the State. You cannot create a life-estate, and forfeit it, and give the remainder to somebody else.

Upon all these facts, Mr. Speaker, I can come but to the conclusion, that the framers of the Constitution intended to guard against two evils in the British system: first, the forfeiture of the estate by proceedings instituted after the death of the offender; and, secondly, the corruption of blood so as to disable the heirs of an offender from inheriting through him. The construction I have given to the Constitution secures these two objects, and it must be observed that it gives full force and effect to every word in the instrument relating to treason; and, when we have found a satisfactory use for every word, it is unnecessary to look further, and especially when the interpretation given is consistent with the general policy and ideas of the country. I have, then, no hesitation, for one, in sustaining a measure, be it this joint resolution or any other, which shall provide for the forfeiture of the estates of persons convicted of treason, whether those estates be in goods and chattels, or lands held by fee-simple titles, or in land in which the offender has a life-estate. If he has a lifeestate merely, he forfeits that; if he owns the fee, he forfeits the fee; if he owns goods and chattels, he forfeits his goods and chattels. We thus inflict a necessary and just punishment upon the offender, and take security that his property will not by some indirection be used in behalf of the rebellion.

255

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

[FROM THE "NATIONAL REPUBLICAN," FEB. 5, 1864.]

WE have heretofore expressed the opinion,

that the energies of the government should be directed to the work of strengthening ourselves on the Mississippi, and crippling the rebellion at its extremities in Tennessee and Louisiana; and that, in the mean while, no serious effort should be made against Richmond. Our south-western lines may now be considered secure, although it is in the highest degree probable that a vigorous effort will be made to drive our forces from Knoxville and Chattanooga, by a formidable movement across the Tennessee River between those points, or at a point west of the latter town.

The attempt will be a desperate one; and the preparation on our part should correspond to the exigency in which the rebel leaders are placed. While a success by the rebels would be temporary in its results, it cannot be denied that any thing less than the complete overthrow of the plan would be a disgrace to our arms. We are greatly superior in numbers; our soldiers are animated by the recollection of recent victories, and inspired with confidence in the speedy and successful termination of the war. The veterans have re-enlisted generally;

and the numbers of the army are augmented weekly by the addition of several thousand recruits, many of whom have seen service heretofore.

There ought to be no cause for apprehension, although we cannot overlook the fact that it is possible for the rebels to combine the greater part of their available force upon a single position. As the rebel lines are contracted by our successes, their ability to concentrate their army at a given point is increased. Hence our necessity for large armies was never greater than at the present time; and there is no doubt that our available force on the first of March next will equal, if it do not exceed, that of any previous period of the war.

Richmond is again the point of chief interest. It is the only base for rebel movements upon Maryland, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. Once in our possession, and these States are secure, while the rebel forces would soon be compelled to abandon North Carolina. Following this, and without delay, they would retire from East Tennessee, and concentrate their forces in South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama. These States are quite unable to sustain an army of one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand men, for even sixty days, in addition to the present population, swollen beyond that of any former time by the influx of whites and blacks from the northern rebel States. Hence, if we can maintain our positions at Knoxville and Chattanooga, the capture of Richmond is, in effect and in fact, the end of the war.

It is therefore quite unnecessary, if not gravely impolitic, for us to assume the offensive in the

West. The army in that quarter should be treated. as an army of observation, occupying such positions as will best guard the approaches to Tennessee and Kentucky, while it is prepared to take advantage of any weakness of position or force on the part of our opponents. We ought, then, to struggle for the overthrow of the rebel army in Virginia.

How is this to be done? or, rather, how is it to be attempted with a reasonable hope of success? The campaigns of 1861 and 1862 were failures. Yet the Army of the Potomac is composed of good materials, not inferior to any other army of the republic. The Eleventh Army Corps, when transferred to the West, at once achieved a position not less honorable than that accorded to the veteran heroes of Shiloh and Vicksburg. There is no reason to suppose that the other corps of the Potomac Army are in any degree inferior.

It has been led by able and brave men. Of the six Generals who have successively had command, one or more at least would be approved as a good officer by every citizen and military critic in the country. Why, then, have we failed to capture Richmond? Some may say that our misfortunes are due to the interference of the government at Washington; but there are those who know that this suggestion has no foundation in fact. In the nature of things, the government must be responsible for the general plan of a campaign; but the details of its execution are necessarily left to the judgment of the commander in the field.

It is probably true, that neither suggestions, nor the absence of suggestions, on the part of officials

in Washington, could have changed materially the result of the several campaigns in Northern and Eastern Virginia. We have there encountered the best army of the rebels, led by their ablest officers, while acting under the advice of Davis and others at Richmond, and inspired by the belief that the existence of the Confederacy was indissolubly connected with the fate of that city. These were facts amounting to serious difficulties, if not obstacles in our way; to which were superadded the physical features of the country in which military operations have been conducted.

The region between the Potomac and the James Rivers is traversed by numerous and nearly parallel streams and rivers, and ranges of hills and highlands. These, considered singly, are barriers to the movements of an army; and, collectively, they become an insuperable obstacle when viewed in connection with the fact, that an advance to Richmond does not relieve us from our dependence upon the Potomac as a base of supplies, unless we seek our way through the swamps of the Chickahominy. These are the natural and unavoidable obstacles which have impeded our progress. It may be true. that it was well during these three years to contest for supremacy with the rebels between the Potomac and the Rappahannock. The rebellion could not have been overthrown by strategy, by bloodless victories, by advantages of position merely.

It was necessary that battles should be fought, that sacrifices should be made, that thousands should be slain, that the capacity of each side should be fully tested. This has been done; and no