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and corrected to accord with the action of the Peace Conference of 1919. Professor Oppenheim “had himself written the important sections explaining and discussing the League of Nations,” but the editor has added the "section dealing with the Treaties of Peace and the position of Unions after the World War."

The work of the editor has been faithfully, modestly and intelligently accomplished. The volume is devoted to “Peace," and the forthcoming volume to “War.” The latter, therefore, must deal with the precedents of the World War which, in the main, do not fit with the topics of Peace.

Professor Oppenheim was born and educated in Germany, but removed to Switzerland in 1891, and to England in 1895. In the latter country he married an English lady, daughter of Lieutenant-Colonel Cowan, and there he achieved his great career as lecturer on international law at the London School of Economics, and from 1908 until his death as Whewell Professor of International Law at Cambridge, in which he worthily succeeded his friend Westlake. He took and held the place of one of England's ripest and most learned publicists, standing loyally by his adopted country during the great war.

His profound acquaintance with the Continental, as well as the English and American authorities, prepared him for a unique service in the discussion of the problems of the years that have passed since his edition of 1912. It is a great loss that his lips are silent and his pen laid down.

On the subject which was thought so vital, the League of Nations, he had expressed himself somewhat fully in a little volume, The League of Nations and its Problems, published in 1919, and which he kindly sent to this writer. He there traces the generation of the plans for a world league, and expresses very cautious and hesitant belief in its successful operation.

The present volume devotes to this subject some thirty-seven pages. 1st, to a “Statement of the Birth and General Character of the League;' 2nd, “The Constitution of the League;" 3d, “The Functions of the League;" 4th, “Defects and Merits of the Constitution of the League." These defects, as stated by Professor Oppenheim, may be summed up as follows:

First, that the league was created by the Allied and Associated Powers, not by the free deliberation of all civilized states, and its acceptance by the Central Powers was made obligatory by the Treaties of Peace, and its council consists of representatives of the “Principal Allied and Associated Powers" and of four other Powers; yet, he states, that thirteen neutral states have joined the league (that number is now much greater) and the terms of the Covenant provide opportunity for remedying its defects by amendment; that it has been enabled to undertake numbers of functions required by the treaties and the resettlement of international affairs.

Second, Professor Oppenheim says objection to the predominance of the Great Powers in the Council of the League is unjustified; that those Powers are the leaders in “The Family of Nations” and when action is required, they must provide such action, and that it is, therefore, right that they should be always represented and predominant in the Council ; that the rule requiring unanimity prevents abuse of such predominance.

Third, that the objection that it fails to create a Super State is met by the fact that no single civilized state would have acceded to it if it had created such a Super State, and that any scheme for such creation is, in Professor Oppenheim's opinion, Utopian.

Fourth, that the objection that it is a league of governments and not of peoples is met by the fact that autocracy has almost disappeared and substantially all government is representative; that moreover each nation may select its representative in its own way.

Fifth, and lastly, that the objection that the League is not strong enough to secure peace (which, at the date of the present review, seems established quite beyond controversy) is based on a wrong presumption that the League was intended to be something like a Super State, whereas, it is nothing but the organized Family of Nations."

Dr. Oppenheim admits as real defects: 1st, that members may withdraw or be expelled from the League, and thus it may cease to represent the Family of Nations; 2nd, that there is no provision for a separate Council of Conciliation; 3d, that it does not make the settlement of judicial disputes, by an International Court of Justice, compulsory; 4th, the right of the Assembly of the League to advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and consideration of international conditions which may threaten the world's peace, he considers a misfortune and contends that as unanimity is required for this action, the large body of the Assembly is unfit for this function; 5th, the absence of a covenant requiring the Council to intervene if a belligerent violates fundamental rules of war, he counts a further fault.

However, Professor Oppenheim thinks that the League has inaugurated a new epoch in the development of mankind by organizing the Family of Nations.He thinks that "the absence of rigidity in the Constitution permits adaptation to future circumstances."

This reviewer cannot but reflect that it affords every convenience for injurious, as well as for salutory, modification.

It is almost two and a quarter years since our esteemed author wrote this discussion of the League. It seems somewhat trite, stale and perfunctory, at the present time. The phrase "Family of Nations,” which proved so attractive to Professor Oppenheim, indicates a relation of common affection which is about as obvious between the nations as between the carnivorous and the herbivorous animals. The months that have passed, since the passages were written by Professor Oppenheim, seem to have developed a considerable faculty in the League for debate and expenditure, the latter especially, upon its own officers and agents. It is difficult to point to many “ripe fruits' it has produced, or even to any sure and reasonable hope of its growth in usefulness as the result of these fifty-two months. Professor Oppenheim's work, however, in its new edition, will be everywhere welcome, His first edition took almost at once the place of an accepted classic in the great branch of law with which it dealt.

It seems to this reviewer, however, that we must gratefully value it more as the work of a remarkable scholar, of untiring research and vast and varied learning, lucidly presented, than as the creation of a constructive thinker in advanced lines as to the reconstruction of international relations.

Oppenheim's volumes, in a measure, replaced the older work of Hall, always so compendious and satisfactory, except where American views or interests were discussed. There a hostile bias always appeared from which Oppenheim is wholly free. In one respect the present edition falls far short of its predecessors. The paper on which it is printed is vastly inferior, which must be laid to the changes in the paper market, and not to the niggardliness of the publisher.


Histoire Diplomatique du Traité de 1839 (19 Avril, 1839). By Alfred

de Ridder. Bruxelles et Paris : Vromant & Co. 1920. pp. 399.

