that is a very different thing from giving individual members the right to propose an expenditure which a man may think in the interests of the whole public, when in fact it is not.

MR. CULLINAN-You would eliminate the log-rolling feature? DOCTOR LOWELL-Yes, sir, I would eliminate the log-rolling features. As it is now we have said that each individual member shall have the right to initiate, but the governor may veto. I think the governor should initiate and the legislature should veto, so far as appropriations are concerned.

MR. SANDERS-If the English budget were adopted in New York State, how would it be changed, in case the executive affairs are in the control of one party and the legislative affairs are in control of the other party.

DOCTOR LOWELL-Of course that raises a different proposition from that which exists in England, where they must be of the same party. Although it probably would not work as well as if the governor and legislature were of the same party, still I do not think it would produce a deadlock; but, if it did, you would have to take some method by which you can get over a deadlock. There are a great many different ways in which you can get over a deadlock.

MR. STIMSON-Are you familiar with the way which has been in effect where some of our insular governments are established? DOCTOR LOWELL-Yes. But we would not want to do that, the budget would be continued until the next election. My impres-sion is that you will find in most cases that a deadlock will not arise. Even in the State of New York I happen to have taken statistics of those some years ago. The proportion of matters that are carried by purely party votes in the legislature is much less than it is in the House of Commons.

MR. SANDERS-You think the friction would not be any greater than it is at the present?

DOCTOR LOWELL-I think the friction would not be any greater than it is at present.

MR. DEYO-I don't see how there could be any deadlock, but I can see how the grilling would be decidedly adverse grilling. DOCTOR LOWELL-I don't think that would be objectionable. MR. STIMSON-The grilling in the House of Commons is by the opponents of the government.

DOCTOR LOWELL-I do not object to that, but if the governor

presented the budget, and the House refused to accept it, and there were not any power to initiate any budget of their own, there might be a deadlock.

MR. Low-Would you propose that that should be avoided, and how?

DOCTOR LOWELL-I could invent various ways of getting rid of that. Of course, if worse came to worse, we would have a reelection of either the Governor or the House, if the term ran for some time. You could provide a certain minimum of expenditures in some way; but if you shake the people up in a box they would generally agree, because neither party would want to keep the State of New York without expenditures.

MR. FRANCHOT-If I understand you, the ministers are responsible to the Cabinet, and to the people, only through the medium of the House of Commons?

DOCTOR LOWELL-Yes.

MR. FRANCHOT-What would you say would be the effect of having them directly responsible to the people, not through the legislative branch?

DOCTOR LOWELL-It would make a good deal of difference, of course, in the operation of things, and it is for that reason that you cannot adopt their scheme as it stands here. You have got to adapt it to that very condition, and our executive is not responsible to the legislature, but to the people. That would make you modify the scheme, but still, I think, there are many points in it that could be adapted to that condition.

MR. HALE-What control has the House of Lords over the budget?

DOCTOR LOWELL-The House of Commons has always contended that the House of Lords had no right to change the budget in any way; no right to increase or diminish it, but must accept it or reject it as a whole. The House of Lords never admitted that, but they never ventured to exercise any such disputed power. It has been usually admitted that they had a right to reject it; but a little while ago they did reject it, and I fancy they will never again.

MR. HALE That was in 1911?

DOCTOR LOWELL-They rejected it, and election was so decidedly a condemnation of the way they did it, that I do not

think that it is likely to be attempted again. Practically, they have no financial power.

MR. HALE-I happened to be in London that time.

DOCTOR LOWELL-Yes.

MR. HALE-I understand the King agreed, if necessary, to appoint seventy-six additional Peers.

DOCTOR LOWELL-He did. He was ready to swamp the House of Lords. They have no powers in financial matters, practically. MR. HALE-What effect would that have upon the proposition to have a legislature of a single house?

DOCTOR LOWELL-I suppose you could apply this either to the two Houses or to one. I think it would be possible to apply it to either. Of course, it is a great deal easier to work in a government the simpler it is; it is simpler to work a government with one House than with two; but it does not always follow that the simpler form of government, which is the easiest to work, is always the best. Good results usually come from more or less friction. If a thing works too easily it does not always work best. The very fact that you have two Houses, and consequently some friction between them, it may be good, or it may not. It does not follow that any system of administration which is the easiest is the best. I think you could work with two Houses or one. Of course it would work easier with one. But as it is now, either House can put up or down any appropriation. They must both agree. If they could not put it up, it would make the agreement between the two Houses so much easier to reach, particularly as experience in England goes, they are very rarely cut down.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCES, REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES

[On August 4, 1915, after consideration of several proposals, the Committee on Finances, Revenues and Expenditures reported the following form of proposed amendment to the constitution, accompanied by a report which is included herewith.]

PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

To amend the constitution, by inserting a new article, in relation to the budget, and to amend section twenty-one of article three of the constitution.

Section 1. (Entire section new matter.)

On or before the fifteenth day of November in the year nineteen hundred and sixteen and in each year thereafter the head of each department of the State Government, except the Legislature and Judiciary, shall submit to the Governor itemized estimates of appropriations to meet the financial needs of such department classified according to relative importance and in such form and with such explanation as the Governor may require.

The Governor, after public hearing thereon, at which he may require the attendance of heads of departments and their subordinates, shall revise such estimates according to his judgment.

Itemized estimates of the financial needs of the Legislature certified by the presiding officer of each House and of the Judiciary certified by the Comptroller shall be transmitted to the Governor before the fifteenth day of January next succeeding

for inclusion in the budget without revision but with such recommendation as he may think proper.

On or before the first day of February next succeeding he shall submit to the Legislature a budget containing a complete plan of proposed expenditures and estimated revenues. contain all the estimates so revised or certified and shall be accompanied by a bill or bills for all proposed appropriations and reappropriations, clearly itemized; it shall show the estimated revenues for the ensuing fiscal year and the estimated surplus of revenues at the end of the current fiscal year, together with the measures of taxation, if any, which the Governor may propose for the increase of the revenues. It shall be accompanied by a statement of the current assets, liabilities, reserves and surplus or deficit of the State; statements of the debts and funds of the State; an estimate of its financial condition as of the beginning and end of the ensuing fiscal year; and a statement of revenues and expenditures for the two fiscal years next preceding said year, in form suitable for comparison. The Governor may, before the final action by the Legislature thereon, amend or supplement the budget.

A copy of the budget and of any amendments or additions. thereto shall be forthwith transmitted by the Governor to the Comptroller.

The Governor, the heads of such departments and the Comptroller shall have the right, and it shall be their duty, when requested by either House of the Legislature, to appear and be heard in respect to the budget during the consideration thereof, and to answer inquiries relevant thereto. The procedure for such appearance and inquiries shall be provided by law. The Legislature may not alter an appropriation bill submitted by the Governor except to strike out or reduce items therein; but this provision shall not apply to items for the Legislature or Judiciary. Such a bill when passed by both Houses shall be a law immediately without further action by the Governor, except that appropriations for the Legislature and Judiciary shall be subject to his approval as provided in Section Nine of Article Four.

Neither House shall consider further appropriations until the