whether or not open and undefended coast places might be bombarded by naval forces. The Institute of International Law in 1895, at its meeting at Cambridge, appointed a committee to investigate the matter.1 On the basis of the report of this committee the Institute adopted for consideration by the States a body of rules declaring that the law of bombardment was the same in both land warfare and sea warfare. The First Hague Conference did not settle the matter, but suggested that it should be considered at a subsequent conference. The Second Hague Conference, by Convention IX., provided detailed rules concerning all the points in question : (1) The bombardment of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or other buildings by naval forces is under all circumstances and conditions prohibited (Article 1). To define the term 'undefended,' Article 1 expressly enacted that a place cannot be bombarded solely because automatic submarine contact mines are anchored off the harbour,' but Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan entered a reservation against this, since they correctly considered such a place to be 'defended.' (2) Although undefended places themselves are exempt, nevertheless military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war material, workshops or plant which could be utilised for the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and men-of-war in the harbour of undefended places, may be bombarded; and no responsibility is incurred for any unavoidable damage caused thereby to the undefended place or its inhabitants. As a rule, however, the commander must, before re 1 Interesting extracts from its report (see Annuaire, xv. (1896), pp. 148-150, 313), drafted by Professor Holland with the approval of the Dutch General Den Beer Portugael, and presented in 1896 at the meeting of the Institute at Venice, were printed in the last edition of this treatise. But the World War has robbed them of much of their importance. sorting to bombardment of these works, ships, and the like, give warning to the local authorities so that they may themselves destroy them. Only if, for military reasons, immediate action is necessary, and no delay can be allowed to the enemy, may bombardment be resorted to without previous warning, the commander being compelled to take all due measures in order that the undefended place itself may suffer as little harm as possible (Article 2). (3) In case undefended places do not comply with legitimate requisitions,1 they may be bombarded. (4) In case of bombardments, all necessary steps must be taken to spare buildings devoted to public worship, art, science, or charitable purposes; historical monuments; hospitals, and places where the sick or wounded are collected, provided they are not at the time used for military purposes. To enable the attacking force to carry out this article, the privileged buildings, monuments, and places must be indicated by visible signs, consisting of large stiff rectangular panels, divided diagonally into two coloured triangular portions, the upper portion black, the lower portion white (Article 5). Unless military exigencies render it impossible, the commander of an attacking naval force must, before commencing the bombardment, do all in his power to warn the authorities (Article 6). (5) The giving over to pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is forbidden (Article 7). The first case in which these rules were tested in practice occurred during the Turco-Italian War. On February 25, 1912, Admiral Faravelli, the commander of an Italian squadron, surprised, at dawn, the Turkish gunboat Awni-Illa, and a torpedo boat, in the port of Beirut, and called upon them to surrender, giving them until nine o'clock to do so. The demand was com 1 See above, § 212. municated to the governor and the consular authorities. At nine o'clock the Turkish vessels were again, by signal, summoned to surrender, and as no reply was received, they were fired at and destroyed, though at first they vigorously answered the fire of the Italians. Shells missing the vessels and bursting on the quay killed and wounded a number of individuals and damaged several buildings. The Turkish Government protested against this procedure as a violation of Convention IX., but, if the report of Admiral Faravelli was accurate, the protest was unfounded. During the World War the Hague Convention was not, or may not, have been in strict law binding, since not all the belligerents were parties to it. However this may be, the German bombardments of Scarborough, Hartlepool, Whitby, Whitehaven, and other English coast towns ignored the spirit of the convention, for these raids had no military purpose whatever, unless it is a legitimate military purpose to attempt to frighten and terrorise the civil population of the enemy. VIII INTERFERENCE WITH SUBMARINE TELEGRAPH CABLES Moore, vii. § 1176-Hershey, No. 397-Westlake, ii. pp. 116-119-Liszt, § 41, iii.