1. The equity of a preëmption claimant of land under the laws of the
United States who has complied with the conditions imposed by those
laws, obtained his certificate by the payment of the purchase-money,
and retained uninterrupted possession of the property, cannot be de-
feated by one whose entry was subsequent, although he has fortified
his title with a patent; such person having notice sufficient to put
him on inquiry as to the interests, legal or equitable, of the preëmp-
tion claimant. Hughes v. United States, 232.
2. Open, notorious, and exclusive possession of real property by parties
claiming it is sufficient to put other persons upon inquiry as to the
interests, legal or equitable, held by such parties; and if such other
persons neglect to make the inquiry, they are not entitled to any
greater consideration than if they had made it and had ascertained
the actual facts of the case. Ib.
A demand cannot be regarded as an open account where there is a con-
tract which is the foundation of the claim, and which, though not ful-
filled according to its letter, either as to the time or place of delivery,
yet with the qualifications which the law under such circumstances
imposes, determines the respective liabilities of the parties. Railroad
Company v. Lindsay, 650.
1. The power of pardon conferred by the Constitution upon the President
is unlimited except in cases of impeachment. It extends to every of-
fence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its
commission, either before legal proceedings are taken or during their
pendency, or after conviction and judgment. The power is not sub-
ject to legislative control. Ex parte Garland, 333.
2. A pardon reaches the punishment prescribed for an offence and the
guilt of the offender. If granted before conviction it prevents any
of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon conviction from at-
taching; if granted after conviction it removes the penalties and dis-
abilities and restores him to all his civil rights. It gives him a new
credit and capacity. There is only this limitation to its operation: it
does not restore offices forfeited, or property or interests vested in
others in consequence of the conviction and judgment. Ib.
3. A person who has received a full pardon for all offences committed by
his participation, direct or implied, in the Rebellion, is relieved from
all penalties and disabilities attached to the offence of treason, com-
mitted by such participation. He cannot, therefore, be excluded by
reason of that offence from continuing in the enjoyment of a pre-
viously-acquired right to appear as an attorney and counsellor in the
Federal courts. Ib.
PATENT. See Equity; Mandamus, 3.
1. Where an applicant for reissue of a patent has done all in his power to
make his application effectual-has filed his application with the act-
ing commissioner and paid the requisite amount of fees-the applica-
tion is to be considered as properly before the commissioner. Com-
missioner of Patents v. Whiteley, 522.
2. Semble that an applicant for a reissue of a patent under the thirteenth
section of the Patent Act of 1836, which allows a reissue in certain
cases to a patentee, "and in case of his death or any assignment by
him made of the original patent,” vests a similar right "in his execu-
tors, administrators, or assignees," must be an assignee of the whole
interest in the patent; and not the assignee of a sectional interest
only. At least where the commissioner of patents had thus decided,
the Supreme Court, on the question's being raised in connection with
other questions, whose decision rendered a decision on it unnecessary,
say that "as at present advised they were not prepared to say that the
decision of the commissioner was not correct." Ib.
PENNSYLVANIA. See Ejectment, 3.
PLEADING. See Mandamus, 1.
1. Where there is a plea to merits, and the parties go to trial accordingly,
irregularities previously set up by pleas in abatement and demurrers
to them are waived. Bell v. Railroad Company, 598.
2. Where a plea in answer is but notice of special matter by way of abate-
ment of the amount claimed and so goes to but part of the cause of
action, it cannot be relied on as a plea in bar. United States v. Dash-
iel, 182.
3. When a contract is alleged by the pleadings to have been made on a
certain day, it is no variance to offer in evidence a written contract
which took effect on a different day. United States v Le Baron, 642.
4. If it be proved that a bond bearing date the first day of the month, did
not become obligatory until the fifteenth, this is no variance, although
the bond is counted on in the pleadings as a contract made on the
first day of the month and bearing that date. Ib.
5. An allegation of variance between the averments of a petition and the
findings of the court, where there is no allegation that the findings
were unwarranted by the proofs, or that the judgment does not con-
form to the law and justice of the case as presented by the findings,
will not be sustained in the Supreme Court on review. Railroad
Company v. Lindsay, 650.
6. Such case comes within the thirty-second section of the Judiciary Act,
curing imperfections, defects, or want of form in the pleadings or
course of proceedings, except such as are specially demurred to. Ib.
7. In a suit caused by a person's falling into an area in a public sidewalk,
a declaration charging that the defendant "dug, opened, and made"
the area is sustained by proof that he formed it partially by excava-
tion and partially by raising walls. Robbins v. Chicago City, 657.
POSTMASTER-GENERAL. See Post-offices, 1–3.
1. By the legislation of Congress the Postmaster-General has the power
to "establish post-offices" as well where the commissions of the office
amount to or exceed one thousand dollars as where they do not. Ware
v. United States, 617.
2. Unless there is some provision in the acts of Congress restraining its
exercise, the power to establish post-offices, as interpreted by usage
coeval with the creation of the Post-office Department and recog-
nized in Congressional legislation, infers a power to discontinue them.
And deputy postmasters occupy their offices subject to the contin-
gency that such offices may be so discontinued. Ib.
3. Possessing thus the power to discontinue post-offices, the Postmaster-
General may exercise the power, notwithstanding that the deputy
postmasters have been appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, and under a statute which enacts
that the appointee shall hold his office for the term of four years un-
less sooner removed by the President. Ib.
4. If he do exercise it, the office of deputy postmaster is, in such cases,
gone. There is no longer a deputy postmaster at that place. Ib.
PRACTICE. See Jurisdiction, 1–14; Mandamus, 2–4; Principal and Surety;
Pleading, 5, 6; Prohibition, 1–3.
