(197 Iowa, 832, 198 N. W. 44.) that defendant was thereby estopped to assert that such train did not stop at Oxford. On the trial, the evidence on behalf of plaintiff tended to show that the plaintiff was a traveling salesman, and on the afternoon of the day in question he went to defendant's ticket agent at its station in Iowa City and asked the agent if there would be a train on which he could go to Oxford that afternoon, so he could work Oxford and get back to Iowa City for the night, as he wanted to go out on another train leaving Iowa City next morning; that the agent said there would be a train along in a little bit, and plaintiff handed him the money and he gave plaintiff a ticket to Oxford; that in about thirty minutes a train arrived headed in the direction of Oxford, and plaintiff followed the crowd out on the platform, and went with others to the rear door of the smoking car, where there was a brakeman standing at the steps with his hand on the rail; that the brakeman asked plaintiff, "Where to?" and plaintiff replied, "Oxford," whereupon the brakeman stepped back, and plaintiff boarded the train and sat down; that after the train left the station the conductor passed through the car taking up tickets, and plaintiff gave him the ticket he had purchased of the agent at Iowa City, and the conductor punched the ticket and kept it, and passed on one or two seats punching other tickets; that he then came back to plaintiff and asked, "Where are you going?" that plaintiff said, "Oxford, Iowa," and the conductor replied, "Not on this train, you are not;" that plaintiff informed the conductor he had a ticket to Oxford which the conductor had taken up, and that he had told the brakeman where he was going, and the latter let him on the train; that the brakeman denied this; that the conductor told plaintiff the train did not stop at Oxford and, in the presence of other passengers, repeatedly ordered plaintiff to "cut out this talk and get off here," and stopped the train at a point some 2 miles from Iowa City, and required the plaintiff to alight. We do not refer to all the circumstances attending plaintiff's ejectment or the situation in which he was placed on alighting, as they are not material to the question presented. At the close of plaintiff's evidence the court sustained a motion on behalf of the defendant for a directed verdict in its favor. verdict in its favor. This ruling presents the only question on this appeal. It is the contention of the appellee that the petition alleged a cause of action in tort for the wrongful ejection of plaintiff from the train, and that the evidence failed to establish a wrongful ejectment, but showed at most a breach of the contract evidenced by the plaintiff's ticket; that plaintiff could, in any event, recover only for a breach of contract, and could not recover for that in this action. There is a lack of uniformity in the holding of the courts as to the situation and rights of one who, holding a ticket entitling him to be carried to a particular station, is directed by an agent of the carrier to take a train that does not stop at that station, and upon doing so is by the conductor ejected from the train. It is well settled that, in the absence of statutory regulation, a railway company has a right to adopt a schedule Carriers-duty for the operation of to stop at all its trains according stations. to which certain trains do not stop at all stations on its line. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gants, 38 Kan. 608, 5 Am. St. Rep. 780, 17 Pac. 54; Noble v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 4 Okla. 534, 46 Pac. 483; Black v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 82 S. C. 478, 64 S. E. 418; White v. Evansville & T. H. R. Co. 133 Ind. 480, 33 N. E. 273; Chicago, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Bills, 104 Ind. 13, 3 N. E. 611. It is also an established rule that it is the duty of one about to board a train to inform himself whether, -duty of passenger to learn stopping places of trains. according to the schedule under which it is operated, it stops at the station to which he wishes to go, and that, if he does not do so, and fails to avail himself of the means at hand to ascertain that fact, and gets upon a train that does not stop at the station to which he is going, he is wrongfully upon the train. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gants, supra; Usher v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 71 Kan. 375, 80 Pac. 956; Noble v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 4 Okla. 534, 46 Pac. 483; Duling v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. 66 Md. 120, 6 Atl. 592; Black v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 82 S. C. 478, 64 S. E. 418; Chicago, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Bills, supra. It has been held that the conductor of a train, when presented with a ticket entitling one to be carried to a station at which the train is not scheduled to stop, in obedience to his instructions and the rules of the company, and on the refusal of the person presenting the ticket to leave the train at a regular stop short of his destination, or to pay the additional fare to a regular stop beyond that point, has a right to stop the train and to require such person to alight, using such force as is reasonably necessary. