The Present Organization for Executive Direction and Control

The fact is that the constitution itself inhibits the development of a responsible chief executive. It has set up two independent heads of Proprietary Functions-the secretary of state and the treasurer; it has set up three independent heads of groups of public service functions; it has set up one independent staff agency, the attorney general. Providing no organization for a chief executive, the constitutional inhibition against the expenditure of public moneys except pursuant to appropriations has done the rest. Acting within these constitutional powers the legislature has also failed to provide either organization or funds with which the governor might build up staff agencies, except the civil service commission, and the department of efficiency and economy-the first of which is made a continuous body-as it probably should be, and the second of which was abolished on recommendation of a new governor who came into office viewing it as a creature of an opposition party. Furthermore, the legislature has established 140 different departmental officers and commissions having administration duties with no provision for coordination and with little possibility of executive direction and control. (See Chart V, Page 98.)

Without "staff" or "line" advisers the governor is required to deal with or act upon the independent requests of all these administrative heads and groups as an observer from a far-off mountain top, or if he is visited by one who asks for his official sanction, he must decide or refuse without having the matter considered and discussed by the various other officers whose interests may be affected.

The Tenure of the Governor

New York, in her first constitution, drafted by the convention of 1777, granted the governor a three-year term, instead of the twelve-month term established in many of the other states. When the convention of 1821 overthrew the predominance of the landed class by sweeping away the freehold qualifications for voters for senators and reduced the term of the senators to two years, it also reduced the term of the governor to the same period. This provision was incorporated in the constitution of 1894. Meanwhile other states have moved in the direction of longer terms, all of the original thirteen, except Massachusetts, having abandoned the annual election. At the present time, of the original thirteen states, six (Connecticut, Georgia, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island and South Carolina) limit the term of the governor to two years; one, Massachusetts, retains the annual election; one, New Jersey, fixes the term at three years, and the remaining five have extended it to four years.

An examination of the constitutions of all the states shows that

BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR COORDINATING THE ONE
HUNDRED AND FORTY DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS, OFFICES,
BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS HAVING ADMINISTRATIVE FUNC-
TIONS, EXCEPT THROUGH THE GOVERNOR.

THE NEW YORK BURERY OF MUNICIPAL RESEARCH

MENTS, OFFICES, BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS, THE NUMBERS REFERRING TO CHART ON OPPOSITE PAGE.

about half of them provide for the two year term and about half or a slight majority for the four year term. A search for the factors which led to the choice of two or four years in the several states reveals no consistent explanation. It cannot be said that those states which have been making the most radical experiment in direct democracy are uniformly attached to the shorter term. On the contrary, Oregon, Washington, California, Oklahoma, Nevada and Arizona appear among those that have adopted the four year term. Neither can it be said that all of the recent conventions have adopted the four year term in spite of the tendency in that direction, for Ohio and Michigan retain the two year period. Yet it is worthy of note that Oklahoma, Arizona and New Mexico, in making entirely new organic laws, adopted the longer period. In view of these facts, it appears that in the main the tendency is in the direction of the longer term, that some states which have tried the shorter term are abandoning it, that neither geographical or political reasons account for the choice of one or the other, that the most radical democracies do not deem the short term a necessary part of their system.

From the point of view of responsibility, however, the term of four years has been more satisfactory. From the point of view of responsibility and efficiency, the two year term is without doubt subject to serious objections. The governor is hardly installed before he has to begin to think of the next election, the campaign for which begins within at least sixteen or eighteen months after his inauguration. By the time he has disposed of the inevitable patronage, the fight for renomination has begun. Serious and prolonged study of the problems of administration is impossible. To hold the governor to account for efficient administration under such circumstances is as unjust as it is unjustifiable, particularly when the chaos in the state administrative organization is borne in mind.

The Power of Appointment and Removal

As has been pointed out in other connections, no consistent principles have been applied in the determination of what officers should be made independent of the governor through popular election and what officers should be made subordinate to him through the exercise of the power of appointment. For instance, the state engineer and surveyor, an officer charged with duties which involve those of officers appointed by the governor, is made elective by the constitution, and an equally technical position, for which no qualifications are established, that of superintendent of public works, is made appointive. The governor's adviser on legal matters of great moment who is responsible in a large measure for the enforcement of the law, the attorney general, is elected, while the superintendent of prisons is an appointive officer.

After having decided that certain offices shall be elective, the lawmakers have not followed any consistent principles in selecting the methods of appointment, except in the case of the two important officers mentioned in the constitution, the superintendents of public works and of prisons, who are appointed by the governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate. The offices created by statute are filled by a variety of methods, so large that it has surely exhausted the inventive genius of our legislators. Whatever may have been the considerations brought to bear in determining the mode of appointment to any particular office or group of offices, it is clear that the standard of responsibility and efficiency has not been the dominant motive. At all events the debates and records available do not show that any effort has been made to discover and apply such a standard in providing modes of appointment.

When tried by canons of consistency and responsibility, the methods of removal provided by the constitution and statutes are found to be confusing beyond measure. Article V of the Constitution authorizes the removal of two officers by the governor and the suspension of a third. The superintendent of public works "may be suspended or removed from office by the governor, whenever, in his judgment, the public interest shall so require." The superintendent of prisons may be removed by the governor "for cause at any time." In the case of the removal of the former officer, the governor must file with the secretary of state a statement of the cause of such removal and shall report such removal and the cause thereof to the legislature at its next session. In the case of the removal of a superintendent of prisons, however, the governor must give the officer a copy of the charges against him and an opportunity to be heard in his own defense. It is difficult to imagine the considerations which require that a superintendent of prisons about to be removed should be heard in his own defense, while a superintendent of public works in a similar position should not be given that opportunity.

In the case of the officers made elective by the constitution, the principle of complete independence of the governor is maintained, except in one instance. The state treasurer may be suspended by the governor, but only during the recess of the legislature and until thirty days after the commencement of the next session. The governor may exercise this high power whenever it appears to him that the treasurer has “in any particular, violated his duty." If the governor suspends a treasurer under such circumstances, he may appoint some person to discharge the duties of the office during the suspension of the treasurer. It is difficult to see what standards of responsibility and efficiency place the treasurer under such partial control by the governor and left the other high elective officers entirely exempt. Surely a comptroller, or state engineer and sur