TEXAS SUPREME COURT. GULF, COLORADO & SANTA FÉ R. v. Richard HENRY. Tex.........) A ticket which is good for a continuous passage only does not entitle a passenger, who voluntarily takes passage upon a train which he must be held to have known would not convey him to his destination and who leaves that train at an intermediate point, to be carried the remainder of the journey on the train which he ought to have taken in the first instance. (May 20, 1892 Co. v. Dean, 43 Ark. 529, 51 Am. Rep. 584; It is competent for a carrier, especially in case of an excursion ticket sold at reduced rates, to limit the time in which the ticket shall be used; and in this case it appears, both from the plaintiff's petition and the evidence, that the time limited for the use of his ticket had expired before he presented it for passage to the conductor of the train on leaving Brownwood, and hence the conductor rightfully refused to receive it for passage. His ticket being invalid for passage upon its face, both on account of the expiration of the time in which it should have been used and the fact that the plaintiff had broken the APPEAL by defendant from a judgment of condition requiring a continuous passage, be the District Court for Runnels County, in favor of plaintiff, in an action brought to recover damages for the alleged wrongful ejection of plaintiff from defendant's train. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. J. W. Terry, for appellant: Even in the absence of any stipulation on the ticket it is good only for a continuous passage, and the passenger is not entitled to disembark from a train upon which he has taken passage at an intermediate point and afterwards resume it again upon another train, but he must inform himself as to what trains run through to his destination and take one of such trains, and hence it was certainly competent for the defendant to contract by stipulation on the ticket that it would only be good for continuous passage, and the plaintiff having traveled on the freight train as far as Brownwood, and disembarked there, and afterwards attempting to resume his journey on a regular passenger train, his ticket was properly refused by the conductor. was properly expelled by the conductor, and, under such circumstances, it was not proper or competent for the conductor to hear excuses from the plaintiff for his failure to use the ticket in the proper time and in the proper manner. Mosher v. St. Louis, 1. M. & S. R. Co. 127 U. S. 390, 32 L. ed. 249, 34 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 339, 17 Fed. Rep. 880, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 283; Bradshaw v. South Boston R. Co. 135 Mass. 407, 48 Am. Rep. 481, 16 Am, &. Eng. R. R. Cas. 386; Hall v. Memphis & C R. Co. 9 Fed. Rep. 585, 9 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 348; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Pierce, 47 Mich. 277, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 340; Yorton v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. R. C. 54 Wis. 234, 41 Am. Rep. 23, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 322; Townsend v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. 56 N. Y. 295; 15 Am. Rep. 419; Frederick v. Marquette, H. & O. R. Co. 37 Mich. 342, 26 Am. Rep. 531; Shelton v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 29 Ohio St. 214; Downs v. New York & N. H. R. Co. 36 Conn. 287, 4 Am. Rep. 77; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Griffin, 68 Ill. 499. Thompson, Carr. 69, 70; Hutchinson, Carr. 575; Dietrich v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 71 Pa. Nor was the action of any previous con434, 10 Am. Rep. 711; Stone v. Chicago & N. ductor in receiving the ticket for passage bindW. R. Co. 47 Iowa, 82, 29 Am. Rep. 458;ing on the conductor who refused plaintiff's McClure v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. 