the results of the trial of automatic freight car brakes now being made on the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy railroad, under the auspices of the Master Car Builders' Association, with the view of adopting one should any prove practically successful, and in the event of its not adopting a vacuum brake.

By the Board.

WILLIAM C. HUDSON.

Secretary.

II.

IN THE MATTER OF A DERAILMENT ON THE NEW YORK, WEST SHORE AND BUFFALO RAILROAD, AT 12:27 A. M., OF THE EARLY MORNING OF NOVEMBER 9TH, NEAR LITTLE FALLS, BY WHICH MRS. C. R. PRATT, OF ROCHESTER, WAS KILLED, AND SOME OTHER PASSENGERS

MORE OR LESS INJURED.

December 1, 1885.

The facts and circumstances attending the above disaster as developed by testimony taken before a coroner's jury and before Commissioner Rogers, and by an inspection of the premises by the inspector of the Board shortly after the accident, are as follows:

Train No. 57, known as the limited express, left Weehawken at 6:30 P. M. The train consisted of engine No. 42, Morris Finch, engineer, one baggage, two day and four Pullman sleeping cars. When the train reached a point about one mile west of Little Falls, while running at the rate of between thirty and thirty-five miles per hour, it was thrown from the track.

It appears that the south rail of the north or west bound track had sunk about eleven inches for a distance of some twelve feet, while its opposite rail and those of the south track remained in their normal position. The result was a derailment of the entire train, except the locomotive proper, which remained on the track and was stopped about 900 feet west of the depression. The tender broke loose from the engine and sheered northerly, while the baggage and both day passenger cars ran toward the south track, all passing the tender. The forward sleeping car followed the tender, came in contact with it, and both rolled down the north embankment to the bottom, some twelve feet below the surface of track. The second sleeping car followed and piled on top of the tender and first sleeper. In the wreck, Mrs. Charles R. Pratt, of Rochester, N. Y., died of shock and suffocation. Her husband, Mr. Pratt, Member of Congress; James W. Weston, New York city; Miss E. C. Vaugh, Worcester, Mass.; Judge Green, Springfield, Ill., and the car porter, A. A. Ceaser, were bruised and more or less hurt.

The cause of the settling of the rail has been clearly shown. South of the railroad there is a highway. The ground slopes from the highway toward the railroad. At a point about 240 feet east of the sunken rail a water-course formerly ran at right angles to the direction

of the track from the highway. This water-course is confined in a channel two feet wide at bottom, three at top and three feet deep, covered with flagging from the highway to a point about fifteen feet from the south rail; thence the bed of the stream is uncovered to the railroad. Water does not run here except in the spring and during rainy weather. Instead of a sluice being constructed to carry this water across the track and thence down the slope into the canal, the stream was turned so as to run westerly alongside of the road-bed until it found a passage under it at the point where the derailment took place, about 240 feet from the turn. The road-bed was largely constructed of stone at this point.

It appears from a statement of Patrick Murphy, the section foreman who has been in charge of this portion of the road since the fall of 1882, to the present time, except from March 1 to September 1, 1884, that during ordinary rainy weather the stream found its way under the embankment at the point of derailment, but in spring and during heavy rains the water ran still further west before it found a vent.

It is shown that at times the water ran on to the track notwithstanding the attempts to turn the stream to the west, and the testimony of several passengers and others was that on the night of the accident the water was running ankle deep between the tracks.

Undoubtedly the crevices between the large stones forming the base of the embankment remained unfilled, and a stream of water running over the gravel on top washed the sand and gravel into the crevices below, allowing the top of the road-bed to settle down with the fatal results before described.

In his testimony before the coroner's jury Thomas Murphy, the section foreman above-mentioned, stated that he visited the place of the accident at about 9:15 P. M.; that there was a good current of water running down side of track, but none over the track then.

[Passengers testify, however, that at the time of the accident the water was five or six inches deep.]

