permit appellant to escape liability by showing that this statement on which they acted was untrue. It presents a clear case requiring the application of an estoppel. It is in the fullest sense an estoppel upon appellant.

It is insisted that the damages were assessed too high. If it were conceded that the finding and assessment of damages is not the finding of a fact which has been found the same way by the Appellate Court, and we can look into the evidence to determine the correctness of the finding, the evidence clearly sustains it. This being true, there is no force in this position.

Perceiving no error in this record, the judgment of the Appellate Court must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

A carrier may contract to carry goods to a destination beyond his own line, and in such a case each and all connecting carriers become his agents, for whom he is responsible to the shipper. Wilby v. West Cornwall Ry. Co., 2 H. & N. 703; Blake v. Great Western Ry. Co., 7 H. & N. 987; Coxon v. Great Western Ry. Co., 5 H. & N. 274; Le Conteur . London, etc., Ry. Co., 1 L. R. Q. B. 54; Murchamp v. Lancaster, etc., Ry. Co., 8 M. & W. 421; Quimby . Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306; Bissell v. Michigan, etc., R. R. Co., 22 N. Y. 258; Burtis v. Buffalo, etc., R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 269; Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 217; Roberts v. Van Buskirk, 31 N. Y. 661; Buffit v. Troy, etc., R. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 168; Root v. Great Western R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 524; Railroad Co. v. Trans. Co., 16 Wall. 324; Evansville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Androscoggin Mills, 22 Wall. 594; Railroad v. McCarthy, 6 Otto, 258; Steamboat Co. v. Brown, 54 Pa. St. 77; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Berry, 68 Pa. St. 272; Feital v. Middlesex R. R. Co., 109 Mass. 398; Hill Manuf. Co. . Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 104 Mass. 122; McCuer v. Manchester, etc., R. R. Co., 13 Gray, 124; Najac v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 7 Allen, 329; Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. v. Copeland, 24 Ill. 332; Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 34 Ill. 389; Southern Ex. Co. v. Shea, 38 Ga. 519; Peet v. Railroad, 19 Wis. 118; Wahl v. Holt, 26 Wis. 703; Candee v. Penna. R. R. Co., 21 Wis. 589; Perkins v. Portland, etc., R. R., 47 Me. 573; Noyes v. Rutland, etc., R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 110; Morse v. Brainerd, 41 Vt. 550; Newell v. Smith, 49 Vt. 255; St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Piper, 13 Kan. 505; East Tennessee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Nelson, 1 Cold. 276; Angle v. Mississippi, etc., R. R. Co., 9 Iowa, 488; Wheeler o. San Francisco, etc., R. R. Co., 31 Cal. 46; Nashua Lock Co. v. Worcester, etc., R. R. Co., 48 N. H. 339; Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Pontins, 19 Ohio St. 221; Kyle v. Laurens R. R. Co., 10 Rich. (8. Car.) 382; compare Hood v. N. Y., etc., R. R. Co., 22 Conn. 502; Converse v. Ñ. Y. etc., Trans. Co., 33 Conn. 166.

In England the rule is well settled that if a carrier merely accepts goods to be forwarded to a destination beyond his own line, he becomes exclusively liable to the shipper for the safe arrival of the goods, notwithstanding he has made no contract for through carriage with the shipper. Scothorn . South Staffordshire Ry. Co., 8 Exch. 341; Crouch v. Great Western Ry. Co., 2 H. & N. 491; Wilby v. West Cornwall Ry. Co., 2 H. & N. 703. But in this country this rule has met with but limited acceptance. In a portion of the States it has been approved and followed. Bennett v. Filyaw, 1 Fla. 403; Mosher. Southern Ex. Co., 38 Ga. 37; Cohen v. Southern Ex. Co., 45 Ga. 148; Southern Ex. Co. v. Shea, 38 Ga. 519; Angle v. Mississippi, etc., R. R. Co., 9 Iowa, 487; Mulligan v. Illinois, etc., R. R. Co., 36 Iowa, 181; Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. v. Copeland, 24 Ill. 332; Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cowles,