34 ticket. Md. 532, 6 Am. Rep. 345; Johnson v. Concord Dietrich v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 71 Pa. 434, 10 R. Corp. 46 N. H. 213, 88 Am. Dec. 199; Petrie | Am. Rep. 711; Beebe v. Ayres, 28 Barb. 276; v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 42 N. J. L. 450; Wyman Johnson v. Concord R. Corp. 46 N. H. 213; v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 34 Minn. 210, 22 Am. Stone v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 47 Iowa, 82, 29 & Eng. R. R. Cas. 402; Hatten v. Railroad Co. Am. Rep. 458; Keeley v. Boston & M. R. Co. 39 Ohio St. 375, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 53, 67 Me. 163, 24 Am. Rep. 19; Wakefield v. South and cases cited in note, p. 55. See notes to Boston R. Co. 117 Mass. 544; Sherman v. ChiO'Brien v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. 1 cago & N. W. R. Co. 40 Iowa, 45; Thorp v. ConAm. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 262; Auerbach v. New cord R. Co. 61 Vt. 378; Hill v. Syracuse, B. & York Cent. & II. R. R. Co. 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. N. Y. R. Co. €3 N. Y. 101. Cas. 337; Walker v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. 16 Am. & Eug. R. R. Cas. 386; Teras & P. R. Co. v. McDonald, 2 Will. C. C. § 163; Pennington v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. 62 Md. 95, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 310, and cases cited in note, p. 312; Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Messrs. Powell & Smith, for appellee: A passenger is "a person whom a railway, in the performance of its duty as a common carrier, has contracted to carry from one place to another place for a valuable consideration, and whom the railway, in the course of the For conditions in ticket as to the right to ride upon it, see portion of above note in McGowen Case, on page 819 of 5 L. R. A., also note to Fonseca v. Cunard S. S. Co. (Mass.) 12 L. R. A. 340. ́ GULF, COLORADO & SANTA FÉ R. Co. v. HENRY. performance of that contract, has received at The relation of carrier and passenger having Patterson, Railway Accident Law, § 220; Appellee, on the morning of the 24th day 319 morning, when he boarded a mixed train, he reached Brownwood, under instructions which was not going to Ballinger; and when to wait for the regular train for Ballinger, from the conductor of that train, he left it which he boarded, but on failure to pay fare when demanded he was expelled from the car, and, being without money, had to walk to Ballinger. To have reached Ballinger before the expiration of the time to which his ticket was limited, appellee should have left Austin in time to have taken appellant's train No. 1, leaving Brenham at 10:35 A. M. on May 24, and by that train alone could he nake continuous passage from Brenham to pellant's road is thus stated by appellant's general passenger agent, and there seems to Ballinger. The movement of trains on apbe no controversy as to the correctness of his trains 1, 3, and 47 between Brenham and Temple, and train 11 between Temple and statement: "May 24 and 25 defendant had Ballinger, all allowed to carry passengers. It had also train No. 49, a freight, that was permitted to carry passengers between Temple and Coleman, but between no other points. The schedule time was-No. 1, leave Brenham, 10:35 A. M.; arrive Temple, 2:30 P. M. No 3, leave Brenham 11:50 P. M. ; arrive Temple, 3:20 A. M. No. 47, leave Brenham, 1:05 P. M.; arrive Temple, 10 P. M. Ballinger, 12:55 A. M. On May 24 train No. 1 left Brenham 2 minutes late, and arrived No. 11, leave Temple, 5:15 P. M.; arrive at Temple 8 minutes late; train No. 3 left Brenham 5 minutes late, and arrived at Temple 10 minutes late; train 47 left Brenham 12 minutes late, and arrived in Temple 12 minutes late; train No. 11 left Temple 2 hours and 45 minutes late, and arrived at Ballinger 2 hours and 45 minutes late. On May 25, train No. 1 left Brenham on time, and arrived at Temple 12 minutes late; train No. 3 left Brenham on time and arrived at 47 left Brenham, and arrived at Temple, on time; train No. 11 left Temple 40 minutes Temple 6 hours and 42 minutes late; train International & G. N. R. Co. v. Smith, 62 Tex. 252; St. Louis, A. & T. R. Co. v. Mackie, 1 L. R. A. 687, 71 Tex. 491; Patterson, Rail-late, and arrived at Ballinger 30 minutes way Accident Law, §§ 210-220. Stayton, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court: late. In order to have made a continuous Temple to Ballinger, plaintiff should have passage from Brenham to Temple, and from Appellee purchased from appellant a and train No. 11 from Temple to