whether by canal or railway, across the isthmus which connects North and South America, and especially to the interoceanic communications, should the same prove to be practicable, whether by canal or railway, which are now proposed to be established by the way of Tehuantepec or Panama.

Later, the United States desired not merely to be a partner in such a venture but to be the sole party. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty stood in the way. After much negotiation Great Britain agreed to abrogate that treaty, leaving the United States free to take the initiative without the cooperation of Great Britain. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was therefore expressly abrogated by the treaty of November 18, 1901, commonly called the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, owing to the fact that Secretary Hay negotiated it on behalf of the United States and Lord Pauncefote, Ambassador to the United States, negotiated it on behalf of Great Britain.

The way was now clear for the United States to build a canal. It finally decided against a canal through Nicaragua in favor of a canal through the Isthmus of Panama, if satisfactory arrangements could be made with Colombia. Colombia proposed such a treaty, and also the financial consideration for the use of its territory. Therefore, the so-called Hay-Herrán Treaty was concluded on behalf of the United States by Secretary of State Hay and by Tomás Herrán, on behalf of Colombia, on January 22, 1903. It authorized the United States to cut a canal across the Isthmus of Panama, then a part of Colombia, and it granted the United States for the period of one hundred years, subject to renewal by the United States as long as it might desire to do so, a zone from ocean to ocean through which the canal should run.

In consideration of this authorization and grant and other rights set forth in the treaty, the United States agreed to pay the sum of $10,000,000 in gold coin "after its approval according to the laws of the respective countries," and also an annual payment during the life of this convention of $250,000 in like coin beginning nine years after the date aforesaid.

The ratification of the treaty was advised and consented to by the Senate of the United States on March 17, 1903. It was submitted to the Congress of Colombia, but that body adjourned on October 31, 1903, without ratifying the treaty. The State of Panama resented the failure to approve the treaty to such an extent that a revolution broke out on November 2d. Forty-two marines from the U. S. S. Nashville were landed at Panama the next day, and again on the succeeding day, in order to protect American men, women and children. The United States apparently took no action other than to prevent the transportation of Colombian or Panaman troops across the Isthmus in order to keep that line of communication open in accordance with what it conceived to be its rights under the treaty of 1846 with Colombia.

In 1902 there had been a revolution in Panama and the United States acted in September of that year as it did in November of the ensuing year.

Thus, Commander McLean, commanding the U. S. S. Cincinnati, informed the commander of the Colombian forces and the commander of the insurgent forces

that the United States naval forces are guarding the railway trains and the line of transit across the Isthmus of Panama from sea to sea, and that no persons whatever will be allowed to obstruct, embarrass, or interfere in any manner with the trains or the route of transit. No armed men except forces of the United States will be allowed to come on or to use the line. All of this is without prejudice or any desire to interfere in domestic contentions of the Colombians.

The revolution of 1902 failed. The revolution of 1903 was successful. Panama's representative, Mr. Philippe Bunau-Varilla, appeared at Washington, asking recognition of Panama. This was accorded on November 13, and on November 18, 1903, he signed a treaty on behalf of the Republic of Panama, Secretary of State Hay signing on behalf of the United States. By this treaty, ratified by both parties, the United States obtained a right to build the canal through the territory recognized by Panama and the United States as belonging to the former as a sovereign state. On the same day France recognized the Republic of Panama, and within the course of the month it was recognized by China, Austria-Hungary and Germany.

Colombia complained of the action of the United States, and proposed to submit to arbitration at The Hague "the grievances" growing out of the political events in Panama in November, 1903. This proposal Secretary Hay refused in a note to the Colombian minister, dated January 5, 1904, on the ground that these "grievances" were of a "political nature such as nations of even the most advanced ideas as to international arbitration have not proposed to deal with by that process," and that "questions of foreign policy and of the recognition or non-recognition of foreign states are of a purely political nature and do not fall within the domain of judicial decision."

