Opinion of the court. those of the front grant to Bachemin and others. That grant fronted on a bend of the river, on the convex side, or shore; and, according to the usage in Spanish locations on such bends, and which is the usage and practice of locations under our system of survey, the side lines run at right angles with the bend of the river, and, as in the instance before us, diverge and widen as the lines extend for the entire depth of the front lot. It was these diverging lines terminating at the rear of the Bachemin lot that were extended in the same direction by the survey and location of the back lot of Madame Le Compte, by Landry, to Lake Borgné, and which were afterwards adopted by Phelps. This Spanish survey and location of the grant removes any obscurity that may exist in the description. The survey of Landry was not produced, but its existence and loss were sufficiently proved to let in the secondary evidence presented on the trial. The testimony of Phelps was taken under a commission, and when produced at the trial several objections were taken to its competency and admissibility, on the part of the government, which were overruled. The objections were very general and indefinite, without pointing out the portions of his answers to the interrogatories which were inadmissible, except in gross, embracing matters clearly competent and relevant to the issues. It is the duty of the party excepting to evidence to point out the part excepted to, so that the attention of the court may be drawn to it. If the exception covers any admissible evidence, it is rightly overruled.* This principle disposes of all the objections in which any doubt can exist as to the competency of the evidence. We do not regard, however, the portion of Phelps's testimony objected to as of any particular importance in the case. The only portions of his evidence which are material relate to the Landry survey of Madame Le Compte's grant, and his own survey of the same in 1831. But 2. The most conclusive defence to this action to recover * Moore v. The Bank of the Metropolis, 13 Peters, 302. Opinion of the court. the land in question is the decision of the register and receiver, on the petition of F. and J. A. Phillipon for confirmation, dated December 20th, 1832, the report of these officers in favor of the claim, 5th September, 1833, and confirmation by act of Congress, March 3d, 1835. The Phillipons owned a large tract of land derived from six French and Spanish grants, all of which are set out on the record, and among them is the grant in question to Madame Le Compte. They state in their petition that the land is situate in the Parish of St. Bernard, on the east bank of the Mississippi River, about ten miles below the city of New Orleans, measuring twenty-one arpents front by an irregular depth extending to Lake Borgne, bounded on one side by the plantation of Mr. Guichard, and on the other side (below) by the plantations of the widow Beauregard; the whole, according to a full and detailed plot thereof, executed by Augustus S. Phelps, United States deputy surveyor, in the month of February, 1831, herewith presented and prayed to be accorded. This map is in the record, and includes the tract of Madame Le Compte, with the diverging lines, as surveyed by Landry, and afterwards by Phelps. The register and receiver, after hearing the proofs in the case, and referring to the claim, and reciting that it contains twenty-one arpents front by an irregular depth extending to Lake Borgne, and bounded above by land of Mr. Guichard, and below by land of the widow Beauregard; and reciting, also, that the tract is made up of several tracts, all of which are derived from the original grants made, and completed in due form, as follows: enumerating the six French and Spanish grants, with their dates, report-" We are therefore of opinion that this claim ought to be confirmed." This claim, thus described by the register and receiver, was specifically confirmed, referring to the date of this report, by the act of Congress of March 3d, 1835. We do not deem it necessary to pursue the case further. It seems to us that the title, to the extent claimed by the Phillipons, under whom the defendants held, has not only Opinion of the court. been confirmed by this government, but that the grants under the French and Spanish governments were as extensive, and the boundaries as well defined and settled, as we are of opinion they now are under the survey and location confirmed by act of Congress. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. INDEX. ADMIRALTY. See Evidence, 2, 3; Prize Court, 1-3. JURISDICTION. 1. A contract for the transportation of passengers by a steamship on the ocean is a maritime contract, and there is no distinction in principle between it and a contract for the like transportation of merchandise. The Moses Taylor, 411. 2. The distinguishing and characteristic feature of a suit in admiralty, is that the vessel or thing proceeded against is itself seized and impleaded as the defendant, and is judged and sentenced accordingly. Ib. 3. The provision of the ninth section of the Judiciary Act, which vests in the District Courts of the United States exclusive cognizance of civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, is constitutional. Ib. 4. The grant of admiralty powers to the District Courts of the United States, by the ninth section of the act of September 24th, 1789, is coextensive with this grant in the Constitution, as to the character of the waters over which it extends. The Hine v. Trevor, 555. 5. The act of February 26th, 1845, is a limitation of the powers granted by the act of 1789, as regards cases arising upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting said lakes, in the following particulars: (a) It limits the jurisdiction to vessels of twenty tons burden and upwards, enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and which are employed in commerce and navigation, between ports and places in different States. (b) It grants a jury trial, if either party shall demand it. (c) The jurisdiction is not exclusive, but is expressly made concurrent with such remedies as may be given by State laws. Ib. 6. The grant of original admiralty jurisdiction by the act of 1789, including as it does all cases not covered by the act of 1845, is exclusive, not only of all other Federal courts, but of all State courts. Ib.; see also The Moses Taylor, 411. 7. Therefore, State statutes, which attempt to confer upon State courts a remedy for marine torts and marine contracts, by proceedings strictly in rem [that is to say, which authorize actions in rem against vessels for causes of action cognizable in the admiralty-The Moses Taylor, 411], are void; because they are in conflict with that act of Congress, except as to cases arising on the lakes and their connecting waters. Ib. (685) ADMIRALTY (continued). 8. These statutes do not come within the saving clause of the ninth section 9. But this rule does not prevent the seizure and sale, by the State courts, 10. Nor does it prevent any action which the common law gives for ob- 11. The jurisdiction of a court of admiralty over a vessel captured jure ALLUVION. The right to alluvion depends upon the fact of contiguity of the estate ATTAINDER, BILLS OF. See Attorneys and Counsellors, 1-8; Constitu- ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS. See Constitutional aw, 1-11; 1. Attorneys and counsellors of the Supreme Court of the United States 2. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties 3. The right of an attorney and counsellor, acquired by his admission, to 4. The admitted power of Congress to prescribe qualifications for the office |