Ballinger. round-trip ticket from Ballinger to Austin It seems to be uncontroverted that the ticket taken train No. 1 from Brenham to Temple, and return, on May 13, 1888, limited until on which appellee was traveling was one that the expiration of May 24 following, on entitled him only to a continuous passage which he went to Austin by way of Brenham from Brenham to Ballinger, and that it was and the Houston & Texas Central Railway. limited to May 24 is conceded. After boardOn the morning of May 24, 1888, after having the mixed train at Temple, appellee preing his ticket properly stamped, appellee sented his ticket to the conductor of that train, went by the railway on which he came to who advised him that it was only good for a Brenham, at which place it was necessary continuous passage, and prepared to put him for him to take a train on appellant's road off at Belton without punching his ticket, to reach Ballinger. He, however, did not there to await the passenger train bound for leave Austin in time to make connection with Ballinger, but appellee refused to do this, appellant's train that would reach Ballinger and said he would remain on the train until on May 24, which left Brenham at 10:35 A. it was overtaken by the passenger train bound M. on that day, and in consequence of this for Ballinger, whereupon the conductor he remained at Brenham until 11:50 on the punched his ticket, and returned it to him, night of that day, when he took a train on and he remained on that mixed train until regular time for Temple, which place he it reached Brownwood, where he left it, and reached at 3:20 on the morning of May 25, soon afterwards entered the train from which and there remained until 10:45 on the same he was expelled. 16 L. R. A. The charge of the court, in effect, informed | he could make that continuous passage from the jury that appellee was entitled to passage Temple to Ballinger, contemplated by his to Ballinger on the ticket held by him, not- ticket, on any particular train, and the jury withstanding the period limited for its use should have been so instructed. Dietrich v. had expired before he was expelled from the Pennsylvania R. Co. 71 Pa. 433, 10 Am. train, unless he had lost that right by break- Rep. 711. We understand the law, further, ing the passage. The court, however, in- to be that the act of the conductor on the structed the jury as follows: "If plaintiff, mixed train running between Temple and when he entered defendant's freight or mixed Coleman, in permitting plaintiff to have car at Temple, or soon thereafter, was in- passage from Temple to Brownwood on that formed by the conductor that said car did train did not confer any right whatever upon not run to Ballinger, and that said conductor him to have passage on the through passenger offered to return plaintiff's ticket, and allow train from Temple to Ballinger, and the jury plaintiff to ride to Belton without canceling should have been so instructed. Ibid. any part of said ticket, and that plaintiff It being conceded that plaintiff had a right, voluntarily remained on said car, and offered at most, only to continuous passage over aphis ticket to said conductor for cancellation pellant's road, we understand the law to be for so much of said distance from Temple to that he had no right to enter a through train, Ballinger as should be made on said car, and, and thereon have passage for a part of the further, that said conductor punched said journey, and then leave it, and again have ticket, to indicate that said ticket had been passage on a following train, by virtue of used for a part of said distance, and that the original contract and payment. Nor had plaintiff, when said train arrived at Brown- he any more the right, under the contract wood, voluntarily left said car, then said for continuous passage, to take a train that ticket would not be binding on defendant for could not give him such passage, and this any other train, and the conductor of such to leave at some intermediate point, and other train would have a right to eject plain-again to enter and have passage on another tiff from such train unless plaintiff paid his train that could take him to his destination. fare; and if you find the above facts from even though the latter train may