32 Ill. 116; Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 34 Ill. 389; Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. v. Frankenburg, 54 Ill. 88; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. People, 56 Ill 365; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Montfort, 60 Ill. 175; U. S. Ex. Co. e. Haines, 67 Ill. 137; Field . Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 71 Ill. 458; Adams Ex. Co. v. Wilson, 81 Ill. 339; Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Smith, 84 Ill. 239; Lock Co. v. Railroad, 48 N. H. 339; Gray . Jackson, 51 N. H. 9; Western, etc., R. R. Co. v. McElwee, 6 Heisk, 208; East Tennessee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rogers, 6 Heisk, 143; Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Campbell, 7 Heisk, 253; Carter v. Hough, 4 Sneed, 203; East Tennessee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Nelson, 1 Coldw. 272; Bradford v. Railroad, 7 Rich. 201; Kyle v. Railroad, 10 Rich. 382. In other States it has been held that the carrier, in the absence of a special contract, is only bound to carry the goods safely to the terminus of his own road, and his liability is ended when he delivers the goods to the next succeeding carrier. St. John v. Van Santvoord, 25 Werd. 660, 6 Hill, 157; Root v. Great Western R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 524; Lamb ⚫. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., 46 N. Y. 271; Reed v. U. S. Ex. Co., 48 N. Y. 462; Babcock v. Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 491; Condict v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 59 N. Y. 500; Camden, etc., R. R. Co. v. Forsyth, 61 Pa. St. 81; Nutting v. Connecticut, etc., R. R. Co., 1 Gray, 502; Darling. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 11 Allen, 295; Burroughs v. Norwich, etc., R. R. Co., 100 Mass. 26; Farmers', etc., Bank v. Champlain Trans. Co., 16 Vt. 52; Brintnall v. Saratoga, etc., R. R. Co., 32 Vt. 665; Cutts v. Brainerd, 42 Vt. 566; Perkins v. Portland, etc., R. R. Co., 47 Me. 573; Skinner v. Hall, 60 Me. 477; Inhabitants v. Hall, 61 Me. 517; Hood v. N. Y., etc., R. R. Co., 22 Conn. 502; Elmore v. Naugatuck R. R. Co., 23 Conn. 457; Converse v. Norwich, etc., R. R. Co., 33 Conn. 166; Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Schumacher, 29 Md. 168; McMillan v. Michigan, etc., R. R. Co., 16 Mich. 79; Phillips . North Carolina R. R. Co., 78 N. C. 294; Railroad v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 123; Railroad v. Manuf. Co., 16 Wall. 318; Crawford v. Southern R. R. Assn., 51 Miss. 222; Irish v. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., 19 Minn. 376.

The carrier may, however, be held liable for loss or damage to the goods when in custody of succeeding carriers if he enters into a contract with the shipper to transport the goods to their destination. A contract of this nature need not be special, but may be inferred from the circumstances attending the shipment, such as the receipt of the freight charges for the entire distance, a through bill of lading or receipt, a partnership or arrangement between connecting lines to pro rate the freight receipts and losses, or the custom of the carrier to forward goods through to their destination. Reed v. Saratoga, etc., R. R. Co., 19 Wind. 534; Berg . Narragansett Co., 5 Daly, 394; Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306; Evansville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Androscoggin Mills, 22 Wall. 594; Railroad v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 123; Gass e. New York, etc., Co., 99 Mass. 220; Hill Manuf. Co. v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 104 Mass. 122; Candee v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 21 Wis. 582; Robinson . Merchants' Dispatch Co., 45 Iowa, 470; St. John v. Express Co., 1 Woods, 612; Root v. Great Western R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 524; Wilson v. Chesapeake, etc., R. R. Co., 21 Gratt. 654; Ellsworth v. Tartt, 26 Ala. 733; Montgomery ". Moore, 51 Ala. 394; Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Spratt, 2 Duval, 4. Gray v. Jackson, 51 N. H. 9; Woodward v. Railroad, 1 Biss. 403.

WOLFF

v.

CENTRAL R. R. Co.

(Advance Case, Georgia. February, 1882.)

Section 2084 of the Code providing that the last of a connecting line of railroads over which goods are shipped which receive them as in good order is liable to the consignee, does not apply to baggage of a passenger checked and accompanying him on his passage.

Where a passenger with a through ticket over a connecting line of railroads checks his baggage at the starting-point through to his destination, and upon arrival it is damaged, or has been broken open and robbed, he may sue the railroad which issued the check, or he may sue the road delivering the baggage in bad order.

That under the American authorities each of the roads composing such a continuous line over which a passenger travels on a through ticket, and baggage is sent on a through check, is a principal contractor, adopting the contract of the first road, and is therefore liable for spoliation of baggage, irrespective of the point at which it actually occurred.

Are such roads also jointly liable as partners or joint contractors?

THE plaintiff in error purchased a through ticket from New York to Macon, Ga., which ticket was the usual coupon-ticket, and included a coupon of the Central Railroad, upon which last coupon the plaintiff passed over the line of the Central Railroad with her baggage, which was received at Macon in apparently good order, but upon opening her trunk she found it had been robbed of clothing, etc., to the amount of $800. The trunk was checked through from New York to Macon by the same parties who sold the ticket. Proof was made of the ownership and loss of the articles after they were delivered to the officials in New York, and that they were usual and ordinary baggage. On closing plaintiff's testimony the court, on motion of defendant's counsel, awarded a non-suit; whereupon plaintiff excepted. Counsel for plaintiff in error insists that the rule of liability prescribed by § 2084 of Code against connecting roads and under different companies, where goods are to be transported over more than one road, includes baggage accompanying a passenger, which rule "makes the last company which has received the goods as in good order responsible to the consignee for any damages, open or concealed, done to the goods."

