'maintaining the open door is Great Britain able to justify the 'holding of one-fourth of the world's productive territories. Only by maintaining or rather, establishing fairly-the 'principle of equal advantages to all comers, can France hope 'to keep and develop properly her vast African empire.' Mr. Gibbons has a good right to say this, inasmuch as he is a warm admirer of the spirit which informs most of the French colonial administration. Exactly the same view is taken throughout British West Africa; it is almost the only criticism one hears of the French West African colonies. In a very interesting paper read before the Royal Society of Arts in May last* on the problems of French North Africa, Captain Millet of 'Le 'Temps' touches incidentally upon the same point. While giving a most gratifying account of the results achieved by his country in Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, Captain Millet refers incidentally to the protectionist policy as having been deplorable in many ways.'

But while pressing this point in the interests of French no less than of British possessions, it is important to add that there are other equally important reforms needed where French and British possessions are contiguous. In remote colonies, old national rivalries have a sharper edge than in the more tolerant circles of great capitals, and such rivalries often breed a quite unnecessary amount of friction. What Captain Millet says of North Africa, that British and French rule will stand or fall together, is equally true of West Africa.

Unfortunately, some of the men whose lives are spent in British or French African possessions have not yet realised this mutuality of interest. So soon as men of the calibre necessary can be spared, both Governments would perhaps be well advised to send to the West African groups of colonies one or two Special Commissioners who, speaking with authority based upon practical acquaintance with the conditions of colonial life, could advise their respective governments as to the best means of securing local co-operation between contiguous colonies. France and Great Britain have undertaken tremendous responsibilities in West Africa, and it is of the utmost importance for the efficient discharge of these trustee

Problems of French North Africa.' By Captain Philippe Millet. 'Journal of the Royal Society of Arts,' June 8 and 15, 1917.

ships that local colonial administrations should act in loyal and constant co-operation with one another.

We now pass to the question whether the Colonies which Germany held before the war should be restored to her, or not. The primary answer to that question can be stated in uncompromising terms. When one country wantonly attacks its neighbours after years of careful preparation for war, they are morally entitled, when they have defeated the aggressor, to insist upon reparation for the wrong done. Therefore, even if the German colonies in Africa were inhabited by Germans, France and Great Britain would be fully justified in retaining those colonies if they wanted them, either as part payment for the enormous damage that Germany has done, or as a strategic precaution against similar aggression in the future. It is, however, unnecessary to press this primary answer. For, with the partial exception of South-West Africa, German African colonies contain the merest handful of Germans. The same statement can be made with regard to Germany's Asiatic possessions. Altogether the German Colonial Empire before the war occupied over a million square miles. Of this total, well over 900,000 square miles were in Africa; nearly 100,000 square miles in the South Pacific; and about 200 square miles at Kiau-chau. The Colonies were begun in Africa, the first conquest by the Allies was made in Africa, and public discussion, with a sure instinct, is occupying itself mainly with the African territory. So far as Kiau-chau is concerned, the matter has already gone beyond discussion. The refusal of Japan and China to restore Kiau-chau to Germany is certain. This fact has a direct influence both upon the Pacific and upon the African problem. Germany's Pacific Colonies, and an important fraction of her African Colonies, were conquered, not by Imperial but by Dominion forces. Doubtless that conquest would have been impossible without the aid, immediate or in reserve, of the Imperial navy. It is also true that the then Colonial Secretary, Mr. Harcourt, in inviting the Dominions to seize the German territories, laid it down that they were to be placed at the disposal of the Imperial Government after the war. Nevertheless, if the Imperial Government should decide to hand back these colonies to Germany, while Japan declines to hand back Kiau-chau, our sister-States will assuredly conclude that membership of the Empire has served them

an ill turn, imposing costly burdens of watchful defence upon their peoples and their revenues, and depriving them of the protection for their future interests which their own arms had won. In the account as between the South African Union and what was German South-West Africa any attempt at restoration would involve a political earthquake from one end of the Union to the other. One great argument used against General Botha by his opponents in the Union, many of whom went into rebellion, was that every informed person knew that the Union was only sacrificing hundreds of lives and millions of money to take a country which would have to be handed back to Germany after the war. Restoration would not merely represent a represent a betrayal betrayal (however (however unintentional) of people who stood staunchly by our cause in circumstances of almost unprecedented difficulty, though this is a great deal. It would also in all human probability mean that political power in the Union would pass, through the eclipse and discrediting of General Botha and his party, into the hands of men at once hostile to the Empire and disposed to act in complete harmony with Prussia's agents in the restored territory.

