have given an abstract of the principal laws by which their rights are defined, and their duties and mutual obligations, as individual citizens of the state and of the nation, are enjoined. As the people of the United States, in their national capacity, occupy an important position in the great community of nations, the author deems it proper to subjoin a compend of the rules by which intercourse between nations is regulated.

§ 2. The law of nations, in its present improved state, has not long existed. Ancient nations were little governed by the principles of natural justice. Little respect was paid by one nation to the rights of the persons and property of the citizens of another. Robbery on land and sea was not only tolerated, but esteemed honorable; and prisoners of war were either put to death, or reduced to slavery. By this rule of national law, commerce was destroyed, and perpetual enmity kept up between nations.

§ 3. No essential, permanent improvement in the law of nations seems to have been made until within the last three or four centuries. By the light of science and Christianity, the rights and obligations of nations have come to be better understood, and more generally regarded. Commerce also has done much to improve the law, by showing that the true interests of a nation are promoted by peace and friendly intercourse.

§ 4. Hence we find the nations of Europe and America recognizing the same rules of international law. And as the light of Christianity shall become more widely diffused, and its principles more generally practiced, the law of nations will undergo still further improvements. And may we not hope, that, as one of these improvements, the practice of settling national disputes by war will be abolished, and one more rational and humane be adopted, that of referring all difficulties which the parties are incapable of adjusting, to some disinterested power for adjudication?

§ 5. There is, in every nation or state, some acknowledged authority to make laws to protect the rights of the citizens, and courts of justice to try and punish offenders. But there is no tribunal before which one nation can be brought to answer for the violation of the rights of another. Every nation, however small and weak, is independent of every other. Hence, when injuries are committed by one

upon another, the offended party, unless it chooses quietly to endure the wrong, must obtain redress, either by appealing to the sense of justice of the party offending, or by a resort to force.

§ 6. The equality and independence of nations, without respect to their relative strength or extent of territory, is a settled principle of national law. Each has a right to establish such government and tolerate such religion as it thinks proper, and no other nation has a right to interfere with its internal policy. To this general rule, however, writers make an exception. The natural right of every state to provide for its own safety, gives it the right to interfere where its security is seriously endangered by the internal transactions of another state. But it is admitted, that such cases are so very rare, that it would be dangerous to reduce them to a rule. The right of forcible interference is only to be inferred from the circumstances of the special case.

7. So also cases seldom arise, when one nation has a right to assist the subjects of another in overturning or changing their government. It is generally agreed, that such assistance may be afforded consistently with the law of nations, in extreme cases; as when the tyranny of a government becomes so oppressive as to compel the people to rise in their defense, and call for assistance. It is held that rulers may, by an unwarrantable exercise of power, violate the principles of the social compact, and give their subjects just cause to consider themselves discharged from their allegiance.

§ 8. When the subjects of any government have carried their revolt so far as to have established a new state, and to give reasonable evidence of their ability to maintain a government, the right of assistance is unquestionable. But it is not clear, that, prior to this state of progress in a revolution, the right to interpose would be justifiable. The assistance given by France to this country, during the war of our revolution, was not a violation of the law of nations. The states having thrown off their allegiance to Great Britain, and established a government of their own, any foreign nation had a right to assist the states in securing their independence.

§ 9. There is a sense, however, in which nations are not

wholly independent. The happiness of mankind, as has been observed, depends upon association. (Chap. I, § 5, 6.) Without the assistance which men in the social state derive from each other, they could scarcely support their own being. Similar to this is the mutual dependence of nations. Although the people of every nation have within themselves the means of maintaining their individual and national existence, their prosperity and happiness are greatly promoted by commerce with other nations. And as laws are necessary to govern the conduct of the individual citizens of a state, so certain rules are necessary to regulate the intercourse of nations.

§ 10. It has been observed, also, that the law of nature, which is in accordance with the will of the Creator as expressed in his revealed law, is a perfect rule for all moral and social beings, and ought to be universally obeyed; and that its observance conduces to their highest happiness. Equally binding is this law upon nations: nor is the general good of mankind less promoted by its application to the affairs of nations than by its application to the affairs of individual persons. It requires each nation to respect the rights of all others, and to do for them what their necessities demand, and what each is capable of doing, consistently with the duties it owes to itself.

