Where the plaintiff, who held income bonds of the Union Pacific R. R. Co., eastern division, the coupons of which were payable out of "net earnings" on the first of March and September in each year, brought an equity suit in March, 1880, claiming an account of net earnings by reason of a default on March 1, 1880, and thereafter brought suit at law to recover coupons on other bonds of the same issue held by him, but not included in the equity suits, for defaults arising September 1, 1880, March 1 and September 1, 1881, and March 1, 1882, held, that plaintiff was entitled to an account in the equity suit; not merely for net earnings prior to the commencement of such equity suit to pay the coupons then due, but also for all coupons due and net earnings received after the commencement of the suit until the accounts were stated, and afterwards on the foot of the decree in the equity suit, and that the lawsuits could all be stayed without prejudice to plaintiff, as all his rights hereafter to recover could be protected in the equity suit. Morgan v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., C. C., S. D. N. Y., 11 Fed. Rep. 693.

A statute of a State authorized commissioners, appointed for a town, to borrow money and execute bonds for the town in aid of a railroad company, and provided that they should exercise their authority only upon the condition that the assent of a majority of the taxables should be obtained, which should be proved by the affidavit of one of the assessors of the town. The statute made it the duty of the assessors to make such affidavit when the requisite assents should have been obtained. Held, that bona fide purchasers of the bonds are not required to show that the requisite numher of taxables assented to their issue, as the affidavit of the assessor is conclusive in their favor; and that the decision of the highest court of the State to the contrary, if rendered after the rights of such purchasers were acquired, is not binding upon a circuit court of the United States. McCall v. Town of Hancock, 10 Fed. Rep. 8.

A petition was presented to a board of county commissioners under the act of May 12th, 1869, before it was amended by the act of March 17th, 1875, praying the board to order an election upon a proposed appropriation by a township, to aid in the construction of a railroad by a railroad company named, "a corporation under the laws of the State of Indiana, now owned by and forming a part of" another railroad company named, "a corporation under the laws of the State of Illinois; and that said appropriation," naming the amount, "be levied by taxation on and from said township. and invested in the capital stock of said company," for the benefit of the township and taxpayers. The petition having been granted and notice given of the election, the appropri

ation voted and the tax levied, a taxpayer brought an action to enjoin its collection.

Held, that the petition sufficiently shows such company to have been one organized under the laws of Indiana.

Held, also, inasmuch as the answer denied the ownership of such company by a foreign company, that the petition was not vitiated by its statement of such ownership.

Held, also, that, under the original act, the township had a right to vote upon the proposition to make an appropriation by taking

stock.

The fact that such petition asks that the tax to be levied shall be paid to the proper railroad company named, "or its assigns," does not invalidate the petition.

The notice of such election stated that the question to be voted upon was that of voting an appropriation to aid in constructing such railroad, naming it, "by taking stock in the company constructing said railroad."

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Held, that the railroad company named was meant by the words company constructing," etc.

The fact that the levy made to raise the tax voted will raise an amount slightly in excess of the amount voted will not invalidate the tax, and will not relieve the plaintiff from the general rule, that he must first have paid or tendered the amount legally levied.

Where, upon the voting of such an appropriation, the board of commissioners order a tax to be levied, they thereby determine judicially that proper notice of such election has been given, and such fact cannot be questioned in an action to enjoin the collection of the tax. If there was not proper notice, the taxpayers' remedy was by appeal from the order of the board. Paris Treasurer v. Renolds, 70 Ind. 360.

Common carriers have the power to make reasonable regulations for the transporting of their passengers from point to point. Whether they may classify passengers according to sex and color not decided.

A colored lady who had purchased and held a first-class ticket was entitled to admission into the ladies' car, if there was room for her therein; and, if she was refused admission and the railroad company declined to carry her except in the smoking-car, containing only men, some of whom were smoking, she had the right to decline to accept such accommodations, and it is liable to her in damages.

Carriers are bound to provide for colored passengers, holding first-class tickets, accommodations precisely equal in all respects to those provided for white passengers holding similar tickets.

The general tendency of courts and text writers of the present age is to embrace all kinds of damages under the head of com

pensatory damages, except in cases of fraud or insult, in which cases vindictive and punitive damages may be awarded.

In an action against a railroad company to recover damages for wrongful exclusion from its cars, in which it appeared that the plaintiff, a colored lady, purchased and held a first-class ticket at the time she applied for admission to the ladies' car; that she was lady-like in appearance and conduct, and was at the time carrying a sick child in her arms; and that the company refused to carry her except in the smoking-car, in which were men only, some of whom were smoking; whereupon she left the cars; held, that she was entitled to such damages as would make her whole, and the jury should consider the loss of time and inconvenience she had been put to, and the proper amount of expenses incurred in the vindication of her rights. Gray v. Cincinnati Southern R. Co., U. S. C. C., S. D. Ohio, W. D., 11 Fed. Rep. 683.

Each carrier on a through bill of lading is liable only as respects his own line, in the absence of a different understanding.

Where a carrier operating a line between Antwerp and Philadelphia issued a through bill of lading from Antwerp to Boston, stipulating that the goods were to be transported to Philadelphia by steamer, and from thence to Boston, either by water or rail, and that the responsibility of each carrier should be limited to each line, held, that it was not liable for injury to the goods on board of lighters which it had employed to transport the goods three miles by water from its wharf in Philadelphia to the wharf in the same city, of a steamship line to Boston.

