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jurisprudence may be said to reflect and indeed to represent the struggle between these two aspects of private property, the individual side and the social side.

The early ascendancy of the individual side has, in many respects, yielded to the claims of the social side. The eminent authorities on property law, Profs. James Casner and W. Parton Leach, suggest that the Founding Fathers would be astounded at the restrictions that have been made upon the right of property and in the use and enjoyment by the owner as he sees fit. Their comments are worthy of note:

We, in the United States, have always prided ourselves on our system of private property. Frequently we boast that in our country a man is free to do what he pleases with what he owns. Anyone who stops to think for a minute, however, realizes that our sys

tem of private property is not what it used to be and that a man's freedom to do what he wants with what he owns has changed from time to time.

Inroads which have been made on the freedom of owners of private property and which are now accepted as commonplace would have been unthinkable to our grandfathers, and it is within the realm of possibility that inroads which are unthinkable to us now may be commonplace to our grandchildren. Time will tell *** Casner and Leach, "Cases and Text on Property," 985 (1959).

This expansion of the power of the Government with respect to property has taken place under the police powers of the State government and, for the most part, the commerce power of the Federal Government.


It has been said that property is a bundle of rights. Under this definition, the owner of property is conceived of as drawing unto himself the whole bundle of interests, the aggregate of rights, privileges, powers, and immunities, in regard to the "thing" which he calls his property-Conflicts Restatement, property sections 1-5. But this property, this bundle of rights, is meaningless except insofar as the owner, the possessor thereof, is protected by the law in the exercise of these rights.

Further, the fundamental characteristic of property is the right to exclude others. Of this Blackstone wrote:

There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections

of mankind, as the right of property; or the sole and despotic dominion which one

man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the


A contemporary writer has denoted

the right to exclude others as the essence of property. H. R. Cohen, "Property and Sovereignty," 13 Cornell Law Review 12 (1927).

In Munn v. Illinois (94 U.S. 113, 141 (1877)), Justice Stone, dissenting, eloquently stated another basic attribute of property:

All that is beneficial in property arises from its use, and the fruits of that use; and whatever deprives a person of them deprives him of all that is desirable or valuable in the title and possession.

Again, the actual value of these attributes of property, and therefore of property itself, is determinable only in pro

portion to their judicial recognition and their legal enforceability. Property then is the bundle of rights which the law accords to the owner.

Certainly there has been a changing concept of private property in American jurisprudence whenever the law in the course of its development changes so that the owner of property is limited anew in respect to the dominion and control of his property. He has lost one of the rights from his bundle. He has lost some of his property. Thus when the Government rules that businesses affected with a public interest are subject to certain regulations, the property of the owners of such businesses has been correspondingly diminished.

In Nebbia v. New York (291 U.S. 502, 523, (1934)), the case where this monumental step was taken, the Court declared:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizens may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exerercise his freedom of contract to work with harm. Equally fundamental with the priit in the common interest. vate right is that of the public to regulate

Similarly, when the law, though recognizing the power of the owner of property to make certain stipulations respecting the use of his property, refuses to give legal redress for the violation of contracts or covenants made in regard to the property, the owner's property is pro tanto decreased. (See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).)

The Constitution as originally framed recognized a virtually unlimited right of private property subject to certain traditional restrictions of the common law. Even property in human beings was proEven property in human beings was protected therein. The absolutist concept of property, prevailing in the 19th century, held private property inviolable against any restrictions by the legislature, even on the grounds of public interest and social welfare. This resulted terest and social welfare. This resulted in the turn of the century emphasis upon the substantive aspects of due process as a limitation upon the remedial social legislation enacted by the States to alleviate problems arising in the wake of industrial expansion. In accordance with the laissez faire tenets of the time, social legislation was deemed contrary to the adequate protection of private property rights and constitutionally prohibited. The words of Justice Stone dissenting in that doctrine: Munn against Illinois are illustrative of

If the legislature of a State, under pretense of providing for the public good, or for any other reason, can determine, against the consent of the owner, the uses to which private property shall be devoted * private property shall be devoted *** it can deprive him of the property as completely as by a special act for its confiscation and destruction (24 U.S. at 142).

