by a neutral State. Through the granting of subsidies a neutral State becomes as much the ally of the belligerent as it would by furnishing him with troops.1 Subsidies on the Neutrals. § 352. It was formerly a moot point in the theory of Loans and International Law whether a neutral is obliged by his duty of impartiality to prevent his subjects from grant- part of Subjects ing subsidies and loans to belligerents to enable them of to continue the war. Several writers 2 maintained either that a neutral was obliged to prevent such subsidies and loans altogether, or at least that he must prohibit a public subscription for them on neutral territory. On the other hand, a number of writers asserted that, since money is just as much an article of commerce as goods, a neutral was in no wise obliged to prevent on his territory a public subscription by his subjects to loans for the belligerents. In contradistinction to the theory of International Law, the practice of the States has established beyond doubt that neutrals need not prevent subscriptions on their territory to loans for belligerents. Thus in 1854, during the Crimean War, France protested in vain against a Russian loan being raised in Amsterdam, Berlin, and Hamburg. In 1870, during the Franco-German War, a French loan was raised in London. In 1877, during the RussoTurkish War, no neutral prevented his subjects from subscribing to the Russian loan. In 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese loans were raised in London and Berlin, and Russian loans in Paris and Berlin. On the other hand, during the World War, President 1 See above, §§ 305, 306, 321. 2 See Phillimore, iii. § 151; Bluntschli, § 768; Heffter, § 148; Kleen, i. § 68. The case of De Wütz v. Hendricks, (1824) 9 Moo. 586, quoted by Phillimore in support of his assertion that neutrals must prevent their subjects from subscribing to a loan for belligerents, is not decisive, for Lord Chief Justice Best only decided Wilson of the United States of America, by his advice to the American bankers,1 at first prevented, though he did not prohibit, the raising of loans by any of the belligerents. But an Anglo-French loan was raised in the United States without objection in September 1915, for the purpose of stabilising the rate of exchange by enabling Great Britain and France to pay for their American purchases in American money, and other similar loans were raised there later.2 Matters differ somewhat in regard to subsidies to belligerents by subjects of neutrals. A neutral is not indeed obliged to prevent individual subjects from granting subsidies to belligerents, just as he is not obliged to prevent them from enlisting with them. But if he were to allow on his territory a public appeal for subscriptions to such subsidies, he would certainly violate his duty of impartiality; for whereas loans are a matter of commerce, subsidies are not. However, public appeals for subscriptions of money for charitable purposes, e.g. for the wounded, prisoners, and the like, need not be prevented, even if they are only made in favour of one of the belligerents. This distinction, then, between loans and subsidies, public subscriptions for loans being permitted, but those for subsidies being prohibited, is certainly correct as the law stands at present. But there is no doubt that the fact of belligerents having the opportunity of getting loans from subjects of neutrals is apt to lengthen wars. The Russo-Japanese War, for instance, would have come to an end much sooner if either belligerent could have been prevented from borrowing money from subjects of neutrals. Therefore, what has been said with regard 1 Garner, ii. § 569. 2 The Second Hague Conference, by enacting in Article 7 of Convention v. that a neutral 'is not bound to prevent the export . . . of any. thing which can be of use to an army or fleet,' has indirectly recognised that he need not prevent the subscription on his territory to loans for belligerents. to the supply of arms and ammunition applies likewise to loans if the standard of public morality rises, and it becomes the conviction of the world at large that loans by subjects of neutrals are apt to lengthen wars, a rule will grow up under which neutral Governments will have to prevent such loans. VII SERVICES TO BELLIGERENTS Westlake, ii. pp. 253-254-Despagnet, No. 696 bis-Bonfils, No. 14751— § 353. Since pilots are in the service of littoral States, Pilotage. the question whether neutrals may permit them to render services to belligerent men-of-war and transport vessels is of importance. Article 111 of Hague Convention XIII. enacts that a neutral Power may allow belligerent warships to employ its licensed pilots.' Since, therefore, everything is left to the discretion of neutrals, they will have to take the merits and needs of every case into account. There would certainly be no objection to a neutral allowing belligerent vessels to which asylum is legitimately granted to be piloted into his ports, and also belligerent war-vessels to be piloted through his maritime belt, if their passage is not prohibited. But a belligerent might justly object to the men-of-war of his adversary being piloted on the open sea by pilots of a neutral Power, except in a case of distress. It is worth mentioning that Great Britain, during 1 Germany entered a reservation against Article 11. on the the Franco-German War in 1870, prohibited her pilots from conducting German and French men-of-war which were outside the maritime belt, except when in distress, and that Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, which compel belligerent warships to use local pilots when entering or leaving a harbour, and the like, prohibit their pilots from conducting belligerent warships outside these areas, except when in distress.1 Transport § 354. It is generally recognised that the duty of part of impartiality incumbent upon a neutral obliges him to Neutrals. prevent his men-of-war and other public vessels from rendering transport services to either belligerent. Therefore, such vessels must neither carry soldiers nor sailors belonging to belligerent forces, nor their prisoners of war, nor ammunition, nor military or naval provisions, nor despatches. The question how far such vessels are prevented from carrying enemy subjects other than members of the forces depends upon the question whether, by carrying those individuals, they render services to one of the belligerents which are detrimental to the other. Thus, when in 1901, during the South African War, the Dutch Government intended to send a man-of-war, the Gelderland, to President Kruger to convey him to Europe, they made sure in advance that Great Britain did not object. The question has been raised 2 whether a neutral whose rolling stock runs on the railway lines of a belligerent, may continue to leave it there although it is being used for the transport of troops, war material, and the like. The answer, I believe, ought to be in the negative; for there is no doubt that, if the rolling stock remains on the railway lines of a belligerent, the neutral concerned is indirectly rendering transport services to the belligerent. It is for this reason that Article 19 of 1 See Wehberg, p. 419. 2 See Nowacki, Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege (1906), p. 126. Convention v. enacts that railway material coming from the territory of neutrals shall not be requisitioned or used by a belligerent, except in the case of, and to the extent required by, absolute necessity.1 on the Mer and by Private § 355. Just as a neutral is not obliged to prevent Transport his merchantmen from carrying contraband, so he is part of not obliged to prevent them from rendering services Neutral to belligerents by carrying, in the way of trade, enemy chantmen troops, and the like, and enemy despatches. Neutral p merchantmen rendering such services to belligerents Neutral Rolling do so at their own risk; for these are unneutral services, Stock. for which the merchantmen may be punished 2 by the belligerents, although the neutral State under whose flag they sail bears no responsibility for them whatever. The same is valid with regard to rolling stock belonging to private railway companies of a neutral State. That such rolling stock may not be used by a belligerent without the consent of the companies owning it, for the transport of troops, war material, and the like, except in the case of, and to the extent required by, absolute necessity, follows from Article 19 of Convention v. If, however, a private railway company does give its consent, and if its rolling stock is used for warlike purposes, it acquires enemy character, Article 19 of Convention v. does not apply, and the other belligerent may seize and appropriate it as though it were the property of the enemy State.3 tion and Naval § 356. Information regarding military and naval Informa operations may be given and obtained in so many regarding various ways that several cases must be distinguished:- Military (1) It is obvious that the duty of impartiality in- Operacumbent upon a neutral obliges him to prevent his menof-war from giving any information to one belligerent concerning the naval operations of the other belligerent. 1 See below, § 365. * See below, §§ 407-413. See Nowacki, Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege (1906), p. 128. tions. |