Pierce (1916) 145 Ga. 130, 88 S. E. 672, Turner v. Durant Cotton Oil Co. (1923) 96 Okla. 31, 219 Pac. 892, and Dublin Cotton Oil Co. v. Jarrard (1897) — Tex. Civ. App. —, 40 S. W. 531, affirmed in (1897) 91 Tex. 289, 42 S. W. 959, under heading, "Conveyers."

294. Sewer.

See "Conduit;" "Drainage ditch;" "Excavations."

295. Sewage tank.

In Dorsey V. Chautauqua Inst. (1922) 203 App. Div. 251, 196 N. Y. Supp. 798, a seven-year-old boy coming on to privately owned grounds to which the public were permitted to resort freely, for the purpose of playing there, and, while playing around a settling vat constituting part of a sewage disposal plant, fell in and was drowned, it was held that a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would be sustained, upon the theory that the deceased was an invitee.

296. Shaft.

See "Revolving shaft."

297. Sheave wheel.

See "Pulleys."

298. Shelves.

In Manos v. Myers-Miller Furniture

Co. (1924) Ga. App.

-, 124 S. E. 357, where a defendant removed from its store and placed in the rear of its premises, 2 or 3 feet from the line of a public alley, a tier of wooden shelves some 6 feet high by 8 feet in length, each of such shelves being about 6 or 8 inches apart from top to bottom, so constructed and placed that the base upon which it was resting was narrower by several inches than the top, thus rendering it top-heavy, and a boy nearly nine years old climbed upon the shelves, which toppled over upon and killed him, it was held that a petition stating such fact was properly dismissed, the court saying: "Unless we felt authorized to extend, rather than restrict, the doctrine of the Turntable Cases, it cannot reasonably be said that the present defendant should have anticipated that a child would have been allured to do the particular thing which brought about the dis

tressing casualty in the instant case. The shelves were not inherently dangerous, nor could they be called alluring, and unless the defendant could have reasonably anticipated that trespassers would be attracted by them, so as to enter upon its premises, and afterwards to climb upon the shelves in such way as would cause them to pitch forward, it could not be held liable. The homicide appears to have been a pure and unforeseen accident." 299. Shooting.

See "Pistol."

300. Shrub.

Poisoning of child by berries on, see "Berries."

301. Sidewalk covering.

In Wilde v. Ohio Knife Co. (1914) 18 Ohio N. P. N. S. 373, the owner of a building in process of construction who had erected over the sidewalk a wooden structure upon which a child of three and one-half years was attracted to climb was held not liable for injuries to such child through stepping on a loose board, causing him to fall to the sidewalk.

302. Signal bridge.

Injury to boy climbing on, by coming in contact with electric wire, see St. Cartier v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (1917) 179 App. Div. 117, 165 N. Y. Supp. 852, under heading, "Electric wires."

303. Skid.

See Rothenberger v. Powers Fuel, Feed, Transfer & Storage Co. (1921) 148 Minn. 209, 181 N. W. 641, under heading, "Unstable equilibrium."

304. Slacked lime.

See FITZPATRICK V. ROSE DONAHUE REALTY Co. (reported herewith) ante, 20, and Jackson v. London County Council (1911) 28 Times L. R. (Eng.) 66, 76 J. P. 37, 10 L. G. R. 75, affirmed in (1912) 28 Times L. R. 659, 10 L. G. R. 348, 76 J. P. 217, 56 Sol. Jo. 428-C. A., under heading, "Lime."

305. Slacking lime. Burning of child by, see "Mortar bed."

See "Ties."

306. Sleepers.

307. Smoke.

Attracting boy into place where he came in contact with defectively insulated electric wire, see Commonwealth Electric Co. v. Melville (1904) 210 Ill. 70, 70 N. E. 1052, affirming (1903) 110 Ill. App. 242, under heading, "Electric wires.'

308. Snatch block.

See "Block and tackle."

309. Spring.

See "Wells and cisterns."

310. Sprocket wheel.

See "Conveyers."

311. Stable.

A stable is not an attractive nuisance merely because boys are likely to it. congregate in and around Giannini v. Campodonico (1917) 176 Cal. 548, 169 Pac. 80.

312. Stairway.

See "Escalator."