Today zoning laws, licensing laws, and numerous trade and business regulations give evidence of the modern understanding of property as requiring a balancing ing of property as requiring a balancing in favor of the social aid. Of this development, Marcus R. Cohen, in his essay velopment, Marcus R. Cohen, in his essay

on "Property and Sovereignty," supra at 22, writes:

Our students of property law need, therefore, to be reminded that not only has the whole law since the industrial revolution shown a steady growth in ever new restrictions upon the use of private property, but that the ideal of absolute laissez faire has never, in fact, been completely operative.

It is then, commonly accepted doctrine, Cohen says that—

There must be restrictions on the use

of property not only in the interests of other property owners (referring to the law of nuisance) but also in the interests of the health, safety, religion, morals, and general

welfare of the whole community.

The extension of, not the existence of, restrictions on private property is the crucial matter. As Professor Philbrick

declared "ownership today is vastly different from the dominium-propertyof the Roman law." In a manner of speaking, the test of the validity of legislation has become the greatest good for the group. The comments of Profs. Casner and Leach, who, while endorsing this as a valid test to apply as "our society develops and changes," strike a warning note, are significant:

One thing to keep uppermost in your mind when traveling down this road of curtailing a man's freedom of action is the basic belief that the greatest good for the greatest number comes from making man free and while some regulation is justified because it enables men to enjoy their freedom, too much regulation may destroy the freedom entirely. Keeping the proper balance in this regard should guide the development of law. (Casner and Leach, supra at 985.)

Today "the position of property in constitutional law is somewhat anomalousthe coming of industrialism has made of 'liberty' and 'property' convenient names for changeable bundles of specific equities." (Hamilton, "Property-According to Locke," 41 Yale L.J. 864 (1932)). Yet with all these analyses as to the present fluidity of the rights of the individual in his private property, it is still true that the right to own, use and enjoy private property is one of the most cherished tenets of American constitutional law. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Allegheny County (369 U.S. 84 (1962)), attests the continued vitality of this. It is only on a showing, first, of overriding public interest and, second, of full compliance with due process, that the Court will recognize the power of the legislature to make inroads upon one of the basic principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence, the right of the individual to own, use, and enjoy his property as he sees fit. These words of Justice Story in Wilkinson v. Leland (2 Pet. 627, 657 (1829)), are apropos:

The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred. At least, no court of justice in this country would be warranted in assuming that the power to violate and disregard them-a power so repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil liberty lurked under any general grant of legislative authority. *** A different doctrine is utterly inconsistent with the great and fundamental principle of a republican government, and with the right of the citizens

to the free enjoyment of their property lation, or in other ways becoming more lation, or in other ways becoming more lawfully acquired. aware of certain provisions and implications of the bill, are now realizing just how misleading are the terms civil rights, public accommodations, and equal employment in respect to this legislation.

I think I know something of constitutional law myself, Mr. President, having taught the subject in college for quite a number of years. But others far more knowledgeable than I, a number of those whom I believe may be objectively termed "experts" in the field of constitutional law, have voiced their sincere convictions that much of this bill is baldly unconstitutional.

I do not think there can be any real argument against the belief of many people that the nature and scope of the most objectionable features of this proposed legislation are due, for the most part, to the exercise of political pressures. We are here witnessing a drive for compete and immediate "equality" on the part of some of our citizens. In playing to the crowds, so to speak, we are considering the enactment of legislation that, as I have said, would be a dangerous Federal infringement upon the right of this Nation's citizens to own and control property. This dangerous infringement, this violation of basic rights, should be of particular concern to all citizens, of whatever color or national origin, for in this country the brown man or the black man has the same right to own property that the white man has, as he well should. If this is lost, if all is submerged in the drive for "equality," and if the Federal Government is to end up as the big brother dictator of "rights" and "morality," it is not too difficult to see what the end result will be. The minorities will be in far worse shape than now, for now they may stand in court as the equal of any man.

In my opinion, the passage of this unconstitutional bill would be violative of our sovereign duty to uphold the Constitution.

Since this proposed Federal legislation is inherently unconstitutional, its support must necessarily fall on the basis that the end justified the means. I, for one, cannot accept this basis; I cannot support inherently, fatally unconstitutional proposed legislation, no matter how noble its intentions and purposes may be said to be.


Mr. President, I do not oppose all facets of this proposed legislation. have been fairly described, I believe, as a moderate on the overall subject of civil rights. I supported, and voted for, the extension of the Civil Rights Commission.

