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within the purview of the statute, prohibition lies as a matter of right without regard to other remedies.

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9. Test of Adequacy or Inadequacy.-There is no general rule by which the adequacy or inadequacy of a remedy can be ascertained, but the question is one to be determined on the facts of each particular case. The necessary delay and expense of an appeal ordinarily furnish no sufficient reasons for holding that the remedy by appeal is not adequate or speedy. But whenever, as incidental to the action of the court, there is involved an infringement of property rights, or a submission to a multiplicity of suits in such way as to make its acts oppressive, there is no adequate remedy by appeal, and it is proper to issue the writ of prohibition; and this is true, whether the court in which the proceeding is instituted has acted or not, if the effect of the void authority under which it is assuming to act stands as a vexatious menace to personal liberty or the destruction of property rights.10 Thus, prohibition has been issued against the entering of a judgment. in a mandamus proceeding directing the state board of examiners for nurses to certify to the governor an applicant for registration as a nurse, since the mere act of certification would require so little time. that the lower court might well command it to be done forthwith, whereas a stay could not be obtained until an appeal was perfected and lodged with the appellate court, an act which might require quite an appreciable time, and the board, in the meantime, if it did not comply with the writ, would be subject to proceedings in contempt, and if it did comply, the effect would be to execute the judgment and render the appeal unavailing. So where the writ is sought to prohibit the enforcement of a void judgment, upon which execution has issued and is about to be levied and property sold thereunder, an appeal from an order denying a motion to quash the summons and set

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7. Evans v. Willis, 22 Okla. 310, 97 Pac. 1047, 18 Ann. Cas. 258 and note, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1050.

Notes: 111 A. S. R. 963; Ann. Cas. 1913D 595.

111 A. S. R. 925 and note, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 395 and note.

Notes: 111 A. S. R. 964; Ann. Cas. 1913D 595.

9. Havemeyer v. Superior Ct., 84 Cal. 327, 24 Pac. 121, 18 A. S. R. 192, 10 L.R.A. 627; Crittenden v. Booneville, 92 Miss. 277, 45 So. 723, 131 A. S. R. 518; State v. Denton, 229 Mo. 187, 129 S. W. 709, 138 A. S. R. 417; Evans v. Willis, 22 Okla. 310, 97 Pac. 1047, 18 Ann. Cas. 258 and note, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1050.

Note: 111 A. S. R. 962.

10. Crittenden V. Booneville, 92 8. Evans v. Willis, 22 Okla. 310, 97 Miss. 277, 45 So. 723, 131 A. S. R. 518. Pac. 1047, 18 Ann. Cas. 258 and note, 11. State v. District Ct., 50 Mont. 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1050; State v. Su- 289, 146 Pac. 743, Ann. Cas. 1917C perior Ct., 40 Wash. 555, 82 Pac. 877, 164.

aside the judgment does not afford an adequate remedy, where there is no provision for a stay pending an appeal from such order.12 In criminal cases where imprisonment is threatened, it seems that neither appeal, habeas corpus, nor certiorari would be a plain, speedy, or adequate remedy.13 But the contrary has also been held.14

10. Errors and Irregularities.-Errors of an inferior court in the exercise of its admitted jurisdiction are properly reviewable on appeal and do not justify a resort to a writ of prohibition.15 Thus, when ju risdiction is clear, an erroneous decision in ruling on the sufficiency of the petition or complaint,16 or on a motion to dismiss,17 or for a change of venue,18 or on matters of defense,19 is not ground for a writ of prohibition. Even though a court assumes to act in a case where it has no jurisdiction, this alone is not a sufficient ground for the issuance of a writ of prohibition, if a full, complete and adequate remedy can be obtained otherwise, as, for instance, by appeal.20 Thus if the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, and the determination of the question as to jurisdiction of the person depends on contested facts which the inferior tribunal is competent to inquire into and determine, prohibition will not be granted though the court should be of the opinion that the questions of fact have been wrongly determined by the court below, and, if rightly determined, would have ousted the jurisdiction. It is otherwise, however, if the particular case is not appealable. Under such circumstances prohibition will lie to correct an erroneous decision of a question of jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions it is held that the remedy of a person convicted of

