184. Luggage lift.

See Wilson v. Glasgow & S. W. R. Co. [1915] S. C. 215, 52 Scot. L. R. 146 [1915] 1 Scot. L. T. 8, under heading, "Elevators."

185. Lumber.

On truck, see “Truck.”

186. Lumber pile.

Injury to child climbing on, by coming in contact with electric wire, see Meyer v. Menominee & M. Light & Traction Co. (1912) 151 Wis. 279, 138 N. W. 1008, under heading, "Electric wires."

Proximate cause of injury by lumber falling from, see MARTINO V. ROTONDI (reported herewith) ante, 6, IV. j, supra.

In St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Underwood (1912) 114 C. C. A. 323, 194 Fed. 363, 3 N. C. C. A. 467 (5th C.), it was held that defendant's conduct in piling lumber on his premises, where children were accustomed to play, in an unsafe manner, where it was easily accessible to children of tender years, constituted actionable negligence so as to render him liable to a six-year-old child upon whom the pile fell while she was playing near it.

In BRANAN v. WIMSATT (reported herewith) ante, 14, the owner of a lumberyard in which children were permitted to play was held not liable for injury to a girl twelve and onehalf years old, who was climbing a pile of lumber with other children when some boards were displaced and fell on her, on the ground that such children were not invitees, but mere licensees, and that the danger was apparent to the injured child.

In Bransom v. Labrot (1884) 81 Ky. 638. 50 Am. Rep. 193, the owner of an unsafe pile of lumber from which a heavy piece of timber fell and killed a child of tender years was held liable for its death, where the lumber was piled within 40 feet of a public street, across a passageway which the public had been accustomed to use, and upon an open, unfenced lot to which children had for years been in the habit of resorting by license of the owner, and without objection

or warning by him, and to which they could, before the timber was placed there, go with safety.

In Lynch v. Knoop (1907) 118 La. 611, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 480, 118 Am. St. Rep. 391, 43 So. 252, 10 Ann. Cas. 807, it was held that the owner of a pile of lumber unloaded at a public landing place was not liable for the death of an eight-year-old girl, caused by the falling of lumber upon her, due to the fact that children in playing on the lumber pile had displaced pieces of it, since the owner had no reason to suspect that the children would do that. The court said: "The owner could not inclose the lumber, as it was a public place. The whole was open and apparent. The lumber was piled in the usual way. It does not appear that there was negligence on the part of the owner. He had no reason to suspect that children would jump on the lumber and displace pieces of the lumber. It was not such as to attract children and excite their curiosity. Under the circumstances

he is not liable."

In Baltimore v. De Palma (1920) 137 Md. 179, 112 Atl. 277, where a boy of ten went to look for another boy on a pier where boys were not allowed and from which they were repeatedly driven off, and was injured there by boards falling from a pile of lumber, it was held that the doctrine of attractive nuisances was not applicable to the facts of the case.

In Kelly v. Benas (1909) 217 Mo. 1, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 903, 116 S. W. 557, the doctrine was held not to apply so as to render a landowner liable for injury to a trespassing child by the fall of a pile of lumber on which he was playing.

In Vanderbeck v. Hendry (1871) 34 N. J. L. 467, the owner of a lumberyard was held to owe no duty of reasonable care, in piling lumber, to children trespassing upon the premises, from which children were generally driven off.

In Powers v. Owego Bridge Co. (1904) 97 App. Div. 477, 89 N. Y. Supp. 1030, it was held that the owner of private premises was under no duty to trespassing children to have lumber

safely piled. It appeared, however, that children playing upon the lot had been repeatedly driven off.

In Middleton v. Reutler (1910) 141 App. Div. 517, 126 N. Y. Supp. 315, it was held that there was no liability to a nine-year-old boy coming on a vavant, uninclosed lot and there injured by the fall of a pile of lumber, such boy being, at most, a mere licensee, toward whom the lot owner owed no active duty of vigilance.

In Balser v. Young (1919) 72 Pa. Super. Ct. 502, where a child was killed while passing a pile of lumber in an uninclosed yard where children were accustomed to play, by the fall of heavy planks carelessly and unsecurely placed on top of the pile by defendant's employees, the owner of the property was held liable, the court saying, however, that a different rule would apply if the boards had been piled properly and securely and a child had caused them to topple by attempting to climb upon the pile, or by some similar act over which the defendant had no control.

