and America.

Nothing-not even the inevitable friction on the Canadian border-can prevent the growth of a good understanding between Britain and the States that implies a practical working alliance; The Alliance of Great Britain an alliance neither for offence nor defence, but for the furtherance of high common ends in which our race is more deeply interested than in wealth or war, in trade or territory. The other great nations apparently do not believe that there are or can be such ends. Hence their all but universal outcry against a combination which they are afraid threatens them and which they could not resist. They might put any number of men in the field, but how could they get at the enemy? Strange to say, the common people of Continental Europe sympathize with their rulers. Britain has always been their safe asylum, and the United States the land of promise to which they turned wistful eyes. Yet both powers are now envied and feared, and therefore hated. It is a new experience for the United States, but it is the price they have to pay for their prosperity, a price which Britain has had to pay for generations, and which they used to join with others in making her pay. "How is it possible for my neighbour to be richer than I am, unless he has in some way defrauded me"? is the question which the natural man or nation puts instinctively. How shall we exorcise that evil spirit? Not by protestations. These provoke only increased wrath. They prove to the hilt the well-worn charge that we are hypocrites. There is only one way, and it is a hard way for both nations. We must "do justly, love mercy and walk humbly with God," or we too shall share the fate of Nineveh and Tyre.

Nothing shows more clearly how far we are from being in an ideal state of mind than the failure-so far-of the The Relations between Canada High Commission, and the probability that —even should it meet again—it will be found impossible to agree upon a treaty.

and the States.

Good has resulted to Canada from an attitude on the part of the States, which, though defensible in business competition, is not calculated to evoke love. It has developed our national spirit; has led us to see clearly that our future depends on ourselves and on the maintenance of Imperial unity; and has quickened our interest in such matters as the efficiency of our militia, transportation by Canadian channels and ports, and the Pacific Cable. As regards the last named, Canada-with the hearty backing of the British public-has forced the Imperial Government to reconsider its position. It will be strange if the Conference which has been called to meet again on the subject does not result in an agreement to lay and work the cable on the principle of joint-ownership. If so, we shall owe the success to Sir Sandford Fleming.

G.

QUEEN'S QUARTERLY

VOL. VII.

OCTOBER, 1899.

No. 2

All articles intending for publication, books for review, exchanges, and all correspondence relating thereto-should be addressed to the editors, Queen's University, Kingston, Ont.

I

PHILO AND THE NEW TESTAMENT.

(Concluded from last number.)

N attempting to estimate the possible influence of Philo on the New Testament, it is especially necessary to have a clear conception of his doctrine of the Logos, because here, if anywhere, we may expect to find the main point of contact between his philosophy and the formulation of Christian ideas.

The term lóros, in its ordinary use, means either thought or speech. This double meaning is made use of by Philo to explain the relation subsisting between the intelligible or ideal world, which exists only in the divine mind, and the sensible universe which is its visible embodiment and image. "The loro," says Philo,, "is two-fold in the universe and in the nature of man. In the universe there is, on the one hand, the kóros which has to do with the incorporeal and archetypal ideas constituting the intelligible cosmos, and, on the other hand, the λóros which is concerned with visible things, these being copies and imitations of the ideas from which this sensible cosmos has been fashioned. In man, again, there is, on the one hand, the λóros vdáleτos, and, on the other hand, the λóros прочорezóг. The former is like a fountain, the latter-the expressed λóros-like the stream which flows forth from it; the seat of the one is in the ruling part (to repovezov), the seat of the other-that which is expressed-is in the tongue and mouth and all the other organs of speech....... Two virtues have been assigned to it, expression (δήλωσις) and truth (αλήθεια), for the λόγος of nature is true and expressive of all things, and the λóyog of the wise man, imitating

the loro of nature, ought therefore to be absolutely incapable of falsehood; it ought to honour truth, and obscure nothing from envy, the knowledge of which can benefit those who have been instructed by it. Not but what there have been assigned to the two forms of 2o70s in us two appropriate virtues-to the 20yoz προφορικός the virtue of expression, (δήλωσις), and to the λόγος in the mind the virtue of truth (aea); for it is not fitting that the mind should accept anything false, or that declaration (έμμpeia) should be a hindrance to the most precise expression of truth."

In this passage Philo draws a parallel between the microcosm and the macrocosm. Thought and speech in man are related to each other, as the intelligible cosmos is related to the sensible cosmos. As in man the inner source is the intelligence, which is revealed outwardly in speech; so the archetypal ideas, which exist only in the divine intelligence, are expressed in the sensible cosmos, an imitation or copy of these ideas. The oro of the intelligible world constitutes its order and harmony, and from this same oro proceeds the order and harmony which is found in the visible universe in an outward form. Thus the intelligible and the sensible universe correspond as perfectly as truth and its outward expression in language. Hence man in grasping by his intelligence the order and harmony of the visible universe will attain to truth, and this truth he will adequately express when his language precisely and accurately expresses his thought.