be the one the evidence you will find for the defendant." he should have taken in the first instance. Appellant asked an instruction to the effect Ibid.; Stone v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 47 that plaintiff was not entitled to passage on Iowa, 85, 29 Am. Rep. 458: McClure v. Philathe train after the time had expired within delphia, W. & B. R. Co. 34 Md. 535, 6 Am. which he, by terms of his ticket, was re- Rep. 345; Johnson v. Philadelphia, W. & B. quired to use it. The court refused this in- R. Co. 63 Md. 107; Johnson v. Concord_R. struction. Appellant also asked an instruc- Corp. 46 N. H. 213, 88 Am. Dec. 199; Pettion in reference to the duty of appellee, rie v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 42 N. J. L. 450; under the contract, to make a continuous Wyman v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 34 Minn. passage from Temple to Ballinger, which, 210: Cleveland, C. & C. R. Co. v. Bartram, in substance, contained the same matter as that 11 Ohio St. 457; Oil Creek & A. R. R. Co. v. contained in the charge of the court upon that Clark, 72 Pa. 231; Drew v. Central Pac. subject, but it was more elaborate and in- R. Co. 51 Cal. 425; Cheney v. Boston & M. formed the jury that it was the duty of plain- R. Co. 11 Met. 121; Hatten v. Railroad Co. tiff to inform himself as to the trains on 39 Ohio St. 375, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. which he could make continuous passage. Cas. 53. That charge also informed the jury that the fact that the conductor on the mixed train between Temple and Brownwood permitted plaintiff to travel on his train from the one place to the other would not entitle him to passage on the train from which he was expelled, if otherwise not entitled. This charge was refused. The contract of the parties must fix their rights, and many reasons are suggested in the cases cited why, in the absence of express contract for continuous passage, such should be presumed to have been within the intent of the parties, and why substantial rights would be denied if such contracts be not enforced. No question arises in this If the charge of the court before quoted case as to what, within the meaning of such be the law, a new trial should have been a contract, is continuous passage, when the granted, for there was no conflict in the evi-passenger holds coupon tickets evidencing dence, and every material fact made necessary by that charge to relieve defendant from liability was proved. It must be conceded that plaintiff was not entitled to recover if the facts enumerated in the charge given existed, but the inquiry arises whether that charge did not make the defense to depend too much upon information given by the conductor to plaintiff, and upon his voluntary action based on such information. There can be no pretense that plaintiff was induced to go upon the mixed train, which did not run to his place of destination, by reason of any invitation or representation made by any servant of the company, and we understand it to be the duty of a person, situated as was plaintiff, to inform himself whether or not his right to transit over several roads within the line of an entire journey. The right of plaintiff was to travel, by one continuous journey, from Brenham to Ballinger, on such trains on appellant's road as carried passen. gers and made connection between these places, and this continuity would not be broken by any delay or change of cars made necessary by the conduct of appellant's business; but when plaintiff voluntarily took passage on a train which he must be held to have known would not convey him to Ballin. ger, and at a point on the line broke the journey, he must be held to have lost his right to enter another train and to be carried to Ballinger on the original contract, as fully as would he, had he, on the 23d of the month, come to Brownwood on the regular passenger | it on the subsequent day. The ticket is not train bound for Ballinger, and stopped over found in the transcript,-of its verbiage we at Brownwood until the next day. are not advised; and, in view of the fact Cases may arise in which, by accident, that the question already considered is demisfortune, fault of the carrier, or the mis-cisive of this appeal, we