that the owner may have about his premises. It is charged in the petition that defendant was negligent in not constructing the protecting wall in such a way that it could not be climbed. It is suggested that spikes could have been placed on it. Manifestly, if this had been done and plaintiff had been injured, there would have been greater reason for holding the defendant liable. It is also suggested that a fence or a guard rail might have been constructed at the lower point of the wall. As this would have rendered access to the wall a little more difficult, the natural result would have been to increase the number of climbers, and not only add to their danger by furnishing them something else to fall from, but to impose upon the defendant the further duty of also guarding and protecting the additional guard rail or fence. In our opinion, the retaining wall in question was not such a dangerous instrumentality or thing as to impose on the defendant any liability for its original construction or its failure to construct barriers to prevent boys from climbing on it."

In Kayser v. Lindell (1898) 73 Minn. 123, 75 N. W. 1038, 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 408, it was held that the turntable doctrine would not be extended so as to render the owner of premises liable for injuries to a tenant's three-year-old child, received in falling from a retaining wall on the land, on the ground that there was nothing about the wall in the nature of a trap or concealed danger. The court said that, while the owner of premises might owe more duty to a child than to an adult coming upon his premises by implied invitation, yet he is not bound to guard every stairway, cellarway, retaining wall, shed, tree, and open window on his premises so that a child cannot clib to a precipitous place and fall off.

ground, and on the street side in some places 20 feet high, was held not to be an attractive nuisance so as to render the city liable for injury to an eightyear-old boy who, while playing there, stepped off backward into the street.

In Albert v. New York (1902) 75 App. Div. 553, 78 N. Y. Supp. 355, it was held that even assuming a child who entered an incompleted park, from which the public were excluded by barricades and notices, was an invitee, the city was not liable for injury sustained by him in falling over a sea wall to the rocks below while playing, the danger being apparent and the precautions taken by the city to protect the place all that a reasonably prudent person could be called upon to exercise.

In Clark v. Richmond (1887) 83 Va. 355, 5 Am. St. Rep. 281, 5 S. E. 369, it was held that a city was not liable for injury sustained by a child of six years who got upon a brick wall the top of which was at least 15 inches above the general level of the sidewalk line, and fell into an area, the allurement being entirely without the travel limits of the highway.

268. Revolving door.

In Harris v. Cowles (1905) 38 Wash. 331, 107 Am. St. Rep. 847, 80 Pac. 537, it was held that the doctrine of the Turntable Cases did not apply so as to render the owner of the premises liable for injury to a child whose wrist was caught in going through a revolving door, the court saying: "It would be difficult to apply the turntable rule to a device of this kind, intended as it was for constant use in passing to and from the building. It could not be used for the purpose intended if it should be locked. The rule of the Turntable Cases requires that the device shall be kept locked or guarded when not in use, and it is well known that the ordinary turntable is only used occasionally. The purpose of this circular door, however, requires that it shall be subject to the uses of ordinary passage at any moment, and it is manifestly impracticable to keep it locked or guarded, if it serves the purposes intended."

269. Revolving shaft.

In Kingsley v. Farmers Lumber & Grain Co. (1918) 209 Ill. App. 38, in which it appeared that defendant's grain elevator and engine room 20 feet distant were connected by an iron shaft used to convey power to the elevator, located about 2 feet from the ground; that the shaft, while not observable from the street, was observable from a runway into the elevator up which teams drove from the street; that plaintiff's intestate, a child of eight years, was killed while playing with the shaft, by his overcoat becoming caught in it so that it whirled him around,—it was held that the evidence showed that a child might be attracted to the shaft from a place where it might reasonably be expected to be, and that such shaft was attractive to childish instincts.

In Hart v. Mason City Brick & Tile Co. (1912) 154 Iowa, 741, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1173, 135 N. W. 423, it was held that a manufacturer was not liable for an injury sustained by a boy who went with others into one of its buildings, where they amused themselves by hanging upon a revolving shaft, where there was nothing to show that he knowingly permitted the children to play there.