12. Gordon v. District Ct., 36 Nev. 18. Notes: 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 395; 1, 131 Pac. 134, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1078. Ann. Cas. 1913D 596. 13. Evans v. Willis, 22 Okla. 310, 97 Pac. 1047, 18 Ann. Cas. 258 and note, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1050; State v. Circuit Ct., 97 Wis. 1, 72 N. W. 193, 65 A. S. R. 90, 38 L.R.A. 554.

Note: Ann. Cas. 1913D 595. 14. People v. Wyatt, 186 N. Y. 383, 79 N. E. 330, 9 Ann. Cas. 972, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 159.

15. See infra, par. 22.

16. Schubach v. McDonald, 179 Mo. 163, 78 S. W. 1020, 101 A. S. R. 452, 65 L.R.A. 136; Evans v. Willis, 22 Okla. 310, 97 Pac. 1047, 18 Ann. Cas. 258 and note, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1050; Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Pinnacle Coal Co., 44 W. Va. 574, 30 S. E. 196, 41 L.R.A. 414.

Note: Ann. Cas. 1913D 596.

17. Walcott v. Wells, 21 Nev. 47, 24 Pac. 367, 37 A. S. R. 478, 9 L.R.A. 59 and note.

19. Evans v. Willis, 22 Okla. 310, 97 Pac. 1047, 18 Ann. Cas. 258 and note, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1050.

Notes: 12 Am. Dec. 608; Ann. Cas. 1913D 596.

20. Jacobs v. Superior Ct., 133 Cal. 364, 65 Pac. 826, 85 A. S. R. 204; Crittenden v. Booneville, 92 Miss. 277, 45 So. 723, 131 A. S. R. 518.

Note: 1 Ann. Cas. 713.

1. In re Alix, 166 U. S. 136, 17 S. Ct. 522, 41 U. S. (L. ed.) 948; Ex parte Oklahoma, 220 U. S. 191, 31 S. Ct. 426, 55 U. S. (L. ed.) 431; Finley v. Moose, 74 Ark. 217, 85 S. W. 238, 109 A. S. R. 79; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Rogers, 52 W. Va. 450, 44 S. E. 300, 62 L.R.A. 178.

Notes: 111 A. S. R. 959, 960; 1 Ann. Cas. 714; Ann. Cas. 1913D 596, 2. Note: 1 Ann. Cas. 715.

the violation of a municipal ordinance in a court having no jurisdiction is by an appeal, and that a writ of prohibition will not issue to restrain such a prosecution, except where such remedy is inadequate. In other jurisdictions the writ has been allowed in such cases without regard to the existence of other remedies.3

11. Constitutional Questions.-Where the validity of a statute or ordinance is involved the general rule obtains that a writ of prohibition will not be granted in advance of the trial or determination in the inferior court where the question is presented, when a plain remedy by appeal is afforded, though it may be that the higher court will, when the question is presented to it, determine that the statute or ordinance is invalid. This is particularly true where the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute in question, as in such cases the inferior court, having jurisdiction, may itself determine the constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be subject to review.5 Where, however, the remedy by appeal is inadequate, prohibition lies to restrain a prosecution under a void statute, notwithstanding the fact that it is necessary to pass on the constitutionality of the statute in the prohibition proceedings. Thus where an attempt to enforce a void statute or ordinance results in damage to property and multifarious and persecuting prosecutions, the remedy by appeal is not adequate, and therefore a resort to the writ of prohibition to put a stop to the proceedings is proper. In such a case the inconvenience and litigation which must arise if the act is unconstitutional and the proceedings unauthorized make it a proper case for the issuance of the writ to the lower tribunal. If the fact that the applicant possesses an adequate remedy is not made to appear, the court will exercise its discretion to hear the case on application for a writ of prohibition, and will determine the constitutional questions arising therein.9

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IV. TRIBUNALS AND PROCEEDINGS SUBJECT TO WRIT

Courts and Judicial Tribunals

12. Acting in Judicial or Quasi Judicial Capacity.—At common law it is well settled that a writ of prohibition must be directed to some

3. Note: 18 Ann. Cas. 265.

4. Riley v. Greenwood, 72 S. C. 90, 51 S. E. 532, 110 A. S. R. 592. Notes: 111 A. S. R. 964; 6 Ann. Cas. 986; Ann. Cas. 1913D 596.