do not now deem conduct of employés of a carrier of passen- it necessary to determine whether the congers, continuous transit may be interrupted struction of such a contract as the petition without fault on the part of the passenger, describes ought to be as appellant contends, and in such cases the passenger may be en which would require the journey to be ended titled to resume his journey, and to be trans- before the expiration of the day named in ported as though no interruption had oc- the contract as its limit, or whether, if the curred; but no such facts exist in this case. passage was commenced before the expiration It is insisted that the time had expired, when of that day, it might be completed by conplaintiff was expelled from the train, during tinuous passage afterwards. There are dewhich he was entitled to travel on the ticket, cisions placing the latter construction on such and that the jury should have been so in contracts. Lundy v. Central Pac. R. Co. 66 structed and if the continuity of the journey Cal. 191, 56 Am. Rep. 100; Auerbach v. had not been broken it would be necessary New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. 89 N. Y. to decide whether, if the journey was begun 281, 42 Am. Rep. 290. on appellant's road before the close of May 24, 1888, plaintiff was entitled to complete For the errors noticed the judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded. NOTE.-Parol evidence of mistake in description of land devised. The English authorities from a very early date have given sanction to the principle, that parol evidence is admissible to correct a mistake in the description of either land devised or personal property bequeathed. Selwood v. Mildmay, 3 Ves. Jr. 206; Doe v. Hathwaite, 3 Barn. & Ald. 632; Mosley v. Massey, 8 East, 149: Thomas v. Thomas, 6 T. R. 671; Doe v. Oxenden, 3 Taunt. 147; Doe v. Hiscocks, 5 Mees. & W. 363: Miller v. Travers, 8 Bing. 244; Goodtitle v. Southern, 1 Maule & S. 299; Hodgson v. Hodgson, 2 Vern. 595; Lingren v. Lingren, 9 Beav. 358; Beaumont v. Fell, 2 P. Wms. 140; Day v. Trig, 1 P. Wins. 286. In the Federal courts it is an established canon of interpretation, applicable alike to deeds, written contracts, and testamentary devises, that extrinsic or parol evidence is competent for the purpose of applying the writing to its appropriate subjectmatter; and all courts, in the construction of a will, are controlled, as to the admission of evidence, by liberal considerations. Bradley v. Washington A. & G. Steam Packet Co. 38 U. S. 13 Pet. 99, 10 L. ed. 77; Doe v. Hiscocks, 5 Mecs. & W. 863; Blake v. Hawkins, 98 U. S. 325, 25 L. ed. 141; Maryland v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 89 U. S. 22 Wall. 112, 22 L. ed. 714: Blake v. Doherty, 18 U. S. 5 Wheat. 362, 5 L. ed. 109: Smith v. Bell, 31 U. S. 6 Pet. 75, 8 L. ed. 525; Clarke v. Johnston, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 502, 21 L. ed. 906; Atkinson v. Cummins, 50 U. S. 9 How. 485, 13 L. ed. 27; Wilkins v. Allen, 59 U. S. 18 How. 393, 15 L. ed. 398; King v. Ackerman, 67 U. S. 2 Black, 417, 17 L. ed. 298: Reed v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. of Baltimore, 95 U. S. 30, 24 L. ed. 349. 16 L. R. A. quarter of a certain section of 'and can. not be shown by parol evidence to men laud in the southwest quarter, as such a change would amount to a reformatiou of the will. (March 28, 1892.) APPEAL by defendant from a decree of the Court for Madison County dismissing her cross-bill and granting the relief prayed Equity has jurisdiction to correct mistakes in wills, only where the error appears upon the face of the will itself, so that both the mistake and the correction can be ascertained and supplied by the context, from a plain interpretation of the terms of the instrument as it stands. A resort to extrinsic evidence is never permitted either to show a mistake or to ascertain the correction. Mistakes which can be thus corrected may be in the names of legatees or devisees, in the description of property, or in other terms. 