Murphy further testifies that he had advised Thomas Burns, the assistant roadmaster, two years ago, to put a culvert across the track at the point where the stream is turned.

Thomas Hastings, track walker, testified that he had seen water running across and on to the track at that point last April; that William Thomas and his son had turned water on the track, and that he had been stationed there to turn it back; that there had been trouble with Thomas about turning the water here, as he claimed it ran into his garden and injured him.

The Board deems it somewhat remarkable that, so far as the testimony sent to the Board shows, neither Thomas nor his son were examined by the coroner's jury.

The superintendent of the road, Mr. C. W. Bradley, testified that his personal attention had never been drawn to the fact that water occasionally ran on the track at this point; that the present roadmaster, Mr. Brock, had informed him that his (Brock's) attention had never been drawn to it either.

It is quite possible that the roadmaster might pass the place very frequently and never think of it as dangerous, unless particular attention was drawn to it.

Murphy's failure to do so was blameworthy, but it is only just to say that neither he nor any one else could anticipate that this apparently slight neglect could lead to such disastrous consequences.

Water should not be allowed to run on the track anywhere, and yet it is safe to say that there is probably not a railroad in the State where occasionally more water than ran here does not run somewhere on the track.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

The Board finds that the New York, West Shore and Buffalo Railway Company was responsible for the above accident by reason of its failure to construct a sluice across the track at the point where it intersects the water-course. The individual responsibility it is difficult to fix, for the reason that Thomas Burus, the assistant roadmaster, whom Murphy, the section foreman, swears he informed of the necessity of this culvert, is no longer in the employ of the company, and has not been found or examined by the Board.

If Murphy did not feel that he had the authority to construct this sluice himself, he should have informed Thomas Burns' successor of its necessity. This he appears to have neglected to do.

By the Board.

WILLIAM C. HUDSON,

Secretary.

III.

IN THE MATTER OF A DERAILMENT ON THE BUFFALO, NEW York AND PHILADELPHIA RAILROAD, AT 8:10 O'CLOCK A. M., OF FEBRUARY 22, 1886, ONE-HALF MILE SOUTH OF AVON, BY WHICH FOURTEEN PASSENGERS AND THREE EMPLOYEES WERE MORE OR LESS SERIOUSLY INJURED.

March 19, 1886.

By Commissioner Rogers-The facts and circumstances attending this accident, as developed by a special report to the Board made by the authorities of the road, and also by an inspection of the premises made shortly after the accident by the inspector of the Board, are as follows:

As train No. 31, known as the Nunda accommodation, consisting of locomotive No. 91, Thomas Jordan, engineer, with passenger car No. 7 attached, and combination car No. 52 in rear, all in charge of William H. Godrey, conductor, was passing around a curve of 750 feet radius (being about eight degrees of curvature) and when within about 170 feet of the tangent point, it became derailed. The wheels of the forward trucks of the combination car dropped inside of the inner rail of curve pressing it outward, and the truck ran thus for about twenty feet. The inner or flange side of the outside rail at this point is very much worn and to a shape conforming closely to the tread or flange.

After running twenty feet the pressure of the flange of the outside wheel against the outer rail became sufficient to cause the outer flange

to mount its rail, the inside rail instantly sprang back to its proper position and threw the wheels opposite outside the outer rail.

The rail in consequence of the pressure of the wheel flange, as marks on the tie indicate, was probably turned over.

The rear truck of the passenger car at the same time was pulled off the track on the same side of the rails; the forward truck of this car and the tender and locomotive, however, were not derailed, but the couplings between the two cars and between the passenger car and tender were broken.

It is reported that as the engineer was looking back and saw the trucks leave the rail, he gave his engine steam and kept away from the train.

When rounding the sharp curves of this division the instructions of the road require the engineer to cut off steam as such curves are approached, and to allow trains to drift around them by the train's momentum. This was done at this time, and the speed of the train was reduced to about eighteen miles per hour, according to the statement of the engineer and conductor.

