize Appeals (1813-14), fo. 418.

37 It is a current jest in the Temple (not at all justified) that Lushington was "always wrong.” In The Abö (ib. 349) he made the statement that "in time of war a person is considered as belonging to that nation where he is resident and where he carries on his trade,”-again a very questionable deliverance.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

PRESIDENT HARDING'S FOREIGN POLICY

On the 12th of April, 1921, President Harding appeared before the Congress of the United States in joint and extraordinary session and delivered in person his first message to the legislative branch of the Government of the Union. In the concluding portion of his message, he dwelt upon foreign relations, and he stated, it would seem, in clear and unmistakable terms the attitude of the government in so far as he could express it at that time toward the League of Nations. He said, by way of introduction:

It ill becomes us to express impatience that the European belligerents are not yet in full agreement, when we ourselves have been unable to bring constituted authority into accord in our own relations to the formally proclaimed peace.

Little avails in reciting the causes of delay in Europe or our own failure to agree. But there is no longer excuse for uncertainties respecting some phases of our foreign relationship.

And amid enthusiastic applause, as recorded in the Congressional Record, he continued: “In the existing League of Nations, world-governing with its super-powers, this Republic will have no part.Then, amid applause, he added: “There can be no misinterpretation, and there will be no betrayal of the deliberate expression of the American people in the recent election; and, settled in our decision for ourselves, it is only fair to say to the world in general, and to our associates in war in particular, that the League Covenant can have no sanction by us."

President Harding, however, was unwilling to disassociate himself from the purpose which the advocates of international organization sought to secure through the League, although he was outspoken in this passage and in other portions of his address against the method by which this purpose was to be realized. Thus, he continued: “The aim to associate nations to prevent war, preserve peace, and promote civilization our people most cordially applauded. We yearned for this new instrument of justice, but we can have no part in a committal to an agency of force in unknown contingencies; we can recognize no super-authority." To President Harding the League is an agency of force, and it apparently defeated its purpose through the element of force and through its connection with the Treaty of Versailles. “Manifestly the highest purpose of the League of Nations was defeated in linking it with the treaty of peace and making it the enforcing agency of the victors in the war."

So far, President Harding's attitude was analytical and largely negative. In the very next portion of his address he states the principles of coöperation : “International association for permanent peace must be conceived solely as an instrumentality of justice, unassociated with the passions of yesterday." Upon this foundation he proceeds to build :

The American aspiration, indeed, the world aspiration, was an association of nations, based upon the application of justice and right, binding us in conference and coöperation for the prevention of war and pointing the way to a higher civilization and international fraternity in which all the world might share. In rejecting the league covenant and uttering that rejection to our own people, and to the world, we make no surrender of our hope and aim for an association to promote peace in which we would most heartily join. We wish it to be conceived in peace and dedicated to peace, and will relinquish no effort to bring the nations of the world into such fellowship, not in the surrender of national sovereignty but rejoicing in a nobler exercise of it in the advancement of human activities, amid the compensations of peaceful achievement.

President Harding had, in an earlier portion of his address, called attention to the fact that two years and a half after the armistice we find ourselves technically in a state of war. This state of things should be, in his opinion, ended, and he expressed himself willing to sign a resolution of the Congress “to establish the state of technical peace without further delay.” He recognized, however, that such a declaration would merely end the war with Germany, with Austria and with Hungary, to which the United States was a party, and that it would be necessary to negotiate treaties and conventions in order to determine our future relations with those countries. In doing so, he was mindful to point out that we should not forget, indeed that we could not forget, the countries with which we were associated in the war. What will be the content of these various treaties and conventions we do not as yet know. Undoubtedly, the purpose of the Administration is to end the war and then to define its relationship with associates and enemies. After which, the question of association with friendly nations, for all will then be in a state of peace, will be taken up. Thus he said:

With the supergoverning League definitely rejected and with the world so informed, and with the status of peace proclaimed at home, we may proceed to negotiate the covenanted relationship so essential to the recognition of all the rights everywhere of our own Nation and play our full part in joining the peoples of the world in the pursuits of peace once more. Our obligations in effecting European tranquillity, because of war's involvements, are not less impelling than our part in the war itself. This restoration must be wrought before the human procession can go onward again. We can be helpful because we are moved by no hatreds and harbor no fears. Help. fulness does not mean entanglement, and participation in economic adjustments does not mean sponsorship for treaty commitments which do not concern us, and in which we will have no part.

