But a neutral bears no responsibility whatever for private vessels sailing under his flag which give such information. Such vessels run the risk, however, of being punished for rendering unneutral service.1 (2) It is likewise obvious that his duty of impartiality must prevent a neutral from giving information to a belligerent concerning the war through his diplomatic envoys, couriers, and the like.2 But the question has been raised whether a neutral is obliged to prevent couriers 3 from carrying despatches for a belligerent over his neutral territory. I believe the answer must be in the negative, at least so far as those couriers are concerned who are in the service of diplomatic envoys, and those agents who carry despatches from a State to its head or to diplomatic envoys abroad. Since they enjoy inviolability for their persons and official papers, a neutral cannot interfere so as to find out whether they are carrying information to the disadvantage of the enemy. (3) According to Article 8 of Convention v., neutral Power is not bound to forbid or restrict the employment, on behalf of belligerents, of telegraph or telephone cables, or of wireless telegraphy apparatus, whether belonging to it, or to companies, or to private individuals.' Since, therefore, everything is left to the discretion of the neutral concerned, he will have to take the merits and needs of every case into consideration, and act accordingly. But so much is certain, that a belligerent has no right to insist that neutrals should forbid or restrict such employment of their telegraph wires, etc., on the part of his adversary. On the other hand, their duty of impartiality must compel 1 See below, SS 409, 410, and Articles 45 and 46 of the unratified Declaration of London. 2 During the World War the Swedish minister to Argentina, Baron Lowen, transmitted cipher messages on behalf of the German envoy, Count Luxburg, thereby violating Swedish neutrality (see A.J., xii. (1918), pp. 135-140). 3 See Calvo, iv. § 2640. See above, vol. i. §§ 405, 457. neutrals to prevent the despatch from their territory of wireless messages sent to enable belligerent cruisers outside the neutral territorial waters to watch for, and capture, vessels which have been within those waters so soon as they depart, or any other wireless messages through the sending of which their neutral territory becomes a base of naval or military operations for one of the belligerents.1 During the World War, in order to discharge the duties so laid upon them, all the maritime neutral States of importance prevented belligerent merchantmen in their ports from using their wireless installations. Thus Sweden, which shortly after the outbreak of the war had passed a law prohibiting vessels in Swedish ports from using their wireless apparatus, in February 1916, in consequence of violations of that law by the German vessel Mecklenburg, sealed the wireless apparatus on that and other German vessels in Swedish ports. Again, during the course of the war, the United States of America took control of the private wireless telegraphy stations which had been erected in the United States before the war, and prevented all stations from transmitting cipher messages.2 A different situation arises when a belligerent intends to arrange the transmission of messages through a submarine cable laid for that very purpose over neutral territory, or through telegraph and telephone wires erected for that purpose on neutral territory. This would seem to be an abuse of neutral territory, and the neutral must prevent it. Accordingly, when in 1870, during the Franco-German War, France intended to lay a telegraph cable from Dunkirk to the north of 1 See Garner, ii. § 560, who mentions the complaints of the British and French Governments during the World War, that wireless stations in various Latin-American States were sending messages to 2 See Garner, ii. § 560. France-the cable to go across the Channel to England and from there back to France-Great Britain refused her consent on account of her neutrality. Again in 1898, during war between Spain and the United States of America, when the latter intended to land at HongKong a cable proposed to be laid from Manila, Great Britain refused her consent.1 The case is likewise different when a belligerent intends to erect in a neutral country, or in a neutral port or neutral waters, a wireless telegraphy station, or any apparatus intended as a means of communication with belligerent forces on land or sea, or to make use of any installation of this kind established by him before the outbreak of war for purely military purposes, and not previously opened for the services of the public generally. According to Articles 3 and 5 of Convention v. and Article 5 of Convention XIII., a neutral is bound to prohibit this. When in 1904, in the RussoJapanese War during the siege of Port Arthur, the Russians installed an apparatus for wireless telegraphy in Chifu, and communicated thereby with the besieged, this constituted a violation of neutrality. (4) It is obvious that his duty of impartiality must prevent a neutral from allowing belligerents to establish intelligence bureaux on his territory. On the other hand, a neutral is not obliged to prevent his subjects from giving information to belligerents, be it by letter, telegram, telephone, or wireless telegraphy. In particular, a neutral is not obliged to prevent his subjects from giving information to belligerents by wireless telegraphy apparatus installed on a neutral merchantman. Such individuals run, however, the risk of being punished as spies, if they act clandestinely or under false pretences, and the vessel is liable to be captured and confiscated for rendering unneutral service. * See above, § 159. 1 See Lawrence, War, p. 219. On the other hand, newspaper correspondents making use of a wireless installation on a neutral merchantman for the purpose of sending news to their papers,1 may not be treated as spies-although during the RussoJapanese War Russia threatened to treat them as such-and the merchantman may not be confiscated, although belligerents need not allow the presence of such vessels at the seat of war. Thus, during the RussoJapanese War, the Haimun, a vessel fitted with a wireless telegraphy apparatus for the service of The Times, was ordered away by the Japanese, although during the first five weeks of the war they had made no objection. But, of course, an individual can at the same time be a correspondent for a neutral newspaper and a spy, and he may then be punished for espionage. VIII VIOLATION OF NEUTRALITY Hall, §§ 227-229-Lawrence, §§ 233, 238, 239-Phillimore, iii. §§ 151a-151b of § 357. Many writers who speak of violation of neu- Violation trality only treat under this head violations of the duty Neutralof impartiality incumbent upon neutrals. Indeed such ity in the violations only are meant, if one speaks of violation of and in 1 See Lawrence, War, pp. 85-92. On the position of newspaper correspondents in naval warfare, as it was before the World War, see Narrower the Wider Sense of Higgins, War and the Private Citizen the Term. Violation distinc tion to End of Neutrality. neutrality in the narrower sense of the term. However, it is necessary for obvious reasons to discuss, not only violations of the duty of impartiality of neutrals, but violations of all duties deriving from neutrality, whether they are incumbent upon neutrals or upon belligerents. In the wider sense of the term, violation of neutrality comprises, therefore, every performance or omission of an act contrary to the duty of a neutral towards either belligerent as well as contrary to the duty of either belligerent towards a neutral. Everywhere in this treatise the term is used in its wider sense. Violations of neutrality on the part of belligerents must not be confounded with violations of the laws of war, by which subjects of neutral States suffer damage. If, for instance, an occupant levies excessive contributions from subjects of neutral States domiciled in enemy country in contravention of Article 49 of the Hague Regulations, this is a violation of the laws of war, for which, according to Article 3 of Convention IV., he must pay compensation; but it is not a violation of neutrality. § 358. Mere violation of neutrality must not be conin contra- founded with the ending of neutrality,1 for neither a violation on the part of a neutral 2 nor a mere violation on the part of a belligerent ipso facto brings neutrality to an end. If correctly viewed, the condition of neutrality continues to exist between a neutral and a belligerent in spite of a violation of neutrality. A violation of neutrality is nothing more than a breach of a duty deriving from the condition of neutrality. This applies not only to violations of neutrality by negligence, but also to intentional violations. Even in an extreme case, 1 See above, § 312. But this is almost everywhere asserted, as the distinction between the violation of the duty of impartiality incumbent upon neutrals and the ending of neutrality is usually not made, |