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. § 871, citing Re Aird's Estate, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 291; Whitfield v. Langdale, L. R.1 Ch. Div. 61; Barber v. Wood, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 885; Newman v. Piercey, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 41; Wilson v. Morley, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 776; Travers v. Blundell, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 436; Homer v. Homer, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 758; Garland v. Beverley, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 213; Re Nunn's Trusts, L. R. 19 Eq. 331; Farrer v. St. Catharine's College, L. R. 16 Eq. 19: Hardwick v. Hardwick, L. R. 16 Eq. 168; McKechnie v. Vaughan, L. R. 15 Eq. 289; Re Ingle's Trusts, L. R. 11 Eq. 578; Hall v. Lietch, L. R. 9 Eq. 376: Box v. Barrett, L. R. 3 Eq. 244; Hart v. Tulk, 2 DeG. M. & G. 300; Campbell v. Bouskell, 27 Beav. 325; Taylor v. Richardson, 2 Drew. 16; Snyder v. Warbasse, 11 N. J. Eq. 463; Wood v. White, 32 Me. 340, 52 Am. Dec. 654; Jackson v. Payne, 2 Met. (Ky.) 567; Goode v. Goode, 22 Mo. 518, 66 Am. Dec. 30: Trexler v. Miller, 41 N. C. 248: Johnson v. Hubbell, 10 N. J. Eq. 332, 66 Am. Dec. 773; Yates v. Cole, 54 N. C. 110; McAlister v. Butterfield. 31 Ind. 25; Erwin v. Hamner, 27 Ala. 296; Machem v. Machem, 28 Ala. 374; Nutt v. Nutt, 1 Freem. Ch. 128. A court may look beyond the face of the will 21 for by the bill in a suit to obtain partition of | certain land. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Happy & Travous, for appellant: It is presumed that a testator, when he makes and publishes his will, intends to dispose of his whole estate, unless the presumption is rebutted by its provisions, or evidence to the contrary. Higgins v. Duen, 100 m. 554; Smith v. Smith, 17 Gratt. 268; Irwin v. Zane, 15 W. Va. 646. When it is shown that the description of the subject of the devise, as it appears on the face of the will, is false in part, courts may look beyond the words of the will,-may place themselves in the position occupied by the testator when he executed the will,-and with the aid of extrinsic evidence, view the testator's where there is an ambiguity as to the person or | Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 440, 4 Am. Dec. 155; property to which it is applicable, but not to enlarge or diminish the estate devised. King v. Ackerman, 67 U. S. 2 Black, 417, 17 L. ed. 298. Watson v. Boylston, 5 Mass. 417; Tudor v. Terrel, 2 | Dana, 49; Hand v. Hoffman, 8 N. J. L. 86: Breckenridge v. Duncan, 2 A. K. Marsh. 51; Haydon v. Ewing, 1 B. Mon. 113; Capel v. Robarts, 3 Hagg. Eccl. 156. his language such an interpretation as it is reasonable to presume, from the circumstances in which he was placed, he intended it should receive, or to put the court in the place of the testator." 1 Redfield, Wills, 496; Scott v. Neeves, 77 Wis. 305. "As a latent ambiguity is only disclosed by extrinsic evidence, it may be removed by extrinsic evidence. Such an ambiguity may arise upon a will, Elsewhere the same author says: แ The admiseither when it names a person as the object of the sion of parol evidence in regard to wills is essentialgift, or a thing as the subject of it, and there are ly the same as that which prevails in regard to two persons or things that answer such name or contracts generally. It can be received to show description; or, secondly, it may arise when the the intention of the testator, and especially to enwill contains a misdescription of the object or sub-able the court, where the question arises, to give ject, as where there is no such person or thing in existence, or, if in existence, the person is not the one intended, or the thing does not belong to the testator. The first kind of ambiguity, where there are two persons or things equally answering the description, may be removed by any evidence that will have that effect. 