SPEER, J.-1. We cannot believe it was the intention of the Legislature to include the transportation of baggage under the term "goods." There is in the same chapter including that section, regulations touching the transportation of baggage that do not apply to goods. Section 2071 of that chapter declares "the com

pany is responsible for baggage placed in their care." The next section provides for the checking of baggage, and imposes a penalty for failing to conform to the regulation touching the same. A lien is given to the company for the cost of transportation, which extends to the fare of the passenger. There are also limitations as to the liability of the company on the value of the baggage for the fare taken, which do not apply to goods. The distinction between goods and baggage is thus so clearly recognized by the context that we cannot construe section 2084 as being intended to include baggage under the term "goods." The rule of liability of a common carrier for baggage is well understood, but in the case of connecting roads, in the absence of proof as to where the loss occurred, which one is liable is now the question. Defendant insists that the company in New York who sold the through ticket is responsible, and so this court ruled in Hawley v. Screven, 62 Ga. 347, but did not rule that such road alone was liable. Is this the only one liable unless the act of spoliation is established as having occurred on a particular road? The plaintiff purchased a through ticket from New York to Macon by which the connecting roads contracted to transport her and her baggage. There is no evidence as to where the spoliation occurred. In the absence of positive statutory regulations as to the liability of connecting roads in the transportation of baggage when loss or damage to the same occurs, we find the English and American decisions are not in harmony. The English rule is, that the carrier who receives the goods and contracts to carry them over the entire route is liable, holding the intermediate carriers to be agents of the first road, and that there is no priority of contract between the agents and owner of the goods. The courts of this country do not recognize this doctrine, and we do not think it fair to our own citizens to send them to a foreign jurisdiction to seek redress if it can be avoided consistently with our rules of law. We conclude, from an examination of our own authorities, that the true rule in case of connecting roads for liability of baggage should be, that when two or more railroads are associated together, and form a continuous line for the transportation of passengers and baggage, giving to each the right to sell these through tickets with coupons over the several roads, and thus bargaining for the transportation of passengers over the whole line, and receiving the price of said tickets, the same to be divided among them at periodical settlements, the company so selling and contracting is the agent of the several companies composing such lines, rather than to regard the other companies as its agent in performing the service allotted to them. 9 Am. Rep. 474; 6 Ib. 434. The sale of such tickets is for the common benefit of all the companies, and the receipts from them are presumptively divided between them in proportion to service rendered by each, making them interested as principals and not as agents. In fact, they stand substantially in the position of

partners in such through business, and may be, perhaps, jointly as well as severally liable as such. There are numerous decisions that hold them as to this through business, jointly liable as partners through the entire route. Angell on Car. 93, and cases cited; Story on Bailm. 506, and cases cited; 11 Wend. 571; 19 Ib. 329; 7 Rich. (S. C.) 201; 4 Seld. 37; 11 Wend. 575. To hold these associated companies severally liable on these through contracts springs from the necessity of the rule. To remit the owner whose baggage has been lost or damaged, to the company where the loss or spoliation occurred, is simply to deny him all redress. For he has no means to ascertain the facts except at the pleasure of the company, who, it is to be presumed, will not be prompt to furnish evidence of their own negligence and liability. To drive the owner to a foreign jurisdiction for redress is not consistent with our public policy. To hold each company liable for negligence or loss incurred while transporting under one continuous and joint contract made with the owner, will interest all alike to be diligent, and if loss should occur, it is more equitable for the losses to be apportioned among them, as they apportion the profits of their joint enterprise, rather than that the loss should be borne alone by the owner. The contract for transportation is made with the joint continuous line; they act for each other and receive the fruits of the contract as common agents one for the other. The rule holding each liable in case of loss is founded in equal justice, and is far more equitable and convenient than the rule which holds that the company alone should be liable which sold the through ticket, and which may be as free from fault as any intermediate com

pany.

JACKSON. C. J., concurring, stated that the exact point decided, and in which the entire court concurred, was the grant of the nonsuit on the ground of non-liability of the last road.

Judgment reversed.

See note, p. 439.

FRANK HADD,

v.

UNITED STATES AND CANADA EXPRESS COMPANY.

(52 Vermont Reports, 335.)

In the absence of special contract, a common carrier, receiving a parcel marked to a point beyond its route, but having no special business relationship with the carrier on the connecting line, is responsible, as such carrier, only for safe and seasonable delivery at the end of its own route to the carrier next in the line of transportation.

In case for money delivered to the agent of an express company to be