MODERNIZING THE MONROE DOCTRINE. By Charles H. Sherrill. Introduction by Nicholas Murray Butler. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. $1.25. MR. R. SHERRILL'S study of the problem of how to make the Monroe Doctrine a practical, up-to-date method, beneficial for all concerned, of directing the interests of both the United States and South America, is the result of his own intimate acquaintance with both continents. He was for some years United States Minister to Argentina, where he paid much attention to the commercial, political, and intellectual developments of South American life, and he is now Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Chambers of Commerce of the United States. In this latter position he is devoting himself to the task of bringing this country into closer relations, not only commercially but in every way, with the South American republics. Within a week after the publication of his book the publishers received requests for permission to translate it into Russian, Japanese, and Spanish. In his introduction the author thus sets forth his position: I believe in Pan-Americanism and its great future because it is at the same time the most altruistic and the most practical foreign policy to which any country has ever devoted itself. It honorably reconciles the two seemingly irreconcilable shibboleths, " Safety First" and "America First," because it satisfies both our patriotism and our desire for security. It is based upon a study of and a regard for the viewpoint of other nations, thus educating the spirit of our own nation: advance the spiritual side of a whole people and things material will take care of themselves. It provides a definite foreign policy upon which the most practical of men may consistently unite with extreme idealists. It is an attempt to assemble the finest traits of twenty-one republics so as to employ them in combination for the common good of all, meanwhile disregarding their shortcomings: this mixture of appreciation and toleration will surely be as effective when applied in the family of nations as it has proved in many a family of individuals. Once this attitude of mind is gained, it matters little how much the republics concerned differ in racial traits. Pan-Americanism makes for a broader and deeper type of patriotism, because it adds consideration for the viewpoint of other nations to the narrower and often selfish patriotism for one's homeland, whose interests, nevertheless, it safeguards. Some policies are only beneficial when completely worked out, but Pan-Americanism, even when incomplete, is beneficial, and complete it would be an immeasurable blessing. It is the most practical agent for international peace thus far devised. * * * In the early part of the book the author cites many facts and describes many conditions in the attempt to show the people of this country the truth about South America, its life and its people, in matters concerning which there is here much misconception. He shows, for instance, that the Latin originals of South America have been as much modified in character as have the immigrants who came to this country, and it is his conviction that the process of Americanization "has been working simultaneously in both North and South America until we have almost reached a point of PanAmerican equilibrium." He urges that in every possible way, especially by utilizing the help of newspapers in the dissemination of news in this country about South America, and in South America about the United States, by bringing the Chambers of Commerce of the two regions in closer touch, and by creating reciprocal interests in their colleges and universities, South and North America be brought to a clearer understanding of each other's needs, views, and possibilities of mutual helpfulness. Passing from consideration of the means by which peace and mutual understanding can be assured, he advances a plan for the removal of friction between this entire hemisphere and Europe on the one side, and Asia on the other. It is, in brief, that the United States should ex change the Philippine Islands for certain European territory in the Western world: Trade the Philippines for all European possessions to the south of us, plus freedom of hand in the Panama Canal by an agreed annulment of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, and then turn the Guianas and British Honduras into free republics, return the Falkland Islands to Argentina, and take under our own flag the West Indian Islands, so important to the defense of the great canal. Germany vs. Civilization" GERMANY VS. CIVILIZATION: NOTES MR. R. THAYER, author of noteworthy biographies of John Hay and Cavour, calls the present conflict the Atrocious War throughout his book. Not only does he charge Germany with aggression and with savage methods, but he also condemns President Wilson bitterly for not protesting at the outset against German violations of international law in Belgium. He says: We were the most powerful free people in the world, and to possess power imposes the obligation to use it in behalf of the weak. The little countries looked to us for leadership, looked and listened and waited, and we gave them neither sign nor sound. They would have joined us in protest even at the risk of bringing on themselves the fury of the Germans, within whose reach they dwelt. Our silence the silence of President Wilson, letting "I dare not wait upon “İ would"-brought to them the desolating conviction that