patented or disposed of in any manner until further legislation by Congress." (Robert Lowe, 5, L. D., 541.)

The act of January 14, 1889, was entitled "An act for the relief and civilization of the Chippewa Indians in the State of Minnesota." By it was distinctly recognized the existence of subsisting and valid preemption and homestead entries on certain portions of this territory. By section 5 thereof it was directed that the "pine" lands be disposed of at public sale or private cash sale where not bought at auction, and by section 6, that the "agricultural" lands be sold to actual settlers only, under the provisions of the homestead law, with the proviso that Nothing in this act shall be held to authorize the sale or other disposal under its provisions of any tract upon which there is a subsisting, valid pre-emption or homestead entry, but any such entry shall be proceeded with under the regulations and decisions in force at the date of its allowance, and if found regular and valid, patents shall issue thereon.

By a report of the Commissioner of May 20, 1890, made to the Secre tary of the Interior, it appears that there have been upon these lands in question already patented eighty soldiers' additional entries, seventy-eight of which were patented in 1883, and two in 1884, embracing 6,270.09 acres; that there was patented the claim of Shaw-bosh-kung, under the first article of the Chippewa treaty of May 7, 1864, 664.70 acres; to the State of Minnesota as swamp lands, 701.55 acres; and to Frank W. Folsom, in accordance with Secretary Chandler's decision, March 1, 1877, 155.82 acres; making a total area patented of 7,792.16 acres. There are pending two hundred and seven soldiers' additional entries on these lands, amounting to 17,763.37 acres; the claim of Shaw-bosh-kung, under his homestead entry, No. 6, 239,153.90 acres; the unpatented claim of the Northern Pacific Railroad Co., under its grant, for 10,882.95 acres; thirty-one declaratory statement filings embracing 4,211.57 acres; six cash entries embracing 907.85 acres; and eighteen homestead entries, amounting to 3,587.40 acres; making a total area embraced in the unpatented claims of 37,507.04 acres.

It is impossible for me to conclude in view of these facts, that the provision of the act of January 14, 1889, was not intended to control the action of this Department in the further consideration of the claims above mentioned pending in the General Land Office. It is to my mind clear that this is the "further legislation" required by the act of July 4, 1884, and that the words "subsisting valid pre-emption or homestead entries" embrace the entries named upon which it is now asked by the petitioners patent may be issued. It is required that these shall be proceeded with under the regulations and decisions in force at the date of the allowance of these entries.

These regulations and decisions exist in relation to these entries the decisions being those of Secretary Chandler dated March 1, 1877, and Secretary Teller dated May 10, 1882, and the regulations being those set forth in the letter of Commissioner MacFarland, dated April 25, 1884, and there will be no further difficulty in following them.

In the previous decision in the case of David H. Robbins, (10 L. D., p. 3) the petition now before me for consideration was disallowed because this "further legislation," to wit, the act of January 14, 1889, had not taken effect, because the agreement therein provided for had not been approved by the President, as required by the terms of the act. Since then, however, as herein before stated, the President has approved the agreement, the cession has become complete and the "further legislation" required has become operative. Under the previous decision of this Department the entries pending would have proceeded to patent, as many of the same class had already done, but for the act of July 4, 1884, requiring further legislation by Congress. This further legislation having been made by the act of January 14, 1889, upon this same subject-matter, with the particular phraseology therein em. bodied, already quoted, the right of the Department to allow the entries to proceed to patent, seems clear, aside from any question of relinquishment of claim by the Mille Lac Indians. Nevertheless it is also true and adds greatly to the force of the argument that the Mille Lac Indians joined in the agreement under the act of 1889 whereby the Indian lands save in the reservations therein mentioned were ceded to the United States. By this any possible interest the Mille Lacs may have had was transferred to the United States. I think the language of the statute of 1889 that the lands upon which the Mille Lacs have enjoyed the favor of residence so long as they should not interfere with the whites is equivalent to a declaration that this favor or license did not amount in effect to a "reservation" of these lands upon which the Mille Lacs could take allotments because it was upon these lands alone that subsisting valid pre-emption or homestead entries existed or were claimed under the regulations and decisions in force at the dates that they were severally allowed and which this statute declares shall now proceed to patent.

It is to be remembered also that another reservation was thereby made (the White Earth), to which the Mille Lacs could remove. There was thus provided, on the one hand legislation for the perfection of the entries of the white men, and on the other a place of abode for the Indians.

I am of the opinion therefore, that the proviso of section 3 of the act of January 14, 1889, that gives to any of the Indians residing on any of the reservations in the act described, in his discretion, a right to take his allotment in severalty, under the act, on the reservation where he lives, instead of being removed to and taking such allotments on the White Earth reservation, does not apply to the particular lands on which the Mille Lac Indians were before their last agreement allowed to live, under the circumstances, regulations, and decisions heretofore made by the successive Secretaries of the Department of the Interior. The President's message was intended to go no further than the statute itself, and it is not necessary to consider its expressions apart

from the statute to which it referred and upon which it was based. Suffice it to say that the land in question was not a reservation within the meaning of the act. It was ceded in 1863; it had been declared open to entry by successive decisions from the Department under the regulations of the Land Office, and was the very land referred to and intended to be covered by the proviso to section 6.

It may be added that, pending the consideration of this question by the Secretary, the Mille Lacs, as reported by the Chairman of the Chippewa Commission, have prepared to move to the White Earth Reservation, and would not now, in all probability, take any allotments on the lands in question, even if so entitled.