At a time when the whole world is absorbed in discussing what happened during the negotiations of the Peace Treaty, it is à propos to consider the diplomatic history of that famous treaty which proved to be something more than a scrap of paper, Von Bethmann Hollweg to the contrary notwithstanding. M. de Ridder has given us a very readable and careful study of the incidents and negotiations preceding the signature of the treaty of April 19, 1839, and at the same time portrays the character of Count Barthélémy de Theux de Meyland who, as M. de Ridder remarks, clearly reveals himself in all these incidents in which, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, he took so prominent a part. A preceding volume, entitled La Belgique et la Prusse en Conflit, covered the early years of the ministerial career of M. de Theux, when Belgium by the aid of France and England was established as an independent state. But in the two or three years preceding the signature of the treaty of 1839 de Theux was himself responsible for the direction of the negotiations which definitely settled the terms of separation from Holland. After we have read the recital of how he carried out this office, we must agree with M. de Ridder that it would have been impossible to have obtained from the Powers terms more favorable to Belgium (p. 9).

The work is particularly valuable because M. de Ridder as a high official of the Belgian Foreign Office has had access to the documents deposited there. He was also fortunate enough to be supplied with others, especially the archives of the Count de Theux for the period in question. The policies and characteristics of Leopold I, Palmerston, Metternich, and others are disclosed in the account of the conferences and in the interchange of notes. The Skrynecki affair is a particularly instructive episode of diplomacy. King Leopold of Belgium was sufficiently ill-advised and inconsiderate as to appoint General Skrynecki to a high command in the Belgian army, without consulting his Minister for Foreign Affairs (p. 312 f.). Skrynecki was a Polish refugee established at Prague, and Metternich at once took umbrage and peremptorily demanded his dismissal. With dignity and firmness de Theux refused to humiliate his country, yet was careful to do nothing to irritate Metternich or the Prussian Government, which supported the Austrian statesman at every move. Who after read. ing this account will assert that Metternich showed himself the equal of de Theux in the art of diplomacy? Preëminent for integrity of character and practical judgment, Count de Theux stands forth nobly portrayed in this his fitting monument.


The Truth about the Treaty. By André Tardieu. Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill Co. 1921. pp. 473. $4.00.

“France has taken the Treaty of Peace seriously, just as she took the war. If others have done otherwise, is France to blame?" (Page 431).

"If France is not to doubt England, she must feel that England does not attach less importance to the enforcement of the peace than she herself.” (Page 452.)

Casual phrases often reveal an author's real preoccupations more clearly than formal and deliberate argument. M. Tardieu is apprehensive as to the durability of the fabric woven by the Parco of Versailles. He seems to feel that in the United States the emphasis on nonparticipation in European affairs may, after all, have been something more than a reaction from the strain of the war; while Great Britain, he fears, is slipping back to her tradition of favoring the second rate, and distrusting the first rate European Powers. The “Anglo-Saxons," therefore, have to be spoken to frankly and resolutely. M. Tardieu has, consequently set himself the task of counteracting these tendencies in the United States and Great Britain. He has prepared a detailed analysis of the treaty, not so much from the juridical point of view, as from that of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of its chief provisions. After stating the origin of each principle upon which the treaty was drawn, he traces its fate throughout the Conference. His narrative is interesting and at times absorbing. There are many picturesque personal details. A number of documents are published, and the existence of even more valuable ones revealed. Much statistical matter is presented, not often, however, with adequate bibliographical apparatus, while in some instances statements, and even whole tables, fail to indicate clearly which of the various statistical values is intended to be understood,-cost, intrinsic or replacement.

M. Tardieu vigorously repels the enemies of the treaty in France. He is, however, more concerned with the state of opinion in the English-speaking countries. He appeals for their political, financial and moral unity with France in enforcing the treaty. Each of them,-France, the British Empire and the United States,—was an indispensable factor in winning the war, he contends; each is equally indispensable in enforcing the peace. Each sacrificed life and property and happiness to an incredible extent to preserve law and order, the sanctity of treaties, and the rights of small nations. Neither the British Channel nor the Atlantic Ocean, but the Rhine is the “frontier of freedom.” Neither England nor the United States can be secure unless France is secure; and France cannot be secure unless Germany is compelled to repair the damage she has done-as far as it can be repaired. Enforcement of the treaty, then, is the paramount task of the three democratic Powers for their own safety. But it is also their solemn duty, because of the moral obligations of each to the others arising from the trusteeship for the law and peace of the world, which they were forced to assume.

Why, then, in the face of both duty and interest, do the United States and England fail to give evidence of the political, economic and moral unity which is M. Tardieu's ideal? Is it because they interpret their duty and interest differently? Is it because both, perhaps one particularly, of them regard their interests as not preëminently European, but Asiatic, American, African-anything else first, and then European? Can it be that the persistence of the policy analyzed more than a generation ago by Sir John Seeley with such refreshing frankness is based on a settled conviction on the part of the British Government as to what is really the British interest on the continent of Europe?

M. Tardieu shows himself a most discerning and astute student of politics. He applies with equal dexterity the methods and approaches of the journalist, the lawyer, the financier, the diplomatist. He must, therefore, have long since perceived that nations are actuated by convictions as to their interests, no matter in what formule those convictions are expressed, if expressed at all, and no matter how mistaken their comprehension of the real nature of their interests.

Whatever may be the extent to which M. Tardieu perceives this fundamental principle at work in determining the policy of England toward the enforcement of the treaty, he will certainly realize its force in the case of the United States, especially if his own book is given any widespread circulation. The chief effect of his volume will be precisely to reinforce the attitude of non-participation in European affairs, which he correctly believes to have been greatly strengthened. It will not be because his argument

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