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ment was completed for joint operation of the cables pending a final settlement. The discussion rapidly broadened into one as to the power of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, which were victors in the World War, or the League of Nations, to dispose of and allocate the territory and rights captured from the enemy, without the concurrence and consent of one chief participant, namely, the United States.

In the Congress on Communications the delegates of Great Britain and Italy were more favorable to the American claims, but France and Japan were unwilling to yield. The claim of Japan was that the Supreme Council had awarded to her a mandate over all islands, ceded by Germany in the Pacific, north of the equator; that Yap came within this description, which latter must be conceded. The contention of the American delegates was strongly supported by their government and by the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, on February 21st.

The matter having been called to his attention by the claims of Japan, put forward as mentioned at the Congress on Communications, the Secretary of State of the United States (Mr. Colby), submitted through our ambassador in Paris, to the Council of the League a note of protest which was presented on February 22d, a propitious date. In this the most fundamental contention was that the approval of the United States was essential to the validity of any determination respecting mandates by the Council.

The reply of the Council, March 1st, was conciliatory, calling attention to the complications arising from the fact that the United States had abstained from ratifying the Peace Treaty and had not taken her seat in the Council of the League of Nations. While inviting the United States to participate in two other forms of mandates, not yet finally disposed of, they said they had not the same liberty of action as to the "C" Mandate, which covered the German possessions in the Pacific; that this mandate was "defined by the Council at its meeting in Geneva on December 17, 1920." They reminded the Secretary of State that "the allocation of all the mandated territories is a function of the Supreme Council and not of the Council of the League;" that any misunderstanding, therefore, was between the Allied Powers and not between the United States and the League; that the note had been, therefore, forwarded to the Governments of France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan.

On February 28, 1921, Lord Curzon, for Great Britain, transmitted to our Department of State an able and elaborate note discussing the mandate in Mesopotamia at length, but not dealing with the question as to mandates in the Pacific Islands in particular.

To anticipate a little, we must know that on April 14, 1921, the Department of State of the United States issued a confidential statement to the press for publication in the afternoon newspapers of April 18th,

containing the correspondence of the United States and Japan as to mandates with particular reference to the Island of Yap. It began November 9, 1920, by a telegram to our Chargé at Tokyo, saying the question had arisen in the Communications Conference as to the disposition of Yap; that it was the clear understanding of this government that the Supreme Council at the request of President Wilson reserved for future consideration the final disposition of the Island of Yap, in the hope that it might be placed under international control and thus rendered available as an international cable station. The same was communicated to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Japan on November 12, 1920, who on November 19th replied that the definite understanding of the Japanese Government was that the Supreme Council came to a final decision placing the whole of the German islands north of the equator under the mandate of Japan with no reservation as to Yap; that, therefore, Japan would not be able to consent to any modification which would exclude Yap "from the territory committed to its charge."

The Acting Secretary of State of the United States on December 6th forwarded to our Chargé at Tokyo a telegram giving the history of the reservations which may be epitomized thus:

On April 24, 1919, at a meeting of President Wilson and Messrs. Lloyd George and Clemenceau, President Wilson reported that he had that morning reminded Baron Makino and Count Chinda that it had been understood Japan was to have a mandate for the islands in the North Pacific, although he had made a reserve as to Yap, which he considered should be internationalized. At a meeting of the Foreign Ministers on April 13, 1919, Mr. Lansing had said that he would like, on a future occasion, to discuss whether in the interests of cable communications it would not be desirable that Yap be internationalized and administered by an international commission in control of cable lines, and that he raised the question to give warning that the question was in his mind and he would propose it for discussion later, and that Yap be considered as a special case. Baron Makino replied that the status of Yap should be decided before the question of cables, and Mr. Balfour thought the question of cables could not be deferred but must be settled in time for the treaty with Germany, and that Germany could be required to give up all title to the island and its status thereafter discussed among the Allies.

On May 1st, at a meeting in Mr. Pichon's room, President Wilson said that, as the cable lines across the Pacific passed through the Island of Yap, which thus became a general distributing center for the lines of communication for the North Pacific, Yap should not pass into the hands of one Power. On May 6th, in the meeting where mandates in the Pacific were discussed, Mr. Lloyd George expressed his understanding that Japan should receive certain islands north of the equator. According to the record, President Wilson consented in principle to this, with an explana

tory statement that as to mandates the "open door" would have to be applied and that there must be equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the league. To quote the American note: "The Island of Yap, having been previously cited as a special case for particular future consideration, was not intended to be included among the 'certain islands' designated as available to Japan under mandate. This seems obvious, as Yap appears to have been the only island north of the equator in regard to the disposition of which there had existed any difference of opinion. There is no indication in the minutes of any further discussion with regard to this island."

There is an appendix to the minutes of the meeting of May 7th purporting obviously to be a codification of the agreement reached on the 6th as to the North Pacific islands. This is understood to be the basis of the claim of Japan. This does not expressly include all the islands in this category, though the word "certain" is omitted; but the Acting Secretary of State held that the erroneous publication of such a decision, of which this government was not aware, would not validate it and he stated that the President recollects no proposal at this meeting to change the decision of the 6th, and he agreed to no change. He understood it was agreed that Yap had been excluded and reserved for future determination. The American note stated further that on August 19, 1919, the President, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations said that he had made the point that the control of Yap should be reserved for the general conference to be held on ownership and operation of cables. These statements were given wide publicity but no comment was received from any nation holding contrary opinions.

