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ceptable also to those who were desirous of preserving state distinction in the general government. In one branch the people would be represented individually, in the other collectively.

§ 3. We notice also the term of office of senators. As has been observed, one object of a second branch is to provide a check upon the popular or democratic branch; and with a view to the greater efficacy of this check, not only was the election of senators given to the state legislatures, but the senate was made a more durable body than the other. In the principle of a permanent senate, the convention was nearly unanimous ; but as to the precise duration of the term of service, there were many different opinions. Terms of four, five, six, seven, and nine years were proposed, and even a term during good behavior, which is virtually for life.

§ 4. One object of a permanent senate is independence. A representative who may be soon displaced by a new election, is more likely to be swayed in the discharge of his official duties, by a desire to secure a reëlection, than one who holds his office more securely. The longer the term, the more independent, it is presumed, will be his action. A durable senate also secures greater stability in the government. Frequent changes of legislatures are generally attended with corresponding changes in the laws. A fluctuating policy is an evil to be avoided. For instance, what man would hazard his capital in a business which might be suddenly prostrated by a change in legislation? Popular excitements are incident to democratic governments, and are often encouraged by demagogues in hope of political gain; and under these impulses the people may call for measures which afterward they would themselves be most ready to lament and condemn. As a safeguard against these excesses of democracy, a long term was adopted.

§ 5. On the other hand, a very long term, it was apprehended, might render that body too independent. Firmly seated in power, senators might become regardless of the wishes and interests of their constituents. Hence, the medium term of six years was supposed to be long enough to give due stability to the law-making power of the government, and yet short enough to insure a proper sense of responsibility on the part of the members of this body.

§ 6. We notice next the principle of representation in the senate. This was involved in the general question of the rule of apportionment which was the subject of the excited controversy mentioned in the preceding chapter. The advocates of the proposed national government contended for a proportional representation in both branches; the adherents to the confederation strenuously insisted on equal suffrage in both. As on the question of slave representation, so on this, a compromise was the only means of effecting an agreement; and the convention finally agreed to the proposition, that in the first branch there should be a proportional representation, and that in the second the states should be equally represented. Thus was effected what may be called the second great compromise of the constitution.

§ 7. It will be perceived, however, that, although the states are equally represented in the senate, the vote in this body is not taken in the same manner as it was under the confederation, namely, by states. The proposition, as at first offered, provided that each state should have one vote; but it was so modified that, instead of voting by states, the members should vote per capita, each senator having one vote.

8. There is a manifest propriety in having the seats of one-third of the senators vacated every two years. The renewal of the entire body at once might be attended by too sudden a change of public measures; or it might place a salutary change of policy for too long a period beyond the power of the people. A wise and politic measure enacted near the close of the term of one senate, might be unexpectedly repealed or materially modified by their successors; or the operation of a bad law passed at the commencement of a senatorial term, might be prolonged for six years. The present arrangement enables the people to prepare for any anticipated changes in legislation, and leaves at all times in the senate a majority of experienced members, acquainted with the unfinished business of previous sessions, and with public affairs generally.

§ 9. That the interests of a state may suffer no injury from the want of a full representation in the senate of the United States, vacancies that happen during the recess of the state legislature, may be filled by the executive of such state, until the next meeting of the legislature. An

appointment, however, may not be made before the vacancy actually happens. The term of James Lanman, a senator in congress from the state of Connecticut, expired with the session which closed on the 3d of March, 1825, at a time when the legislature of that state was not in session. As it was necessary for the senate to reässemble on the 4th of March, to act on the nominations of the newly elect ed president, and as the legislature had failed to appoint a successor to Mr. Lanman, the governor, in order to prevent a vacancy, reappointed that senator a few days before the expiration of his term. It was decided by the senate, that, as no vacancy had happened when the appointment was made, Mr. Lanman was not entitled to a seat.