-Bonfils, No. 1278-Pradier-Fodéré, vi. No. 2772-Nys, iii. pp. 314-327-Fiore, iii. No. 1387, and Code, Nos. 1672-1677-Perels, § 35, p. 185-Perdrix, Les Câbles sousmarins et leur Protection internationale (1902)—Kraemer, Die unterseeischen Telegraphenkabel in Kriegszeiten (1903)-Scholz, Krieg und Seekabel (1904)—Jouhannaud, Les Câbles sousmarins (1904)-Zuculin, I Cavi sottomarini e il Telegrafo senza Fili nel Diritto di Guerra (1907)—Wehberg, pp. 134-138-Holland in Journal de Droit international (Clunet), xxv. (1898), pp. 648-652, and War, No. 114-Goffin in the Law Quarterly Review, xv. (1899), pp. 145-154— Bar in the Archiv für Oeffentliches Recht, xv. (1900), pp. 414-421-Rey in R. G., viii. (1901), pp. 681-762-Dupuis in R. G., x. (1903), pp. 532547-Nordon in the Law Magazine and Review, xxxii. (1907), pp. 166184-Cybichowski in Z.I., xvii. (1907), pp. 160-201-Garner, ii. § 560—— See also the literature quoted above, vol. i., at the commencement of § 286. Uncertainty of Interfer § 214. As the International Convention for the ProRules con-tection of Submarine Telegraph Cables of 1884 1 expressly cerning stipulates by Article 15 that freedom of action is reence with served to belligerents, the question is not settled how marine far belligerents are entitled to interfere with submarine Telegraph telegraph cables. The Second Hague Conference in Sub Cables. serted in Article 54 of the Hague Regulations a provision that submarine cables connecting occupied enemy territory with a neutral territory should not be seized or destroyed, and that, if a case of absolute necessity compelled the occupants to seize or destroy such a cable, it must be restored after the conclusion of peace and compensation paid. But there are no rules for other possible cases of seizure and destruction.2 During the World War, the belligerents cut, and in many cases diverted and used, cables communicating with enemy territory, and at the Peace Conference at Paris questions arose as to the legality of these actions, and also as to whether cables belonging to an enemy company or an enemy State were subject to the right of capture of enemy property at sea. By the Treaty of Peace with Germany, Germany renounced on behalf of herself and her subjects all rights in any of the cables there mentioned, though the value of those that were privately owned was to be credited to the reparation account. But neither this provision, nor the provisions of other treaties of peace, can be regarded as enunciating any rule of law on a subject quite unsettled.5 1 See above, vol. i. §§ 286, 287. 2 The Institute of International Latifi, Effects of War on they are not, and so does Scholz, op. cit., but I have no doubt that they are. Article 244, and Annex vii. thereto. It is impossible for a treatise to discuss the details of this absolutely unsettled branch of the law. Readers who take a particular interest in it may be referred to the excellent monograph of Scholz, Krieg und Seekabel (1904). CHAPTER IVA AIR WARFARE Bonfils, §§ 14404-21-Despagnet, No. 721 bis-Mérignhac, iii". pp. 299-345— Meyer, Die Luftschiffahrt in kriegsrechtlicher Beleuchtung (1909)—Philit, La Guerre aérienne (1910)—Stael-Holstein, La Réglementation de la Guerre des Airs (1911)-Bellenger, La Guerre aérienne et le Droit international (1912) Spaight, Aircraft in War (1914)-Garner, i. §§ 291-312-Nys, Fauchille and Bar in Annuaire, xix. (1902), pp. 58-114, xxiv. (1911), pp. 23-133-Fauchille in R. G., viii. (1901), pp. 414-485, xxiv. (1917), pp. 56-74-Ellis in A.J., viii. (1914), pp. 256-277-Picciotto in the Journal of Comparative Legislation, New Ser. xv. pt. ii. (1915), pp. 150-155-Winfield in the Law Magazine and Review, xl. (1914-1915), pp. 257-271, and the literature quoted above, vol. i. p. 352. before the § 214a. When the First Hague Conference met in Rules 1899, the destructive possibilities of aircraft were World beginning to arouse speculation everywhere. Some War. small use of balloons had, indeed, been made in previous wars; but navigable air-vessels, capable of extensive use as engines of war, then for the first time seemed to be within the reach of practical science. In this atmosphere, the conference adopted an easy but inconclusive solution of the difficulties by forbidding the launching of projectiles or explosives from balloons or air-vessels for a term of five years.1 Between the First and the Second Hague Conferences there was marked progress in aerial invention, which led to a change of attitude on the part of many important States, and though the conference of 1907 renewed the prohibition against launching explosives or projectiles from aircraft up to the close of the Third Hague Conference, many of the stronger military Powers 1 See above, § 114. |