Carroll v. Lessee of Carroll et al.

It is apparent that the question whether some of the lands of the testator were undevised could not enter into or affect the decision of this case. The negroes not being parties, no question could arise whether they were entitled to have the debts paid out of the land of the testator, and the court declares the question is not before them. As between Mrs. Carroll, the executrix of her husband's will or her representatives and the creditors of her husband, the right of the latter was complete to resort to the personal property, including the negroes, and it was therefore wholly immaterial who owned the land. The only prayer in the bill was that the creditors, through the administrators, might be restrained from making their debts out of the negroes. The only question in the case was whether they could be so restrained. And when it was decided that their legal right was, to have all the personalty, including the negroes, applied to their debts, it was immaterial what other rights they or others might have.

We do not consider, therefore, that a comparison of the titles of the heirs at law and the devisee of Michael B. Carroll to his lands was brought into judgment by this injunction bill.

If the Court of Appeals had found it necessary to construe a statute of that State in order to decide upon the rights of parties subject to its judicial control, such a decision, deliberately made, might have been taken by this court as a basis on which to rest our judgment. But it must be remembered that we are bound to decide a question of local law, upon which the rights of parties depend, as well as every other question, as we find it ought to be decided. In making the examination preparatory to this finding, this court has followed two rules, one of which belongs to the common law, and the other is a part of our peculiar judicial system. The first is the maxim of the common law, stare decisis. The second grows out of the thirty-fourth section of the Judiciary Act, (1 Statutes at Large, 92,) which makes the laws of the several States the rules of decision in trials at the common law; and inasmuch as the States have committed to their respective judiciaries the power to construe and fix the meaning of the statutes passed by their legislatures, this court has taken such constructions as part of the law of the State, and has administered the law as thus construed. But this rule has grown up and been held with constant reference to the other rule, stare decisis; and it is only so far and in such cases as this latter rule can operate, that the other has any effect..

If the construction put by the court of a State upon one of its statutes was not a matter in judgment, if it might have been decided either way without affecting any right brought into

Carroll v. Lessee of Carroll et al.

question, then, according to the principles of the common law, an opinion on such a question is not a decision. To make it so, there must have been an application of the judicial mind to the precise question necessary to be determined to fix the rights of the parties and decide to whom the property in contestation belongs.

And therefore this court and other courts organized under the common law, has never held itself bound by any part of an opinion, in any case, which was not needful to the ascertainment of the right or title in question between the parties. In Cohens v. The State of Virginia, 6 Wheat. 399, this court was much pressed with some portion of its opinion in the case of Marbury v. Madison. And Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said, "It is a maxim not to be disregarded that general expressions in every opinion are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit, when the very point is presented. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent; other principles which may serve to illustrate it are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated." The cases of Ex parte Christy, 3 How. 292, and Jenness et al. v. Peck, 7 How. 612, are an illustration of the rule that any opinion given here or elsewhere cannot be relied on as a binding authority, unless the case called for its expression. Its weight of reason must depend on what it contains.

With these views we cannot regard the opinion of the Court of Appeals as an authority on which we have a right to rest our judgment. We have already stated the reasons which have brought us to a different construction of the statute; reasons which do not seem to us to be shaken by the opinion of the Court of Appeals.

Our conclusion is that the will of Michael B. Carroll was not within the statute, and the lands in question were consequently undevised.

One other exception was taken at the trial, respecting which it is only necessary to say that we think the identity of name of the two tracts of land in the same county, taken in connection with the long possession of those under whom the plaintiffs claimed, and the absence of all evidence of any adverse claim. or outstanding title, was sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that the land was embraced in the patents from the State.

We are also of opinion that the judgment is correct in form, being for the term which the declaration alleges was created by

Smith et al. v. Swormstedt et al.

the plaintiffs as owners of three undivided fourth parts of the land.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed, with costs.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.

WILLIAM A. SMITH AND OTHERS, U. LEROA SWORMSTEdt and

OTHERS.

In 1844, the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States, at a General Conference, passed sundry resolutions providing for a distinct, ecclesiastical organization in the slaveholding States,.in case the annual conferences of those States should deem the measure expedient.