In Biggs v. Consolidated Barb-Wire Co. (1899) 60 Kan. 223, 44 L.R.A. 655, 56 Pac. 4, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 335, and in the same case on subsequent appeal in (1901) 62 Kan. 492, 63 Pac. 740, 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 263, it was held that a corporation which, for the purpose of transmitting power from a water wheel to its mill, maintained a shaft supported on timbers about 15 feet above the water, with a ladder affording access thereto, and which had notice of the fact that boys were in the habit of climbing about on the timbers that supported the shaft for the purpose of fishing and playing, was held liable for the death of a fourteenyear-old boy who, in climbing the structure, had his clothing caught by a set screw projecting from a coupling on the shaft.

In O'Leary v. Brooks Elevator Co. (1898) 7 N. D. 554, 41 L.R.A. 677, 75 N. W. 919, 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 451, it was

held that no liability arose under the turntable doctrine for injuries to a nine-year-old boy caused by catching his clothes in an unprotected revolving shaft, where his presence at the place of injury was not due to the fact that he was attracted there.

In Herrem v. Konz (1917) 165 Wis. 574, 162 N. W. 654, it was held that a cause of action was stated by a complaint alleging that the main floor of defendant's mill was raised 8 or 9 feet above the ground, that there were open spaces underneath such floor, that an unguarded revolving shaft was there located, that children living in the vicinity were in the habit of playing around the sawmill and in the sawdust piles, and were in the habit of going underneath the mill and playing in close proximity to such unguarded shaft, with the knowledge and consent of the defendant; that such shaft, because of its rapid speed and of the darkness of the place, was inherently dangerous to children of tender years, and that the plaintiff, a child nine years of age, while playing around the shaft, was caught by it and seriously injured.

In Burbidge v. Starr Mfg. Co. (1921) 54 N. S. 121, 56 D. L. R. 658, one having on his property an unguarded revolving shaft transmitting power from a water wheel to machinery in another building, which he knew would be passed and repassed every day by numbers of children who were in the habit of visiting the locality to fish and play in the water, was held liable for the death of a trespassing child of eight years, whose clothing was caught by the shaft.

270. Rivers.

See "Streams and rivers."

271. Road.

In UNITED ZINC & CHEMICAL Co. v. BRITT (reported herewith) ante, 28, it was held that roads across one's premises do not amount to an invitation from the landowner to children to come upon the land, so as to charge him with the duty to keep the land safe for them and free from hidden dangers, since a road is not an invitation to leave it elsewhere than at its end.

It is to be noted, however, that the presence of a roadway may result in bringing an infant to a place where he will see an attractive nuisance.

272. Rock pile.

Injury to child playing on, see Francesetti v. Spring Valley Coal Co. (1917) 205 Ill. App. 577, under heading, "Conveyers."

273. Roller.

See also "Steam roller."

In Westerfield v. Levis Bros. (1891) 43 La. Ann. 63, 9 So. 52, a highway contractor who left standing in the street a heavy iron roller drawn by two mules, without securing it in any way, while the driver was assisting another, was held liable for the death of a fiveyear-old boy who escaped from the residence of his parents, got on the roller, started the mules, and, while endeavoring to get off, was caught between the roller and the frame.

In Bailey v. Neal (1888) 5 Times L. R. (Eng.) 20, a contractor who had left a heavy roller in a street, securely tied with a strong rope, was held not liable for injury to a nine-year-old boy who, while trying to climb on the roller, got his finger caught in the wheel in consequence of another little boy, who had cut the rope, attempting to play with the shafts of the roller. The court said that the absence of negligence was clearly demonstrated by the fact that the shafts were tied; that, even if they had not been, it was doubtful if there was negligence in leaving the machine where it was.

274. Rolling stones.

In Lyttle v. Harlan Town Coal Co. (1915) 167 Ky. 345, 180 S. W. 519, a landowner who knew that children were accustomed to play at the bottom of a steep hill on its premises, and of the custom of its servants occasionally to roll large rocks down the hill, and who, with this knowledge, did not forbid the children to play on its premises or warn their parents to keep them off, was held liable for the death of a child killed by a rock.

275. Roof.

In Prickett v. Pardridge (1914) 189

Ill. App. 307, 9 N. C. C. A. 76, where a four-year-old child went to the roof of a three-story tenement, used by the tenants for hanging clothes and reached by a stairway, and in attempting to jump across a space 4 feet wide to the roof of an adjoining building fell to the ground, it was held that a judgment in his favor could not be sustained, on the ground that, as the roof could only be reached from the street by climbing three flights of stairs, the evidence failed to prove that the dangerous thing was so located as to attract children from the street or some public place where they might be expected to be, and on the further ground that the injury was caused, not by the roof, but by the act of the plaintiff in jumping from it.

