N the 23d day of June, 1914, Francis Ferdinand, Archduke and nephew of the Emperor of Austria, also Commander in Chief of the Austro-Hungarian Army and heir to the throne, left Vienna to review army manoeuvres in the Province of Bosnia. On Sunday, the 28th day of June, he visited Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The Archduke and his wife, the Duchess of Hornberg, rode in their automobile through the streets of Serajevo, and at a certain point of their progress they were fired upon by an assassin and both were killed.

Few crimes have aroused deeper horror throughout Europe and the world at large. Public opinion and the Governments of Europe were ready to uphold Austria-Hungary in any measure, however severe, that the Austrian Government might think necessary for the punishment of the assassin and his accomplices.

It was immediately apparent from the reports of representatives from the various capitals of Europe that the public of Austria-Hungary, as represented through the press, attributed the greater part of the responsibility of the dastardly crime to the Serbian Government, which, they said, had encouraged a revolutionary spirit and thus brought about a revolutionary movement among the Serbian population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

There is no question that there had. been a strong Serb agitation for years previous to the murder of the Archduke and his wife, in the two provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This same agitation and revolutionary movement swept the provinces, (antedating the rule of Austria, and while they were yet a part of the Turkish Empire,) during the early

seventies, followed by the war of 18771878 between Turkey and Russia. At the treaty of Berlin, in 1878, Austria was given the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Austria gave her pledge to Turkey that her occupation of the provinces should not interfere with the sovereignty of the Sultan of Turkey over them.

In 1908 Austria suddenly proclaimed the annexation of these provinces. On Oct. 7 of that year the annexation was celebrated at Serajevo-the city which, nearly six years later, was to witness the murder of the heir to the Austrian throne-by the firing of salutes and the ringing of the great cathedral bells, amid scenes of official rejoicing, but of popular indifference and apathy.

The Serbian Government at the time protested to the powers of Europe against the annexation as an insult and injury to the rights of the Serbian people. A war cloud loomed up ominously. Russia and several of the powers showed resentment, but after six months' tension Serbia was induced to abandon her claim and promised to live on good terms with Austria.

Her na

But Serbia was dissatisfied. tional aspirations were not quenched, and were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan war of 1912-1913, a success which was, however, restrained by Austria in her opposition to Serbia's territorial expansion. As Serbia grew Austria's jealousy and suspicion of Serbian designs grew also.

The assassination of the Crown Prince sent a wave of anti-Serbian passion over Austria. Mobs in Vienna threatened the Serbian Legation. The entire Austrian press used severe and unbridled language, calling for quick punishment of the Serbian people. Rioters at Sera

In view of these conditions, the disinterested powers sought to wield their influence in the direction of reconciling justice with peace. Though the attitude of public opinion in Austria, and perhaps to a less degree in Germany, was very plain, the intentions of the Austrian Government remained obscure. The Austrian Foreign Office was exceedingly reticent, especially with the British and Russian Ambassadors.

On July 7 the Austrian Government announced that the joint meeting of Austro-Hungarian Cabinets which had just taken place was only concerned with the question of domestic measures to repress the Pan-Serb propaganda in Bosnia. On the 8th day of July the Hungarian Minister, President of Hungary, made a pacific speech in the Hungarian Parliament defending the Serb subjects of the empire and eulogizing their loyalty.

July 11 the Serbian Minister at Vienna said that there was no reason to anticipate a threatening communication from the Austrian Government, and as late as July 22, 1914, the day before the ultimatum of the Austrian Government was received at Belgrade, the Minister-President of Hungary stated in the Hungarian Parliament that the situation did not warrant the opinion that a serious turn of events was necessary, or even probable.

It was known that Serbia had made known her readiness to accept any demands compatible with the sovereignty of an independent State. It was also known that the French, Russian, and German Governments held to the belief that the Serbian Government was not to blame for the crime, but that she must be ready to investigate, as well as put an end to, the murderous propaganda that had led up to it. It was also be

lieved that it originated, partly, at least, on Serbian soil.

Sir Edward Grey, the English Foreign Secretary, advised Serbia to conduct herself in a spirit of moderation and conciliation. He also promised the German Ambassador at London to use his influence in the same way with the Russian Government. What more could be done at the time? There was no actual evidence that Serbian territory had been made the base of revolutionary operations against Austria-Hungary. The Serbian Government also stated that the two assassins implicated were both Austrian subjects, and that on a former occasion the Austrian Government had informed the Serbian Government that one of the assassins was perfectly harmless and was under their protection.

It was generally assumed that before Austria took any definite action she would disclose to the public her case against Serbia.

The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente remained just as they had been for years. Said Sir Edward Grey to the German Ambassador: "We have been quite recently assured that no new secret element had been introduced into the Triple Alliance, and that the Triple Entente remained unchanged so far as England was concerned, and with France and Russia also, so far as we know." As late as May 23, 1914, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed that the policy of the Russian State was as before, the Balkans for the Balkans, and it was known that any attack on a Balkan State by any great European power would be regarded as a menace to that policy.

As late as June 29, 1914, the Austrian Ambassador said to the English Foreign Secretary that "Serbia was regarded by them as being in the Austrian sphere of influence." Sir Edward replied: "If Serbia is to be humiliated, then most assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent and would not."

Sir Edward Grey said further: "It was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmanship at St. Petersburg, but of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian

people for more than two centuries of development." This was known in European diplomacy in the past; it was one of the facts of the European situation, the product of the centuries. Patient work for years might change it, but you couldn't push it aside in a day.

