A XI. calculated with confidence that, under these circumstan- CHAPTER ces, it would be impossible for the government to take any steps hostile to France. Of the feebleness of the 1798. government ample proof had, indeed, been exhibited. solemn embassy of three envoys had been appointed to supply the place of a minister rejected with insult; and depredations on American commerce, to the amount of millions of dollars, had hitherto been patiently borne. So far, this system of insult and injury had answered well, and the Directory seem to have thought that it was only necessary to persist in it to carry every point. After due deliberation, the envoys made a detailed and April 7. elaborate rejoinder to Talleyrand's manifesto-a powerful, and, for the most part, a conclusive reply as to all the alleged special breaches of treaty, whether before Jay's mission, by the negotiation of the British treaty, or subsequently to it. The attempted justification of the recent hostile decrees under that clause of the treaty of commerce securing to France the privileges of the most favored nation, was fully exploded; to which the envoys dryly added, that the provisions of those decrees most complained of, particularly the authorization of captures for want of a role d'equipage, could have no possible relation to any thing conceded or pretended to be conceded to any other nation, as the British had made. no captures on any such pretense. The late outrageous decree, intended to cut off all intercourse between Great Britain and other nations, was made the subject of an energetic remonstrance, as totally inconsistent with neutral rights and the law of nations, to acquiesce in which would be to establish a precedent for national degradation, such as would never cease to authorize any measures which power might be disposed to adopt. The president's strictures on Barras's speech were justified, not as XL CHAPTER a denunciation of the Directory, but as the statement of a highly important fact, fully within the scope of the pres1798. ident's duty. Talleyrand's attempt to hold the American government responsible for the freedoms of the American press was well touched. But the main point of the manifesto assumed, indeed, in that document rather than argued the binding force of the guarantee, and the consequent inability of the United States to assume a neutral position, were passed over in silence. The only decisive evidence of feeling which the envoys suffered to escape them was in reference to the charge of duplicity in the matter of Jay's negotiation urged against the American government, and to which the conduct of Monroe had contributed to give a certain color. As to the imputation on the envoys themselves of hostility to France and devotion to England, they declared themselves "purely American, unmixed with any particle of foreign tint," and anxious to manifest their attachment to their country by effecting a sincere and real accommodation with France, not inconsistent with the independence of the United States, and such as might promote the interests of both nations. They denied that Jay could have been any more desirous to bring the British negotiation to a successful issue than they were of an honorable accommodation with France; and they pointedly asked whether, supposing Jay's demands for reparation of past injuries and security for the future to have been met only by requisitions to comply with which would have involved the nation in evils of which even war would, perhaps, not be the greatest; supposing all his attempts to remove unfavorable impressions to have failed, and all his offers to make explanations to have been rejected; supposing Jay himself to have been ordered out of England, would other ministers have been XI. sent to supply his place? or, if sent, would they have CHAPTER waited six months unaccredited, soliciting permission to display the upright principles on which their government 1798. had acted, and the amicable sentiments by which it was animated? As to the proposition to treat with one of the envoys, selected by the French government, to the exclusion of the other two, they regretted that even this proposition was unaccompanied with any assurance of an abandonment of those demands for money hitherto proposed as the only condition on which a stop would be put to the depredations daily carried on against American commerce; demands which the envoys had no power to accede to, and which the United States would find it very difficult to comply with, since such a compliance would violate their neutrality, and involve them in a disastrous war with which they had no proper concern. Yet to this, as to every other proposition of the Directory, they had given the most careful and respectful consideration, but the result of their deliberations was, that no one of the envoys was authorized to take upon himself a negotiation evidently intrusted, by the tenor of their powers and instructions, to the whole; nor were there any two. of them who would propose to withdraw from the trust committed to them by their government while there remained a possibility of performing it.” The present paper, they hoped, might suffice to dissipate the prejudices which had been conceived against them; but if not, and if it should be the will of the Directory to order passports for the whole, or any of them, it was expected that such passports would be accompanied by letters of safe-conduct amply sufficient to give to their persons and property, as against French cruisers, that perfect security to which the laws and usages of nations entitled them. CHAPTER The Directory desired that the departure of Pinckney and Marshall should have the appearance of being their 1798. own act. Indeed, on the very day on which was presented the joint memorial above quoted, Talleyrand addressed a note to Gerry, intended, as the secretary who delivered it said, to be shown to his colleagues, and in whichpresuming that Pinckney and Marshall, in consequence of the intimations in his note of March 3d, and "the obstacles which their known opinions had opposed to the desired reconciliation," "had thought it proper and useful to quit the territory of the republic"-he proposed to Gerry to resume their reciprocal communications upon the interests of the French republic and of the United States of America. Terrified, so he afterward alleged in excuse, by Talleyrand's repeated threats of an immediate declaration of war if he left Paris, and flattering himself, no doubt, that the personal preference expressed for him, and his superior tact in accommodating himself to the humors, not to say insolences, of the French government, might, notwithstanding all that had passed, open the way to a reconciliation, Gerry had consented to remain, notwithstanding the expulsion of his colleagues. April 4. But he peremptorily declined to be employed as the instrument of any indirect attempt to drive his colleagues out of France, or to do any thing painful to their feelings, or to refrain from rendering them all the assistance in his power. The conditional demand for passports in their last joint note made any hints to them about departure unnecessary. Marshall was waiting impatiently for his passports; but the state of his daughter's health would make Pinckney's immediate departure exceedingly inconvenient. As to Talleyrand's proposition to him to go on singly with the negotiation, he still adhered to the opinion that, under existing circum XI. stances, he had no power to treat independently of his CHAPTER colleagues. He could only confer informally, and communicate the result to his government. Nevertheless, 1798. every measure in his power, and in conformity with his duty to his country, should be zealously pursued to restore harmony and cordial friendship between the two republics. It was not without much caviling, and after experiencing many indignities, that Marshall obtained passports and a safe-conduct. Talleyrand even went so far as to dispute his character of envoy, and his right to the protection of that character, on the ground that he had not been received. At last, however, the safe-conduct was April 16. sent, and he hastened to leave Paris on his way to America. Pinckney, not without great difficulty, obtained leave, on account of his daughter's health, to remain a few months in the south of France. Thus was Talleyrand left in possession of the field of diplomacy with Gerry in his claw. But, before pursuing further the history of this extraordinary negotiation, it is necessary to recur to what was passing in America. |