imperial majesty recently and solemnly guaranteed.

But while the alleged rejection of the emperor of Russia's mediation, between Great Britain and France, is stated as a just ground of his imperial majesty's resentment; his majesty's request of that mediation, for the re-establishment of peace between Great Britain and Denmark, is represented as an insult which was beyond the bounds of his imperial majesty's moderation to endure,

His majesty feels himself under no obligation to offer any atonement or apology to the emperor of Russia for the expedition against Copenhagen. It is not for those who were parties to the secret arrangements of Tilsit, to demand satisfaction for a measure to which those arrangements gave rise, and by which one of the objects of them has been happily defeated.

His majesty's justification of the expedition against Copenhagen is before the world. The declaration of the emperor of Russia would supply whatever was wanting in it, if any thing could be wanting to convince the most incredulous of the urgency of that necessity under which his majesty acted.

But until the Russian declaration was published, his majesty had no reason to suspect that any opinions which the emperor of Russia might entertain of the transaction at Copenhagen could be such as to preclude his imperial majesty from undertaking, at the request of Great Britain, that same office of mediator, which he has assumed with so much alacrity on the behalf of France. Nor can his majesty forget that the first symptoms of reviving confidence, since the peace of Tilsit, the only prospect of success in the endeavors of his majesty's ambassador to restore the antient good understanding between Great Britain and Russia, appeared when the intelligence of the siege of Copenhagen had been recently received at St. Petersburgh. The inviolability of the Baltic sea, and the reciprocal guarantees of the powers that border upon it, guarantees said to

have been contracted with the knowledge of the British government, are stated as aggravations of his majesty's proceedings in the Baltic. It cannot be intended to represent his majesty as having at any time acquiesced in the principles upon which the inviolability of the Baltic is maintained; however his majesty may, at particular periods, have forborne, for special reasons influencing his conduct at the time, to act in contradiction to them. Such forbearance never could have applied but to a state of peace and real neutrality in the north; and his majesty most assuredly could not be expected to recur to it, after France has been suffered to establish herself in undisputed sovereignty along the whole coast of the Baltic sea from Dantzic to Lubec.

But the higher the value which the em peror of Russia places on the engagements respecting the tranquillity of the Baltic, which he describes himself as inheriting from his immediate predecessors, the empress Catherine and the emperor Paul, the less justly can his imperial majesty resent the appeal made to him by his majesty as the guarantee of the peace to be concluded between Great Britain and Denmark. In making that appeal, with the utmost confidence and sincerity, bis majesty neither intended, nor can he imagine that he offered, any insult to the emperor of Russia. Nor can his majesty conceive that, in proposing to the prince royal terms of peace, such as the most successful war on the part of Denmark could hardly have been expected to extort from Great Britain, his majesty rendered himself liable to the imputation, either of exasperating the resentment, or of outraging the dignity of Denmark.

His majesty has thus replied to all the different accusations by which the Russian government labors to justify the rupture of a connection which has subsisted for ages, with reciprocal advantage to Great Britain and Russia, and attempts to disguise the operation of that external influence by which Russia is driven into unjust hostilities for interests not her own.

The Russian declaration proceeds to announce the several conditions on which alone these hostilities can be terminated, and the intercourse of the two countries renewed.

His majesty has already had occasion to assert, that justice has in no instance been denied to the claims of his imperial majesty's subjects.

The termination of the war with Denmark has been so anxiously sought by his majesty, that it cannot be necessary for his majesty to renew any professions upon that subject. But his majesty is at a loss to reconcile the emperor of Russia's present anxiety for the completion of such an arrangement, with his imperial majesty's recent refusal to contribute his good offices for effecting it.