On July 23, 1914, Austria showed her hand. She delivered an ultimatum at Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, and required an answer absolute within fortyeight hours. Ten demands were made on Serbia, as follows: The suppression of newspapers and literature, the suppression of nationalist societies, a reorganization of Government schools, the dismissal of officers from the army, the participation of Austrian officers in judiciary proceedings in Serbia, the prevention of all traffic in arms across the frontier, a full explanation of anti-Austrian utterances, immediate notification of the enforcement of these measures, the Serbian Government to publish on the front page of the official journal a prescribed statement amounting to a full recantation of her alleged errors, and a promise of amendment.

To these ten demands was annexed a very brief summary of the secret trial at Serajevo, without any corroborative evidence attached.

What independent nation could accept such an ultimatum and be worthy of independent national existence? Only twelve days intervened between this ultimatum and the declaration of war between Great Britain and Germany. the whirl of negotiations which ensued there was scarcely time for pondering.

In

When Sir Edward Grey learned of the ultimatum through the Austrian Ambassador at London he expressed grave alarm. There was no time to advise Russia or to influence Serbia. At this critical moment everything depended on Germany. Great Britain during those momentous forty-eight hours made three attempts at peace for Europe. Above all things the time limit of the ultimatum must be extended. Russia and Great Britain urged this at Vienna. Great Britain also urged Germany to join in pressing the matter on the Austrian Government. Berlin simply consented to

Sir Edward Grey then urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy should work together at Vienna and St. Petersburg for conciliation. France assented. Italy assented. Russia declared herself ready to compromise, and Germany said that she had no objections,. if the relation between Austria and Russia became threatening.

Then the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade were instructed to advise Serbia to go as far as possible to meet Austria. But it was too late. Austria would not extend the time limit. Serbia, however, anticipated the advice of Russia, France, and Great Britain, for on the afternoon of the 25th of July, 1914, several hours before the time limit had expired, Serbia made reply to the Austrian ultimatum. The reply was an entire acceptance of the Austrian demands, subject to the necessary delay in passing new laws and the amending of her Constitution, and subject also to an explanation of Austria-Hungary as to her precise wishes with regard to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Serbian judicial proceedings.

Serbia's reply went far beyond what any of the great powers, not even excepting Germany, had thought possible for Serbia to submit to. The same day, the 25th of July, the British Ambassador at Vienna reported to his home Government that the tone of the Austrian press left the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported to his home Government that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable.

In spite of the conciliatory nature of Serbia's reply, the Austrian Minister left Belgrade that very evening, July 25, 1914. Serbia then ordered a general mobilization of her army. The Serbian reply to Austria had been wired to Sir Edward Grey at London, and he immediately wired Berlin that he hoped Germany would urge Austria to accept. Germany again contented herself with merely "passing on" the expression of Sir Edward's hope to Vienna through the German Ambassador there. The

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fate of such a message passed on " may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador shortly afterward that Serbia had only made a pretense of giving way, and that all her pretenses to concession were a mere sham.

Austria declared war on Serbia July 28, 1914; on July 29, Russia ordered partial mobilization, and Austrian troops were bombarding Belgrade, Serbia's capital. On the 29th of July, Sir Edward Grey, at about 4 o'clock P. M., wired to Berlin once more on representations more favorable made by the German Ambassador in London, and also in accordance with a request from the Russian Government," Urging the German Government, if they did not like the Ambassador's conference, to suggest any other form they pleased. Mediation," said Sir Edward Grey, was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought proper, if only Germany would press the button in the interests of peace"

About midnight of the 29th day of July a telegram was received at the British Foreign Office from the English Ambassador at Berlin. He said: "The German Chancellor sent for me late at night and propounded the following question: Would Great Britain promise to remain neutral in a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from France but her colonies?" The German Chancellor refused to give any undertaking that Germany would not invade Belgium, but promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory would be taken away from her.

Sir Edward Grey's answer was a flat refusal, but contained the following exhortation: "The business of Europe was to work for peace; and that was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would now prove by her actions that she desired peace, Great Britain would warmly welcome a future agreement with her whereby the whole weight of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come."

Up to and including the 29th day of

July the only conflict had been on the frontiers of Serbia and Austria; the chief fear was an outbreak between Russia and Austria. Russia had declared that she desired nothing greater than a period of peace to work up her internal improvement and advancement. Germany had declared that her interests were for peace, and France said that she would not fight except to help her ally.

There seemed, on the face of things, no insuperable difficulty in keeping the peace of Europe. But the inquiry of the German Chancellor let the cat out of the bag. Great Britain now knew that Germany was contemplating an attack on France. She knew also that the independence of the Low Countries, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark, had for generations been considered one of the greatest obstacles to a general war, a strong lever for the peace and good-will of Europe. The neutrality of Belgium had been devised and consecrated as a safeguard by two international treaties signed by all the great powers of Europe and recognized by at least two generations of European statesmen. Germany had shown her hand and was ready to smash the main pivot of the concert of Europe. Having decided upon a war with France, Belgium was of supreme importance to Germany. She undoubtedly assumed that if she failed to occupy Belgium, France would, most likely, do So. Acting on that suspicion, Germany took the initiative; but the neutrality of Belgium had not been devised as a pretext for war, but to prevent war.

The British Government therefore on July 31 asked the German and French Governments for an agreement to respect Belgian neutrality, and the Belgian Government for an engagement to uphold it. France gave the necessary engagement the same day, Belgium the day after; but Germany made no reply. Silence was the gauntlet of defiance thrown down. German designs were alarmingly apparent. Late on the evening of July 29 Russia had offered to stop all military preparations if Austria would recognize that her conflict with Serbia had become a question of general European interest and would eliminate from her ultimatum