In MARTINO v. ROTONDI (reported herewith) ante, 6, it was held, disapproving the doctrine of the Turntable Cases, that an owner of a city lot, who piles lumber thereon to be used in the construction of buildings, is under no duty to protect children who may be injured by a displacement of some of the lumber while they are playing thereon.

In street.

In Smith v. Davis (1903) 22 App. D. C. 298, in which one who had piled lumber in a public street without proper consent, so as to constitute a public nuisance, was held liable for injury to a nine-year-old child, upon whom, while she was sitting upon a pile of timber to rest, a timber fell from an adjoining pile, although the evidence failed to make apparent the cause of its falling, the court said that the lumber was piled on public ground where the public had a right to be, and that it was tempting to children to play on it, or, it might be, to sit on it, and that if by indulging their natural impulses they were on the timber, and it fell from some jar or disturb

ance received, it would be difficult to say that there was any such negligence on their part as would defeat a recovery for an injury received by one of them.

Evidence that defendant piled lumber upon the sidewalk in a public street in a city, in the vicinity of the homes of a number of children, that it, through its agent, knew that children were in the habit of congregating at the place where the lumber was piled, and of climbing upon and over it while at play, will justify a finding that the defendant should have known it would be likely to attract small children, and that, if they climbed upon the lumber as piled, it would be likely to fall upon them and they be injured. True & T. Co. v. Woda (1903) 201 III. 315, 66 N. E. 369.

In Harper v. Kopp (1903) 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2342, 73 S. W. 1127, one who piled lumber upon a public street, without necessity or license, in a vicinity where children were in the habit of congregating in the pursuit of childish sport, was held liable to a six-yearold boy who fell from the pile, on the ground that it was actionable negligence to leave unguarded such a dangerous attraction to very young children, situated as that one was.

In Spengler v. Williams (1889) 67 Miss. 1, 6 So. 613, the court refused to interfere with a verdict for the plaintiff in an action brought by a mother for the death of her child, who was killed while at play by the falling of an unsafe pile of lumber in a public street, on account of the absence of evidence especially tending to prove either that defendant knew that piling lumber in the street would attract children, or that it was in fact calculated to entice them to play around it. (See also, as to the effect of this case, the statement made regarding it in Thompson v. Illinois C. R. Co. (1913) 105 Miss. 649, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1105, 63 So. 186.)

In Earl v. Crouch (1891) 61 Hun, 624, 40 N. Y. S. R. 847, 16 N. Y. Supp. 770, affirmed without opinion in (1892) 131 N. Y. 613, 30 N. E. 864, it was held that one piling lumber near a sidewalk in such a way that it could be

easily toppled over was liable for the death of a child of five, who, in attempting to climb upon the lumber pile, caused it to fall over upon him, on the ground that fixing such a trap upon a street in an inhabited district, with a strong probability that children would be playing about it at all hours of the day, was reckless, culpable negligence.

In Kessler v. Berger (1903) 205 Pa. 289, 61 L.R.A. 611, 54 Atl. 887, 14 Am. Neg. Rep. 203, one leaving in the highway lumber piled so carelessly as to be dangerous, was held liable to a boy upon whom it fell while he was stopping to rest near it, on the ground that the boy was injured while lawfully using the street, by an obstruction illegally placed there.

In Addis v. Hess (1905) 29 Pa. Super. Ct. 505, one who, under a permit, had piled lumber in a street so negligently that it fell over upon some children who were playing upon the sidewalk with sand which had washed down from the mortar bed, was held liable for the injuries sustained.

In Busse v. Rogers (1904) 120 Wis. 443, 64 L.R.A. 183, 98 N. W. 219, 15 Am. Neg. Rep. 743, it was held that the fact that a girl of tender years, while passing along a street, turned aside for a moment to play upon lumber so piled in the highway as to constitute a nuisance, thereby became a trespasser, did not relieve the owner of the lumber from liability for injury to her, caused by the falling of a portion of it. The court said: "The child who lags unwilling on the way to school and chases a bright-winged butterfly, or plays a game of marbles, or climbs a tempting pile of timber in the highway to play seesaw for a moment, does not thereby become an outlaw, and when injured by another's negligence he cannot be turned aside with a curt remark that he has ceased to travel, and become a trespasser, and hence can complain of no one's conduct. His natural habits and instincts must be in some way and degree recognized."

