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for nearly eleven years in Austria-Hungary. I was in Vienna throughout the Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908-1909, and the Balkan wars of 1912-13. During those crises I repeatedly discussed with prominent Austrians, and with members of the Austro-Hungarian Staff, the likelihood of a general European war. From them I gained the impression that war was probable, if not certain, in a comparatively near future, that the pretext chosen would be some Austro-Serbian dispute and that, while the Austro-Hungarian forces engaged Serbia and withstood or invaded Russia, the German army would attack France swiftly through Belgium. This plan of campaign was by no means new. It had been discussed by the French Premier, M. Clémenceau, with Sir Edward Grey in London after the funeral of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in April 1908, and, as I have reason to know, was again mentioned by M. Clémenceau during his interview with King Edward at Marienbad in August of the same year. In the autumn of 1912, when the peace of Europe depended upon the action or inaction of Austria-Hungary in regard to the advance of the Serbian forces towards the Adriatic, the events of August 1914 were within an ace of being antedated by more than eighteen months. This was clearly understood in Vienna, though prominent Englishmen in London then expressed horror at the idea that England might be compelled to fight a continental war at a moment's notice on account of an Austro'Serbian quarrel.' Therefore, when I returned to England in the following autumn (1913), it was with a keen sense of the danger which any Austro-Serbian complication must involve for the peace of Europe. As far as I could discover, my apprehensions were not shared in any responsible British quarter. At the Foreign Office firm trust prevailed in the peaceful intentions of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The influence of Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, and of Count Albert Mensdorff, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, was at least as strong as that of the Entente ambassadors, M. Paul Cambon and Count Benckendorff; while the ubiquitous and indefatigable Herr von Kühlmann had established confidential relations with many permanent officials, just as he had succeeded in hypnotising the majority of London editors. If the Austro-Hungarian Embassy was less active, its influence was equally potent in the official world. Count Albert Mens

dorff I had known since September 1904, but had never sought to cultivate his acquaintance. Between October 1913 and July 1914 I met him by chance once or twice, but I had never called at, or had any relations with, the Austro-Hungarian Embassy. In the spring of 1914, moreover, the Austrian autho

es had confiscated my bock, The Hapsburg Monarchy,' for the crime of insult to Majesty,' the charge being founded pon the following passage torn from its context:

bile personally unselfish, generous and just, ever ready recess a private injury or to alleviate public distress,

seth, as a ruler, has often seemed callous to the punt it symom and "constitutional" to the point of sole.' It was manifestly difficult for an English writer this accused of Majestätsbeleidigung to maintain intimate relations with the representative of His Imperial and Royal Apostile Majesty at the Court of St. James's.

On Friday the 15th of July 1914, I was suddenly, but very pressingly invited by an old Viennese acquaintance, Herr Max Goldscheider, the correspondent in London of the Neues Wiener Tagblatt.' to supper, or as he called it, a gemütlichen Horrendbend at his house. There I found Count Dubsky and several other members of the staff of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy, besides the Consul-General, Count Sizzo-Noris. The only other non-Austrians present were Mr. Sidney Low and the President of the Foreign Press Association, M. Coudurier de Chassaigne. The chief topic of conversation was naturally the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenberg at Sarayevo on the previous June 28th, in regard to which the Austro-Hungarian diplomatists began by expressing orthodox official views. From these, as an expert Austrian,' I dissented vigorously, and asked pointedly for an explanation of the strange failure of the Bosnian authorities to make any arrangements for the protection of their heir-presumptive and his consort; and also for some plausible reason why none of the authorities guilty of such neglect had been punished or even reprimanded. I did more than hint that there had been deliberate negligence to protect the Archduke and his wife.

Next morning (Saturday, July 17th), to my astonishment,

t Dubsky telephoned from the Austro-Hungarian Emto ask me to lunch with the Ambassador. I declined.

The invitation was immediately renewed for the Sunday. Again I declined. Thereupon Count Mensdorff expressed the hope that I would come on Monday. Once more I refused. But, nothing abashed, he pressed me, through Count Dubsky, to come on the Tuesday (July 20th). Feeling that there must be some imperative reason for this insistence, I accepted, and on Tuesday lunched with Count Albert Mensdorff and Baron von Frankenstein, the Commercial Attaché.

After luncheon the Ambassador said: 'I wish to appeal 'to you, as a friend of Austria, to use your influence in the 'British press in order that the position of Austria-Hungary in this crisis may be rightly understood. It is impossible 'for us longer to tolerate Serbian provocation. Serbia must 'be punished; but if the press will give the lead, British public opinion will remain friendly to us, and the conflict may be 'localised.'

I answered that I was too good a friend of Austria to help her to commit suicide.

The Ambassador seemed shocked by the word 'suicide,' and asked whether I thought Austria-Hungary so weak as not to be able to deal with a little people of three or four millions.