The requisition of his imperial majesty for the immediate conclusion, by his majesty, of a peace with France, is as extraordinary in the substance as it is offensive in the manner. His majesty has at no time declined to treat with France, when France has professed a willingness to treat on an admissible basis. And the emperor of Russia cannot fail to remember, that the last negotiation between Great Britain and France was broke off, upon points immediately affect ing, not his majesty's own interests, but those of his imperial ally. But his majesty neither understands, nor will he admit, the pretension of the emperor of Russia to dictate the time, or the mode, of his majesty's pacific negotiations with other powers. It never will be endured by his majesty, that any government shall indemnify itself for the humiliation of subserviency to France, by the adoption of an ininsulting and peremptory tone towards Great Britain.

His majesty proclaims anew those principles of maritime law against which the armed neutrality, under the auspices of the empress Catherine, was originally directed, and against which the present hostilities of Russia are denounced. Those principles have been recognized and acted upon in the best periods of the history of Europe, and acted upon by no power with more strictness and severity than by Rus

sia herself in the reign of the empress Catherine

Those principles it is the right and the duty of his majesty to maintain; and against every confederacy his majesty is determined, under the blessing of divine Providence, to maintain them. They have at all times contributed essentially to the support of the maritime power of Great Britain; but they are become incalculably more valuable and important at a period when the martiime power of Great Britain constitutes the sole remaining bulwark against the overwhelming usurpations of France; the only refuge to which other nations may yet resort, in happier times, for assistance and protection.

When the opportunity for peace between Great Britain and Russia shall arrive, his majesty will embrace it with eagerness. The arrangements of such a negotiation will not be difficult or complicated. His majesty, as he has nothing to concede, so he has nothing to require: satisfied, if Russia shall manifest a disposition to return to her antient feelings of friendship towards Great Britain; to a just consideration of her own true interests; and to a sense of her own dignity as an independent nation.

Westminster, Dec. 18, 1807.

The sentiments expressed in the above declaration were those of the nation, as well as the government. But when Prussia declared against England, and Austria prepared to join the same confederacy, the only sentiment which prevailed was pity for the abject state of subjection to which these courts were reduced, and the wretched thraldom which their mutual jealousy and mutual misconduct had brought on Germany.

During the last war the flourishing state of trade was the constant boast of ministers, and the custom-house books were referred to as proofs of national prosperity from which there could be no appeal. This wretched folly imposed upon the people, and even deceived the enemy, for while the English confounded the wealth of nations with their welfare, Buonaparte mis

a

took it for their strength. He called us a nation of shopkeepers, and reasoning as if we were so, concluded that by ruining our trade he must destroy our prosperity. Upon this avowed principle he prohibited all trading in English manufacture, ordered every article of English merchandise belonging to England or coming from her colonies, to be seized as lawful prize, and declared, as we have seen, the British islands to be in a state of blockade. The tyrannical clauses affected others more materially than us; and it remained to be ascertained, whether America, the only nation which could properly be called neutral, would remonstrate against measure so injurious to her trade. But in the government of America, there was a manifest disposition to crouch at the feet of France. After it had been vainly intimated therefore to the neutral powers, that, if they submitted to have their ships confiscated in France when bound to or sailing from an English port, we should seize and confiscate all British cargoes bound to or from France; the threat was followed by an order of council, (November 11th, 1807,) enacting, that all neutral ships, with neutral goods on board bound for France, or any of the countries under her control, should come into an English port, and there pay duty to an English customhouse, so that no goods should enter France which we had not previously taxed. This decree exasperated Buonaparte, and he immediately issued at Milan, an edict, declaring that every neutral vessel which submitted to be searched by a neutral ship, or paid any duty whatever to the English government, should be considered as denationalized, as having forfeited the protection of its Own government, as having become English property, and in consequence as liable to be seized as lawful prize by French ships of war. The British islands were again declared to be in a state of blockade both by land and sea, the passion of Buonaparte not pausing to consider whether such a land-blockade were intelligible. Our orders in councilwere in fact seized upon as a pretext for new-wording and colouring a previous

commercial decree issued at Milan a few days after them, but before they could be known, (November 23rd.) For this previous decree enacted, that "All vessels, after having touched at England, entering the ports of France, shall be seized and confiscated, as well as their cargoes, without exception or distinction of commodities or merchandise." The orders in council, therefore, were now represented as the provocation and reason of enacting what had been before enacted.