Let the claims, therefore, pending, if found regular and valid in all other particulars, and as herein defined, proceed to patent. As proceedings thereon have been so long delayed, I deem the circumstances affecting them all, so peculiar and unusual as to entitle them to precedence and your very early consideration, and they are accordingly ordered to be made special.

CONTEST-SUSPENDED ENTRY-DEFECTIVE SURVEY.

BOND v. WATKINS.

A contest should not be entertained against an entry that is suspended on account of an alleged defective survey of the township.

First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January 14, 1891.

I have considered the appeal of James B. Watkins from your office decision, dated June 5, 1889, holding for cancellation his homestead entry for the NE. of Sec. 35, T. 12 N., R. 1 E., Humboldt, California. The record shows that he made homestead entry for the land in question April 14, 1885.

February 15, 1886, your office notified the local office at Humboldt, California, that a special agent had reported that the survey of township 12 N., R. 1 E., was irregular and incorrect. In view of his report you directed the local office to suspend all entries and disposals of the lands in said township of any kind pending an investigation of the matter in your office. This order was still in force, the matter of said survey not having been investigated when on December 21, 1886, following, Bond initiated a contest against said entry, averring therein that Wat kins had abandoned said land.

After notice, a hearing was had before the register and receiver, May 31, 1887; both parties appeared and submitted testimony.

The local office, after considering the evidence, decided in favor of the contestant and recommended that claimant's entry be canceled.

July 20, 1887, he took an appeal to your office and alleged the following errors :

1. That said register and receiver erred in finding that said Watkins had not complied with the law in regard to his residence on and improvements of said tract. 2. That by letter "E" of the Hon. Commissioner, received by the register and receiver of said land district in February, 1896, based upon the report of Special Agent Treadwell, claiming that the survey of said township was irregular and incorrect, this claimant was induced to move from said land. It is therefore submitted that the register and receiver should not have allowed the contest and that this claimant be granted an opportunity to resume his residence on said land.

By your office decision of June 5, 1889, you held his entry for cancellation.

The testimony offered on the trial shows that claimant made settlement on the land May, 1835, and lived there until February 15, 1886, when your office letter reached the local office ordering them to suspend action in said township until further orders. He was informed by Special Agent Treadwell that if the land was correctly surveyed the land described in his entry would be found in section 36-which section is now patented to Patrick Carroll. Claimant says he was unwilling to make any more improvements on land which he did not know would ever become his own, hence, he moved away.

There is some evidence showing that the lines run by Special Agent Treadwell places Watson's improvements on section 36, for which patent has already been issued by the State of California.

I am of the opinion that your decision holding his entry for cancellation is incorrect. It was the duty of the local officers upon receipt of your directions "suspending all entries and disposals of any kind" to have refused to act upon the contest proceedings of Bond. John Buckley (10 L. D. 297).

The contest was prematurely instituted, and should not have been considered pending the investigation of your office relating to the survey of said township.

Your decision is accordingly reversed.

ADDITIONAL HOMESTEAD-ACT OF JULY 1, 1879.

SHIRLEY v. SHROPSHINE.

The additional land embraced within an entry made under the provisions of the act of July 1, 1879, must be adjoining the land covered by the original entry, and the residence on such land, required by said act, can not be established nor maintained through a tenant.

First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January 15, 1891.

I have considered the case of Letha L. Shirley v. James W. Shropshine on appeal by the latter from your decision of May 10, 1889, hold.

ing for cancellation his additional homestead entry for the E. SW. and NW. SW. Sec. 15, T. 8. N., R. 27 W., Dardanelle, Arkansas land district.

In 1869, Shropshine made a homestead entry for forty acres of land, the NW. NE. Sec. 15, T. 8 N., R. 27 W., Dardanelle land district, and made final proof for same and received patent therefor.

He has

He afterward sold this tract and purchased one hundred and twenty acres "deeded land" in the same section, and moved onto it. lived since said time on the NW. of NW. of said section 15.

On February 26, 1882, he made additional homestead entry for the land in controversy and on January 27, 1857, affidavit of contest was filed against the same charging failure to reside upon and cultivate the land, etc.

Notice having been given the parties met and they were each sworn and testified and agree as to the facts, as above stated. The entryman, says "I did not reside on my original homestead at the time I made my second entry." That he only applied to enter forty acres when he made his first entry because he understood it was within railroad limits, aud he had not been a federal soldier, and was told he could not enter forty acres. He admits that he has not resided upon the land in controversy but has cultivated it by tenants. It does not adjoin his original homestead nor the land on which he resides. Under the act of July 1, 1879, the additional land must be "adjoining the land embraced in his original entry." It is provided "that in no case shall patent issue

under this act, until the person has actually and in conformity with the homestead laws, occupied, resided upon, and cultivated the land embraced therein at least one year."

This entry therefore can not be allowed and if contiguous to the homestead it could not be entered as the entryman has not resided upon it. Residence can not be established or maintained by a tenant. See West v. Owen (4 L. D., 412).

Your decision, in so far as it holds the entry for cancellation is af firmed.

FOREST RESERVATION-APPLICATION TO ENTER.

DANIEL J. CANTY.

A pending application to purchase, under the act of June 3, 1878, land previously withdrawn, does not except the land covered thereby from the operation of the act of October 1, 1890, providing for the reservation of certain forest lands in the

State of California.

First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January 15, 1891.

I have considered the appeal of Daniel J. Canty from your office decision of July 19, 1889, affirming the action of the register and re