An examination of the wheels and axles of the truck first leaving the track, made by the inspector of the road, revealed nothing as worn, out of gauge or loose.

The jaws of the truck were broken, whether before or after leaving the rail is unknown, but the breakages are recent.

An examination of the track at the point of derailment clearly shows a spreading of the rails at a joint on the outside of the curve. This was undoubtedly the cause of the accident.

The result was that car 52 ran about 170 feet on a line tangent to the curve, and turned over on its side.

Car No. 7 held by its forward truck on the track, ran about 660 feet, the rear end of the car gradually working over the angle of embankment; when nearly at a stand it careened over on its side into the dry bed of the old canal.

The hot coals from forward stove immediately set the car on fire; the flames ran rapidly along the oil cloth head-lining, and soon the whole was consumed. By great exertion the trainmen and some of the uninjured passengers cleared the car of passengers, some fourteen in number, the whole escaping with bruises and sprains of a more or less serious nature. Only one person was in the rear car; no injury occurred.

At a point about thirty feet south of the joint that gave way, frost had thrown up the track from one to two inches. To restore evenness of surface both rails north had been raised with one-inch hemlock boards placed between the railroad ties—a work that is called “shimming." The tapering down of this one-inch raise is done with hard wood "shims," gradually reduced in thickness as they approach the ties each way that do not require such "shimming."

These hemlock "shims" are about twelve inches long, six inches wide and nailed lengthwise with tie with cut nails.

They do not appear to have moved, but show the action of the outside base of rail; thus permitting the rails at the bend to be pushed far enough apart to permit the inside wheels to drop inside of the inner

rail.

The joint of rail which gave way rested upon a black oak tie considerably decayed.

The company use on the outside of both rails, on all sharp curves, a cast iron brace nearly the same height as the rail, and secured to tie with three rail spikes. The number of these braces depends upon the degree of curvature. In this instance they were used at every

third or fourth tie.

Where the track spread, however, at the joint tie and at the second. tie north, the rail was braced with ordinary fish bars, one end abutting against the bottom or neck of rail and the other end fastened to the tie with two rail spikes.

The partly decayed joint tie did not hold these braces, although it was said to have been in position the evening before the accident, when the last patrol was made by the track walker.

The standard adopted by the company for elevation of outer rails on curves is one inch per degree up to two degrees, then one-half inch up to five degrees, and the speed to be reduced to compensate for any increased curvature.

The elevation of the outer rail at the point of the accident corresponded with the above standard, and yet the flange side of the outside rail is very much worn, showing the necessity of great care to slow down while rounding the sharp curve.

The use of ties in the least decayed, or of "shims" and ties other than of hard wood, or of rail braces of less height than the rail, on these sharp curves is very hazardous. If "shimming" is necessary it should be done in the most substantial manner. The inspector walked over a few miles and noticed the condition of the superstructure.

He reports nothing unworkmanlike and very little of blocking between the ties and rails; generally the superstructure is in good condition and well lined and surfaced.

In the instructions to section foremen from J. A. Dixon, roadmaster, particular care was required to be exercised by such foremen to keep the track from spreading, especially on sharp curves.

The instructions read as follows:

"You must see to this personally as often as possible. If on account of your track heaving with the frost on inside of curve, you will cut it down instead of putting in long shims.' You will see that your track is well spiked and braced, especially at the points that are 'shimmed' on curves or tangents. You will instruct your trackwalker about the spreading of track, and see that he carries spikes to fix any place that requires it. You must see that he attends to his duty and keeps a sharp look-out for bad places, fix them the best he can and report them promptly to you. No excuse will be taken if a train is derailed by track spreading, as it is avoidable if the track is properly watched every day.

This order is important to section foremen and you will see that it is obeyed."

In the case under consideration it is evident that the instructions had not been obeyed. The decayed tie should not have been allowed to remain. The rail brace should have been of the height of rail and of a proper shape, and not a mere fish bar.