276. Rope.

See also "Block and tackle;" "Cable."

In Parkes v. New York Teleph. Co. (1923) 120 Misc. 459, 198 N. Y. Supp. 698, affirmed without opinion in (1923) 207 App. Div. 869, 201 N. Y. Supp. 930, where the employees of a telephone company who had been using a bos'n chair in repairing cables maintained on poles in a street, at quitting time, anchored it by means of a rope hung down from it and tied to a telephone pole at a point a few feet above the ground, and a boy of seven climbed the pole and reached out and swung on the rope loop, allowing himself to drop to the ground, and, on doing so a second time, was injured, it was held that the defendant was not liable, upon the ground that the rope loop which attracted the boy was not inherently dangerous.

277. Rough stuff.

See Jackson v. London County Council (1911) 28 Times L. R. (Eng.) 66, 76 J. P. 37, 10 L. G. R. 75, affirmed in (1912) 28 Times L. R. 659, 10 L. G. R. 348, 76 J. P. 217, 56 Sol. Jo. 428-C. A., under heading, "Lime."

278. Roundhouse.

In Osborn v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. (1912) 86 Kan. 440, 121 Pac. 364, an abandoned roundhouse in railroad yards about 200 feet from the street

and 300 feet from residences, upon the roof of which it was possible for children to climb by means of a sloping shed on one side and also by cleats nailed to the doors, and to which children were known customarily to resort, was held to be an attractive nuisance, rendering the railroad liable for the death of a boy who was trying to climb one of the smokestacks when it fell on and killed him.

279. Rowboat.

On reservoir, see Reardon v. Spring Valley Water Co. (1924) — Cal. App. -, 228 Pac. 406, under heading, "Reservoir."

280. Rubbish conveyer. See "Refuse conveyer."

281. Rubbish dump.

Fire in rubbish dump, see Smith v. Illinois C. R. Co. (1916) 177 Iowa, 243, L.R.A.1917F, 1033, 158 N. W. 546; Roman v. Leavenworth (1913) 90 Kan. 379, 133 Pac. 551, s. c. on subsequent appeal in (1915) 95 Kan. 513, 148 Pac. 746; Butz v. Cavanaugh (1897) 137 Mo. 503, 54 Am. St. Rep. 504, 38 S. W. 1104, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 299; Johnstone v. Lochgelly Magistrates [1913] S. C. 1078, 50 Scot. L. R. 907, [1913] 2 Scot. L. T. 190, under heading, "Fire."

282. Ruinous building.

In Boyd v. Glasgow Iron & Steel Co. [1923] S. C. 758-Ct. of Sess., a cause of action was held to be stated by allegations that defendant was the owner of a ruinous building abutting on a public road close to dwelling houses, and not fenced off from the road; that owing to its state of disrepair, with breaches in its walls, it was attractive to children to climb, and that children were in the habit of climbing it for the purpose of seeking for birds' nests in the crevices of the walls; that the building was in the nature of a trap; that the walls appeared to be safe, but were in reality dangerous; that while a boy ten years of age was bird nesting, he stepped upon a stone which appeared to be securely embedded in the wall, but which, unknown to the boy, was not in fact safe; that his weight dislodged the stone and he fell; that

the defendants knew the condition of the building and knew and tolerated the practice of the children of playing there.

283. Sand.

Injury to child playing in car loaded with sand, see Cauley v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. (1880) 95 Pa. 398, 40 Am. Rep. 664, under heading, "Standing cars."