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gants, supra; Usher v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 71 Kan. 375, 80 Pac. 956; Noble v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 4 Okla. 534, 46 Pac. 483; Drew v. Wabash R. Co. 129 Mo. App. 459, 107 S. W. 478. And, coming to the question presented here, there are cases holding that, since the conductor acts within his power and authority in ejecting one who presents a ticket to a station at which the train does not stop, and is required to act only on the situation presented by the ticket and the rules of the carrier, the person ejected can recover, not for the ejectment, but only for the misdirection or for a breach of the contract evidenced by his ticket. Noble v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 4 Okla. 534, 46 Pac. 483; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gants, 38 Kan. 608, 5 Am. St. Rep. 780, 17 Pac. 54; Usher v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 71 Kan. 375, 80 Pac. 956; Virginia & S. W. R. Co. v. Hill, 105 Va. 729, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 899, 54 S. E. 872. See also Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Patrick, 10 Ala. App. 341, 65 So. 437; Drew v. Wabash R. Co. supra. It has been held in some cases that, although an intended passenger is misdirected by an agent of the carrier as to what train he should take, the agent had no authority to bind the company or to waive its regulations, and there can be no recovery. Runyon v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. 74 N. J. L. 225, 68 Atl. 107; White v. Evansville & T. H. R. Co. 133 Ind. 480, 33 N. E. 273. On the other hand, it has been held that, where one who has a ticket good only on trains scheduled to stop at his destination is by the fault of the carrier's agent induced to take a train that does not stop at such station, and, as a consequence, is ejected by the conductor, he has a right to recover from the company as for a tort in being wrongfully ejected, and is not limited to an action for breach of contract merely. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 55 Ohio St. 370, 60 Am. St. Rep. 706, 45 N. E. 712; Central R. & Bkg. Co. v. Roberts, 91 Ga. 513, 18 S. E. 315; McGinnis v. Missouri P. R. Co. 21 Mo. App. 399. See also Pennsylvania Co. v. Bray, 125 Ind. 229, 25 N. E. 439; Hufford v. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. 64 Mich. 631, 8 Am. St. Rep. 859, 31 N. W. 544; Duling v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. 66 Md. 120, 6 Atl. 592; Gorman v. Southern P. Co. 97 Cal. 6, 33 Am. St. Rep. 157, 31 Pac. 1112, 8 Am. Neg. Cas. 69; Pittsburg, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hennigh, 39 Ind. 509; Northern P. R. Co. v. Pauson, 30 L.R.A. 730, 17 C. C. A. 287, 70 Fed. 585. The conflict in the cases arises, in some instances, from the fact that the court has looked alone to the act of the conductor in ejecting a traveler presenting a ticket entitling him to be transported to a sta (197 Iowa, 832, 198 N. W. 44.) tion at which the train did not stop, and, finding it to be one he was authorized or required to do by instructions or regulations the carrier was entitled to promulgate, has reached the conclusion that his act was not wrongful. As pointed out in the case of Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Reynolds, supra, this reasoning ignores the fact that the question is not between the complaining party and the conductor, but between such party and the company, and that the conductor's act may be one required of him by the company, and yet one that the company itself, in the situation presented, had no right to do. The conductor, acting on the situation presented to him of a person offering a ticket to a station at which he was not permitted to stop the train, may have been required to eject him from the train, while the defendant, by reason of having induced the person to take that particular train, had no right to do so. The act of the conductor in ejecting the passenger may be rightful from his standpoint, and yet wrongful from the standpoint of the company, where, acting through another authorized agent, it had directed the passenger to take the train. The -ejection of passenger train-liability, act of the conductor cannot be rightboarding wrong ful as against the passenger when the company is responsible for the mistake of the passenger in taking the wrong train. In the cited case a very convincing illustration is presented. It is said: "The question may be simplified by eliminating the fact of agency in each instance; that is, by supposing that the common carrier in each instance acts for himself or itself. Here no mind would doubt but that the carrier, having instructed the passenger to take one of his trains, with knowledge of his destination, would be a wrongdoer, should he, on discovering his own mistake, eject him from the train, on the ground that he has taken the wrong train. But the in tervention of an agent by whom the act is done in each instance does not change the case. For each act of the agent, done in the scope of his agency, must be imputed to the principal-is, in law, the act of the principal." It is further said in that case that when the company, by the act of a proper agent, causes a passenger to take a train that does not stop at his station, it must be held to have contemplated that, under the instructions given its conductor, the passenger would be put off the train as soon as the error should be discovered. And, speaking of the contingency that the company might be made liable by the act of its conductor in following its rules, where the appearances on which he acted were created by the fault of another agent, of which he had no knowledge, it was said to be a risk incident to the privilege of making rules, and it should suffer for the fault of the agent that caused the mistake, rather than an innocent person. Where a carrier, through a duly authorized agent, directs or consents that a traveler whose destination is known shall take a train that, under its schedules, does not stop at such station, we do not perceive how it can be said that the traveler is not rightfully on the train, or that a subsequent act of the carrier, through another agent, in ejecting him, is not wrongful, even though the latter agent, on the situation as presented to him, acted under instructions and regulations which the carrier had a right to issue. See Fitzgibbon v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 108 Iowa, 614, 79 N. W. 477. Some of the cases holding to the contrary are grounded on the want of authority of the agent or employee giving the misdirection, to bind the carrier. No such question arises in this