XIII. The motives which might have operated on Adams's CHAPTER mind for making this nomination are sufficiently obvious. The almost universal anxiety for peace with France, 1799. for which the opposition seemed willing to sacrifice every thing, while even the Federalists professed a willingness to sacrifice every thing short of independence, national honor, and neutral rights, had prompted the mission of Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry, in face of an express declaration of the Directory that they would not receive another minister from America till their alleged griev ances had first been redressed. If true policy had required the institution of an embassy in face of a declaration like that, how was it possible entirely to disregard the assurances of Talleyrand, communicated through Pichon and Murray ? assurances the most explicit and direct that could be made, short of the appointment of a French minister to America-a stretch of condescension hardly to be expected from the "terrible republic" toward a nation so weak as the United States, and rendered almost helpless by internal dissensions. There had no doubt been a great change in public sentiment since the appointment of the late rejected embassy. All the earnest efforts of Jefferson and his coadjutors had been unable to extinguish in their partisans the sense of national degradation; and many, especially in the Southern States, who had hitherto vehemently opposed the Federal administration, had come manfully forward to join in defending the national independence. But how far could this new-born zeal be relied upon? n? Would these new recruits to the Federal ranks-indeed, would the bulk of the old Federal party-support the administration in standing out against the advances of France, when they came to feel the burden of the new direct tax, for the collection of which the preliminary arrangements CHAPTER lic. XIII. The letter finally closed with a strong hint that Murray himself would be perfectly acceptable. 1799. After some further communications, as it would seem, from Pichon, of interviews between him and Murray, Talleyrand wrote again (September 28)—and this was the letter communicated by the president as the basis of his nomination of Murray-giving his express sanction to a declaration which Pichon had taken it upon himself to make, that, whatever plenipotentiary the government of the United States might send to France, "he would undoubtedly be received with the respect due to the representative of a free, independent, and powerful nation." Both these letters had been communicated to Murray for transmission to the United States, but only the second was laid before the Senate, and that as a secret communication. When it had been received, or why the other was kept back, does not appear. The letter communicated had probably reached the State Department not long before the nomination was made. Possibly the other, though prior in date, had not yet arrived ; or, more likely, the president did not care, by communicating it, to show how much his choice of a minister had been guided by Talleyrand's selection. The first letter, however, having probably been sent by Talleyrand himself for publication in America, made its appearance in print in the course of the following summer in Callender's new paper at Richmond; Callender, since the death of Bache, disputing with Duane the editorial leadership of the opposition. In making the nomination, the president expressly pledged himself that Murray should not enter France without having first received direct and unequivocal assurances from the French minister of Foreign Relations that he should be received in character, and that a minister of equal grade would be appointed to treat with him. XIII. The motives which might have operated on Adams's CHAPTER mind for making this nomination are sufficiently obvious. The almost universal anxiety for peace with France, 1799. for which the opposition seemed willing to sacrifice every thing, while even the Federalists professed a willingness to sacrifice every thing short of independence, national honor, and neutral rights, had prompted the mission of Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry, in face of an express declaration of the Directory that they would not receive another minister from America till their alleged grievances had first been redressed. If true policy had required the institution of an embassy in face of a declaration like that, how was it possible entirely to disregard the assurances of Talleyrand, communicated through Pichon and Murray? assurances the most explicit and direct that could be made, short of the appointment of a French minister to America-a stretch of condescension hardly to be expected from the "terrible republic" toward a nation so weak as the United States, and rendered almost helpless by internal dissensions. There had no doubt been a great change in public sentiment since the appointment of the late rejected embassy. All the earnest efforts of Jefferson and his coadjutors had been unable to extinguish in their partisans the sense of national degradation; and many, especially in the Southern States, who had hitherto vehemently opposed the Federal administration, had come manfully forward to join in defending the national independence. But how far could this new-born zeal be relied upon? Would these new recruits to the Federal ranks-indeed, would the bulk of the old Federal party-support the administration in standing out against the advances of France, when they came to feel the burden of the new direct tax, for the collection of which the preliminary arrangements CHAPTER lic. XIII. The letter finally closed with a strong hint that Murray himself would be perfectly acceptable. 1799. After some further communications, as it would seem, from Pichon, of interviews between him and Murray, Talleyrand wrote again (September 28)—and this was the letter communicated by the president as the basis of his nomination of Murray-giving his express sanction to a declaration which Pichon had taken it upon himself to make, that, whatever plenipotentiary the government of the United States might send to France, "he would undoubtedly be received with the respect due to the representative of a free, independent, and powerful nation." Both these letters had been communicated to Murray for transmission to the United States, but only the second was laid before the Senate, and that as a secret communication. When it had been received, or why the other was kept back, does not appear. The letter communicated had probably reached the State Department not long before the nomination was made. Possibly the other, though prior in date, had not yet arrived; or, more likely, the president did not care, by communicating it, to show how much his choice of a minister had been guided by Talleyrand's selection. The first letter, however, having probably been sent by Talleyrand himself for publication in America, made its appearance in print in the course of the following summer in Callender's new paper at Richmond; Callender, since the death of Bache, disputing with Duane the editorial leadership of the opposition. In making the nomination, the president expressly pledged himself that Murray should not enter France without having first received direct and unequivocal assurances from the French minister of Foreign Relations that he should be received in character, and that a minister of equal grade would be appointed to treat with him. XIII The motives which might have operated on Adams's CHAPTER mind for making this nomination are sufficiently obvious. The almost universal anxiety for peace with France, 1799. for which the opposition seemed willing to sacrifice every thing, while even the Federalists professed a willingness to sacrifice every thing short of independence, national honor, and neutral rights, had prompted the mission of Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry, in face of an express declaration of the Directory that they would not receive another minister from America till their alleged grievances had first been redressed. If true policy had required the institution of an embassy in face of a declaration like that, how was it possible entirely to disregard the assurances of Talleyrand, communicated through Pichon and Murray ? assurances the most explicit and direct that could be made, short of the appointment of a French minister to America-a stretch of condescension hardly to be expected from the "terrible republic" toward a nation so weak as the United States, and rendered almost helpless by internal dissensions. There had no doubt been a great change in public sentiment since the appointment of the late rejected embassy. All the earnest efforts of Jefferson and his coadjutors had been unable to extinguish in their partisans the sense of national degradation; and many, especially in the Southern States, who had hitherto vehemently opposed the Federal administration, had come manfully forward to join in defending the national independence. But how far could this new-born zeal be relied upon ? Would these new recruits to the Federal ranks indeed, would the bulk of the old Federal party-support the administration in standing out against the advances of France, when they came to feel the burden of the new direct tax, for the collection of which the preliminary arrangements |