284. Sand bins.

In RAMSAY v. TUTHILL BLDG. MATERIAL CO. (reported herewith) ante, 23, where it appeared that the defendant maintained on its premises an elevated switch track beneath which bins were constructed in the trestlework for the purpose of holding sand, which was dumped into them from cars on the track overhead; that in the bottom of the bins were chutes used for emptying the sand into wagons beneath; that the premises were accessible from the street, and that children of the neighborhood were in the habit of going upon the premises, playing in the sand which they found beneath the structure, climbing the ladder attached thereto, and sliding down in the bins and through the chutes; that the deceased, who was ten years old, jumped into a bin which was nearly full of sand, and the slide at the bottom of which was open, and slid down through the opening, followed by a quantity of sand which covered him and smothered him,-it was held that there was no error in refusing to direct a nonsuit, the court saying: "While it may be said that neither the sand upon the ground, the ladder, the structure, nor the sand in the bin, were themselves dangerous, and the combination of all or any of them was not dangerous, this is only true so long as the sand was inert. But the bin full of sand, with the opening in the bottom, was itself dangerous to any person who would get into the bin. It was especially attractive to children because of the motion of the sand itself and the apparent case of sliding down through the hole to the ground. The danger would not be apparent to a child, and the conditions constituted

an attractive and dangerous combination for children."

285. Sand pile.

As proximate cause of injury by hoisting apparatus, see McDermott v. Burke (1912) 256 Ill. 401, 100 N. E. 168, in IV. j, supra.

As proximate cause of injury by passing train, see Swartwood v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (1908) 129 Ky. 247, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1112, 130 Am. St. Rep. 464, 111 S. W. 305, in IV. j, supra.

Conversion of, into mortar bed, see "Mortar bed."

Injury to child playing on, by fall of pile of ties, see Foster v. Lusk (1917) 129 Ark. 1, 194 S. W. 855, 17 N. C. C. A. 361, under heading, "Ties."

Whether a large pile of sand 20 or 30 feet wide and of considerable height, one end of which was close to the bank of a river which at that point was composed by piling rising 4 feet above the water, on which children were allowed to play without objection, was an attractive nuisance so as to render the owner liable for the drowning of a ten-year-old boy who, while playing on it, tripped, fell, and rolled into the river, is a question for the jury. Rost v. Parker Washington Co. (1913) 176 Ill. App. 245.

In South Bend v. Turner (1901) 156 Ind. 418, 54 L.R.A. 396, 83 Am. St. Rep. 200, 60 N. E. 271, a municipal corporation which, in constructing a sewer in a public street, had left a manhole uncovered for several weeks, and within 4 feet of it a pile of sand, with knowledge that children are accustomed to play in the sand, was held liable for injuries to a child six and one-half years of age, who, while at play in the sand, fell into the manhole.

In Johnson v. New York (1913) 208 N. Y. 77, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 462, 103 N. E. 691, it was held that a municipal corporation which had closed, by means of barricades, a street in which a deep sewer was being constructed, was not liable for injury to a child who went to play upon a pile of sand deposited by the side of the trench for use in the work, and fell into the trench, in the absence of anything to charge it with notice of some special

danger to children in the conditions which existed.

286. Sand pit.

Cave-in of, see "Cave-in."

287. Sawdust conveyer.

See Isbell v. Hayward Lumber Co. (1907) 47 Tex. Civ. App. 345, 105 S. W. 211, under heading, "Conveyer."

288. Sawdust pile.

Attraction of children by, see Herrem v. Konz (1917) 165 Wis. 574, 162 N. W. 654, under heading, "Revolving shaft."

Drowning of child attracted upon premises by sawdust pile, see Coeur d'Alene Lumber Co. v. Thompson (1914) L.R.A.1915A, 731, 131 C. C. A. 316, 215 Fed. 8 (9th C.), under heading, "Pools."

In Holstine v. Director Gen. (1922) 77 Ind. App. 582, 134 N. E. 303, where it appeared that a child nineteen months old, after playing on a pile of sawdust along the edge of a railroad right of way and partly thereon, about 30 feet from the track, wandered upon the track and was struck by a train, it was held that, as the child was not injured by reason of the sawdust, the attractive-nuisance doctrine was not applicable.

289. Scaffold.

In Martin v. Cahill (1886) 39 Hun. (N. Y.) 445, it was held that a painter's scaffold left hanging some 2 or 3 feet below a window while a coat of paint was drying presented no invitation to a girl under nine years of age to climb out of the window on to it, so as to render the painter liable for injury to her by a fall therefrom, not occasioned by the insecurity of the scaffold itself.

290. Scalding.

See "Hot mash;" "Hot water." 291. Scraper. See "Wheel scraper."

292. Sea wall.

See Albert v. New York (1902) 75 App. Div. 553, 78 N. Y. Supp. 355, under heading, "Retaining wall."

293. Seed conveyer.

See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v.