county jail not less than three months nor more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment." A faithful compliance with such request will, I think, soon correct the evil of which you complain. Very respectfully, Jos. H. MAUPIN, Attorney General. 1. The General Assembly has no power to order, by concurrent resolution, the printing of a number of copies of the State Engineer's report, in excess of the number fixed by law, "for distribution among the people." 2. A contract made pursuant to such resolution, is void, and no warrant should issue in payment for work done pursuant to such void contract. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, DENVER, COLORADO, July 10, 1891. HON. JOHN M. HENDERSON, Auditor of State. DEAR SIR-You ask my advice as to whether or not you shall audit and allow the claim of Collier & Cleaveland for the sum of seven thousand five hundred dollars, for printing the State Engineer's report, pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 15, which is as follows: "Be it resolved by the Senate, the House of Representatives concurring, That three thousand copies of the State Engineer's report be printed, as prepared, to be, by the State Engineer, distributed among the people of the State." Said resolution passed both houses of the Eighth General Assembly, February 10th, but was not presented for executive approval. The question whether or not said claim is valid, involves the question of law, whether or not the General Assembly had any power to order said printing by concurrent resolution. Counsel for claimants have called my attention to the fact that heretofore the General Assembly of this State has made no distinction between joint and concurrent resolutions, and that the terms have been continually used interchangeably to describe resolutions approved by the executive, and those not so approved. Usage, however, has given a distinct and different meaning to each of said terms. A learned writer on this and kindred subjects, defines the two kinds of resolutions as follows: "A joint resolution, like a public act or statute, is one which is passed by both houses, and signed by the president."-Ency. Polit. Science, vol. 3, page 84. "A concurrent resolution is adopted by both houses, chiefly on the subject of adjournment of the session. Unlike a joint resolution, it does not require the signature of the president.”—Id., page 80. A joint resolution is, in other words, an informal method of passing a law; and such a law, if not otherwise invalid, will be effective, unless said method of enactment is in conflict with constitutional prohibition. Some laws of congress are enacted in this way. Likewise, under the Constitution of 1848, of the State of Illinois, the Supreme Court of that State held that a joint resolution, directing the publication of a certain number of the reports of the Adjutant General, had "the force of law." (People ex rel., etc., vs. Tyndale, Secretary of State, 47 Ill., 538.) But no law can be passed in this way by the General Assembly of the State of Colorado. Article V., Section 17, of our Constitution, provides that "no law shall be passed except by bill," etc. The term, "bill," is defined, by the authority just above cited, as being "any act of" proposed legislation commencing with "Be it enacted," etc. This is the universally accepted meaning of the term. (Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 60.) And accordingly, our State Constitution (Art. V., Sec. 18) further provides that the style of the laws of this State shall be, "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Colorado." Therefore, a joint resolution, as above defined, intended to have the effect of the law, would be void, because not enacted in the above named constitutional formula. (Sutherland, Section 64, and cases cited.) But the resolution upon which the claimants rest their title is not even a joint resolution, as above defined, since it is a resolution not signed by the Governor, nor presented to him for approval or veto. If legislation could be effected in this way, and money disbursed from the State treasury for other than legislative expenses proper, the Legislature might wholly evade the executive veto power. Notwithstanding the prescribed form of enactment above named, which seems to preclude all conceivable legislation in any other form, the framers of our Constitution took the additional precaution to provide, by Section 39, Article V., that "every order, resolution or vote to which the concurrence of both houses shall be nec essary, except on the question of adjournment, or relating solely to the transaction of business of the two houses, shall be presented to the Governor; and before it shall take effect, be approved by him, or, being disapproved, shall be re-passed by two-thirds of both houses, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in cases of a bill." It is obvious that either house, subject to the limitations imposed by statute, in compliance with Sections 28 and 29, Article V. of our Constitution, may, for its own purpose solely, order printing and contract for services which, when performed, would constitute a valid claim to payment from the State treasury. But I think it is more than obvious indeed, that it cannot be controverted with any show of reason-that neither house could, without the concurrence of the other, incur the expense of printing the reports of another department of the State administration "for distribution among the people of the State." And if the concurrence of both houses is essential to the validity of such action, the Governor's approval is, by virtue of Section 39 of the Constitution, above quoted, equally essential. We must conclude, therefore, that even if Section 17 had been omitted from the Constitution, inasmuch as the resolution under consideration was neither approved by the Governor nor passed over his veto, it is void and of no effect, further than as an expression of the sense of the General Assembly upon the subject therein mentioned. I must, therefore, advise you to refuse to draw a warrant for the payment of any part of the first aforesaid claim, greater than would have been valid by virtue of the statute in force at the time said printing was undertaken, and applicable thereto. Very respectfully, Jos. H. MAUPIN, Attorney General. N. B.