In 1845, these conferences did deem it expedient and organized a separate ecclesiastical community, under the appellation of the Methodist Episcopal Church South. At this time there existed property, known as the Book Concern, belonging to the General Church, which was the result of the labors and accumulation of all the ministers.

Commissioners appointed by the Methodist Episcopal Church South, may file a bill in chancery, in behalf of themselves and those whom they represent, against the trustees of the Book Concern, for a division of the property.

The rule is well established that where the parties interested are numerous, and the suit is for an object common to them all, some of the body may maintain a bill on behalf of themselves and of the others; and a bill may also be maintained against a portion of a numerous body of defendants, representing a common interest. The Methodist Church was divided. It was not a case of the secession of a part from the the main body. Neither division lost its interest in the common property. The General Conference, of 1844, had the legitimate power thus to divide the church. In 1808, the General Conference was made a representative body, with six restrictive articles upon its powers. But none of these articles deprived it of the power of dividing the church.

The sixth restrictive article provided that the General Conference should not appropriate the profits of the Book Concern to any other purpose than for the benefit of the travelling ministers, their widows, &c.; and one of the resolutions of 1844 recommended to all the annual conferences to authorize a change in the sixth restrictive article. This was not imposed as a condition of separation, but merely a plan to enable the General Conference itself to carry out its purposes.

The separation of the church into two parts being legally accomplished, a division of the joint property by a court of equity follows, as a matter of course.

THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Ohio, which dismissed the bill.

The bill was originally filed in the names of Henry B. Bascom,

Smith et al. v. Swormstedt et al.

a citizen of Lexington, in the State of Kentucky;_ Alexander L. P. Green, a citizen of Nashville, in the State of Tennessee; Charles B. Parsons, a citizen of Louisville, in the State of Kentucky; John Kelly, a citizen of Wilson county, in the State of Tennessee; James W. Allen, a citizen of Limestone county, in the State of Alabama; and John Tevis, a citizen of Shelby county, in the State of Kentucky —

Against Leroy Swormstedt and John H. Power, agents of the "Book Concern" at Cincinnati, and James B. Finley, all of whom are citizens of the State of Ohio; and George Peck and Nathan Bangs, who are citizens of the State of New York; who are made defendants to this bill.

Bascom, Green, and Parsons were commissioners appointed by the Methodist Episcopal Church South, to demand and sue for the proportion belonging to it of certain property, and espe cially of a fund called the "Book Concern." Bascom having died whilst the suit was pending, William A. Smith, a citizen of Virginia, was substituted in his place. The other plaintiffs were supernumerary and superannuated preachers, belonging to the travelling connection of the said church south; and all the plaintiffs were citizens of other States than Ohio, and sued not only for themselves but also in behalf of all the preachers in the travelling connection of the church south, amounting to about fifteen hundred.

The defendants were Swormstedt and Power, agents of the Book Concern at Cincinnati, and Findley, all travelling preachers of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and citizens of Ohio; and the Methodist Book Concern a body politic, incorporated by an act of the General Assembly of Ohio, and having its principal office at Cincinnati, in that State.

The nature of the dispute and the circumstances of the case are set forth in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Stanberry, for the appellants, and by Mr. Badger and Mr. Ewing, for the appellees.

The following extract from the brief of Mr. Stanberry explains the points which he made.

We claim, in the first place, that the division of the church was a valid act, and thereby the original church was divided into two churches equally legitimate, and that the members and be neficiaries in each have equal rights to their distributive share of all the property and funds.

Secondly. That if there was no valid division of the original church, but only a separation of the southern portion from the original church, yet, under the circumstances in which it was

Smith et al. v.

the plaintiffs as owners of th land.

The judgment of the Circ

This cause came on to be from the Circuit Court of Maryland, and was arg whereof, it is now here or the judgment of the said same is hereby affirmed,

WILLIAM A. SMITH

In 1844, the Methodist Epis ence, passed sundry resol in the slaveholding State deem the measure exped In 1845, these conferences

tical community, under At this time there existe General Church, which ministers. Commissioners appointe in chancery, in behalf trustees of the Book C The rule is well establis suit is for an object c behalf of themselves a portion of a numer The Methodist Church the the main body. The General Conferen In 1808, the General ive articles upon it of dividing the chur The sixth restrictive a ate the profits of th travelling minister mended to all the article. This was enable the General The separation of th the joint property