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through the treaty a condition corresponding to the idea of equilibrium. But, moreover, it is clear that this condition could not subsist without the support of the same principle. In causing the absolute collapse of every conception of unity, the Peace of Westphalia created a Europe composed of independent sovereignties, and although their ambitions were not nurtured by Machiavellian theories, moral ideas were not capable of guiding them. It follows from this that the only guarantee against the abuse of force by a state whose political designs threatened others was to be found in a combination of Powers. In this sense the Peace of Westphalia furnished the basis of a policy inspired by the principle of equilibrium.

However, it soon appeared that the conception, as it was realized in the Peace of Westphalia, could not guarantee a pacific development. As yet equilibrium is only a formula without any moral basis. The brutal operations attendant upon the organization of the German sovereignties disclose its true character. The ambitions of Louis XIV brought about the formation of the coalitions aiming at the maintenance of the equilibrium which was threatened by him, but when subsequently the menace appeared in another quarter, namely in the prospect of the reëstablishment of the empire of Charles V, we witness England withdrawing from the coalition in the name of the same principle. In a word, it was due to the policy of England that neither Austria nor France could acquire a predominance which would have resulted from a union with Spain, and that the Treaty of Utrecht could thus reëstablish the equilibrium.

In this new state of affairs it was no longer a question of maintaining a balance between two continental Powers-Austria and France. It was necessary to take the claims of Russia into account, and the problem which the principle of equilibrium is called upon to solve is considerably complicated. None of the Powers was in a position of being able to dominate the others, but none was ready to abandon its ambitious designs. In order to satisfy these wishes and at the same time the desire for a balance of power between the Powers, the logical conclusion must be found in the partition of the weak states. It is thus from this point of view that the principle of equilibrium is interpreted in the partitions of Poland, an interpretation completed and perfected by the idea of a partition in consonance with the existing state of strength of the Powers. However, the idea of partition caused the maintenance of the equilibrium to be forgotten, so that Napoleon, taking advantage of the territorial cupidity of the coalitionists, could succeed in destroying it. It required the crushing of Prussia and Austria and the threat against Russia to make it clear that the European equilibrium was shaken. Thus the earlier conception of the principle was revived.

The discussions of the Congress of Vienna show in a very plain manner the complicated questions which the analysis of the principle raises. The allies sought to reestablish the equilibrium but at the same time to reduce France to its former limits. But how were these two matters to be recon

ciled, granted that the material increase of the allied forces would have to allow France a relative increase? Thus the discussion introduces into the conception of equilibrium elements likely to complicate it. It was imperative to take into account the qualities of the state which do not necessarily correspond to powers of aggression. This thesis, upheld by France, was not admitted in its consequences. The principle continues to serve the egotistical ambitions of every state which makes its claims under this vague formula. Only France, being in a certain sense disinterested, tried to introduce the moral element. It is easy to understand the importance of this new conception, introduced by Talleyrand. If the principle of equilibrium could not guarantee peace, if it served in an odious manner to the detriment of the weak states, the reason was because the moral idea had not been introduced into it. In order to construct a just equilibrium, no purely arithmetical methods must be applied, as the principle is not a mechanism which can make an abstract question of the various qualities of each population and its moral force. These ideas, which brought considerable complication into the work of the Congress of Vienna, convinced M. de Metternich, at least with regard to the necessity of taking account of the nature of the populations in the territories in dispute. The expression of this conviction will be seen in the appointment of a statistical commission for estimating the territories from the point of view of their population.

Certainly it can not be denied that these efforts helped to render the Treaty of Vienna more durable. But the moral considerations invoked by Talleyrand could not readily penetrate the minds of the diplomats. The latter, occupied in the first place by material questions relating to the strength of their respective states, were not attached to the wishes of the populations. It became a new task for European politics to determine and regulate the influence which this element could have upon equilibrium. Thus it was with regard to the question of Greece and with regard to the problem of Belgium. In the former it appeared that the equilibrium could be adapted to the national claims and in the latter it could be reëstablished by virtue of the neutralization of the Belgian State.

The policy of Napoleon III was characterized by the same efforts, perhaps to the detriment of France. During the Crimean War the principle of equilibrium was invoked against Russian aggression. The balance was restored without conquest or partition and in harmony with certain national claims. In his Italian policy, Napoleon III attempted to carry out the French point of view of equilibrium against the Italian power, created with his aid by national forces. The reunion of Savoy and of the county of Nice with France shows the principles which directed his policy. Since their application against Prussia could not have so happy an issue, Napoleon sought to conceal the failure of his policy under a new form of equilibrium. "The Emperor does not believe that the greatness of a country depends upon the weakening of the peoples which surround it and he sees a true

equilibrium only in the fulfilled wishes of the nations of Europe.1 However, it was evident that the balance was inclining to the side of Prussia, a fact which in 1870 presented itself in a manner threatening for France. The Hohenzollern candidature placed France in a position which her policy had constantly sought to avoid in the name of equilibrium. The principle invoked in the declaration of war furnishes the best example of the flexibility of the conception: Europe did not consider the equilibrium to be in danger.