I have consistently supported and voted for nondiscrimination in federally assisted programs, having myself introduced, on various occasions, amendments precluding any such discrimination. But the measures I have supported were, I believe, consistent with our Constitution, and not in violation thereof.

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This clause has two aspects. First, in a negative manner, it can be said to act as a limitation upon the power of the States.

Second, in a more affirmative manner, the commerce clause can be said to be a source of national power. The general principles delineating the scope of this power were set forth in the classic 1824 case of Gibbons against Ogden. In this case, Justice Marshall asks the question:

What is this power? It is the power to regulate, that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is

complete in itself, may be exercised to its

utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than those prescribed in the Constitution of the United States.

Certainly the unconstitutionality of this legislation centers around the titles of public accommodations and equal employment opportunities. Civil rights, equal employment, public accommodation are all words which sound good to the American citizen. However, the increasingly large numbers of individuals who are reading and studying this legis

The Constitution speaks of commerce been recognized that this phrase was: among the several States. It has long

Not one which would have been said to indicate the completely internal traffic of a State. It was said in Gibbons v. Ogden that the genius and character action of the Federal Government is to be applied to all external concerns of the Nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally, but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the Government. It is well understood and long established that Congress may exercise regulation over what would otherwise

be beyond its constitutional bounds where the subject of the regulation may reasonably foreign commerce or its free flow. Acts which have this effect, however they originate, are subject to Federal control. The criterion has been held to be upon commerce and not the source of the injury.

be held to burden or obstruct interstate or

The power of Congress over commerce is often described as plenary. An inquiry into the practical delimitations of the power of Congress in this respect reveals that the word plenary is one which, while denoting much, also misleads much.

Congress may pass a measure designed to eliminate a burden once it has made its appearance, or it may act in anticipation of a probable obstructing effect

on commerce.

The effect upon commerce may occur in an enterprise lying in the main stream of commerce. Obviously public accommodations do not fall into this category. The necessary effect may be found in activities "which restrain a substantial part of the commerce in a particular part of the commerce in a particular commodity." There has been no showing here that discriminatory practices have this effect. Nor has there been any finding that the completely free choice

by an individual proprietor of his customers restrains the movement of a substantial volume of goods which would otherwise move in interstate commerce. No serious argument can objectively be made that the exercise by a businessman of his constitutional rights to be individually and arbitrarily selective in his dealings with the public restrains a substantial volume of goods from moving in interstate commerce.

We must be told more than merely that the measures prescribed or the practices proscribed in this civil rights bill are necessary to the free, unobstructed and unimpeded flow of commerce and therefore within the preventative power of Congress under the constitutional grant to regulate commerce among the several States. The facts upon which this power is asserted must be capable of delineation with definiteness. He who would bring an action on legislation based on the commerce power must clearly establish incontrovertible facts showing, not a conjecturable effect, but actual evidence of the recurrent burdens produced on interstate commerce by the specific practices regulated in that legislation. Federal regulation of local industry pursuant to the commerce power must deal with matters closely connected with commerce, must not go beyond what is necessary for the protection of commerce, and must not attempt a broad regulation of business or industry within the State.

Even in those cases where the Court has upheld a statute extending the power of the Federal Government pursuant to the commerce clause, it has made undeniably clear, said Chief Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court in the 1914 Pipe Line cases, 234 U.S. 548, 561, that

The control of Congress over commerce among the States cannot be made a means of exercising powers not entrusted to it by the Constitution.

As a guide to the inquiry of whether or not Congress has the power to pass a law prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation substantially engaged in commerce, the following statement of the Court in Swift v. United States, (196 U.S 375, 398), should be borne in mind:

Commerce among the States is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business

Said the Court in the Swift case. Thus an establishment is subject to regulation under the commerce power if it is in commerce, or if it substantially affects commerce. This test of a substantial effect should be emphasized. The relation to commerce of the subject or object to be regulated must be such that its regulation is necessary for the effective regulation of interstate commerce. The effect upon commerce must not be "accidental, secondary, remote, or merely probable-from Swift against United States, we find that local activities may be regulated under the commerce power only where those local activities are an integral part of interstate commerce.