The address which President Harding delivered to the Congress was before its delivery submitted to the members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. It met with their approval. Greater evidence of his desire to coöperate with his colleagues of the Senate could not have been given, and it augurs well for coöperation in the future. But coöperation does not mean surrender. President Harding has, on more than one occasion, manifested his intention to perform the duties and to exercise the prerogatives of the office of President. He will, of course, as chief executive, conduct the foreign relations of the government in conjunction with Secretary of State Hughes, or, rather, Mr. Hughes will negotiate in conjunction with the President, inasmuch as Mr. Harding has stated that Mr. Hughes is to be Secretary of State in fact as well as in name. President Harding, however, will doubtless, as a prudent man, sound the Senate in advance as to what that branch of the treaty-making power will accept and, through coöperation, avoid the risk of having this country's commitments to its associates in the late war repudiated. This is not conjecture. As he himself says, “I shall invite in the most practical way the advice of the Senate, after acquainting it with all the conditions to be met and obligations to be discharged, along with our own rights to be safeguarded.”.

President Harding wants “normalcy" in our foreign affairs, and he is set on restoring it in our domestic affairs. We can render no effective service to humanity," he says, “until we prove anew our own capacity for coöperation in the coördination of powers contemplated in the Constitution, and no covenants which ignore our associations in the war can be made for the future.”

That President Harding and Secretary Hughes, on the one hand, and the Senate of the United States, on the other, may be successful in their joint efforts, must be the hope of those who would see Europe restored and prosperous and the prestige of the United States rehabilitated.

JAMES BROWN SCOTT.

GERMAN REPARATIONS

Another critical stage has been passed in the long and tedious controversy regarding the German reparations due the allies for “damage done to their civilian populations and property” during the World War. Apparently wearied and almost worn out by the repeated disagreements and failures attending previous efforts to secure a settlement, the Allies, on May 5th of this year, finally presented to Germany the following ultimatum:

The Allied Powers, taking note of the fact that despite the successive concessions made by the Allies since the signature of the Treaty of Versailles, and despite the warnings and sanctions agreed upon at Spa and Paris, as well as of the sanctions announced at London and since applied, the German Government is still in default in

fulfillment of the obligations incumbent upon it under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles as regards:

First, disarmament.

Second, the payment due, May 1, 1921, under Article 235 of the treaty, which the Reparations Commission already has called upon it to make at this date.

Third, the trial of war criminals as further provided for by the Allied notes of February 13 and May 7, 1920, and

Fourth, certain other important respects, notably those which arise under Articles 264 to 267, 269, 273, 321, 322 and 327 of the treaty, decide:

A–To proceed from today with all necessary preliminary measures for the occupation of the Ruhr valley by Allied troops on the Rhine under the conditions laid down.

B-In accordance with Article 235 of the Versailles Treaty, to invite the Allied Reparations Commission to notify the German Government without delay of the time and methods for the discharge by Germany of her debt, and to announce its decision on this point to the German Government by May 6, at the latest.

C—To summon the German Government to declare categorically within six days after receiving the above decision its determination: (1) To execute without reservation or condition its obligations as defined by the Reparations Commission; (2) To accept and realize without reservation or condition in regard to its obligations the guarantees prescribed by the Reparations Commission; (3) To execute without reservation or delay measures concerning military, naval and aërial disarmament of which Germany was notified by the Allied nations in their note of January 29; those measures in the execution of which they have so far failed to comply with are to be completed immediately and the remainder on a date still to be fixed; (4) To proceed without reser. vation or delay to the trial of war criminals, and also with other parts of the Versailles Treaty which have not as yet been fulfilled.

D—To proceed on May 12 with the occupation of the Ruhr valley, and to undertake all other military and naval measures, should the German Government fail to comply with the foregoing conditions. This occupation will last as long as Germany continues her failure to fulfill the conditions laid down.

On the night of the same date (May 5, 1921), the Reparation Commission handed to the German War Burdens Commission the following Protocol :

Germany will perform in the manner laid down in this schedule her obligations to pay the total fixed in accordance with Articles 231, 232 and 233 of the Treaty of Versailles, 132,000,000,000 gold marks, less: (a) the amount already paid on account of reparations; (b) sums which may, from time to time, be credited to Germany in respect of state properties in ceded territory, etc.; (c) any sums received from other enemy or former enemy Powers, in respect to which the commission may decide credits should be given to Germany, plus the amount of the Belgian debt to the Allies, the amounts of these reductions to be determined later by the commission.

The Protocol then provides for the issue of bonds secured by the entire assets of the German Empire and the German States. The first series of bonds for the amount of 12,000,000,000 gold marks, says the Protocol, shall be delivered by July 1, 1921, but the interest of five per cent, plus one per cent for a sinking fund, shall be payable half-yearly from May 1st. The second series for 38,000,000,000 gold marks shall be issued on November 1, 1921. The third series for 82,000,000,000 gold marks shall be

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