Compul. sive tinction to settling international differences make it a necessity to draw a sharp line between these means and war. It is, firstly, characteristic of compulsive means that, although they frequently consist of harmful measures, they are neither by the conflicting nor by other States considered as acts of war, and consequently all relations of peace, such as diplomatic and commercial intercourse, the execution of treaties, and the like, remain undisturbed. Compulsive means are in theory and practice considered peaceable, although not amicable, means of settling international differences. It is, further, characteristic of compulsive means that they are even at their worst confined to the application of certain harmful measures only, whereas belligerents in war may apply any amount and any kinds of force, with the exception only of those methods forbidden by International Law. And, thirdly, it is characteristic of compulsive means that their application must cease as soon as their purpose is realised by the compelled State declaring its readiness to settle the difference in the way requested by the compelling State; whereas, war once broken out, a belligerent is not obliged to lay down arms if and when the other belligerent is ready to comply with the request made before the war. As war is the ultima ratio between States, the victorious belligerent is not legally prevented from imposing upon the defeated any conditions he likes. § 28. The above-described characteristics of comMeans in pulsive means for the settlement of international contradis differences make it necessary to mention the distinction between such means and an ultimatum. The latter is the technical term for a written communication by one State to another which ends amicable negotiations an Ultimatum and Demonstrations. respecting a difference, and formulates, for the last time and categorically, the demands to be fulfilled if other measures are to be averted. An ultimatum is, theoretically at least, not a compulsion, although it may practically exercise the function of a compulsion, and although compulsive means, or even war, may be threatened through the same communication in the event of a refusal to comply with the demand made.1 And the same is valid with regard to withdrawal of diplomatic agents, and to military and naval demonstrations, which some publicists 2 enumerate among the compulsive means of settlement of international differences. Although these steps may contrive, indirectly, the settlement of differences, yet they do not contain in themselves any compulsion. II Vattel, II. § 341-Hall, § 120-Phillimore, III. § 7-Twiss, II. § 10— Taylor, § 435-Wharton, III. § 318-Wheaton, § 290-Bluntschli, § 505-Heffter, § 110-Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 59–71— Ullmann, § 135-Bonfils, Nos. 972-974-Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2634-2636-Rivier, II. § 60-Calvo, III. § 1807-Fiore, II. Nos 1226-1227-Martens, II. § 105. tion and sion. § 29. Retorsion is the technical term for the Concepretaliation of discourteous or unkind or unfair and Character inequitable acts by acts of the same or a similar of Retorkind. Retorsion has nothing to do with international delinquencies, as it is a means of compulsion not in the case of legal differences, but only in the case of certain political differences. The act which calls for retaliation is not an illegal act; on the contrary, it is 1 See Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2649. 2 See Taylor, §§ 431, 433, 441, and Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2633. Retorsion when justified. . an act that is within the competence of the doer.1 But a State can commit many legislative, administrative, or judicial acts which, although they are not internationally illegal, contain a discourtesy or unfriendliness to another State or are unfair and inequitable. If the State against which such acts are directed considers itself wronged thereby, a political difference is created which might be settled by retorsion. It § 30. The question when retorsion is and when it is not justified is not one of law, and is difficult to answer. The difficulty is created by the fact that retorsion is a means of settling such differences as are created, not by internationally illegal, but by discourteous or unfriendly or unfair and inequitable acts of one State against another, and that naturally the conceptions of discourtesy, unfriendliness, and unfairness cannot very precisely be defined. depends, therefore, largely upon the circumstances and conditions of the special cases whether a State will or will not consider itself justified in making use of retorsion. In practice States have frequently made use of retorsion in cases of unfair treatment of their citizens abroad through rigorous passport regulations, exclusion of foreigners from certain professions, and in cases of the levy of exorbitant protectionist or fiscal duties, of refusal of the usual mutual judicial assistance, of refusal of admittance of foreign ships to harbours, and in similar cases. von It is for this reason that Never of political importance. how ex ercised. § 31. The essence of retorsion consists in retalia- Retorsion tion for a noxious act by an act of the same kind. But a State in making use of retorsion is by no means confined to acts of the same kind as those complained of, acts of a similar kind being equally admissible. However, the acts of retorsion are confined to acts which are not internationally illegal. And, further, as retorsion is made use of only for the purpose of compelling a State to alter its discourteous, unfriendly, or unfair behaviour, all acts of retorsion ought at once to cease when such State changes its behaviour. Retorsion. § 32. The value of retorsion as a means of settling Value of certain international differences consists in its compulsory force, which has great power in regulating the intercourse of States. It is a commonplace of human nature, and by experience constantly confirmed, that evil-doers are checked by retaliation, and that those who are inclined to commit a wrong against others are often prevented by the fear of it. Through the high tide of Chauvinism, Protectionism, and unfriendly feelings against foreign nations, States are often tempted to legislative, administrative, and judicial acts against other States which, although not internationally illegal, nevertheless endanger the friendly relations and intercourse within the Family of Nations. The certainty of retaliation is the only force which can make States resist the temptation. VOL. II. D Concep tion of Reprisals distinc tion to Retorsion. III Grotius, III. c. 2-Vattel, II. §§ 342-354-Bynkershoek, Quaestiones jur. publ. I. c. 24-Hall § 120-Lawrence, §§ 157-158-Twiss, II. § 11-22-Taylor, §§ 436-437-Wharton, III. §§ 318-320-Wheaton, §§ 291-293-Bluntschli, §§ 500-504-Heffter, §§ 111-112-Bulmer. incq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 72-116-Ullmann, §§ 136-137-Bonfils, Nos. 975-985-Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2637-2647-Rivier, II. § 60 -Calvo, III. §§ 1808-1831-Fiore, II. Nos. 1228-1230-Martens, II. § 105-Lafargue, "Les représailles en temps de paix" (1899)— Ducrocq, "Représailles en temps de paix" (1901), pp. 5-57, 175-232. § 33. Reprisals is the term applied to such injurious and otherwise internationally illegal acts of a State in contra- against another as are exceptionally permitted for the purpose of compelling the latter to consent to a satisfactory settlement of a difference created by its own international delinquency. Whereas retorsion consists in retaliation of discourteous, unfriendly, unfair, and inequitable acts by acts of the same or a similar kind, and has nothing to do with international delinquencies, reprisals are otherwise illegal acts performed by a State for the purpose of obtaining justice for an international delinquency by taking the law into its own hands. It is, of course, possible that a State retaliates to an illegal act committed against itself by the performance of an act of a similar kind. Such retaliation would be a retorsion in the ordinary sense of the term, but it would not be retorsion in the technical meaning of the term as used by those writers on International Law who correctly distinguish between retorsion and reprisals. Reprisals admissible for all International Delin quencies. § 34. Reprisals are admissible not only, as some writers1 maintain, in case of denial or delay of justice or of any other internationally interdicted ill-treat1 See, for instance, Twiss, II. § 19. |