On a later occasion, Secretary of State Root replied on behalf of the United States, to the same contentions in a note to the Colombian Minister, dated February 10, 1906, in which he said:

The real gravamen of your complaint is this espousal of the cause of Panama by the people of the United States. No arbitration could deal with the real rights and wrongs of the parties concerned unless it were to pass upon the question whether the cause thus espoused was just-whether the people of Panama were exercising their just rights in declaring and maintaining their independence of Colombian rule. We assert and maintain the affirmative upon that question. We assert that the ancient State of Panama, independent in its origin and by nature and history a separate political community, was confederated with the other States of Colombia upon terms which preserved and continued its separate sovereignty; that it never surrendered that sovereignty; that in the year 1885 the compact which bound it to the other States of Colombia was broken and terminated by Colombia, and the Isthmus was subjugated by force; that it was held under foreign domination to which it had never consented; and that it was justly entitled to assert its sovereignty and demand its independence

from a rule which was unlawful, oppressive, and tyrannical. We cannot ask the people of Panama to consent that this right of theirs, which is vital to their political existence, shall be submitted to the decision of any arbitrator. Nor are we willing to permit any arbitrator to determine the political policy of the United States in following its sense of right and justice by espousing the cause of this weak people against the stronger Government of Colombia, which had so long held them in unlawful subjection.

There is one other subject contained in your note which I cannot permit to pass without notice. You repeat the charge that the Government of the United States took a collusive part in fomenting or inciting the uprising upon the Isthmus of Panama which ultimately resulted in the revolution. I regret that you should see fit to thus renew an aspersion upon the honor and good faith of the United States in the face of the positive and final denial of the fact contained in Mr. Hay's letter of January 5, 1904. You must be well aware that the universally recognized limitations upon the subjects proper for arbitration forbid that the United States should submit such a question to arbitration. In view of your own recognition of this established limitation, I have been unable to discover any justification for the renewal of this unfounded assertion.

Both countries were anxious to find a way out, and, pursuant to a suggestion made to Secretary Root when he visited Colombia on his return from South America in 1906, Mr. Enrique Cortes, then Colombian Minister to Great Britain, was transferred to Washington in order to work out a settlement of the differences with Secretary Root. Their negotiations resulted in the so-called tripartite agreement, consisting of three treatiesthe first between Panama and the United States, the second between Colombia and the United States, and a third between Colombia and Panama, dated January 9, 1909, to be ratified as one and the same instrument and only to go into effect when each of the three had been ratified by each of the three contracting parties.

According to the treaty with Colombia, Panama was to transfer to Colombia for a period of ten years the annuity of $250,000 to be paid by the United States to Panama. Colombia was to be allowed free transit over the canal and railroad for mails, troops, etc., and was to retain ownership of the fifty thousand shares of capital stock held by Colombia in the Panama Canal Company. In consideration of the ten annual payments, amounting in all to $2,500,000, and the concessions made to Colombia in the use of the canal and the railroad across the Isthmus, friendly relations were to be restored between the two countries; Colombia was to acknowledge the independence of Panama, and agree to a settlement of the boundaries between the two countries. The differences between Panama and the United States were either settled by the treaty or were to be by recourse to arbitration in certain contingencies.

The special concessions to Colombia contained in the treaty between that country and the United States were, through Secretary Root's practical foresight and diplomatic skill, agreed to in advance by Great Britain, which might perhaps have objected to some of them as inconsistent with the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901.

These treaties were approved by the Senate of the United States and by the Republic of Panama. Unfortunately, the treaty between the United States and Colombia was rejected by the Congress of Colombia, to which it was submitted and the government overturned which had concluded and which advocated the treaty and the settlements of which it formed a part. In President Taft's administration, Mr. James T. DuBois was sent as minister of the United States to Colombia. Very sympathetically and very deftly he established friendly relations with the members of the government to which he was accredited, and in a letter written on his return to Washington to Secretary of State Knox, dated September 30, 1912, he thus diagnosed the situation:

In investigating the causes of the rejection of the Root-Cortes treaty, I asked many prominent persons in various walks of Colombian life what were the serious objections to this treaty, and the replies were to this effect:

"Five years after President Roosevelt had taken Panama from us with rank injustice, your Government, still under his chief magistracy, offered us a paltry $2,500,000 if Colombia would recognize the independence of her revolted province, fix our frontier at a further loss of territory, open all our ports free to the refuge of vessels employed in the canal enterprise, and exempt them from anchorage or tonnage dues, renounce our rights to all of our contracts and concessions relating to the construction and operation of the canal or railroad across the Isthmus, release Panama from obligation for the payment of any part of our external debt, much of which was incurred in the interest of Panama, and enter into negotiations for the revision of the treaty of 1846, which five years before had been openly violated by the United States in their failure to help maintain the sovereignty over the rebellious province which they had solemnly guaranteed. The reply was to this, banishment of our minister who negotiated the treaty, and all South America applauded our attitude."