1Jarman, Wills, 370; Hawkins, 9, 10." Patch v. White, 117 U. S. 240, 29 L. ed. 860. From the earliest period in the history of testamentary law, there has been manifested a disposition to apply a more favorable construction to wills than to ordinary legal instruments. Regret has sometimes been expressed at the disposition thus manifested, but the courts have nevertheless continued to countenance that line of judicial pol-ing icy. It must therefore be accepted and acted upon as an established rule of construction at the present time. Cleveland v. Spilman, 25 Ind. 95; Brownfield v. Brownfield, 12 Pa. 136; Wilkins v. Allen, 59 U. S. 18 How. 385, 15 L. ed. 396. O'Hara, in his work on the Interpretation of Wills, on page 374, concludes his review of void testamentary gifts as follows: "The question whether an uncertainty of the description of the subject or object of a gift by will can be cured or not by parol, resolves itself into the ulterior inquiry, Is the ambiguity so patent as that the testator shows that he was aware of it, and that he was leaving a part of his will undeclared in writing? As this is very rarely the case, it follows that at the present day hardly any case of uncertain or erroneous description in a will can occur which may not be remedied by parol." "The law is not so unreasonable as to deny to the reader of any instrument the same light which the writer enjoyed." Wigram, Wills, p. 161; Gilmer v. Stone, 120 U. S. 586, 30 L. ed. 734. The reasoning which sustains the admission of parol evidence to correct a misdescription as to the particular individual intended in a bequest would seem to apply with equel force when such evidence is introduced for the purpose of determinthe particular piece of property devised. Thus a mere misdescription of the legatee does not render the legacy void, unless the ambiguity is such as to render it impossible, either from the will or otherwise, to ascertain who was intended as the object of the testator's bounty. Smith v. Smith, 4 Paige, 271, 3 L. ed. 432. In Button v. American Tract Soc., 23 Vt. 836, neither of the claimants answered the description, and neither came any nearer to it than the other, but the will was construed with the aid of extrinsic circumstances. St. Luke's Home for I. C. F. v. Aged Indigent Females Asso. 52 N. Y. 191. And it has been held that when the will contains two inconsistent descriptions extrinsic evidence may be resorted to to ascertain which is the true description; and where there is a latent ambiguity, as, if the object of the testator's bounty or subject of disposition is described in terms applicable indifferently to more than one person or thing evidence is admissible to prove which of the persons or things was intended, including declarations of the testator. Gary's Probate Law, § 645, citing Case v. Young, 3 Minn. 209; Morgan v. Burrows, 45 Wis. 211; Sydnor v. Palmer, 29 Wis. 226; 1 Redfield, Wills, chap. 9. § 4; 2 Williams, Exrs. pt. 3, bk. 3, chan. 2, § 1; 2 Jarman, Wills, 762. Where the description of the subject-matter of the devise is mistaken, parol evidence has been admitted to aid the construction, by showing to what the testator must have referred. As where, on a devise of a house and lot in Fourth street, Philadelphia, it appeared the testator had no property in Fourth street, but did own a house and lot in Third street, in that city, it was held such property passed under the devise. And where the devise The purpose for which extrinsic evidence may was of "thirty-six acres, more or less of lot 37 in be legitimately admitted is not to add to or vary the second division in Barnstead," and there was or ordinarily to explain, the literal meaning of the no such lot in the second division in that town, but terms of the will, or to give effect to what may be the testator owned a portion of lot 97 in that divis- supposed to have been the unexpressed intention ion, it was held to pass under the devise. 1 Red- of the testator, but to connect the instrument with field, Wills, p. 584, citing Allen v. Lyons, 2 Wash. the extrinsic facts therein referred to, and to place C. C. 475; Riggs v. Myers, 20 Mo. 239: Cleveland v. the court, as nearly as may be, in the situation ocSpilman, 25 Ind. 95; Winkley v. Kaime, 32 N. H. cupied by the testator, so that his intention may 268; Redfield, Am. Cases on Wills, 547. See also Jack-be determined from the language of the instruson v. Goes, 13 Johns. 518, 7 Am. Dec. 399; Pritchardment, as it is explained by the extrinsic facts and v. Hicks, 1 Paige, 270, 2 L. ed. 643; Pinson v. Ivey, circumstances. Dougherty v. Rogers, 3 L. R. A. 1 Yerg. 206; Wusthoff v. Dracourt, 3 Watts, 243; 847, 119 Ind. 254, citing Greenpoint Sugar Co. v. Gass v. Ross, 3 Sneed, 211; Doe v. Roe, 1 Wend. 541; | Whitin, 69 N. Y. 328, 336. F. 8. R. |