tion of the Catholic Mexican States; and it permits the immigrants from the celestial empire to re-establish their institutions, and take their places as members of this imperial republic.

Does any one suggest that we have carried the doctrine of popular sovereignty so far that it is either dangerous or ridiculous? It is certainly ridiculous enough in theory, and it would be infinitely dangerous in practice; but Mr. Douglas went as far at Columbus the other day, when he asserted that there was no difference between States and Territories. But, we may humbly ask, if there is no difference, why appoint Committees of Congress on Territories? Why consume the time of senators and representatives in framing governments for people who have full and complete rights of their own as citizens of perfect States? Why has Mr. Douglas himself stood patiently and laboriously at the head of the Committee on Territories, until he was dethroned by his political friends? Is there any such Committee on States? Would it be proposed by anybody? Would it be tolerated by anybody? If Territories are States, why haggle, as did Mr. Douglas in the case of Kansas, about their admission into the Union? Why, indeed, is there any question at all? If, as Mr. Douglas asserts under the pressure of the necessity of his own theory, Territories are "subject only to the Constitution of the United States," and Territories are equivalent to States, why are they not, from the first, sovereign members of the confederacy, and entitled to representation and consideration as such? If popular sovereignty is so sacred a right

in this country, is it too much to suggest that some portion ought to reside in the citizens of the States? that they may very properly have an opinion, under the Constitution of the United States, concerning the admission of new States into the Union? Yet all this is theoretically denied by Mr. Douglas's dogmas. It seemed hard enough that the thirty million of people in the old States should have no opinion concerning the institutions of Territories that had been acquired by their valor, wealth, and enterprise; but now, under the new political dispensation, these thirty million can have no opinion concerning the admission of States which may have established Catholicism, Mohammedanism, polygamy, or even slavery.

Further, Mr. Douglas's doctrine of popular sovereignty is not freedom, but tyranny,- tyranny for the old States, in that they are compelled to accept new States as equal copartners in the confederacy, without the right to a separate, independent judgment of their own; tyranny to the Territories, or to the State-territories, as Mr. Douglas will undoubtedly call them by and by, in that they are compelled to accept the sovereignty of the Constitution of the United States, to which they have never assented. It is the essence of freedom in a political organization, that the people shall either have formed, or assented to, the constitution or fundamental law. In violation of this great principle, Mr. Douglas, from the beginning, puts the Territories under the Constitution of the United States, and, by the operation of the same Constitution, forces these Stateterritories into the American Union. The Constitu

tion of the United States is but an institution, and therefore, according to Mr. Douglas's doctrine of popular sovereignty, ought to have received, in some way, the assent of all who live under it; yet he asserts over a new Territory the supremacy of an institution to which the people have never assented, and, by virtue of that supremacy, transforms the Territory into a State, and then forces the State into the Union.

The preamble to the Constitution of the United States is a sufficient exposure and refutation of all Mr. Douglas's absurd vagaries and theories:

"We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

It is quite plain that the Constitution was formed by the people of the United States, and that its jurisdiction was limited to the United States.

Another delusion under which Mr. Douglas labors, is, that the people of a Territory derive their authority to establish and regulate their domestic institutions from the Constitution of the United States; while, in fact, the right exists because they are men, and it would be just as perfect had the Constitution of the United States never been formed. In truth, the Constitution of the United States, as a constitution, can never apply to the people of a Territory until they have formed a constitution for their own government as a State, been admitted into

the Union, and accepted the terms of admission. The underlying truth of republicanism — a truth which Mr. Douglas unceasingly disregards in his hot zeal for popular sovereignty-is, that every man, at some period in his life, has a right to a voice in the establishment of the government under which he is to live.

With our opinion of Mr. Douglas's character for boldness and perseverance continually enhancing, as we have disentangled his inconsistent propositions from each other and from the delusive arguments by which they are supported, we turn to examine his quality as an historical authority upon matters of government. Mr. Douglas misapprehends or misrepresents the political character and condition of the American colonies; and therefore all inferences drawn from, or arguments based upon, his statements are erroneous and fallacious. The American colonies never had an incipient or inchoate existence; but they were perfect political organizations from the very first. By the operation of the feudal law, the lands discovered in America by the subjects of England were for the benefit of the sovereign; and we have only to refer to the early charters, to see that all grants made were made by the king. The lands in America were never the property of the people of England, nor subject to the jurisdiction of their Parliament. By the charters, granted without the authority of Parliament, the people of the respective colonies were recognized as perfect political bodies. It is the theory of the British constitution that all power originally resided in the king; and our ancestors

maintained that by the charters, under the feudal law, and in conformity with the long-established usage of Great Britain, the people of the colonies were independent of the Parliament and people of England. The colonies were separate governments, having the same head, to be sure; but the people of England had no rights of legislation over the people of America. The king was the acknowledged head of the colonial governments, and the rights enjoyed by the people of England were the measure of colonial rights. Neither the Parliament nor the people of England had jurisdiction in America. Your jurisdiction, said the colonies to Parliament, is confined to the English realm. America is not within the realm. As the king granted to you the right of legislation for the realm of England, so has he granted to us the right of legislation for and within our respective colonies in America. As the king has granted to you lands within the realm by the feudal tenure, so has he granted to us lands without the realm by the same tenure. As the conditions on which you exercise authority are expressed in Magna Charta, the great charter of British liberties, so the conditions on which we exercise jurisdiction over our lands are expressed in our respective charters, which are the charters of American liberties. As the king has agreed that he would not levy an aid nor assess a tax upon his subjects within the realm without your consent, so he has agreed that he would not impose a tax upon his subjects in America without the consent of their representatives in general assembly met. As the king had and has the right to cede a