The finding of the necessary tie between a local activity and interstate commerce was at one period of constitutional adjudication presented by describ

ing the effect on commerce as substantial or direct. Under a more sophisticated approach, questions of the power of Congress are not determined by reference to any formula which would give controlling force to nomenclature and would foreclose consideration of the actual effect of the activities in question upon interstate commerce. Thus the continu

ing statements of proponents of this legislation that the burdens imposed on interstate commerce by discriminatory practices and the resulting obstructions to the free flow of commerce are serious and substantial is not conclusive. The actual effect imposed upon interstate commerce by the practices of catering to selected clientele in privately owned places of public accommodation must still be shown. It would only be upon It would only be upon an objective determination that such practices exert a real impact on interstate commerce that the necessary link between local activity and interstate commerce would be found.

By objective determination is meant a determination based on incontrovertible evidence of facts and figures, and not a conclusion leaped to by the device of affixing the labed "substantial" to the area to be regulated.

There is not one shred of evidence to support this bill's hypothesis that there are such burdens obstructing and impeding commerce by reason of the absence of Federal public accommodations laws or that Federal regulation of public

accommodations is essential to its exercise of its constitutional power over commerce. Not one scintilla of evidence to this effect has been presented. Those who drew this bill confused subjective

moral beliefs with constitutional principles, and started with the hypothesis that discrimination in places of public accommodation was to be prohibited. They then sought to bottom the constitutional power on a catchall argument that such discrimination substantially affected interstate commerce. The only correct procedure in framing constitutional legislation is to lay the proposed measure beside the constitutional grant and determine whether the power granted in the Constitution comprehends the power to enact the particular measure-whether the proposed legislation would contravene the Constitution.

In 1824, in the previously referred to case of Gibbons against Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall warned that effective restraint on the exercise of this embrac

ing and penetrating power must proceed from political rather than from judicial processes. This warning was reiterated in a case which has gone as far as any in upholding the power of Congress under the commerce clause to regulate local activities, in Wickard v. Filburn, (317 Supreme Court Reports, 110, 120 (1942)).

In assessing the extent of the commerce power, let us recur to broad concepts of this grant. Take the words of the Court in U.S. v. Wrightwood Dairy

Co. (315 U.S. 110 (1942)):

The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the regulation of commerce among the States. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Con

gress over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce. *** The power of Congress over interstate commerce is plenary and complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitation other than are prescribed in the Constitution. Gibbons v. Ogden, (9 Wheat. 1, 196). It follows that no form of State activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce clause to Congress. Hence the reach of that power extends to those intrastate activities which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the granted power.

Broad as this is, and unquestionably it is broader than the framers intended, there is not one word recognizing a power in Congress to regulate such peculiarly local activities covered by this


The central


here is

whether this Congress proposes to seize upon a slender reed and attempt to inject the Federal regulatory power into all areas, into the most local of local activities.

Although the commerce power has been held to permit Federal regulation to reach a farmer growing wheat on his own farm for his own consumption (Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)), and to govern the labor relations of a retailer whose sales are entirely intrastate and whose purchases tirely intrastate and whose purchases are eight-ninths intrastate (Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, 353 U.S. 20 (1957)), these extraordinary extensions of the commerce power under special acts are not determinative of the power acts are not determinative of the power of Congress to regulate all local activity of Congress to regulate all local activity under the commerce power.

They cannot be extended to give the Federal Government power to prohibit Federal Government power to prohibit private property owners, operating their own local business, from choosing their customers according to their own desires.

This public accommodations measure is predicated on the doctrine that where the Government has the power to deny a privilege altogether, it may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. pose. The privilege is said to be interstate commerce, with the Government having the power to deny the right to engage in interstate commerce or in activities affecting commerce. The argument continues with the allegation that the Government may condition this right as it sees fit. The analysis is completed

with the conclusion that the Government may prohibit racial discrimination by the operators of local establishments. by the operators of local establishments. Now let us examine this thesis. Congress may deny the right to engage in interstate commerce or in activities affecting commerce for failure to conform with a

regulation, if, and only if, there is a link or valid relation between the unobstructed operation of interstate commerce and the regulation. Thus, in order for Congress to dictate who local establishments may serve, it must first show either that these establishments are in interstate commerce or that, though local, they are an integral part of that commerce and the activity sought to be regulated. Neither the first nor the second requirement has been met, or can be met in this legislation.

