will not be the less sure. Nor is the tardiness an objection. All changes in the fundamental laws of the State, ought to be the work of time, ample discussion, and reflection; and no people, who lack the requisite perseverance to go through the slow and difficult process necessary at once to guard against improper innovations, and to insure wise and salutary changes, or who are ever ready to resort to revolution, instead of reform, where reform may be practicable,—can preserve their liberty. Nor would it be desirable, if it were practicable, to make the requisite changes, without going through a long previous process of discussion and agitation. They are indispensable means,-the only school (if I may be allowed the expression,) in our case, that can diffuse and fix in the mind of the community, the principles and doctrines necessary to uphold our complex, but beautiful system of governments. In none that ever existed, are they so much required; and in none were they ever calculated to produce such powerful effect. Its very complication-so many distinct, sovereign, and independent States, each with its separate Government, and all united under one-is calculated to give a force to discussion and agitation, never before known, and to cause a diffusion of political intelligence heretofore unknown in the history of the world,—if the Federal Government shall do its duty under the guarantees of the Constitution, by thus promtly suppressing physical force, as an element of change, and keeping wide open the door for the full and free action of all the moral elements in its favor. No people ever had so fair a start. All that is lacking is, that we shall understand, in all its great and beautiful proportions, the noble political structure reared by the wisdom and patriotism of our ancestors, and to have the virtue and the sense to preserve and protect it: and happy shall I be, if what I have written in answer to your inquiries, should contribute, in the least, to a better knowledge

of it, and through this, in any degree, to its perfection and preservation.

With great respect, I am, &c., &c.,

Hon. W. SMITH.

J. C. CALHOUN.

THE ADDRESS OF MR. CALHOUN TO HIS POLITICAL FRIENDS AND SUPPORTERS.

I have left it to you, my friends and supporters, through whose favorable estimate of my qualifications, my name has been presented to the people of the United States, for the office of Chief Magistrate, to conduct the canvass on such principles, and in such manner, as you might think best. But, in so doing, I did not waive my right to determine, on my individual responsibility, what course my duty might compel me to pursue ultimately, nor have I been an inattentive observer of the canvass, and the course you have taken.

It affords me much pleasure to be enabled to say, that, on all leading questions, growing out of the canvass, I heartily concurred with you in the grounds you took, and especially those relating to the mode in which the delegates to the proposed Convention to be held in Baltimore should be appointed, and how they should vote. You have, in my opinion, conclusively shown that they should be appointed by districts and vote per capita, but your reasons, as conclusive as they are, have proved in vain. Already New York and some other States have appointed delegates en masse by State Conventions, and one State (Virginia) has resolved that the votes of her delegates shall be settled by the ma-jority, and be counted per capita. Their course would necessarily overrule that which you have so ably supported, should you go into Convention, and would leave you no alternative, but to yield yours and adopt theirs, however

much you may be opposed to it on principle, or to meet them on the most unequal terms with divided, against united and concentrated forces.

The question is, then, what course, under such circumstances, should be adopted? And that question you will be compelled speedily to decide. The near approach of the time for meeting of the proposed Convention will not admit of much longer delay. But as your course may depend in some degree on that which I have decided to take, I deem it due to the relation subsisting between us, to make mine known to you without further delay.' I then, after the most careful and deliberate survey of the ground, have decided that I cannot permit my name to go before the proposed Convention, constituted as it must now be, consistently with the principles which have ever guided my public conduct. My objections are insuperable. As it must be constituted, it is repugnant to all the principles, on which, in my opinion, such a Convention should be formed. What those principles are, I shall now proceed briefly to state.

I hold then, with you, that the Convention should be so constituted, as to utter fully and clearly the voice of the people, and not that of political managers, or office holders and office seekers; and for that purpose, I hold it indispensable that the delegates should be appointed directly by the people, or to use the language of General Jackson, should be "fresh from the people." I also hold, that the only possible mode to effect this, is for the people to choose the delegates by districts, and that they should vote per capita. Every other mode of appointing would be controlled by political machinery, and place the appointments in the hands of the few who work it. I object, then, to the proposed Convention, because it will not be constituted in conformity with this fundamental article of the Republican creed. The delegates to it will be appointed from some of the States, not by the people in districts, but, as has been stated, by State

Conventions en masse, composed of delegates appointed in all cases as far as I am informed, by county, or district conventions; and in some cases, if not misinformed, these again composed of delegates appointed by still smaller divisions, or a few interested individuals. Instead, then, of being directly, or fresh from the people, the delegates to the Baltimore Convention will be the delegates of delegates; and, of course, removed, in all cases, at least three, if not four degrees from the people. At each successive remove, the voice of the people will become less full and distinct, until, at last, it will be so faint and imperfect as not to be audible. To drop metaphor, I hold it impossible to form a scheme more perfectly calculated to annihilate the control of the people over the Presidential election, and vest it in those who make politics a trade, and who live, or expect to live on the Government.

In this connection, I object not less strongly to the mode in which Virginia has resolved her delegates shall vote. With all due respect, I must say, I can imagine nothing more directly in conflict with the principles of our federal system of government, or, to use a broader expression, the principles on which all confederate communities have ever been united. I hazard nothing in saying, that there is not an instance in our political history, from the meeting of the first Revolutionary Congress to the present day, of the delegates of any State voting by majority, and counting per capita; nor do I believe an instance of the kind can be found in the history of any confederated community. There is, indeed, something monstrous in the idea of giving the majority the right of impressing the vote of the minority into its service, and counting them as its own. The plain rule, that which has ever prevailed, and which conforms to the dictates of common sense, is, that where a State votes as a State, by a majority of its delegates, the votes count. one, be they few or many, or the State large or small. On the contrary, where the votes of all the delegates are counted,

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they vote individually and independently, each for himself counting one. And it is to be noted, that wherever this latter mode of voting exists among confederate States, it is in all cases founded on compact, to which the consent of each State is required. In the absence of compact, the invariable mode of vote in such States is, in all cases, by the majority, their vote counting one. The course which Virginia has resolved to take is in violation of this plain and fundamental rule, and destructive of the foundation on which the whole structure of the State rights doctrine is reared.

I hold it, in the next place, to be an indispensable principle, that the Convention should be so constituted as to give to each State, in the nomination of a candidate, the same relative weight, which the Constitution secures to it in the election of the President, making due allowance for its relative party strength. By the election I mean the wholethe eventual choice when it goes into the House of Representatives, as well as the primary vote in the electoral College. The one is as much a part of the election as the other, the two make the whole. The adoption of the one in the Convention which framed the Constitution, depended on the adoption of the other. Neither could possibly have been adopted alone. The two were the result of compromise between the larger and smaller States, after a long and doubtful struggle, which threatened the loss of the Constitution itself. The object of giving to the smaller States an equality with the larger in the eventual choice of the House, was to counterpoise the preponderance of the larger in the electoral college. Without this, the smaller would have voted against the whole provision, and its rejection would have been the consequence. Even as it stands, Delaware voted against it. In confirmation of what I state, I refer to Mr. Madison's report of the proceedings of the Convention.

Having stated what I mean by the election, it will require but a few words to explain my reasons for the principles I