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Opinion of the court.

the stockholders. "The corporation," says this court, in Van Allen v. The Assessors,* "is the legal owner of all the property of the bank, real and personal; and within the powers conferred upon it by the charter, and for the purpose for which it was created, can deal with the corporate property as absolutely as a private individual can deal with his own. This is familiar law, and will be found in every work that may be opened on the subject of corporations." A striking exemplification may be seen in the case of The Queen v. Arnoud.† The question related to the registry of a ship owned by a corporation. Lord Denman observed: "It appears to me that the British corporation is, as such, the sole owner of the ship. The individual members of the corporation are no doubt interested, in one sense, in the property of the corporation, as they may derive individual benefits from its increase, or loss from its decrease; but in no legal sense are the individual members the owners."

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.

The question raised in this case came before us in the case of Van Allen v. The Assessors,‡ from New York, where the statute taxing the State banks was substantially like that of Illinois. We there held the tax unauthorized for the defect stated.

It was in that case attempted to be sustained on the same ground relied on here, that the tax on the capital was equivalent to tax on the shares, as respected the shareholders. But the position was answered that, admitting it to be so, yet, inasmuch as the capital of the State banks may consist of the bonds of the United States, which were exempt from State taxation, it was not easy to see that the tax on the capital was an equivalent to a tax on the shares.

We see no distinction between the two cases, and the judgment of the court below must be reversed, and the

* 3 Wallace, 584.

† 9 Adolphus and Ellis, New Series, 806.

3 Wallace, 573, 581.

Statement of the case.

proceedings remanded, with directions to enter a judgment affirming the decision of the board of supervisors.

JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY.

Mr. Justice DAVIS took no part in the decision of this

case.

THOMPSON v. BOWIE.

On an issue as to whether certain promissory notes, dated on a particular day, were given for money lost at play and therefore void, it is not allowable to prove that the party giving them was intoxicated on the day of the date of the notes in suit, and that when intoxicated he had a propensity to game.

THOMPSON Sued Bowie, in the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia, on three promissory notes for $1000, all dated on the 1st January, 1857, and all drawn payable to and indorsed by one Steer.

The defence was, that the notes were given for a gaming consideration, and were, therefore, void even in the hands of a bona fide holder, under the statute of 9th Anne, ch. 14, § 1, in force in the district;* which statute makes such notes "utterly void, frustrate, and of none effect, to all intents and purposes whatsoever."

The defendant did not offer any direct evidence tending to establish the defence; but resorted to and relied on proof of a circumstantial sort, or such as he so regarded. It consisted of the following facts, tending to prove which the court below allowed evidence to be given.

1st. That Steer, the payee of the notes, was the keeper of a gambling-house, in Washington City, at the date of the

notes.

2d. That, at the time of the making of the notes, Steer

* See Kilty's Report of Statutes, p. 248.

Statement of the case.

was not engaged in any other business than gambling, nor was he the owner of any property.

3d. That another note of the defendant, of the same date (January 1st, 1857), as those sued on, of the same amount ($1000), as those sued on, was given, payable to the order of one Campbell, who was not only a frequenter of the gaming-house of Steer, but also in his employment as a dealer of faro.

4th. That the body of all four of said notes was in the handwriting of one J. R. James, who was a professional gambler, and a frequenter, among other such places, of the gambling-house of the said Steer.

5th. That on the night of the 31st of December, 1856 (New-Year's eve), the defendant, being at a social entertainment, became greatly intoxicated-so much so that he was unfit to transact any business; and that he was in that condition when with the witnesses he left the place of the entertainment, between one and two o'clock in the morning of the 1st of January, 1857, and was no more seen by them that day.

6th. That whenever the defendant was under the influence or excitement of wine or spirits, he had a propensity to gamble; and was in the habit of going into gamblinghouses, faro banks, &c., and there gambling, but not at other times; that, in the knowledge of the witness, he was always in this condition when he frequented such places; that the witness was a great deal with the defendant during the sessions of Congress; that he was in the witness's room almost every night, and frequently, when in liquor, would leave the witness to go with his friends to gambling-houses, and request the witness to go with him.

7th. That, at the date of the notes, the defendant was wealthy.

On this testimony, and without the plaintiff endeavoring to rebut this case, or to show in what manner he obtained possession of the notes, the case was given to the jury, who rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant.

On error here, one question among others, and the chief

Argument against admission.

question, was as to the admissibility of the evidence tending to show, that when the defendant was under the excitement of ardent spirits he had a propensity to game; was in the habit of going into gaming-houses, &c., and of there gaming, but not at other times; and that, in the knowledge of the witness, he was always in this condition when he frequented such places.

Messrs. Brent and Merrick, for the holder of the notes, plaintiff in error:

In addition to numerous errors of the court, there was palpable error in its admitting the evidence to show that when the defendant was under the excitement of ardent spirits he was in the habit of going to gaming-houses, and, so far as the witness knew, was always in this condition when he went there. The testimony simply tended to prove a propensity; a propensity to game. Now, such a propensity, even if admitted, did not tend to prove that the notes sued on were given for a gaming debt. If A. has his money stolen, assuredly he could not recover it from B. by proving that B. had a propensity to steal. Jackson v. Smith,* in the Supreme Court of New York is in point. There, a man named Norris was in the habit of lending money at usurious rates of interest; and the court considered it "altogether probable" that a loan in question "was a loan of that description." They held, however, that "the fact of Norris's general character or habit as a usurer" was not "a legal foundation" for a verdict which found a particular transaction, not otherwise proved so to be, usurious.

Messrs. W. S. Cox and S. L. Phillips, contra:

Three notes of a wealthy gentleman, all of the same date, in the same handwriting, for a like amount, and of a regular series of thirty, sixty, and ninety days, given at one time and in the same transaction, are found payable to a professional gambler at a time when he is a keeper of a public

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Argument for admission.

gaming-house, and has no other ostensible business, and a man of no property with which he might engage in lawful commerce. The body of each of these notes was in the handwriting of one J. R. James, a professional gambler and frequenter of the gaming-house of the said payee; and a fourth of the same series and like handwriting as the others, of the same date, and for the same amount, is found payable to the order of one Campbell, who was not only a frequenter of the gaming-house of the said Steer, but in his employment as a dealer of faro. We ask, is it not a fair inference from these facts that these notes had their origin in the gaming-house of the payee, and in the ordinary business which was carried on there? But these facts do not stand alone. Early in the morning of the very day the notes were given-New-Year's day, a day of festivity, and with many of excess-the defendant was in a grossly intoxicated state, and was no more seen by his friends that day; and we show that when intoxicated he exhibited an invariable habit of frequenting gaming-houses, a thing which he did at no other time.

The case presents, therefore, many circumstances, all interlacing and depending upon each other, and all pointing towards the same result; all reconcilable with the hypothesis of the defence, and improbable with any other. And we submit that each and every item of the evidence was admissible, including the one so particularly objected to.

This court has lately decided, in the two important cases of Cliquot's Champagne and Fennerstein's Champagne,* the same principle of establishing one fact by another, although occurring as between third parties. In those cases, it is submitted no such necessary connection appears as is to be found in this.

The main question, however, now more particularly raised is this: Does evidence of the invariable habit or propensity of the defendant to game when intoxicated, and of the fact of intoxication at a certain time, tend, in connection with

3 Wallace, 114; and Id. 145.

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