In Ricketts v. Markdale (1900) 31 Ont. Rep. 610, a municipal corporation was held liable for the death of a

child less than seven years of age, who was killed while at play on a pile of lumber at the side of a street, near to and partly on the sidewalk, the accident being caused by one of the pieces swinging around and crushing him. Ferguson, J., said that the timbers offered an invitation and were an allurement to children for the purposes of play. The recovery was based upon the corporation's negligence in failing to keep the street safe, it being held that the child had the right to play in the highway; but no point was made as to his being a trespasser on the lumber.

187. Machines.

See also "Coffee grinder;" "Cogwheels;" "Conveyers;" "Cotton gin;" "Counterweight;" "Elevators;" "Escalator;" "Hoisting apparatus;" "Horse power;" "Mowing machine;" "Oil mill;" "Pumping machinery;" "Revolving shaft;" "Truck;" "Turntable;" "Ventilating fan;" "Washing machine;" "Well-drilling machine."

Electric shock to child climbing upon air compressor, see Devost v. Twin State Gas & E. Co. (1920) 79 N. H. 411, 109 Atl. 839, under heading, "Electric wires."

Machinery in mill, see "Mill."

Machinery visible in building as dangerous attraction, see Briscoe v. Henderson Lighting & P. Co. (1908) 148 N. C. 396, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1116, 62 S. E. 600, under heading, "Hot water."

It is an act of negligence to leave unguarded and exposed to the observation of little children dangerous and attractive machinery which they would naturally be tempted to go about or upon, and against the dangers of which their judgment interposes no warning or defense. Barrett v. Southern P. Co. (1891) 91 Cal. 296, 25 Am. St. Rep. 186, 27 Pac. 666.

In Driscoll v. Clark (1905) 32 Mont. 172, 80 Pac. 1, 373, a complaint was held insufficient, under the turntable doctrine, which contained no allegation that the machinery by which plaintiff was injured was so especially and unusually alluring to children as to attract them, but only that defendant knew that it did attract them, and

which, while alleging that the machinery was dangerous, alleged no facts from which its dangerous character could be inferred, thereby failing to show any implied invitation to the plaintiff to come upon defendant's premises.

In Cummings v. Darngavil Coal Co. (1903) 5 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 513, 40 Scot. L. R. 389, 10 Scot. L. T. 660, the owner of waste ground upon which children were accustomed to play was held not liable for injury to a child by unfenced machinery there

on.

In Ziegler v. Friedman & G. Iron Works (1911) 70 Misc. 553, 127 N. Y. Supp. 457, it was held that, in view of the repudiation of the turntable doctrine by the court of appeals, a landowner could not be held liable for injury to a nine-year-old boy, who, in playing tag, jumped from a window sill in the front of defendant's premises, and fell, striking the lever of a punching machine situated upon a platform in front of the premises, so that his leg was injured by the falling of the punch, the defendant not having been guilty of any active negligence.

In Sarapin v. S. & S. Corrugated Paper Machinery Co. (1924) 209 App. Div. 377, 204 N. Y. Supp. 778, where a factory owner, with the consent of the owner of the adjoining premises, placed discarded machines 7 or 8 feet high, 20 feet long, and 3 or 4 feet wide, in the back yard of such premises, which was used as a playground by children residing on the premises, and also placed iron beams upon the ground beside them, it was held that children were not trespassers in climbing upon the machines, and that, there being evidence that defendant knew that children were accustomed to play there and to climb upon the machines, and that it had been asked to remove them on the ground that someone was liable to get hurt, it was a question for the jury whether danger was reasonably to be anticipated so as to render the defendant liable for injury to a seven-year-old boy, who, while climbing on a machine, caught his clothing on the cogs of a

See also "Oil mill."

Injury to child in, see also Jensen v. Wetherell (1898) 79 Ill. App. 33, under heading, "Cogwheels."

