AMERICA'S CASE AGAINST GERMANY CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY No war in which the United States has ever engaged has had greater justification than the one recognized on April 6, 1917. The language of the congressional resolution, which asserted that the Imperial German Government had "committed repeated acts of war" and formally declared a status which had been "thrust upon" the United States of America, was strictly accurate, because for more than two years President Wilson attempted in vain to persuade Germany to abandon the wanton sinking of merchant vessels in disregard of the undisputed rules of international law and elementary dictates of humanity. In the refusal of the Imperial Government to cease the murder of American citizens and the destruction of American property is to be found the immediate cause of the entrance of the United States into the European conflict; and while our abandonment of the intolerable rôle of neutral enables us formally to declare what many of us have long felt-that the Allies have been fighting for our ideals; that the submarine warfare is simply symptomatic of an international ruthlessness which cannot be allowed to triumph; that, in President Wilson's phrase, it is a warfare against all mankind, against all nations-nevertheless the reason why the United States finally decided to substitute force for argument was the continued assertion by Germany of the right to use the submarine against commerce. This, he maintained, could not be done except in violation of principles of international law so humane and so fundamental that their abandonment by a proud, self-respecting nation was unthinkable. The immediate cause of a war may be lost sight of in larger issues and this is abundantly true in the present instance. We are prone to justify our entrance on the basis of American approval of the purposes of the Entente Allies and disapproval of the purposes of the Central Powers. In the opinion of a great many Americans an international conscience would long ago have justified us in casting in our lot on the side of England and France. Before the submarine campaign was inaugurated it had become trite to say that American public opinion was wholeheartedly sympathetic with the Allies; that America was very generally convinced that if Germany did not will the war, she did not exert herself at least until too late to avert such a terrible catastrophe; that the theory of the State as power-preached by Treitschke and popularized by Bernhardi-is exactly contrary to the political beliefs of democratic, liberty-loving America; that in a struggle between Prussian military autocracy and democratic ideals our support could not but be given to the latter, and that America abhors this Prussian ideal as evidenced in actual fact: the invasion of Belgium, the atrocities, the violations of international law-all deeds in fulfillment of the injunction of the German War Book that an effort should be made to destroy the complete mate rial and moral resources of the enemy. "War is an act of violence which in its application knows no bounds." The submarine campaign, with its disregard of the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, with its violation of sacred principles of international law and humanity, has simply been another evidence of this theory. The Allies are fighting our battle; they have been sacrificing for everything we believe in to combat the things that we do not believe in. Only an Allied victory can insure a stable peace and America should not stand indifferently, but should make sacrifices in its turn to fulfill this noble purpose. Again, the belief is now widely held that the refusal of the United States to continue on friendly relations with Germany may be justified on the ground of policy, on a consideration of our own material interests as the greatest nation of the Western World. A successful outcome of the submarine campaign would mean the destruction of the British Navy, first of all, and secondly, the dismemberment of the British Empire. Without England's sea power to support it, the Monroe Doctrine would be come a mere brutum fulmen; it would be safer to cancel it as obsolete rather than attempt to enforce it. The security of the colonial possessions of the United States would be endangered and this country would face a most calamitous trade war. The points need not be argued. A moment's reflection is all that is necessary to establish them; and incontrovertible evidence has been furnished by the Zimmermann proposal to Japan and Mexico to join with Germany in an alliance against the United States. But these considerations were not the ones which forced the United States into war with Germany. The real reason was assigned by President Wilson when he announced to Congress that diplomatic relations had been broken: Germany had wantonly violated international law; she had disregarded the absolute immunity which all neutral citizens have when on the high seas in private, unresisting vessels; she had made pledges only to break them, and her final announcement was so flagrant in its disregard of international right, so insulting in its demands upon the United States, that self-respect alone was sufficient to compel the action then |