Moreover, the right of regulation does not imply an unlimited power of regulation. Congress' power over interstate commerce itself is not unlimited. There are inherent limitations on the right to regulate activities affecting commerce and on the power to deny access to interstate commerce. Congress may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. In Frost v. Railroad Commission (271 U.S. 583, 594 (1929)), it was said:

If Government could compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition for its favor, it might, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the United States could thus be manipulated out of existence.

In the Civil Rights Cases (109 U.S. 3 (1883)), which held unconstitutional under the 13th or 14th amendment the power of Congress to pass a law prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation, the Court categorically declared:

No one will contend that the power to pass [this law] was contained in the Constitution before the adoption of the last three amendments.

The commerce power did not support this legislation in 1883. And it does not in 1964.

The commerce power has been expanded by the courts, it is true, since the turn of the century, but the fundamental distinction between what is local and what is national remains. In a recent case, Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 Federal 2d 845 (4th Circuit 1959), the court observed:

We do not find that a restaurant is engaged in interstate commerce merely because in the course of its business of furnishing accommodations to the general public it serves persons who are traveling from State to State. As an instrument of local commerce, the restaurant is not subject to the constitutional and statutory provisions discussed above and, thus, is at liberty to deal with such persons as it may select.

This reasoning applies to all privately owned places of public accommodation.

Mr. President, the commonsense and good judgment possessed by the American citizen is enough for him to determine for himself the inherently fatal defect of the public accommodations section of the bill. Attempts at legislative definitions determining interstate commerce formulas, which fly in the face of plain commonsense and ordinary good judgment, will not be accepted by our citizenry. Legislative declarations that restaurants, cafeterias, lunchrooms, lunch counters, soda fountains, motion picture houses, theaters, concert halls, sports arenas, stadiums, hotels, motels, lodging houses, and so forth, are henceforth to be classified as interstate in character defy sound reason.

The accommodations to which I refer are privately owned and operated, and if they are not involved in interstate commerce, there is no power anywhere in the Constitution given to Congress to regulate their respective customers.

It is poor judgment and unsound reasoning to now attempt to redress grievances by destroying the constitutional,

the private right of each American citizen to run his or her business affairs, not involved in interstate commerce, as he or she sees fit. It is certainly hoped by many opposing the bill, that no business would discriminate among customers solely on the ground of race, religion, or color. I am sure it is hoped by many that any business that did so discriminate would lose business, and eventually be forced to close its door because of public opinion. But I do not believe a local business should be forced to close because of actions by the Attorney General of the United States based on a complaint of discrimination when the fact of the matter is that the owner just did not want the complainant as a customer-and this in my opinion is the prerogative of the owner.

Nowhere that I can determine under the Constitution is the Federal Government given any power to legislatively determine that a private citizen, desirous of engaging in a business endeavor, must never discriminate in the selection or acceptance of customers. And there is one interesting point that should not be overlooked-a good many many customers prefer to be selected much more than just accepted.

When private establishments within the confines of the respective State, in the lawful and legitimate exercise of their private discretion, wish to select their customers, there is no constitutional power, under the Constitution or any of its amendments, giving the Federal Government the right to regulate the private establishment.

As one of our colleagues, the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY], has stated:

The delicate balance of power between Federal and all local governments could be forever destroyed, if to accomplish even a laudable purpose we do violence to the clear

intent of the Constitution that limits Federal activity to matters substantially affecting interstate commerce.

11 A.M.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the

Senate at this time, I move, pursuant to the order previously entered, that the Senate stand in recess until 11 o'clock a.m. tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 5 o'clock and 31 minutes p.m.) the Senate took a recess, pursuant to the order previously entered, until tomorrow, Friday, March 20, 1964, at 11 o'clock a.m.



The House met at 12 o'clock noon.
The Chaplain, Rev. Bernard Braskamp,
D.D., offered the following prayer:

I John 4: 19: We love Him because He first loved us.

Almighty God, at this noon hour, as we engage in a moment of prayer, we are manifesting a feeling and a faith to seek Thee which Thou hast implanted

in us and that Thy gracious presence ing that the unofficial returns of the special alone canst satisfy.

We penitently confess that we are so slow of heart to feel and so dull of vision to see that we often fail to understand that if we are seeking Thee it is because Thou hast first sought us.

May our minds and hearts this day become animated and aglow with a sense of the supremacy of duty and a passion for righteousness.