The employment of the lighters in such case held to be not ordinary lighterage service, but a carriage by water over a necessary part of the route to Boston. Harding v. International Nav. Co., U. S. C. C., E. D. Penn., 12 Fed. Rep. 168.

Where a railroad company issues a ticket entitling the holder to a passage over its own and connecting lines to the place of destination mentioned in the ticket, and there is no limitation in it upon the right of the holder to transfer it to another, held, that upon the refusal of a connecting line to accept the ticket, and of the contracting company to furnish a local ticket over that line or the amount of money necessary to procure one, the holder has a right of action against the original contracting company for breach of contract; and this right is assignable, under the laws of the State of Colorado, so as to give a right of action to the assignee.

It is too late after verdict to object that the assignee alleged that he purchased such ticket, when the proof shows that it was bought by others, or that he failed to allege a failure on the part of the contracting company to redeem the ticket. Hudson v. Kansas Pacific R. R. Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 879.

Although a passenger may have the right to be carried under a

special contract, if he be not provided with a ticket the conductor can recognize, he must pay the fare demanded by the conductor, under a reasonable regulation requiring him to demand a fare of persons without tickets, and cannot insist on being expelled by force as a foundation for a suit for damages for wrongful expulsion. By this conduct he contributes to his injuries, which are the direct results of his own conduct, and not of the breach of any special contract he may have for his carriage. Hall v. Memphis, etc., R. R. Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 585.

A provision in a bill of lading, issued by a common carrier, to the effect that the carrier shall not be liable for loss by fire, will not exempt it from liability for a loss by fire occurring through its negligence.

Where a common carrier undertakes to transport cotton for hire upon open flat cars, it is bound to take all needful precautions for the cotton's safety and protection.

Where cotton in course of transportation by a common carrier was destroyed by fire in consequence of the carrier's gross negligence, and the owners assigned and transferred their interest in said cotton and their rights against said carrier to a fire insurance company, by which the cotton was insured, upon its indemnifying them for the loss sustained, held, that the insurance company was entitled, as against the carrier, to the value of the cotton at the time of the loss, with 6 per cent interest from the day upon which the cotton would probably have been delivered to the owners if it had not been destroyed. American North Insurance Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 811.

Where two or more railroads, by an arrangement between themselves, established a route to a certain point, and contract to carry a passenger over their roads to the terminal point, the terminal road is liable to him, as a common carrier, if, while being conveyed by it to his destination, he is injured, either through the negligence of its immediate employees or others with whom it has contracted for motive power or other service.

A corporation furnishing motive power to a railroad company, but not acting, or chartered to act, as a common carrier, is not bound to use more than the ordinary skill and diligence which its employment needs, and is only liable for direct negligence or unskilfulness.

Where a common carrier employs another party to furnish motive power, and through the direct negligence of the latter, a passenger, being conveyed by the carrier, is injured, and the carrier is also at fault, and the passenger brings a suit against each party, and both suits are tried together, the same amount of damages should be rendered against each. Under such circumstances the

satisfaction of the judgment in either case should be made to operate as a satisfaction in both.

A party who receives a physical injury through the negligence of another, should be allowed sufficient damages to compensate him for the amount of his expenditures and losses in consequence of the injury, taking also into consideration the extent of his injuries, his sufferings, and the effect of the accident on his general health. Keep v. Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 625.

The fact that the shipper was allowed to fill the bill of lading in his own handwriting, and leave a blank which afforded opportunity for increasing the statement of the number of bales shipped, will not render the common carrier liable for loss occasioned by the forgery of the shipper in raising the bill of lading. Lehman, Durr & Co. v. Central R. R. and Banking Co., U. S. Č. C., M. D. Ala., 12 Fed. Rep. 595.

A carrier is not deprived of the protection afforded by the Carriers Act (11 Geo. 4 & 1 Wm. 4, c. 68), s. 1, by the fact that the loss of the goods is temporary and not permanent.

The plaintiff delivered to the defendants, who were carriers for hire from London to Rome, a trunk to be sent by rail from London to Liverpool, and thence shipped by steamer for Italy. Owing to the defendants' negligence the trunk was sent to the Victoria Docks and put on board another vessel bound for New York where it arrived, and a long time elapsed before it was restored to the plaintiff. The trunk contained articles within the Carriers Act, the value of which exceeded 102.:

Held, by Lopes, J., having power to decide questions of law and fact, first, that the defendants were not deprived of the protection of the Carriers Act by the fact that the loss of the goods was temporary and not permanent; secondly, that the loss of the trunk must be taken to have occurred during its transit by land, as it was lost to the plaintiff directly it went on its wrong road to the Victoria Docks; thirdly, that the plaintiff was entitled, notwithstanding the Carriers Act, to recover as damages the cost of the re-purchase of other articles at Rome at enhanced prices in place of those temporarily lost, as this was not damage for the loss, but for something consequential to it, and the damage was not too remote, for it was a reasonable and necessary act for a person in the position of the plaintiff to buy these articles in Rome. Millen v. Brash & Co. L. R., 8 Q. B. D. 35.

When goods are sent, not according to the contract with the owner, but by some other route, there is no lien for freight money; and if the goods are withheld under a claim of lien, an action of trover will lie for their value.

Where household goods, more or less used, were transported by