313. Standing cars.

See also "Hand cars and push cars." Injury to child finding loose blasting powder in, see Bogdon v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co. (1922) 59 Utah, 505, 205 Pac. 571, under heading, "Blasting powder."

Injury to child by fall of door, see McEachern v. Boston & M. R. Co. (1890) 150 Mass. 515, 23 N. E. 231; Martin v. Northern P. R. Co. (1915) 51 Mont. 31, 149 Pac. 89, under heading, "Unstable equilibrium."

Railroad cars and similar machinery are not "dangerous machines" within the meaning of the rule of the Turntable Cases. Barney v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. (1895) 126 Mo. 372, 26 L.R.A. 847, 28 S. W. 1069.

In Northern P. R. Co. v. Curtz (1912) 116 C. C. A. 403, 196 Fed. 367 (9th C.), the court sustained a judgment in favor of a child who was injured while getting loose wheat out of an unloaded car standing on a siding in a public street, by the violent propelling of another car against the standing cars, where it appeared that for more than

six years prior to the time of the accident people went into such empty cars to gather up loose wheat, and that the railroad employees never drove any of them away.

In Erie R. Co. v. Swiderski (1912) 117 C. C. A. 17, 197 Fed. 521 (3d C.), it was held that the liability of a railroad company to a child injured while playing around cars standing on a siding where children frequently played, for injury occasioned by the movement of such cars without due lookout for or warning to the children, was not limited to wanton or wilful negligence.

In Barnhill v. Mt. Morgan Coal Co. (1910) 215 Fed. 608 (D. C. E. D. Ky.), where a coal company left a lot of empty cars weighing 1,000 pounds each on a sidetrack the point of connection of which with the main track was 300 feet from a grade, and also derailed a car, and boys from fifteen to seventeen years of age put the car back on the track, pushed the empty cars out on the main track and to the grade, and were running them down the grade when plaintiff's intestate, a ten-year-old child, ran behind the front car and fell on the track and was run over and killed by a following car, the court directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that there was no reason to anticipate that children of tender years would sustain any injury from the cars as they were left.

In Hodges v. Erie R. Co. (1919) 168 C. C. A. 498, 257 Fed. 494 (6th C.), it was held that a case of attractive nuisance or invitation was not stated by a petition alleging that, after a freight train had stood about half an hour on the track at the end of a public street, thereby blocking passage over a longexisting and well-recognized pathway from the end of such street to a nearby and much-used picnic ground, the plaintiff's three-year-old child walked along the pathway and crawled under the standing freight train, and that his mother, seeing the child's danger, attempted to rescue him by crawling under the train, and was killed when it was started without warning.

In George v. Los Angeles R. Co. (1899) 126 Cal. 357, 46 L.R.A. 829, 77

Am. St. Rep. 184, 58 Pac. 819, 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 420, a nine-year-old boy, while playing with his companions with some street railroad trailer cars left standing during the hours of light travel at the end of the line, with brakes set, which the boys were playing with by pushing them a short distance up the track, starting them down the grade, and jumping on and riding back, after riding down part of the distance, jumped off the car, ran ahead, and started across the track in front of it, when he fell and was run over. The jury found for the defendant, and the court, in considering the propriety of instructions given, held that the principle of the Turntable Cases was not violated by an instruction that if the jury should believe that any element of danger connected with the defendant's trailer by which plaintiff was injured was not a hidden or concealed danger, but was open to the observation and could be comprehended by a boy of average intelligence of the age of plaintiff, and that if the jury should believe that the trailer, when left on the track by defendant's employees, was held by brakes of the ordinary kind, set in a manner to hold the cars where they were unless someone should loosen them, the plaintiff could not recover.