Grant that the spirit of love and light may pervade our souls and may the good seed, that we sow here and there, bloom and become fragrant with the flowers of kindness, of mercy, and good cheer.

When we fail to attain unto that spiritual growth and dignity of soul, which we covet, may we have the will to try again for Thy love will never let us go. Hear us in Christ's name. Amen.


election conducted on March 10, 1964, in the Second Congressional District of Tennessee to elect a Representative in the Congress of the United States to fill the unexpired term of the Honorable Howard H. Baker, deceased, show that Mrs. HOWARD H. BAKER was duly elected by a margin of 8,982 votes. There has been no indication of any election contest or dispute.

Sincerely yours,

RALPH R. ROBERTS, Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives. Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentlewoman from Tennessee [Mrs. HoWARD H. BAKER] be permitted to take the oath of office today. Her certificate of election has not arrived, but there is no contest, and no question has been raised with regard to her election.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

Mrs. BAKER appeared at the bar of The Journal of the proceedings of yes- the House and took the oath of office. terday was read and approved.


A message in writing from the Presi

dent of the United States was communi

cated to the House by Mr. Ratchford, one of his secretaries, who also informed the House that on March 18, 1964, the President approved and signed bills of the House of the following titles:

H.R. 5306. An act for the relief of Paul James Branan;

H.R. 7491. An act for the relief of William L. Berryman; and

H.R. 10051. An act to amend Public Law 86-272, as amended, with respect to the reporting date.


A message from the Senate by Mr. Arrington, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 7967. An act for the relief of certain individuals employed by the Department of the Air Force at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii.

The message also announced that the Senate agrees to the amendments of the House to bills of the Senate of the following titles:

S. 614. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to make water available for a permanent pool for fish and wildlife and recreation purposes at Cochiti Reservoir from the San Juan-Chama unit of the Colorado River storage project;

S. 1299. An act to defer certain operation and maintenance charges of the Eden Valley Irrigation and Drainage District; and

S. 1445. An act for the relief of Archie L. Dickson, Jr.

The SPEAKER laid before the House
the following communication from the
Clerk of the House of Representatives:
Washington, D.C., March 16, 1964.
The Honorable the SPEAKER,
House of Representatives.

SIR: From the secretary of state, State of
Tennessee, a letter was received today stat-
Tennessee, a letter was received today stat-

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amount nor the nature of foreign assistance. It is the will and commitment of the government and people directly involved.

To those nations which do commit themselves to progress under freedom, help from us and from others can provide the margin of difference between failure and success. This is the heart This is the heart of the matter.

The proposals contained in this message express our self-interest at the same time that they proclaim our national ideals.

We will be laying up a harvest of woe for us and our children if we shrink from the task of grappling in the world community with poverty and ignorance. These are the grim recruiting sergeants of communism. They flourish wherever we falter. If we default on our obligations, communism will expand its ambitions. That is the stern equation which dominates our age, and from which there can be no escape in logic or in honor.


It is against our national interest to tolerate waste or inefficiency or extravagance in any of these programs. But it is equally repugnant to our national interest to retreat from our obligations and commitments while freedom remains under siege.

We recognize that the United States cannot and should not sustain the burden of these programs alone.

Other nations are needed in this enterprise of mutual help. Encouraging Encouraging signs exist that the process of sharing the burden is steadily growing.

The best way for the United States to stimulate this growth and to broaden this partnership in freedom is to make our own example an incentive to our friends and allies.

We need the assurance of stability and progress in a world restless with many dangers and anxieties.


In this program we do not seek to cover the whole world. Aid on a worldwide scale is no part of our purpose.

We seek instead, through prudent and responsible programs, to help carefully selected countries whose survival in freedom is essential-and whose collapse would bring new opportunities for Communist expansion.

There are no easy victories in this campaign. But there can be sudden disasters. We cannot ask for a reprieve from responsibility while freedom is in danger. The vital interests of the United States require us to stay in the battle. We dare not desert.

Economic and military assistance, used at the right time and in the right way, can provide indispensable help to our foreign policy in enabling the United States to influence events instead of merely reacting to them. By committing a small part of our resources before crises actually occur, we reduce the danger and frequency of those crises. Our foresight becomes a shield against misfortune.

The recommendations contained in this program for fiscal year 1965 are designed to move the aid program in that direction. They reflect views and ex

perience of the Congress, of the executive branch, and of informed private citizens.