Under these circumstances, America appeared to have only a choice of evils, to join with one of the hostile powers, tc arm her vessels against both for defensive war, or to submit to both, and carry on her trade with England. But the president and the populace of America were alike under the influence of hostile feelings towards England. The first state papers of Mr. Jefferson were so strikingly contrasted, with all which it had been our fortune to see promulgated in Europe, that the feeling of delight which they occasioned in the heart of an Englishman, were more than counterbalanced by a sense of humiliation which he could not fail to experience. They spoke of plans for national improvement, of expense curtailed, and taxes remitted to the people, and they indicated a spirit of hope not less philosophical than generous, which promised to hasten the approach of happier ages. But when trying times came on, and the president was weighed in the balance, he was found wanting. His enmity to this country continued long after it behoved him as a minister and a statesman, to return to more natural sentiments. The war against the French republic undoubtedly contributed to this animosity, and something has been ascribed to to wounded vanity. Mr. Jefferson had been received at Paris with the most flattering distinction; in London he was entertained with a reserve more consonant to our usual manners than his real merit would have justified, or policy dictated. The temper of the American people corresponded but too well with that of their president. The identity of language which in better times

will restore the two nations to a state of mutual amity, gave occasion in the present agitated' aspect of affairs to mutual provocations. Our seamen frequently deserted to the Americans, and their sailors were sometimes impressed on suspicion of being Englishmen. On both sides there was just cause of complaint. We endured most injury, but they received most insult. But it was the practice of searching merchantvessels, which chiefly irritated the Americans. Accustomed during the last war, to enjoy the whole carrying trade of Europe, they forgot in their vexation at its loss, that France had begun this system of restriction, and their whole resentment was directed against England. Under the impression of this feeling they co-operated with Buonaparte, in his plan of commercial warfare. A non-importation act prohibiting many articles of English manufacture was passed in 1806, which was at various times suspended, but when Buonaparte and his ally the emperor of Russia, had endeavored by their edicts to close the ports of Europe against us, this act was once more brought forward to be enforced. The oppressive conduct of France at length extended to the Americans themselves, who reduced by the edicts of Milan and the orders in council, to a choice of difficulties, adopted the strange expedient of suspending their own commerce entirely, by laying. an embargo on all exports. Encouraged by this event, Buonaparte now determined to proceed in his experiment. He had already sent an army into Portugal, which expelled the reigning family, occasioned their exile to Brasil, and shut the port of Lisbon against us. The king of Prussia in a melancholy declaration, prohibited all intercourse between us and his states, and the king of Spain, so long the tool, and destined to be the victim of the French emperor, added another proof of blind subservience to his treacherous ally, by adopting in all his dominions the measures which had been enacted by France. In consequence of these combined and cotemporary measures, the whole continent of Europe, with the exception of Sweden, was closed against British goods, and our

import trade from America was suddenly suspended.

The power and the will of Buonaparte had occasioned this state of things. In England the immediate inconvenience which was felt occasioned a partial cry of peace, begun by some of those manufacturers whose trade was at a stand, and supported by others whose views were less selfish, though not more enlightened. The most strenuous advocate for peace at this inauspicious moment was Mr. Roscoe, a man not to be mentioned without respect ever when his errors are noticed. His pamphlets were eagerly received, and the authority of so excellent and celebrated a man, was triumphantly quoted by the advocates of peace. But his pamphlets produced no other effect, and they persuaded no person who had not already adopted his opinion.