These are the sentiments that are universal in Colombia to-day, and they are increasing from year to year. Conversing discreetly with many persons in the Republic, I found no one free from the spell of the spirit of reproach and condemnation. I did find, however, a genuine desire among the people of all classes that the United States and Colombia should, at the earliest possible moment, reach a just and honorable settlement of this unfortunate dispute.

A great change has come to the Colombian mind within the past year. When I reached Bogota in the autumn of 1911, I found a universal demand for arbitration. When I left Bogota last July there was an open desire for direct negotiations, and it was the general belief that these should take place at the Colombian capital.

Secretary Knox conferred with President Taft, who agreed to the resumption of negotiations along the lines suggested by Mr. DuBois, as appears from the following letter, dated November 30, 1912:

My dear Mr. Secretary:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, November 30, 1912.

I have your letter of November 29, with reference to the settlement of the questions between this Government and Colombia. I have read the communication of Minister Dubois and your proposed instructions to him and the suggested treaty. The proposition consists in the United States submitting to arbitration the question whether, taking into consideration the stipulations of the treaty between the United States and

Panama, and the status quo of Panama, as thereby recognized, the Government of Colombia or the Government of the United States is the owner of the reversionary rights of the Panama Railway. If the arbitral tribunal shall find that this reversionary right is still owned by the Government of Colombia, then it shall be empowered to assess and award, and it shall assess and award, the amount of indemnity which shall be paid by the Government of the United States to the Government of Colombia for such right, and such sum so awarded shall be paid by the United States within one year from the date of such award.

Second. The purchase by the United States of the right to build a canal on the Atrato route for $10,000,000, the said sum of $10,000,000 to be paid to include also the lease in perpetuity to the Government of the United States of the island of Old Providence and the island of St. Andrews.

Third. The Government of the United States undertakes to act on behalf of the Government of Colombia to bring about an adjustment, by reference to an impartial tribunal of arbitration, or otherwise, of the pending question of the northwestern boundary of Colombia.

And, finally, the ratification (by Colombia) of the Root-Cortes treaty.

If I understand these four parts, it would involve the United States substantially in the payment of $10,000,000, in addition to its liability under the Root-Cortes treaty. While I think the sum stipulated to be paid is a large one, I believe the advantage of settling the questions is so great that I would not hesitate to recommend such a treaty to the Senate for its ratification.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM H. TAFT.

HON. P. C. KNOX,

Secretary of State.

The negotiations started by Mr. DuBois did not bear fruit during the tenure of his office. Time, however, was in favor of a settlement, and, on April 6, 1914, Mr. Thomson was able to conclude on behalf of the United States a treaty with the Colombian plenipotentiaries calculated in the opinion of the contracting parties "to remove all the misunderstandings growing out of the political events in Panama in November, 1903."

The ratification of this treaty was advised and consented to by the Senate on April 20, 1921. It is in the Department of State ready to be exchanged when Colombia shall likewise have approved the treaty and is willing to proceed to an exchange of ratifications.

That this may take place, at no distant date, must surely be the hope of those who wish to see the friendliest of relations exist between the United States of Colombia and the United States of America, and even of those who hesitate to approve the settlement, but who desire the friendliest of relations among the American republics. Rightly or wrongly, the misunderstandings growing out of political events in Panama in November, 1903, are not confined to Colombia. They have to a greater or less degree affected the relations of the republics of the western world. Whatever differences of opinion there may have been as to the propriety of the settlement, it is believed that there will be none as to its immediate and ultimate effect. JAMES BROWN SCOTT.