the safeguard of three fourths of the States, as our associates and equals, there is no safety for us. The period is now rapidly approaching, when this great issue must be finally determined. The payment of the public debt is now just at hand, when there will be no pretext to continue the present burden on us; and when it must be finally removed, or fixed in some more permanent, and more odious form. We have made every effort to enlighten our brethren, as to the character and amount of our burden. For years we have petitioned, remonstrated, and resolved. Our representatives have faithfully performed their duty. They have ably portrayed our suffering the unjust, the unequal, and unconstitutional burden which we bear-and, finally, we have joined the other States and interests, suffering with us, in a representation of our grievance, as a last effort at redress through the General Government. We wait the result. Should it fail, it will only remain for us, to sink down in hopeless submission, or to place this State on its sovereignty, and interpose its veto to arrest, within its limits, the encroachments on our constitutional rights; as the only peaceful means left, by which a great question, touching the construction of our constitutional compact, can be submitted to the august and conclusive jurisdiction of the States themselves, in their original and sovereign capacity, as parties to our great political Association ;—a jurisdiction peculiar to our admirable political system ;-which constitutes its great conservative principle ;-but which, without the high right of interposition, on the part of the States, would be perfectly nugatory.

ADDRESS

To the People of South Carolina. Prepared for the Members of the Legislature, at the close of the Session of 1831.

In adopting a course, so unusual as that of directly addressing you, we deem no other explanation necessary, than to state that, after due reflection, we are of the impression the existing relations between this State and the General Government, are such as to demand the freest and most direct communication between your representatives and yourselves. The highly important questions which they involve, claimed and received our early and most deliberate attention. The one which so deeply excited your feelings during the late election (we allude to the call of a Convention of the State), was submitted for consideration, at an early period of the session; and, though sustained by a majority of the votes in each House, yet, not having two thirds in its favor, as required by the Constitution, the question was of course lost. We are not disposed to complain of the decision. The question was fairly submitted for your consideration, and the presumption is, that the vote of the Legislature truly represents your sentiments at this time; but while we acquiesce, we cannot but deeply regret the result. We fear it has put the great cause at issue in jeopardy, while we feel the most thorough conviction that, had you been united, with zeal and energy, to defend your constitutional rights,—had you, with one united voice, invoked the sovereignty of the State, by the call of a Convention to devise the proper means of resistance to the encroachments of the General Government,-our wrongs would have been promptly, peaceably, and effectually redressed.

We know that other views are taken. We doubt not the honesty and sincerity of those who entertain them. Our object is, not to question the patriotism of others, but simply to express our regret at the unhappy want of union in this great crisis of our affairs; and our deep conviction of the efficacy of the means that had been proposed, and which are, for the present, lost by our divisions.

But while we lament the want of union, when so much needed, we are, in some degree, consoled by the reflection that, on the important point of our wrongs, there is little or no division of sentiment among us. With, perhaps, a few exceptions, all acknowledge the unconstitutional,-the unequal and oppressive burden imposed by the Tariff on this, and the other staple States; but many, even of those who are the devoted friends of State-Rights, and who doubt not that a State has the right to interpose its sovereignty, in order to protect its citizens against the encroachments of the General Government, believe it to be inexpedient to act at this time. They hope for redress from the General Government; a hope resting on the veto of the President, and the expectation of a returning sense of justice on the part of the majority. We cannot participate in this hope, for reasons which appear to us conclusive, but which we do not deem necessary to be now advanced. Time must soon decide the point to the conviction of all parties. Congress is now in session, and a few months must teach us all, what we have to expect from the General Government, much more effectually than the most elaborate argument could, at this time. If, contrary to our expectation, it should yield up the Tariff of protection, surrender the taxing power as a means of encouraging the industry of one section at the expense of another, and abandon the claim of being the sole and exclusive expounder, as well of its own powers, as of those of the States, none will more sincerely rejoice than we, or be more prompt to admit, that we have been in error. We sought not the

present unhappy controversy, and would be most happy to close it on just and safe principles. We can have no object of ambition or interest, in continuing a dispute into which we were forced by an imperious sense of duty, and solely in defence of our constitutional rights. But if all these pleasing anticipations should fail, we cannot doubt, but that those friends of State-Rights, who have too readily yielded to, what we doubt not, will prove a delusion, will rally with us on the sovereignty of the State, as the only citadel of liberty and safety. In the mean time, during this pause of expecta tion, we must admonish you against a danger to which you. may be exposed. The supporters of the system, by which you have been so long oppressed, foreseeing,-if nothing should be done, that you who are now divided, would then be united, and knowing that your union would endanger the whole, may resort to specious and unimportant modifications, with a view to appease your just resentment, and to distract your councils. Should such a course be adopted, as is by no means improbable, and you should be blind enough to yield to such concessions, or to any other, except such as will amount to an abandonment of the system,it would, in such case, have been better that you had never made a stand in defence of your rights. The principles, on which the system rests, would then be firmly established beyond the power of opposition,-ready to be wielded against you to their full extent, as opportunity offered. For of one

*This course was adopted by the "Supporters of the System." The Treasury Bill, reported by the Secretary, Mr. McLane, and subsequently passed by both Houses, contained these "specious and unimportant modifications," and nothing more. The reductions it proposed, were thrown almost exclusively on the unprotected articles, while the comparatively small amount taken from the list of protected articles, was more than counterbalanced by the introduction of cash duties,diminished credit, and the change in the value of the pound sterling.— Editor.

truth, you may be perfectly satisfied, that you have arrived at a period, which must practically settle the question, as to the real character of the General Government; and that, on your determined and unyielding efforts, the result, whether it is to prove an instrument of oppression, or of liberty, mainly depends. From the beginning, two opposite views were taken of our Constitution. While the question of its adoption was yet pending, its enemies every where pronounced it to be, in reality, though artfully disguised,— a consolidated Government; and, as a necessary consequence of extending a government of that form over a country of such vast extent of territory, and diversity of interest,—it would end in corruption, tyranny and monarchy. On the other hand, its friends, while they conceded that such would be the consequence of consolidation, asserted that it was a Federal, and not a consolidated Government; and that the States, as the guardians of the peculiar and local interests of the country, would oppose effectual barriers against any supposed tendency it might have to consolidation. The States, after a doubtful struggle, adopted the Constitution, with great distrust and powerful minorities; and rather from a fear of anarchy, through the feebleness of the Confederation, than confidence in the arguments of its supporters. To allay the apprehensions of the States, the 10th amendment to the Constitution was adopted, with the view of more effectually protecting the rights reserved to them, by confining the General Government more strictly to its limited and proper sphere of action. Yet what has been the result? But little more than forty years have elapsed, and the predictions of its opponents are almost fully realized. Scarcely a restraint, in fact, is left on the will of the General Government; and doctrines are openly and boldly avowed, which, if not successfully resisted, will give it unlimited power, and reduce the States to mere corporations. Already the painful consequences of consolidation,-discord, corruption and op