Mr. Morel, in his rhetorical plea for the reinstatement of Germany as an African Power, uses arguments which the case of German South-West Africa disposes of altogether. He invites us to consider the situation of

' a nation having no colonisable areas at its disposal overseas where it can dispose of its human surplus (and still retain that surplus within the national fold). . . . The Germans have no room for race-expansion, either in contiguity to their own borders, or in temperate areas overseas.'

Mr. Morel apparently has not visited German South-West Africa, or he would know that the Colony, which has an area of over 320,000 square miles, is like the adjacent South African Union in having a climate in which the European race thrives perfectly well. It thrives so well that Mr. Gibbons, who has visited it, found that even so far back as 1909

'German colonists increased 300 per cent., and the Government began to work hand in hand with the settlers to develop in every possible way the agricultural and mining resources of the Colony. There were 10,000 Germans, exclusive of the army, in the Colony in 1914. At the outbreak of the war, 1400 miles of railway, 2500

miles of telegraph line and over 400 miles of telephone line were the achievement of a decade.'

Such results reflect creditably upon German enterprise and initiative-backed by the German Imperial exchequer. But Mr. Gibbons forgets to mention that the native population of German South-West Africa has in a generation fallen by more than half; he forgets to mention the deliberate massacre of the Hereros, and the persistent brutality with which natives were treated by German settlers and German soldiers. British and Dutch South Africans have not a spotless record in the treatment of subject races; but their standard is immensely higher than that of the Germans, and the occupation of 'German 'South-West' by the Union forces has meant for the natives of this huge territory liberation from an atrocious and callous tyranny. On this ground alone, apart from all others, the restoration of South-West Africa to Germany must be pronounced impossible.

There remains the question of Germany's tropical colonies-Togoland, the Cameroons, and German East Africa. These tropical countries are peopled by many races, without combination and practically without possibility of united leadership. Some of the races are at the primitive stage of development, though others, particularly along the coast, are led by men of high character and attainments.

Here again Mr. Gibbons seems to be hypnotised by the material side of Germany's rule. He writes:

Germany has outstripped all other colonising Powers in Africa in four things, all of which are strikingly illustrated in the little Colony of Togoland: road-building for co-operation with railways and transport; accommodation for travellers in the interior; scientific forestry; and supervision of public health.'

The point about rest-houses is well taken, though, as ten thousand pounds will supply a country the size of Togoland with all the rest-houses it needs, and a couple of hundred pounds a year will keep them in good order, it does not in fact signify much. The railways and the roads are indisputable facts. What Mr. Gibbons means by 'supervision of public health is less intelligible. In 1894 the official return of the native population of Togoland was two millions and a half; in 1913 that population was returned at a million less. Is this the

result of health supervision? The truth is that German rule makes life intolerable for African natives. As regards the Cameroons, this is admitted even by Dr. Solf. Speaking in the Reichstag he openly deplored the 'melancholy' appearance of the natives, and declared that a remedy must be found. There is nothing recondite about the causes of these things. Mr. Gibbons indicates them in a later paragraph:

'In British West African Colonies, a European is fined who strikes a native. In the German Colonies, one can flog a native up to twenty-five lashes. This helps greatly in making the native work: But the method is incompatible with Anglo-Saxon ideas of the way things should be done.'

Yet, in spite of this clear recognition of the fundamental difference between the status of a native African under British and under German rule, Mr. Gibbons-writing it must be noticed before his own country had joined the Allies-pleads for the restoration of these unfortunates to German rule. His argument is that Germany ought to be allowed room for expansion, and that when once Prussian militarism has been crushed, the world will have no further quarrel with the German people. This distinction between the German government and the German people is, of course, a very popular thesis in the United States. It is difficult to discover in the sermons of German pastors, in the articles in the German press, and in the declarations of the German Socialist parties the least evidence in favour of such a distinction. At any rate it would be a monstrous act of perfidy to the natives who have now passed under French and British rule if they were traded back to Germany. They have joyfully transferred their allegiance, and they know -and Mr. Morel, the pro-German apologist, also in his heart well knows that wholesale hangings, floggings, confiscation of property, and burning of villages await them if they are handed back. The Allies have been scrupulously loyal to one another throughout this terrific war; they owe equal loyalty to the defenceless natives of Africa, who have welcomed their protecting flags.

MALLAM.