'You can certainly crush Serbia,' I replied, 'if you are 'left alone to do it; but even in that case you will be committing suicide. You must reckon on a war of eight or nine months, 'you will be obliged to mobilise at least 600,000 men, you will 'lose some 200,000 killed and wounded, and will spend not 'less than £120,000,000. That will complete the ruin of your 'finances. You are not unaware that Austria alone has, on the confession of your Finance Minister, been making debts at 'the rate of £40,000 a day for the last ten years. Taxation 'is already so high that it cannot be increased. When you 'have conquered Serbia, you will be confronted with the 'problem of a costly military occupation, which will require ' an army of 200,000 men and should you annex the country, 'you will create a solid block of 12,000,000 Southern Slavs, 'whose weight will so upset the Dual System that, in order 'to keep her hold on you, Germany will demand and obtain 'such military, political, and economic pledges of control over 'you that your independence will vanish.'

'But that,' I continued, 'is not what will happen. At the 'first shot you fire across the Save, Russia will cry "Hands VOL. 226. NO. 462.

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""off!" Germany will summon Russia not to intervene, and 'Russia will refuse, because compliance would cost the Tsar his 'throne. Germany will then mobilise, and will bolt through 'Belgium into France; and when England sees German troops ' in Belgium, she will intervene against Germany and against 'you.'

'You will never intervene !' cried the Ambassador.

'We shall certainly intervene,' I returned.

'I have the assurance that you will not intervene,' replied Count Mensdorff.

'I care nothing for your assurance,' I answered; 'you do not know the strength of English public feeling.'

'Then you will not help us?' said Count Mensdorff.

'On no account whatever,' I answered; and took leave of the Ambassador immediately.

The behaviour and language of Count Mensdorff seemed so significant that I informed the Foreign Office at once.

I said that Count Mensdorff's attitude proved to me that Austria-Hungary was bent on war and that Germany was supporting her, since the Ambassador would never have acted and spoken as he had done had he not received urgent instructions from his Government. These instructions could never have been given-in view of the intimate relationship between Berlin and Vienna-were not Austrian policy concerted with Germany. The decision to provoke war, I added, must be several days old, since, had I not refused to lunch with Count Mensdorff on Saturday the 17th, he would probably have spoken then as he had spoken on the 20th. I urged that, in my opinion, the only way to avert a European war in which England would be obliged to intervene would be for Sir Edward Grey immediately to explain in public the peril to which peace was exposed, and to declare that, if Germany and Austria attempted to make the Sarayevo murders a pretext for war, England would stand by France and Russia from the outset. Otherwise the Government would find themselves in ten days or a fortnight with a terrible crisis on their hands and would not know which way to turn, because they would not be sure of the support of a public opinion that would be utterly ignorant of the vital issues at stake.

My suggestions were thought extravagant. The Foreign Office, it appeared, had reason to believe German policy to

be pacific, and to expect Germany to exercise a restraining influence upon Austria. Any alarmist action would 'spoil 'the diplomatic atmosphere' and bring on the very crisis which Sir Edward Grey and the Government desired to avert. During the fortnight between July 20th and the outbreak of war the Austro-Hungarian and German Embassies strained every nerve to influence the British Press in their favour, and achieved an astonishing degree of success. Thus AustriaHungary followed the fatal course from which a courageous British Government and an informed public might perhaps have saved her. Now, after more than three years of war, it is dawning upon wide circles of opinion in this and Allied countries that there can be no lasting peace in Europe unless the subject Hapsburg peoples be liberated and the Hapsburg dominions radically transformed.

Against this dawning conviction there is, indeed, a noticeable and not altogether spontaneous reaction. The cry no dis'memberment of Austria' has been echoed in the strangest quarters. Roman Catholic' Clericals' and the Russian Soviet, the Italian 'official' (or Germanophil) Socialists and British and French Conservatives have vied with British Pacifists, sundry Radicals, and the organs of international finance in repeating it. Little experience of the workings of the parallel and often mysteriously correlated intrigues of international finance and international clericalism is required to detect the sources of this pro-Austrian agitation. With those who are its conscious tools, argument is useless; but to the great majority of actual or potential Austrophils, who act and speak in uninformed good faith, some questions may usefully be put. When they speak of 'Austria' what do they mean? Have they in mind merely the Emperor Charles and his government or governments, or do they mean the peoples of the AustroHungarian monarchy? Do they desire the continuance of the Monarchy in its present dual form, or do they contemplate some federalist rearrangement of the Hapsburg dominions? If so, by what means is the rearrangement to be brought about? On the supposition that it might be possible to induce the Germans of Austria to accept, for the Austrian half of the Monarchy, the federalist programme against which they have always desperately fought, how is it intended to carry through the 'federalisation' of Hungary? And, without the

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