5. Note: 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 844. 6. Bell v. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 28 Nev. 280, 81 Pac. 875, 113 A. S. R. 854, 6 Ann. Cas. 982 and note, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 843 and note. Note: 6 Ann. Cas. 986.

7. Hughes v. Recorder's Ct., 75 Mich. 574, 42 N. W. 984, 13 A. S. R. 475, 4 L.R.A. 863; Crittenden v. Booneville, 92 Miss. 277, 45 So. 723, 131 A. S. R. 518.

Notes: 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 449; Ann.
Cas. 1913D 596.

8. Note: 6 Ann. Cas. 986.
9. Note: 6 Ann. Cas. 986.

judicial tribunal or officer.10 In other words it lies only to prevent or control judicial (or quasi judicial) action,11 as distinguished from legislative, executive, or ministerial action.12 Accordingly it is generally held that prohibition will not lie to prevent the performance of ministerial duties by executive or administrative officers, 18 or to restrain the performance by the courts of duties which are merely administrative and ministerial.14 While there are cases which hold that properly speaking the writ can only issue to a court,15 the writ is not restricted in its operation to courts eo nomine.16 Accordingly the writ of prohibition lies from a superior court, not only to inferior judicial tribunals, but also to inferior ministerial tribunals, possessing incidentally judicial powers, and known as quasi judicial tribunals,1 and also in extreme cases to purely ministerial bodies, when they usurp and attempt to exercise judicial functions.18 In other words. it seems not to be necessary that the tribunal to which the writ issues shall actually possess any judicial power. It is enough if it is attempting to exercise such power in a particular case without lawful authority.19 Although the tribunal sought to be restrained is a court, the action in question may not be judicial, and though it is clearly not a court in the ordinary acceptation of the term, such action may be judicial in its nature, and therefore, in the one case the writ must be denied, though the tribunal against which it is sought is by law de

10. State v. Bright, 224 Mo. 514, 123 S. W. 1057, 135 A. S. R. 552, 20 Ann. Cas. 955 and note; Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Pinnacle Coal Co., 44 W. Va. 574, 30 S. E. 196, 41 L.R.A. 414; Woods v. Cottrell, 55 W. Va. 476, 47 S. E. 275, 104 A. S. R. 1004, 2 Ann. Cas. 933, 65 L.R.A. 616; McWhorter v. Dorr, 57 W. Va. 608, 50 S. E. 838, 110 A. S. R. 815; In re Radl, 86 Wis. 645, 57 N. W. 1105, 39 A. S. R. 918.

11. Havemeyer v. Superior Ct., 84 Cal. 327, 24 Pac. 121, 18 A. S. R. 192, 10 L.R.A. 627; Speed v. Common Council, 98 Mich. 360, 57 N. W. 406, 39 A. S. R. 555, 22 L.R.A. 842; State v. Bright, 224 Mo. 514, 123 S. W. 1057, 135 A. S. R. 552, 20 Ann. Cas. 955 and note; Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Pinnacle Coal Co., 44 W. Va. 574, 30 S. E. 196, 41 L.R.A. 414; Williamson v. Mingo County Ct., 56 W. Va. 38, 48 S. E. 835, 3 Ann. Cas. 355 and note; In re Radl, 86 Wis. 645, 57 N. W. 1105, 39 A. S. R. 918.

Notes: 12 Am. Dec. 604; 18 Am. Dec. 239; 3 L.R.A. 57; 20 Ann. Cas. 962.