If there was little cause of fear in pursuing this inevitable and apparently interminable war, the manner in which it had been, and was now conducted, precluded the hope of ultimate success. Every administration, this like the last, and the last like that before it, proceeded without system, and trod the same beaten and uniform path of incorrigible fatuity. The same tardiness, the same indecision, the same half measures, the same waste of men and money in fruit less expeditions, characterized them all. Even now when it became us to appear, as in reality we were, the only supporters of morals, intellect, and freedom, we continued to obey the pleasure of corrupt courts, in opposition to the welfare and the wishes of their subjects, and to squander our resources in attempting to support the most atrocious and arbitrary governments.

Much time during the early part of the session was consumed in debates upon the expedition to Copenhagen, and the subjects which it implicated. The orders in council were not less obstinately contested. The present ministry when out of place had pursued a system of harassing and vexatious opposition, which was now fully retaliated upon them. Night after night the discussion was renewed, and upon every separate debate the lights in Westminster hall were to be seen burning till

morning. What leisure can a ministry have for the important duties of their station whose whole time must be employed in haranguing about what they have done, in stead of arranging what they are to do? His days occupied in the office with the business of such an empire, in such times, and his nights consumed in fruitless debates in parliament, the iron frame of Talus is as necessary for an actual minister of state, as his moral inflexibility for an ideal one. Many reforms in the constitution of parliament have been proposed, a regulation which should exempt the efficient ministers from this wasting fatigue, would be one of the most beneficial. They might present their reports to the house, and leave the house to discuss them.

Lord Grenville, in the debate upon the king's speech, had shown what ground would be taken in opposing these orders of council. He affirmed that the ministers could not on the king's authority, constitutionally decree such extraordinary prohibitions, and that they had actually violated an article of Magna Charta. No ministers, it was said, had ventured to give such advice to the crown, since the reign of James II. when that monarch was advised that he had a power to dispense with the laws of the country. The exercise of the prerogative was limited by fixed rules, and the court of privy council was subject to the law of nations, which law was broken by the present orders. These arguments were enforced with much ability by lord Grenville in the upper, and by lord Henry Petty in the lower house. But, alas! the law of nations was extinct. The law of the strongest, which had often been acted upon in its stead, was now proclaimed by the enemy; and to call up the ghost of Magna Charta against a ministry, is as hopeless as it is to oppose Puffendorf to Buonaparte; majorities are as little influenced by the one as armies by the other. All arguments from the law of nations were therefore futile; and the other objection amount-. ed only to this, that ministers ought to come to parliament for a bill of indemnity, which, had they supposed their proceedings required any palliation, they would of

course have done, but this they absolutely denied. The statutes which were infringed, they said, related to a state of peace and not of war, and the measures in question were measures of war, which the king was entitled by his prerogative to adopt.

It was observed by lord Hawkesbury that when the French decree was published, there appeared two courses, either of which might be adopted; to consider the decree as wholly ineffective, and treat it with contempt, or to regard it as a substantial measure, calculated to injure the interests of the country, and justifying measures of retaliation. The former would have been least inconvenient to ourselves, most dignified, and most humiliating to the enemy. And this alternative lord Hawkesbury would have preferred, had not the contrary system been adopted by the late administration, which had exercised the right of retaliation, and distinctly avowed their determination to extend, if necessary, the principle of the orders in council issued on the 7th of January, 1807. "The principle was incontrovertible; we were completely justified in retaliating upon the enemy their own measure; if they declare that we shall have no trade, we have a right to declare that they shall have none, and we have the power to enforce our decrees.”

The great body of the people and even the merchants were decidedly in favor of these orders in council, as they would have been of any measure which was thought necessary for supporting the honor of their country, and continuing the war against Buonaparte. But there were many persons whose interests were immediately affected to a material degree. A petition against the orders was brought up from Liverpool, and nearly fifty nights of the session were consumed in debates upon the policy of the measure. Even after the orders had been enacted by a large majority, licences were granted exempting ships from those very orders, and enabling them to trade with France; an inconsistency which was occasioned by the rapacity of the clerks belonging to the privy council office, who received for every licence a handsome perquisite.

Ministers found an easy task in the