Machinery in a mill is not within the doctrine of the Turntable Cases, so as to render the owner liable for injury to a boy who, while not occupied with his regular duties, attempted to do as he had seen its operator do; and was caught between rollers and injured, such machinery not having been left exposed and unguarded at a place where children might be expected to play with or handle it. Montgomery Cotton Mills v. Bowdoin (1912) 4 Ala. App. 314, 58 So. 732.

194. Mill pond.

See Smith v. McGoldrick Lumber Co. (1923) 124 Wash. 363, 214 Pac. 819, under heading, "Ponds."

195. Mill race.

In Riggle v. Lens (1914) 71 Or. 125, L.R.A.1915A, 150, 142 Pac. 346, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 1083, it was held that the maintenance of an unprotected mill race over property near a public highway would not, although it was resorted to by children for amusement,

render the owner liable for the death of a five-year-old child by falling into it and drowning, on the ground that the duty to guard a child against unconcealed dangers devolves upon the parents, and not upon the landowners.

In Bottum v. Hawks (1911) 84 Vt. 370, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 440, 79 Atl. 858, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1025, 3 N. C. C. A. 186, one who maintained an opening into an underground mill race, located near a public highway and school building, between which and the opening there were no barriers, and about which children were accustomed to play because of its attractive character, was held not to be under any duty to protect it to prevent accidents to children, and therefore not to be liable for the drowning of a five-year-old child therein.

196. Mine.

As attractive nuisance, see Faylor V. Great Eastern Quicksilver Min. Co. (1919) 45 Cal. App. 194, 187 Pac. 101, under heading, "Standing cars."

197. Mine hoist.

See "Hoisting apparatus."

198. Molten lead.

Injury to child by upsetting of ladle. containing, see Crane v. South Suburban Gas Co. [1916] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 33, 32 Times L. R. 74, 85 L. J. K. B. N. S. 172, 114 L. T. N. S. 71, 80 J. P. 51, 60 Sol. Jo. 222, 14 L. G. R. 382-Div. Ct., under heading, "Fire."

199. Mortar bed.

In Gnau v. Ackerman (1915) 166 Ky. 258, 179 S. W. 217, where a pile of sand placed in the street in the course of constructing a building to which children were attracted to play had been converted into a mortar bed by making a depression in the center and filling it with unslaked lime, and left unguarded, it was held that the city, the owner of the premises, and the contractor were liable for injuries to a boy between two and three years of age, who went there to play, and was burned by the slaking lime.

But in Zartner v. George (1914) 156 Wis. 131, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 129, 145 N. W. 971, a sand pile and mortar box

containing slaking lime, covered with a layer of sand, were held not to be such attractive nuisances as to render the one using them liable for injuries to a six-year-old boy who jumped into the mortar box and sustained serious burns on his feet from the hot lime, where the evidence showed that it was necessary to leave the box uncovered in order not to get the lime so hot that it would burn, and that it was likewise necessary to spread a thin coating of sand over the top, so the lime would not get too soggy.

200. Motor trucks.

See Gamble v. Uncle Sam Oil Co. (1917) 100 Kan. 74, L.R.A.1917D, 875, 163 Pac. 627, under heading, "Vehicles in motion."

201. Moving cable.

See "Cable."

202. Moving cars.

As proximate cause of injury, see Seymour v. Union Stock Yards & Transit Co. (1909) 224 Ill. 579, 79 N. E. 950, and Swartwood v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (1908) 129 Ky. 247, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1112, 130 Am. St. Rep. 464, 111 S. W. 305, in IV. j, supra.

In Wilson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. (1903) 66 Kan. 183, 71 Pac. 282, it was held that the fact that a slowly moving train might be a temptation to boys to mount and ride thereon could not be regarded as an invitation by the railway company to do so, and that a boy who went upon such a train without invitation or right was a trespasser, the extent of the company's duty toward whom was not to injure him wantonly or recklessly.

The doctrine does not apply to moving cars, so as to require a railroad company to maintain a lookout for children who are in the habit of jumping on or off the cars while in motion. Swartwood v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) supra.

In Barney v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. (1895) 126 Mo. 372, 26 L.R.A. 847, 28 S. W. 1069, it is said that even if the doctrine were applicable to railroad cars when at a standstill, it could not apply to cars in motion, fully equipped with the requisite number of