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12. Speed v. Common Council, 98 Mich. 360, 57 N. W. 406, 39 A. S. R. 555, 22 L.R.A. 842; State v. Bright, 224 Mo. 514, 123 S. W. 1057, 135 A. S. R. 552, 20 Ann. Cas. 955 and note; Ex parte Braudlacht, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 367, 38 Am. Dec. 593 and note; Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Pinnacle Coal Co., 44 W. Va. 574, 30 S. E. 196, 41 L.R.A. 414; Williamson v. Mingo County Ct., 56 W. Va. 38, 48 S. E. 835, 3 Ann. Cas. 355 and note.

Notes: 12 Am. Dec. 605; 18 Am. Dec. 239; 3 L.R.A. 57; 20 Ann. Cas. 962.

13. See infra, par. 17.
14. See infra, par. 13.
15. Note: 12 Am. Dec. 604.
16. See infra, par. 16.

17. Williamson v. Mingo County Ct., 56 W. Va. 38, 48 S. E. 835, 3 Ann. Cas. 355 and note. See infra, par. 16.

18. Williamson v. Mingo County Ct., 56 W. Va. 38, 48 S. E. 835, 3 Ann. Cas. 355 and note.

19. Note: 12 Am. Dec. 604.

nominated a court, and in the other the writ must be granted, though the tribunal is nowhere spoken of as a court.20 The issuance of the writ to the parties to a suit or proceeding is merely incidental to the prohibition laid upon the court. It cannot issue to the parties independently of the court, or to mere private persons, not attempting to exercise judicial power.1

13. Acting in Legislative or Ministerial Capacity.-Except in those cases where some valid constitutional or statutory enactment declares directly to the contrary, it must appear that the act in question is not ministerial in character. If it is ministerial, the writ cannot be sustained, though the person or tribunal against which it is sought is a judge or court authorized in proper cases to discharge judicial functions. Nor will prohibition issue to a tribunal strictly legislative in its functions. It is not essential to the application of the rule that the tribunal should bear a name indicating its legislative capacity. On the contrary, it may bear the name of a court, and the functions usually exercised by it may be strictly judicial. An inquiry is, therefore, always permissible respecting the actual character of the act or proceeding sought to be prohibited, and if such character is found to be legislative, the writ must be refused, though the tribunal against which it is sought is a court. Hence a writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent the appointment of election commissioners, or the hearing and determination of an election contest where the tribunal acting must be regarded, under the law, as a mere representative of the legislature itself and as an instrumentality created or employed by it for making the investigation and taking the action which it might itself have made or taken in the exercise of its authority to hear and determine the contest in question. Nor will prohibition generally be allowed to prevent the issuance of a writ of execution, although there are cases in which the superior court will interpose, as by preventing a justice of the peace from issuing compulsory process of subpoena under an information insufficient to give him jurisdiction."

14. Particular Courts and Tribunals.-Where the court to which the application is made possesses general common law jurisdiction to grant writs of prohibition, its writ may be directed to, and must be respected by, any court or judicial tribunal which is inferior in rank to the court issuing the writ, including courts of equity,8 probate

20. Note: 111 A. S. R. 937.

1. Note: 12 Am. Dec. 607.

Note: 111 A. S. R. 938.

5. Ex parte Braudlacht, 2 Hill

2. Notes: 111 A. S. R. 937, 938; 3 (N. Y.) 367, 38 Am. Dec. 593. Ann. Cas. 357, 358.

3. Williamson v. Mingo County Ct., 56 W. Va. 38, 48 S. E. 835, 3 Ann. Cas. 355 and note.

4. McWhorter v. Dorr, 57 W. Va. 608, 50 S. E. 838, 110 A. S. R. 815.

6. Note: 111 A. S. R. 953.

7. State v. Ross, 122 Mo. 435, 25 S. W. 947, 23 L.R.A. 534.

Note: 111 A. S. R. 935.

8. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Wear, 135 Mo. 230, 36 S. W. 357, 658, 33

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