case, for the defendant alleged that it was its invariable custom to have an employee at the point where passengers were permitted to board its trains, for the purpose of answering inquiries by intended passengers; and the evidence tended to show that a brakeman so stationed, with knowledge of plaintiff's destination, consented, or by his conduct gave implied direction, that he should board the train to be carried to Oxford. Some of the cases cited above hold that the only remedy of one who is directed by an agent of the carrier to take the wrong train is for a breach of contract. But where he is directed by an agent having actual or apparent authority so to do, and with knowledge of his destination, to take a particular train, he is, as we have said, rightfully a passenger on the train, and his ejectment for no other cause in tort. In Central R. & Bkg. Co. v. Roberts, 91 Ga. 513, 18 S. E. 315, it was held that a recovery may be had for the injury as a tort as a breach of a public duty by a common carrier, although there is also involved a breach of contract. What has been said disposes of the contention that there was a fatal variance between the cause of action set up in the petition and that established by the evidence. Holding, as we do, that, if the plaintiff was upon the train by the direction or with the knowledge and consent of an authorized agent of the defendant, and with knowledge of his destination, he was rightfully a passenger thereon, and may recover for a wrongful ejection, the evidence clearly presented a case for submission to the jury. The case is reversed and remanded. Arthur, Ch. J., and Stevens and De Graff, JJ., concur. ANNOTATION. Carrier's liability to passenger for consequences of ejection or threatened ejection by one employee due to fault of another employee. a. Passenger without any ticket: 1. Failure of agent or conductor to issue, etc., 1027. 2. Failure of conductor to return ticket or give check, 1031. b. Defective ticket: 1. As to time limit, 1033. 4. Destination omitted, 1040. 7. Partial cancelation, 1046. IV. continued. c. Stop-over, 1050. d. Train not stopping at station to which ticket bought, 1052. e. Direction to, or placing on, wrong train, 1055. I. Scope and introduction. The purpose of this annotation is to indicate the attitude that the courts have taken in reference to a carrier's liability to a passenger in cases where one employee of a carrier has relied upon an appearance that is due to the fault of another employee of such carrier, particularly where, by reason of such a fault, a passenger has innocently presented a defective ticket, or has a good excuse for not having a valid ticket, or has taken a wrong train. It has often been held that the passenger may be required to pay fare to the conductor, notwithstanding the error, at least if he has enough money, and that for failure to do so he may properly be ejected or put to other inconvenience, without making the carrier liable except for the breach of the contract predicated upon the original mistake. The doctrine of these cases has been repudiated by many courts, however, and the better rule now appears to be that the passenger, assuming that he is not himself at fault, should be protected more adequately against being ejected or put to other inconvenience or injury in consequence of the mistake. It is apparent that, to present the distinctive question under consideration, it must be assumed that the person who made the original mistake bore such a relation to the defendant carrier as to charge it with responsibility for that mistake, at least to the extent of damages as for a breach of contract. The cases which, notwithstanding the original mistake for which the carrier was responsible, have considered the question of the liability of the carrier for the damages consequent upon the ejection, or threatened ejection, merely with reference to the fault of the passenger himself, other than his refusal to pay the extra fare, or the misconduct of the conductor or other employee by whom he was ejected, or threatened with ejection, IV. continued. f. Street car transfers, 1056. g. Printed condition that passenger agrees to pay fare in case of dispute, 1060. h. Miscellaneous, 1061. without considering the doctrine referred to, are not within the scope of the annotation. It will be noted, however, that in some cases within the scope of the annotation, the personal contributory fault of the passenger or of the conductor has been a factor in the result. It is important, in considering the question under annotation, to distinguish between the right to recover damages proximately resulting from the expulsion, e. g., inconvenience, loss of time, etc., and the right to recover damages enhanced by resisting an expulsion. See, for example, Arnold v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. (1909) 81 Kan. 400, 105 Pac. 541, infra, IV. b, 1; Loy v. Northern P. R. Co. (1912) 68 Wash. 33, 122 Pac. 372, infra, IV. b, 5; Wasserman v. Los Angeles R. Corp. (1920) 184 Cal. 202, 193 Pac. 130, infra, IV. f; and Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Connell (1884) 112 Ill. 295, 54 Am. Rep. 238, infra, IV. h. As the court in Hot Springs R. Co. v. Deloney (1898) 65 Ark. 177, 67 Am. St. Rep. 913, 45 S. W. 351, 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 1, observed, the question whether a conductor collecting tickets and fares is justified in relying solely upon the fact and appearance of the ticket to determine his duty as to the acceptance of the same, and as to his expulsion of a passenger for refusing to pay fare, in case of rejection of the ticket, "has given rise to one of the most protracted discussions in all the domain of the law pertaining to the relative duties of carriers and passengers." II. Grounds upon which doctrine supported. a. Passenger must submit to carrier's rules, which are necessary for public convenience. The doctrine has been supported in many cases upon the ground that a passenger must submit to the carrier's rules, which are necessary for the con |