In Faylor v. Great Eastern Quicksilver Min. Co. (1920) 45 Cal. App. 194, 187 Pac. 101, it appeared that a mining company, by reason of a cave-in occurring near the mouth of its main tunnel, abandoned part of it, driving another tunnel to intersect it beyond the caved-in part; that in the abandoned portion a stope had been driven up through the floor of the tunnel; that the débris of the cave-in was subsequently removed from the mouth of the old tunnel, so that the entrance was unobstructed, and tracks laid into it up to the stope; that at the junction of the old tunnel and the intersecting tunnel there was a large timber in the center, which one proceeding from the mouth of the old tunnel would have to pass around, and that the old tunnel was also obstructed by a pile of dirt and débris 2 feet high and by a pipe line extending across it; that the min

ing property was inclosed by a barbed wire fence, having a gate with a sign on it bearing the words "Danger" and "No admittance;" that, when the mine was not being operated, the little cars used in bringing out ore were left near the mouth of the tunnel, where children would sometimes play with them by running them up into the tunnel a way and riding out on them on the descending grade; that on a Sunday the deceased, a boy eleven years old, with two companions, was playing with a car which they pushed back to the point where the old and new tunnels intersected; that, on hearing the voices of other children at the entrance of the tunnel, two of them hid behind the car and the deceased started out of the old tunnel and fell into the open stope. It was held that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that the car, tunnel, and stope, taken together, constituted an attractive nuisance.

In Denver City Tramway Co. v. Nicholas (1906) 35 Colo. 462, 84 Pac. 813, 20 Am. Neg. Rep. 16, it was held that a street car company leaving cars not in use upon a track in a public street with the trolley poles tied down, knowing that children were attracted to play thereon and to amuse themselves by imitating the actions, motions, and conduct of the employees of the company in operating the cars, was liable for an injury sustained by a boy of thirteen, whose companion, a boy of about the same age, released the trolley pole, thereby enabling plaintiff inadvertently to set the car in motion, who, being frightened, hastily attempted to get off and in doing so was caught between the moving car and one standing just ahead of it.

A railroad company need not guard cars standing by themselves on a track in a public street to keep children from getting upon them or from being run over while playing about them. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. McLaughlin (1868) 47 III. 265.

The fact that a child is of such tender years as to be incapable of exercising care for its safety does not affect the question of the degree of care imposed on the servants of a railroad

company to avoid injury to it in starting a train, in the absence of knowledge that the child is in danger of being run over; and, aside from the duty of giving warning before starting by sounding a bell or whistle, no other duty is required to avoid injury to a three-year-old child, though it is attracted to the train by curiosity. East St. Louis Connecting R. Co. v. Jenks (1894) 54 Ill. App. 91.

In Colby v. Chicago Junction R. Co. (1920) 216 Ill. App. 315, it was held as a matter of law that neither a steel coal car having openings in the bottom furnished with lids or covers that would lower so as to close such openings, and which, when raised, would stand against the inner side of the car, where they were held in postion by latches or pins, nor such lids, nor the holes in the bottom of the car, were an attractive nuisance so as to render the railroad company liable for the killing of a child of eight, upon whom, as he was climbing down through one of the openings, another child of tender years allowed the lid to fall. The court said: "We do not believe that the doctrine of attractive nuisance can be extended to include the railroad car now under consideration. It is of the usual type of steel car, ordinarily carrying coal. From the photograph, the distance from the bottom of the car to the ground appears to be between 3 and 4 feet; the sides of the car extended upward about 4 feet. It is therefore quite evident that the particular thing which caused the injury in question, namely, the lids, could not be seen by anyone, whether a child or adult, until he had climbed up over the side of the car, a climb of approximately 8 feet. This brings this case within the rule stated in McDermott v. Burke (1912) 256 Ill. 401, 100 N. E. 168, in which it was held that the dangerous thing must be so located as to attract children from a public street or a place where the public was in the habit of passing. It cannot be claimed that there was anything attractive in law in the car itself, and the appliance which caused the injury was so hidden from sight as to be discovered only by the exercise of considerable

physical agility. We are further of the opinion that the appliance itself cannot properly be called an attractive nuisance. It was simply an iron lid intended to cover holes in the botton of the car; when raised it was kept in place by an ordinary hasp and pin. This could not reasonably have attractive qualities to children playing near by. It would have no more attraction than an ordinary door or other appliance in frequent use. We know of no case which has held such a simple appliance or anything like it to be an attractive nuisance, and we do not see how it could reasonably be so held. This also applies to the holes in the bottom of the car."

An empty railroad car placed on a track is not an attractive nuisance. Papich v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (1918) 183 Iowa, 601, 167 N. W. 686; Miles v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. (1918) 184 Iowa, 461, 167 N. W. 672.