The draft mandate covering the German islands in the North Pacific submitted December 24, 1919, provided, in case of dispute as to whether any particular island is or is not covered by the mandate that it should be submitted to the decision of the Council of the League, which should be final. This draft was objected to wholly on other grounds by Japan and so was rejected, which shows that no definite agreement as to all the islands in the general description was deemed to have been reached. The terms of the mandate had not been accepted by Japan or approved by the principal interested Powers and, therefore, the status must be one of temporary occupation, not signifying a vested interest.

Therefore, the Acting Secretary of State stated that the Government of the United States cannot agree that the Island of Yap was included in the decision of May 7th, or in any other agreement of the Supreme Council; that this island must form an indispensable part of international communications, and it is essential that its free and unhampered use for such purposes should not be limited or controlled by any one Power; that, even if under mandate to Japan, it is not conceivable that other Powers should not have free access to land and operate cables; that the

United States is disposed to grant such rights on any unfortified island essential therefor; and the hope was expressed that Japan would concur in the above views, and that, even if she receives the mandate for Yap, other Powers may have free access for cable purposes.

On February 6th, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Japan delivered to our Chargé at Tokyo a reply to the foregoing contentions, in substance as follows:

1. That no delegates from Japan were present at the meetings of the Supreme Council of April 21st, May 6th and May 7th, and, therefore, the Imperial Government had no means of ascertaining the utterances of the American delegates on those occasions; that, assuming they were as claimed, they were expressions of the opinion of Mr. Wilson or Mr. Lansing, and are unavailing unless accepted by the Council, and that views expressed by delegates prior to a decision are not necessarily reservations as to such decision; that the mandate as to Yap must be judged by the decision of May 7th, and previous utterances must be regarded as only preliminary conversations of no cogency to qualify or limit the decision. This view is enforced by the fact that the Imperial delegates expressed no agreement with these views and that Baron Makino distinctly disagreed with them at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on April 30, 1919.

2. That instead of the specific designation of Yap in the assignment being required, sound interpretation would require that it be specifically excluded, if that were meant, as an exception must always be stated definitely; that, if a decision to exclude Yap, on which Japan had maintained a firm attitude, had been made on May 7th, when Japan was unrepresented, it would have been an act of bad faith which Japan could not conceive of; that Japan has notes from Great Britain and France, agreeing in this interpretation; that the words "certain islands" used by Mr. Lloyd George at the meeting of the Supreme Council on May 6th, do not tend to prove the exclusion of Yap since there are other islands in the South Pacific, north of the equator, which did not belong to Germany; that only that appearing on the face of the decisions should be accepted as authoritative in so grave a matter, and no unusual interpretation on vague grounds as to the interest of one party, not expressed in the text, should be accepted. 3. That the decision of May 7, 1919, was made public the following day, and if wrong, an immediate protest would be expected from the United States, but that none followed until over a year and a half later; that this rule does not apply to President Wilson's statements to a Senate committee, as the former is an international agreement, while the latter was a purely domestic affair.

4. That the language as to proceedings in case of dispute in the draft of the mandate submitted December 24, 1919, was solely to provide a means of settlement in case of dispute as to boundaries or the assignment of lands.

Like words were included in other draft mandates. The American contention would honeycomb all with exceptions or exclusions.

5. That whether or not Yap, though under mandate to Japan, should be freely opened to other Powers for the entry and operation of cables, is a matter exclusively for the decision of Japan. Moreover, Colonel House at the Commission on Mandates on July 8, 1919, opposed Viscount Chinda's claim that equal opportunities for trade and commerce should be guaranteed in territories belonging to Class C as in those of Class B. That, therefore, America cannot justly contend for the open door in the Class C territories, at least against Japan. Japan cannot consider herself bound in any way to recognize the rights of other governments in the matter of cables as indicated.

The new administration in the United States had come into office on March 4, 1921, and Mr. Hughes succeeded Mr. Colby as Secretary of State. On April 5th, Mr. Hughes telegraphed our Chargé at Tokyo a very cogent and vigorous reply to the Japanese note of February 26th, which reply was communicated to the Japanese Foreign Office on the same day.

Mr. Hughes states that the Government of the United States is unable to agree with the contention of the Japanese Government that to sustain its contention the United States must not only prove statements as claimed but also that the Supreme Council decided in favor of those views; that, on the other hand, the United States cannot be bound except by its own consent and that it has never assented to the mandate embracing Yap; that the United States Government deems the fundamental basis of its representation and the principles in its view determinative to be:

That the right to dispose of the overseas possessions of Germany was acquired only through the victory of the Allied and Associated Powers and that Japan does not deny the participation of the United States in that victory. It necessarily follows that the right accruing through the common victory is shared by the United States and there could be no valid or effective disposition of the overseas possessions of Germany without the assent of the United States, and as she had never vested either the Supreme Council or the League of Nations with any authority to bind her or to act on her behalf, there had been no opportunity for any decision which could affect her rights.

That the rights of the United States could be ceded or surrendered only by treaty, and no such treaty has been made; that failure to ratify the Treaty of Versailles does not detract from the rights of the United States which accrued prior thereto, and, moreover, that treaty expressly provides that Germany renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and title over her oversea possessions, which confirms the position of the United States; that the draft convention for the mandate "proceeded in the same view" and purported to confer the mandate on Japan on behalf of the United States as one of the

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