First. The request for funds must be realistic.

For economic assistance, new authorizations of $917 million for fiscal 1965 are recommended. Specifically, I recommend $335 million for supporting assistance, $225 million for technical cooperation, $134 million for contributions to international organizations, $150 million for the President's Contingency Fund, and $73 million for administrative and and $73 million for administrative and miscellaneous expenses.

For military assistance, I recommend that the Congress provide a continuing authorization, subject to an annual review of each year's proposals by the authorizing committees in both Houses.

For fiscal 1965, I recommend no additional authorizations for the Alliance for Progress or for development lending assistance in Asia or Africa. Existing authorizations for these programs adequate.


The appropriations recommended for fiscal 1965 total $1 billion for military assistance and $2.4 billion for economic assistance.

In fiscal 1964, the initial request was $4.9 billion, later reduced to $4.5 billion. This fiscal year, the request of $3.4 bilThis fiscal year, the request of $3.4 billion is $1.1 billion less than last year's request, although about the same as was available last year, taking into consideration the unexpended balance from the year before. Moreover, more than 80 percent of aid funds will be spent in the United States. The impact of the program on our balance of payments will be less than ever before. INSURANCE TO AVOID COMMITTING AMERICAN


These requests reflect a determination to continue to improve the aid program both in concept and administration. The overall request represents a great deal of money-but it is an amount which we should, in all prudence, provide to serve essential U.S. interests and commitments throughout the world.

More than 1 million American men in uniform are now stationed outside the United States. United States. As insurance to avoid involving them and the Nation in a major conflict, we propose to spend through aid programs less than 4 cents out of every tax dollar.


If there is any alternative insurance against war, it might be found in an increase in the defense budget. increase in the defense budget. that would require not only many times more than $3.4 billion, for a military budget which already takes more than 50 cents out of every tax dollar, but also a severalfold increase in our own military manpower.

The foreign assistance requested will provide: The crucial assistance we have promised the people of Latin America who are committed to programs of ecowho are committed to programs of economic and social progress; continued economic development in India, Pakistan, and Turkey under the major interstan, and Turkey under the major international aid-consortia to which we are a party; the U.S. share of voluntary contributions to the United Nations tech

nical cooperation programs and to such special international programs as the work of the United Nations Children's Fund, and the development of the Indus Basin; funds to meet our commitments to the freedom of the people of South Vietnam, Korea, and for the other obligations we have undertaken in Asia and Africa.

Second. The funds I am requesting will be concentrated where they will produce the best results, and speed the transition from U.S. assistance to selfsupport wherever possible.

Two-thirds of the proposed military assistance will go to 11 nations along the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc, from Greece and Turkey through Thailand and Vietnam to the Republic of China and Korea. These funds are a key to the maintenance of over 3.5 million men under arms, raised and supported in large measure by the countries receiving the assistance.

The need for supporting assistance: Funds used primarily in countries facing defense or security emergencies will continue to be reduced. Fourteen coun

tries which received supporting assistance 3 years ago will receive none in fiscal year 1965.

Four-fifths of the present request will go to four countries-Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Jordan.

Two-thirds of the development lending proposed for fiscal 1965-including Alliance for Progress lending-will be concentrated in six countries: Chile, Colombia, Nigeria, Turkey, Pakistan, and


Funds for educational and technical

cooperation to help start schools, health centers, agricultural experiment stations, credit services, and dozens of other institutions-are not concentrated in a few countries. But they will be used for selected projects to raise the ability of less fortunate peoples to meet their own needs. To carry out these projects we are seeking the best personnel available in the United States-in private agencies, in universities, in State and local governments, and throughout the Federal Government.

Wherever possible, we will speed up the transition from reliance on aid to self-support.

In 17 nations, the transition has been completed and economic aid has ended. Fourteen countries are approaching the point where soft economic loans and grants will no longer be needed. New funds for military equipment grants are being requested for seven fewer countries for fiscal 1965 than for the present

Third. We must do more to utilize private initiative in the United States-and in the developing countries-to promote economic development abroad.

During the past year the first new houses financed by U.S. private funds protected by AID guarantees were completed in Lima, Peru; the first rural electrification surveys, conducted by the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association under contract to AID, were completed and the first rural electrification loan-in Nicaragua-was approved; the first arrangement linking the public and private resources of

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