In the Central Branch Union P. R. Co. v. Henigh (1880) 23 Kan. 347, 33 Am. Rep. 167, a railroad company was held not to be liable for the death of a boy less than five years of age who climbed upon a flat car standing on a sidetrack near a station in a small village, and loosened the brakes, and who, when the car started on a down grade, jumped off in front of it and was run over. The court said: "The accident that actually occurred could not have been anticipated. The cars were so well fastened that no danger was possible, unless some person climbed upon them and unfastened the brakes; and then danger was almost impossible to any ordinary person. The cars were not dangerous machines, left exposed near a populous city. Nor were they of that alluring character to entice boys to play upon them, for when unfastened they would move only a few feet and then stop. Nor were they dangerous, even when moving, to ordinary boys. Certainly, boys from ten to sixteen years of age were not likely to be hurt by them. No one would have anticipated that a boy less than five years old would have gone to the cars, unaccompanied by any older person, and have climbed upon one of them, and unloosened the

brake, so as to set the car in motion. No such a thing had ever before occurred. And certainly no one could have anticipated that a boy big enough to do that would have fallen off or jumped off in front of the car so that the car would run over him and kill him. Most boys would have stayed on the car, so as to get a ride. And this the company had a right to expect. We do not think that the company was negligent."

In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Popp (1894) 96 Ky. 99, 27 S. W. 992, it was held that a railroad company to whose depot children were, to its knowledge, accustomed to resort, was under a duty to have some employee in a position to see that there was no person in danger of being injured in coupling a train to some cars standing on a sidetrack within a few feet of the depot building; and therefore that it was liable for injury to a five-year-old boy who was upon the platform of one of the cars, and, being terrified by the impending collision, attempted to get upon the bumper at the end of the track and had his leg crushed against it. The court said: "Technically, appellee was a trespasser, but, as said in the Conley Case (1889) 89 Ky. 402, 12 S. W. 764, when an injury is the result of nonperformance or violation of a plain and manifest duty for protection of human life or safety, the party thus acting will not be heard to say, in justification, that the person thus injured was merely a trespasser. We do not doubt applicability of that principle to this case, for, obviously, to attempt backing a train and coupling cars at the place and under circumstances it was done when appellee was injured, is violation and disregard of a plain duty. There is another aspect in which the conduct of appellant's employees showed negligence of a reprehensible character. It was known to them that children of all ages were in the habit of resorting to the depot premises, yet not only were the two cars coupled to the backing train without any servant being in a position to warn appellee of his danger, but one of the cars, if not both, was left open, so as to invite and tempt children to 36 A.L.R.-17.

enter, as appellee and his companions did do; and if the two men who gave them water were not actually employees, the fact is thus made apparent that the cars were left so open and exposed that anyone, child or adult, might enter at will, no employee being present to prevent or warn them of the coupling process that would and did shortly take place."

In Reary v. Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. (1888) 40 La. Ann. 32, 8 Am. St. Rep. 497, 3 So. 390, a railroad company was held not liable for injuries to a little girl between eight and nine years of age, who, while playing around a depot, got on a car which was being switched about, for a ride, and fearing that it was going to be carried out of the city, jumped out while it was in motion.

In Gay v. Essex Electric Street R. Co. (1893) 159 Mass. 238, 21 L.R.A. 448, 38 Am. St. Rep. 415, 34 N. E. 186, it was held that leaving street cars in the street is not an invitation or license to children to play upon them, even though the street car company knows that they are calculated to attract children and do in fact attract them.

In Kaumeier v. City Electric R. Co. (1898) 116 Mich. 306, 40 L.R.A. 385, 72 Am. St. Rep. 525, 74 N. W. 481, it was held that a small flat car weighing between 1,500 and 1,800 pounds and not equipped with a brake, which in itself was not an object dangerous to children when left standing on the street car company's tracks in a highway, did not, by being so light that children could move it, become, under the doctrine of the Turntable Cases, a dangerous object in being moved along the track, so as to render the company liable for injury to a sevenyear-old child who fell off and was run over while riding upon it.

In Iamurri v. Saginaw City Gas Co. (1907) 148 Mich. 27, 111 N. W. 884, Ostrander, J., said of the last-mentioned case that the court could not have reached the conclusion it did except upon the theory that, under the circumstances of the case, no duty to take care for the playing, trespassing children existed. The