§ 10. A person to be eligible to the office of senator, must have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States; and he must be when elected, an inhabitant of the state for which he is chosen. (Art. 1, sec. 3.) The propriety of these qualifications of age and citizenship has been considered. (Chapter XXXI, $5.) In fixing the qualifications of senators, it was deemed proper to require greater age and experience, and a longer term of citizenship, than in the case of representatives; and to increase the independence of this body, and perhaps also to infuse into it some degree of the aristocratic principle, by making it the representative of wealth, it was proposed to superadd the property qualification. A majority, however, appear to have been opposed to such restriction upon the eligibility of a candidate for any office in the general government.

§ 11. The remainder of this section, and most of the four succeeding sections, so nearly resemble those of a similar nature in state constitutions; and the propriety of the other portions of these sections is so readily perceived, that no particular notice of them is deemed necessary.

§12. The powers and the regulations of the two houses in relation to impeachments, the election of officers, the elections and qualifications of members, adjournments, rules of proceeding, punishment of members, &c., described in this first article of the constitution, are nearly the same as are provided by the constitutions of the several states for the government and practice of their respective legislatures.

§ 13. The 7th section of the 1st article of the constitu

tion provides for the passage of bills negatived by the president. Bills returned by him with his objections become laws when passed by majorities of two-thirds of both houses. They also become laws if not returned by him within ten days (Sundays excepted) after they have been presented to him, unless their return is prevented by the adjournment of congress.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

POWERS OF CONGRESS.TAXATION, AND BORROWING MONEY.

§ 1. HAVING seen how the legislative department of the general government is constituted, we proceed to the consideration of its powers. Liberty can be secure only where the rights of the people and the powers of the government are clearly defined and well understood; since, without this knowledge, the people are incapable of keeping the government within the limits of its constitutional powers.

§ 2. In respect to the origin and extent of the powers of the state governments and the general government, there is an important difference. The general government derives its powers from the states, or the people of the states, and can exercise such powers only as the people have delegated to it by the constitution; whereas, the states, originally possessing entire sovereignty, may exercise all powers which they have not surrendered to the general government. That is to say, the national government is limited to the powers granted; the power of the state governments is unlimited, except so far as they have parted with any of their original

powers.

§3. Most of the important powers of the government of the United States are vested in congress, and are expressed in the 8th section of the 1st article of the constitution. Perhaps the want of none of these powers was so sensibly felt under the confederation, as the first three here mentioned and it is probably for this reason that they were

placed at the beginning of the list. The first of these is the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises,” the objects of which power are declared to be, "to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States."

§ 4. Congress had been obliged to borrow large sums of money to defray the expenses of the war. Several millions were borrowed from France and Holland. But congress had no power, as has been observed, to raise money by taxation. The government could not pay its debts, nor support itself. But by the power here given, it may raise money to any amount necessary for the objects stated in the constitution, either by direct taxation; that is, by laying the tax directly on the property of the citizens; or by indirect taxation, which is by duties, imposts, and excises.

§ 5. Duties or customs, and imposts, have nearly the same meaning. The last, however, are properly taxes on goods imported only; the first apply to taxes on goods exported as well as on those imported. But as our government does not impose duties on exports, these three words practically signify the same thing. But excise has no reference at all to the exportation or importation of goods; it is a tax laid upon an article manufactured, sold or consumed, within the country. Such, for example, is the duty paid by keepers of taverns and groceries for the privilege of selling liquors.

§ 6. The power of taxation is qualified by the provision, that "all duties shall be uniform throughout the United States." This is necessary to prevent the giving of unjust preferences to any one or more states over others. Without this restriction upon the exercise of this power, a few states might, by a combination of their representatives in congress, secure to themselves undue advantages in certain branches of trade and business.

§ 7. Notwithstanding congress has power to raise money by taxation in several ways, it has seldom been found necessary to exercise it in any other way than by laying duties on foreign goods, and on the vessels in which they were imported. How effectual this mode of taxation has been will appear from the following facts: At the close of the revolutionary war, the national debt amounted to $42,000,000, on which congress could not so much as pay the interest. Two years after the constitution went into

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