1. It is not required that a writ of error be allowed by a judge. It is
enough that it is issued and served by copy lodged with the clerk of
the court to which it is directed. Davidson v. Lanier, 447.
2. A mistake in the date of the writ of error is not important, when it is
clear that such mistake is a clerical one merely, and when, from the
judgment described and the number given to it, the party cannot be .
3. When a paper which is to constitute a part of a bill of exceptions is
not incorporated into the body of the bill, it must be annexed to it, or
so marked by letter, number, or other means of identification men-
tioned in the bill, as to leave no doubt, when found in the record, that
it is the one referred to in the bill of exceptions, otherwise it will be
disregarded. Leftwitch v. Lecanu, 187.
4. The fact that a copy of a paper is attached to a pleading in the case,
which purports to be the same as the paper mentioned in the bill of
exceptions, does not make it a part of that bill, nor can this court
presume that it is the same paper read in evidence and excepted to. Ib.
5. The practice of making bills of exception a sort of abstract or index to
the history of the case, and so of obscuring its merits, condemned.
Evans v. Patterson, 224.
6. It is the duty of a party excepting to evidence to point out the part ex-
cepted to, so that the attention of the court may be drawn to it.
Hence objections of a very general and indefinite nature to testimony
taken under a commission, with interrogatories, and which do not
point out except in gross the portion of the answers objected to and
which embrace matters clearly competent, will not be sustained. If
the exception covers any admissible testimony, it is rightly overruled.
United States v. McMasters, 680.
7. Where none of the evidence offered by a plaintiff is objected to below,
and no exception taken to the findings of the court there, objection
cannot be made in this court. Railroad Co. v. Lindsay, 650.
8. A motion for a new trial is not a waiver of exceptions.
9. A certiorari for diminution of the record allowed under special circum-
stances, and where the cause had been continued till the next term,
although the motion for it was made after more than one term had
passed since the entry of the case, and contrary, therefore, to a rule
of the court. Stearns v. The United States, 1.
10. A writ of fieri facias, tested and issued after the death of the party
against whom the judgment is recovered, is void, and confers no
power on the ministerial officer to execute it. Mitchell v. St. Max-
ent's Lessee, 237.
11. Under the practice prevailing in the Circuit Courts of the United
States, the finding of the facts by the court makes a case in the nature
of a special verdict and is conclusive as to those facts; and this al-
though the petition sets forth a different state of facts which are nei-
ther confessed nor denied by the answer. Saulet v. Shepherd, 502.
12. When a want of jurisdiction is patent, or can be readily ascertained
by an examination of the record in advance of an examination of the
questions on the argument of the merits, this court will entertain and
act upon a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Semple v. Ha-
gar, 131.
13. On the application of a prisoner for a writ of habeas corpus, the usual
course of proceeding is for the court to issue the writ, and on the re-
turn to hear and dispose of the case; but where the cause of imprison-
ment is fully shown by the petition, the court may, without issuing
the writ, consider and determine whether, upon the facts as presented.
in the petition, the prisoner, if brought before the court, would be
discharged. Ex parte Milligan, 2.
14. If parties setting up a maritime lien for work and materials alleged to
have been furnished to a vessel prior to her capture jure belli do not
present and ask to have it decided in the prize court, before which
the captured vessel is brought for adjudication, the question is not
properly before this court for review, in case where the District
Court has only dismissed the libel as improperly filed on its instance
side. The Nassau, 634.
PRESCRIPTION. See Louisiana, Civil Code of.
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. See Pardon; Trial by
Jury, 4.
The President cannot be restrained by injunction from carrying into effect.
an act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional, nor will a bill hav-
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (continued).
ing such a purpose be allowed to be filed. And it makes no difference
whether such occupant of the Presidential office be described in the
bill as President or simply as a citizen of a State. The State of Mis-
sissippi v. Johnson, 475.
If a judgment is obtained against a surety, the amount of it being fixed
by a judgment previously obtained against his principal, the former
judgment cannot be reversed on error as for an amount too small,
though the latter should be afterwards reversed as having so been.
United States v. Allsbury, 186.
A person who was a resident, during the Rebellion, of a loyal State, in
which he was then arrested; who was never resident in any State en-
gaged in rebellion, nor connected with the military or naval service,
cannot be regarded as a prisoner of war, within the meaning of the
act of March 3d, 1863, authorizing, on certain conditions. the dis-
charge from imprisonment of persons held "otherwise than as prison-
ers of war." Ex parte Milligan, 2.
PRIVATE BANKING. See Public Policy.
PRIZE COMMISSIONERS. See Evidence, 5.
1. Demands against property captured as prize of war must be adjusted in
a prize court. The property arrested as prize is not attachable at the
suit of private parties. If such parties have claims which, in their
view, override the rights of captors, they must present them to the
prize court for settlemeut. The Nassau, 634.
2. Whether a maritime lien for work and materials alleged to have been
furnished to a vessel prior to her capture jure belli is lost by such cap-
ture, is a proper subject for investigation and decision by the prize
court before which the captured vessel is brought for adjudication; and
which the parties setting up such lien can, on presentation of their
claim to that tribunal, properly have decided. Ib.
3. But if such parties do not so present and ask to have it decided, the
question is not properly before this court for review, in a case where
the District Court has only dismissed the libel as improperly filed on
its instance side. Ib.
1. The writ of prohibition can only be used to prevent the doing of some
act which is about to be done, and can never be used as a remedy for
acts already completed. United States v. Hoffman, 158.
2. Therefore, where the court to which the writ should be issued, has al-
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