the United States would officially utter no declaration in behalf either of neutrality or of humanity. We tacitly admitted that a small nation has no rights, that neutral nations may be overrun and destroyed at the pleasure of a powerful aggressor. Having devoted chapters to the Kaiser, Kultur, and the barbarous strain in the German nature, Mr. Thayer gives one to "Germanizing America," in which he addresses himself to the plots and activities of Germans in the United States. His view is indicated in the following passages: Germany practiced a peculiarly ignoble form of deceit in permitting her subjects who came to this country to become nat uralized American citizens, with the tacit understanding that when they returned home they might resume their German citizenship. The purpose of this double shuffle was evident as soon as the war broke out. Germans who had resided here for years, never hinting that they wished to become Americans, suddenly applied for naturalization papers, and were soon presiding at pro-German meetings or editing pro-German journals, and setting themselves up as expounders of the Americanism of Washington and Lincoln. One hardly knows which to despise more, the deceit or the impudence. * * * Glancing at the recoil of these activities upon German-Americans themselves after the war, Mr. Thayer says: Only men convinced that they must win at any cost and by any means could resort to the terrorist methods which these agents use. But what if the Kaiser does not win? In what state will the hyphenate, seditious Germans here be left? Can they suppose that the Americans who are and intend to remain Americans will welcome them as neighbors? Will the American workmen who have been thrown out of employment by the blowing up of their factories feel kindly toward the Teutons who committed these crimes? Will American business men, whose legitimate business and investments have been blocked by German capitalists, cherish no resentment? Will American universities tolerate professors who have been slyly preaching sedition? It is far more likely that for a generation to come the very word "German will be detested in the United States and that every German will have to show cause why he should not be regarded as a secret enemy of this country. In his final chapter Mr. Thayer views the war as a death grapple between despotism and democracy. A SLANDER: NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF THE PEROID PRECEDING THE WORLD WAR. By Professor Doctor Theodor Schiemann. Berlin: J. S. Preuss. PROFESSOR SCHIEMANN, an emi His nent German historian, and friend of the Kaiser, has undertaken to answer the most damaging of all the anti-German books on the war-"J'Accuse." answer is in the form of a brochure entitled "A Slander," narrating the diplomatic history of the years preceding the war, and seeking to prove that there was a conspiracy of France, England, and Russia to strangle Germany. His main propositions are these: That this war was desired by France in the first instance, was brought closer by the RussianFrench alliance, and, through England's joining hands with those conspirators, became, under English leadership, necessary and inevitable. That these three powers had long since resolved to break Germany's powerful strategic position in Central Europe, and had been systematically working to educate the world up to the notion that this proceeding was a moral necessity. That in this war which has been forced upon us our goal should be the permanent safeguarding of our borders and the freeing of the seas from English tyranny. Professor Schiemann holds that Bernhardi merely pointed out the necessity of grasping the sword before this conspiracy became active: The plot, he says, began with King Edward's entente with France, but it first became dangerous when England and Russia got together in 1907 and divided Persia between them. "This was designed above all else," he believes, "to make of Persia the booty by means of which Russia should be led to an understanding with England over the great questions of European policy." Then followed the crisis of 1908 and the meeting of King Edward and the Czar, with their diplomatic representtatives: Iswolsky declared himself ready. to proceed with England against Germany as soon as Russia should have sufficiently strengthened itself in a military way. Six or eight years was the longest period contemplated for this purpose, that is to say, till between the years 1914 and 1916. As long as Clemenceau remained in office it could be reckoned on that France would under all circumstances join in. To Dr. Schiemann's mind the defensive agreements entered into by Great Britain and France at critical moments in the succeeding years were aggressive acts in a settled program for the ultimate and deliberate crushing of Germany. The most important of the comparatively new evidence that he cites is in regard to a secret naval convention entered into between Great Britain and Russia about two months before the war broke out. As the actual signing of this convention admittedly took place only after hostilities had begun, little has been said about it; but Dr. Schiemann gives it several pages, with details said to be taken from the minutes of an Admiralty conference held at St. Petersburg May 26, 1914, agreeing upon concerted action of the British and Russian navies. If this brochure lacks the sweeping eloquence of " J'Accuse," it has the power of quiet earnestness and of a trained historical mind. |