§ 11. The law of nature applied to nations or states as moral persons, is called the natural law of nations. It is also called the necessary law of nations, because nations are morally bound to observe it; and sometimes the internal law of nations, from its being binding on the conscience.

§ 12. Although, as has been elsewhere remarked, (Chap. II, § 9,) the law of nature, as expressed in the law of revelation, is a correct rule of human conduct; yet, as much of this law consists of general principles from which particular duties can not always be deduced, positive human enactments are necessary to define the law of nature and revelation. So also an important part of the law of nations necessarily consists of positive institutions. Hence, some writers have divided international law under these two principal heads the natural law of nations, and the positive.

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§ 13. The positive law of nations is founded on usage or custom and agreement; and may be considered as properly divided into the customary law of nations, and the conven

tional. The customary law of nations consists of certain maxims, or is founded on customs and usages which have long been observed and tacitly consented to by nations, and which thereby become binding upon all who have adopted them, so far as their observance does not require the violation of the law of nature.

§ 14. A conventional law of nations is one that has been established by a treaty or league. A convention is an assembly of persons who meet for civil or political purposes. But an agreement or contract between nations, though made without a formal meeting, is deemed conventional. The manner in which treaties are made, has been described. (Chap. XL, 5.)

15. Thus the rights and interests of nations do not depend for their security entirely upon the law of nature, which is liable to misconstruction. Nor, so far as they are dependent upon positive institutions, do they rest wholly upon the vague and uncertain law of usage or custom. Conventional law, because more definite, has been found to afford far greater security to the rights of commerce. Hence the practice, now common among nations, of regulating their intercourse by negotiation. Treaties of commerce have been formed between most of the principal commercial states in the world. Their utility in regulating trade between states, is no less than that of written agreements between individuals, by which the rights of the contracting parties are placed beyond dispute.

§ 16. One advantage of treaties of commerce is, that a nation may, if its interest demand, enter into treaties granting special privileges to one or more nations, without giving just cause of offense to others. Such special favors, however, should not be granted without good reasons. It is the duty of every nation to respect the rights of all others, and to cultivate that mutual good will which is the result of liberal, just, and impartial dealing.

17. It may be said, that, if each nation is independent of every other, and if there is no constituted authority to enforce the fulfillment of treaty stipulations, the rights guarantied by treaties are still insecure. Few governments, however, are so devoid of a sense of honor, as, by a palpable violation of their treaty obligations, to incur the odium and condemnation of all mankind. Self-respect, and

the fear of provoking a war, have generally proved sufficient incentives to the observance of treaties.

18. The obligations of nations are sometimes called imperfect. A perfect obligation is one that can be enforcedone that exists where there is a right to compel the party on whom the obligation rests to fulfill it. An imperfect obligation gives only the right to demand the fulfillment, leaving the party pledged to judge what his duty requires, and to do as he chooses, without being constrained by another to do otherwise

CHAPTER LX.

THE JURISDICTION OF NATIONS; THEIR MUTUAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS; THE RIGHTS OF EMBASSADORS, MINISTERS, &C.

1. THE seas are regarded as the common highway of nations. The main ocean, for navigation and fishing, is open to all mankind; and no nation can appropriate it to its own exclusive use. Every state, however, has jurisdiction at sea over its own subjects, in its own public and private vessels. The persons on board such vessels are protected and governed by the laws of the country to which they belong; and they may be punished by these laws for offenses committed on board of its public vessels in foreign ports.

§ 2. The question how far a nation has jurisdiction over the seas adjoining its lands, is not clearly settled. It appears to be generally conceded, that a nation has the right of exclusive dominion over navigable rivers flowing through its territory; the harbors, bays, gulfs, and arms of the sea; and such extent of sea adjoining its territories as is necessary to the safety of the nation, which is considered by some to be as far as a cannon shot will reach, or about a marine league. Different nations have at times claimed much wider jurisdiction into the sea; but such claim rests upon doubtful authority.