In this instructive passage we see how Philo sought to preserve the absolute inscrutability of God, and yet to explain how it is possible for man to have in a certain sense a knowledge of God. Though in His inner essence incomprehensible by any but Himself, God has created the intelligible cosmos by his selfactivity. From this intelligible cosmos, which constitutes the divine oro, is to be distinguished the visible cosmos, which is its outward expression. Thus the oro is, on its inner side, the Thought of God, and on its outer side the Word of God. The Word is therefore in Philo the rational order manifested in the visible cosmos; in modern language it is the system of laws constituting the permanent and abiding element in all the changes of phenomena. To comprehend this system is therefore to grasp the outward expression of the divine intelligence.

Since he holds that God always remains in absolute unity with Himself, Philo naturally represents the lóros as the instrument of creation, while God is the ultimate cause. "God is the cause," he says, "not instrument. Whatever comes into being is produced by means of an instrument, but by the cause of all things. In the production of anything there must co-operate (1) that by which it is made; (2) that from which it is made; (3) that through which it is made; (4) that on account of which it is made; in other words, (1) the cause, (2) the matter, (3) the instrument, (4) the reason or purpose (airía). Thus, in the production of a house or a whole city there must co-operate, (1) the architect, (2) the stones and timber, (3) the instruments. Now, the architect is the cause by which the house is made, the stones and timber are the 'matter' from which the building is made, the instruments are the things through which it is made, and the reason of its being made is to afford shelter and protection. Passing from particular things, look at the production of that greatest of all buildings or cities, the world, and you will find that God is the cause, by whom it has been produced, that the matter is the four elements from which it is put together, and the instrument is the lóros of God through which it has been formed, and the reason of its existence is the goodness of the Creator." (I. 161 §35).

The loro is here distinguished from God, as the instrument from the cause. Following the analogy of a human architect, and adopting the Aristotelian distinction of the efficient cause, the matter, the instrument and the end, Philo represents the visible universe as a vast temple or city, the orderly arrangement of which is due to the loro, i.e., the outer expression of the divine word. The lóros or Word is therefore the instrument employed by God in the creation of the world. The Word is not the cause of the world-the primal energy from which it has proceeded but the means by which the world has received its order and system.

As the λóros is the instrument by means of which God made the world, it is in its nature intermediate between God and man. It is therefore "neither unbegotten as God, nor begotten as man” (I. 502), but is eternally begotten; in other words, the λóros has not come into being in time, but is eternal; while, on the other

hand, it is not self-creative, but is dependent upon the original creative energy of God. Philo's view may therefore be summed up in the phrase: the loro is eternally begotten, not made.

Again, when the λóros is viewed as the expressed thought or Word, and therefore as the rational principle of the visible cos mos, it is called the "oldest" or "first-born Son" of God (πρεσβύτατος υἱός-πρωτόγονος υἱός, Ι, 414, 308). Hence we find Philo saying that "the eldest oro of the self-existent Being puts on the cosmos as a garment, for it arrays itself in earth and water and air and fire and their products, as the individual soul is clothed with the body, and the mind of the wise man with the virtues." "The Zoro of the self-existent Being," he adds, "is the bond (dog) of all things, which holds together and closely unites all the parts, preventing them from being loosened and separated." (I, 562.) By the 'first-born Son of God,' we are therefore to understand that ideal bond or law which determines the order and harmony of the visible universe. Philo, however, conceives of the Word not merely as the law of nature, but as the law which determines the course of human life, and especially the destiny of states and nations. "Once Greece flourished," he says, "but the Macedonians deprived it of its power. Then Macedonia had its period of bloom, but it was gradually dismembered, and finally its authority entirely perished. Prior to the Macedonians the Persians were prosperous, but in a single day its vast and mighty kingdom was overthrown. And now the Parthians are more powerful than the Persians, who but the other day were their masters. Egypt once had a long and glorious career, but like a cloud its great dominion has passed away. Where are the Ethiopians, where are Carthage and Libya ? Where are the kings of the Pontus? What has befallen Europe and Asia, and, in a word, the whole habitable world? Is it not tossed up and down and agitated like a ship at sea-at one time sailing under prosperous winds and again struggling with contrary gales? For the divine oro, which most men call fortune (5) moves in a circle. Ever flowing on it acts upon cities and nations, assigning the possessions of one to another, exchanging the possessions of each by periods, but ever making for the conversion of the whole habitable world into one city, with that highest form of polity, democracy, (I. 298)."