After the defeat of 1870, France tried to reëstablish the balance of power by allying herself with Russia. It was made clear in 1914 that this combination could not suffice to insure peace. It required the entrance into the war of the Powers outside of Europe in order to create a balance against Germany. Thus the war has given to the principle a world aspect, the first stage of which was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902. Without doubt, extra-European questions have for a long time had a great influence upon the problem of equilibrium in Europe. But they have simply been the elements of the problem. Now the question arises as to whether the principle will be able to satisfy the requirements of a world policy, in view of the necessity of taking into account the extra-European Powers as independent elements. These considerations blend with another point of view, namely, that it is necessary to seek a means which will secure the general peace in a more happy manner.

II.

The tremendous complexity which the conception of equilibrium presents follows from its historical development. We must determine its character by studying the principal characteristics which have resulted from the examination made of it. Is the principle itself a rule of law? Has it any importance at all for international law?

We have shown how the principle of equilibrium has been invoked in very different situations. The constructions made in its name present an infinite variety. It has permitted conquests or partitions, depending upon the circumstances. At times it has shown itself favorable to national claims. It can not furnish identical solutions in identical cases. This lack of stability must deprive it of any pretensions that it may have of being a juridical rule.

However, from another point of view it possesses a certain importance. Its vague contents make negotiations possible. No one can refuse to avail himself of it as a basis, for over against the claims of his adversary in the name of equilibrium, he will always be able to set up a contrary opinion founded upon the same basis. And the one who will be forced to make a concession will be able to style his defeat as an action done in conformity with the same principle.

1 Livre jaune. Documents diplomatiques, 1867, VIII, p. 101.

Although it is not a rule of law, one can not deny that it has considerable importance for international law. The principle of equilibrium could form the sanction of international law. It could constitute the force by virtue of which the right of each party might be realized. Just as in internal law the liberties of individuals are protected by the fear of punishment entertained by him who might wish to violate them, the same motive could restrain one state from attacking another. A firm belief that the equilibrium will be endangered would suffice to marshal against the aggressor the united forces of the others, and the conviction that such an event would produce, would hold in check the evil passions and would prevent

war.

Why has the principle of equilibrium not succeeded in fulfilling these functions? We have suggested that it lacks clearness, that it can be given various interpretations and that it can serve opposed interests. But, on the other hand, it can not be denied that there are cases in which the states have almost instinctively united against another state which seemed to them to threaten the balance of power. It is sufficient, in this connection, to note the coalitions against Louis XIV, Napoleon I, and recently against Germany. It must also be stated that although the interpretation of the principle may very often present difficulties and serve egotistical interests, the facts may be so evident that the judgment will not be contestable.

But who will be competent to judge whether the balance of power is threatened or not? Over and above the difficulty which the interpretation of the principle itself offers, there is here a question of the highest importance to be solved. Without an organ to apply the force which the opinion of the Powers represents, each one of them will be able to invoke arbitrarily the authority of the principle, which under such conditions can not be conducive to the general interest. But given the existence of a competent organ and the conviction on the part of the organ that the balance of power is being threatened by some state, will it be possible to make this state responsible? Will it be possible to check the growth due to the fortunate development of the economic and moral forces of a country? The industrial life of a state will, for instance, require colonies. What means shall be employed to satisfy the necessary needs of a country? It is evident that the change of physical and moral conditions will never permit a balance status quo. This is still another reason why the principle of equilibrium could not succeed in guaranteeing international law.

We have shown that every invocation of the principle of equilibrium necessarily presupposes the existence of a general interest. This interest has not been everywhere understood or perhaps it has not always existedthis interest of peace. It was natural that the ambitions of the states sought their satisfaction in war at a time when the victor derived material benefits from his victory. Now, when the economic effects of war are heavily felt by all the states, their common interest is clearly outlined.

And the community of interest from this point of view will be accentuated to such an extent that all means will be employed to hinder a state from aggrandizement in a manner which constitutes a menace to the others. The same holds true in a case where the aggrandizement is due to a development of the interior forces of the state. In adopting this point of view, it does not follow necessarily that the solidarity of the states would demand the mutilation of another state whose growing greatness depends upon its moral or material activity. Diplomacy can furnish other means designed to give free play to the interior forces of the state; by treaties of commerce the need of raw materials can be satisfied, and by virtue of the system of spheres of interest, the population can find new fields for its activity. But in order to realize this idea of solidarity which should unite the states against evil passions conducive to war, the moral element must manifestly be emphasized. It will be necessary for the state to have the desire to reconcile its own interests with the respect for the rights of the others. The thought of Talleyrand has not lost its applicability.

It must be stated that if the principle of equilibrium has not succeeded in guaranteeing the rights of all, the reason for this is the fact that there is no instrumentality capable of giving a just interpretation to the requirements of the principle, that the common interest of the states in maintaining it is not clearly defined, and that the considerations of a moral order have not been introduced into it. It is clear that in the efforts to constitute the League of Nations we must see the expression of a desire to create a new condition of affairs in this connection. The conception of moral obligations among states, their common interest accentuated by a formal organization, and the institution of an executive agency indicate a development in this direction. But what should be specially noted is the fact that these efforts are made, not because they are considered as sufficient or useful in themselves, but in order to bear out the principle of equilibrium. For the system which incorporates the collective threat or the use of military or economic force against a state that seeks to disturb the peace can only rest upon the principle of equilibrium, better understood and better realized.

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