-This opinion is supported by a subsequent decision of the Court of Appeals, in the case of Carlile vs. Henderson, reported in Vol. II., Court of Appeals Reports. The act of March 15, 1887, relating to commutation of life sentences, does not authorize the warden of the penitentiary to discharge a prisoner, under life sentence, at the end of the time mentioned in said act, unless said prisoner is pardoned by the executive. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, DENVER, COLORADO, July 11, 1891. ( HON. WILLIAM A. SMITH, Warden Colorado State Penitentiary. DEAR SIR--In your recent communication, you direct my attention to an act, approved March 15, 1887, concerning the commutation of life sentences, and request me to advise you whether, under said act, prisoners sentenced to the State penitentiary for life, prior to the passage thereof, are entitled to a discharge when they shall have served a sentence of twenty-five years, less their allowance for good time. Under Section 2 of this act, the class of prisoners referred to in your letter are not entitled, as a matter of absolute right, to a discharge, but the section is more in the nature of a recommendation, of this class of prisoners, to executive clemency, and the Governor may or may not extend this clemency, as his best judgment dictates; or, in other words, Section 2 has little or no force, and leaves the question of pardon right where it was before-in the sound discretion of the Governor. Doubtless, the Governor of the State, upon having his attention called to the fact that a prisoner in the penitentiary, sentenced thereto prior to the passage of the act in question, shall have served the sentence mentioned in said Section 2, and shall be satisfied that the prisoner's conduct, while in prison, has been good, would grant him a pardon; but before you would be authorized to discharge such a prisoner, it would be necessary that you have the Governor's warrant authorizing you so to do. Very respectfully, Jos. H. MAUPIN, Attorney General. Section 34, Article V. of the Constitution, does not prohibit the granting of pensions to those who have rendered past military service to the State. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, DENVER, COLORADO, July 16, 1591.} HON. JOHN C. KENNEDY, Adjutant General. DEAR SIR-In reply to your inquiry of July 13th, as to what effect, if any, Section 34 of Article V. of the Con State Historical and DENVER, COLORADO. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. stitution has upon the power of the Legislature to make certain pension appropriations, I have to say that it is my opinion it has no bearing whatever upon this class of legislation. The language of the section is: "No appropriation shall be made for charitable, industrial, educational or benevolent purposes, to any person, corporation or community not under the absolute control of the State, nor to any denominational or sectarian institution or association." A pension is defined by Webster to be an annual allowance of a sum of money to a person, by the government, in consideration of past services. In theory, at least, it is an arbitrary payment of money, by the money-giving power, for what it considers services. It is not a charitable donation, nor a gratuity. In one sense, it is a gift, it is true, but one that is supposed to be earned by honest devotion to the country's interest and safety. At every period of our national history, and in the history of many of the States, laws have been passed giving pensions, where needed and deserved, to those who have been wounded and rendered incapable of self-support while in the military service of the State or nation, or to the families of, or other dependents upon, those who have died in the service. . And it seems to me perfectly proper, just and right, that the popular appreciation and thanks for such services should be expressed in this way, instead of in empty words; and, so far as I am able to learn, there has at no time been any serious objection, from any source, to the passage of such laws, nor is there likely to be, so long as the objects of these appropriations are deserving, and no attempt is made, under the guise of such laws, to despoil the public treasury or unjustly burden the taxpayers. The appropriations referred to in your letter were made by the last General Assembly, for services rendered the State in the Ute war, and at a time when certain counties of the State were being overrun, and the lives of the citizens thereof endangered by hostile Indians. It was eminently just that the Legislature should at least take care of the dependent families of those who were killed in that war, and this is all that is sought to be done by the acts in question. In my opinion, there is |