from the law of neutrality. But the right of angary itself is rather a right deriving from the law of war. As a rule the law of war only gives the right to a belligerent, under certain circumstances and conditions, to seize, make use of, or destroy the private property of the inhabitants of occupied enemy territory; but under other circumstances and conditions, and very exceptionally, it likewise gives a belligerent the right to seize, use, or destroy neutral property temporarily on occupied enemy territory, on his own territory, or on the open sea. The right of angary being a right deriving from the law of war, it must not be confounded with the right, which every State no doubt possesses, of seizing in case of emergency, and subject to compensation, any foreign property on its territory. One ought not therefore to speak of a right of angary belonging to neutrals1 as well as to belligerents, or of a right of angary in peace as well as war. 1 As does Basdevant in R.G., xxiii. (1916), pp. 268-279. See also Garner, i. § 120. CHAPTER III BLOCKADE I CONCEPTION OF BLOCKADE Grotius, iii. c. 1, § 5-Bynkershoek, Quaestiones Juris publici, i. c. 11— Vattel, iii. § 117-Hall, §§ 233, 257-266-Lawrence, §§ 246-252-Westlake, ii. pp. 255-276, and Papers, pp. 312-361-Maine, pp. 107-109Manning, pp. 400-412-Phillimore, iii. §§ 285-321-Twiss, ii. §§ 98-120— Halleck, ii. pp. 210-242-Taylor, §§ 674-684-Walker, §§ 76-82Wharton, iii. §§ 359-365-Moore, vii. §§ 1266-1286-Wheaton, §§ 509523-Hershey, Nos. 477-495-Bluntschli, §§ 827-840-Heffter, §§ 154157-Geffcken in Holtzendorff, iv. pp. 738-771-Ullmann, § 182-Bonfils, Nos. 1608-167312-Despagnet, Nos. 620-640-Pradier-Fodéré, vi. Nos. 2776-2779, and viii. Nos. 3109-3152-Nys, iii. pp. 165-196, 691-694Rivier, ii. pp. 288-298-Calvo, v. §§ 2827-2908-Fiore, iii. Nos. 16061629-Martens, ii. § 124-Pillet, pp. 129-144-Kleen, i. §§ 124-139Ortolan, ii. pp. 292-336-Hautefeuille, ii. pp. 189-288-Gessner, pp. 145-227-Perels, §§ 48-51-Testa, pp. 221-229-Dupuis, Nos. 159-198, and Guerre, Nos. 113-136-Boeck, Nos. 670-726-Holland, Prize Law, §§ 106-140-U.S. Naval War Code, Articles 37-45-Bernsten, § 10-Nippold, ii. § 32-Schramm, § 9-Bargrave Deane, The Law of Blockade (1870)— Fauchille, Du Blocus maritime (1882)-Carnazza-Amari, Del Blocco maritimo (1897)-Frémont, De la Saisie des Navires en cas de Blocus (1899)-Guynot-Boissière, Du Blocus maritime (1899)—§§ 35-44 of the 'Règlement international des Prises maritimes' (Annuaire, ix. (1887), p. 218), adopted by the Institute of International Law-Atherley-Jones, Commerce in War (1907), pp. 92-252-Söderquist, Le Blocus maritime (1908)-Hansemann, Die Lehre von der einheitlichen Reise im Rechte der Blockade und Kriegskonterbande (1910)-Güldenagel, Verfolgung und Rechtsfolgen des Blockadebruchs (1911)—Hirschmann, Das internationale Prisenrecht (1912), §§ 17-23—Wehberg, pp. 138-172-Piggott, The Neutral Merchant (1913)—Halsbury, The Laws of England, xxiii. (1912), pp. 279-281-Kennedy in the Journal of Comparative Legislation, New Ser. ix. (1908), pp. 239-251-Myers in A.J., iv. (1910), pp. 571-595-General Report presented to the Naval Conference of London by its Drafting Committee, Articles 1-21-Holtzoff in A.J., x. (1916), pp. 53-64. § 368. Blockade is the blocking by men-of-war1 of Definition the approach to the enemy coast, or a part of it, for Blockade. 1 When in 1861, during the American Civil War, the Federal Government blocked the harbour of of the purpose of preventing ingress and egress of vessels of all nations. Blockade must not be confounded with siege, although it may take place concurrently with siege. Whereas siege aims at the capture of the besieged place, blockade endeavours merely to intercept all intercourse, and especially commercial intercourse, by sea between the coast and the world at large. Although blockade is, as shown above,1 a means of warfare against the enemy, it concerns neutrals as well, because the ingress and egress of neutral vessels are thereby interdicted and may be punished.2 Blockade in the modern sense of the term is an institution which could not develop until neutrality was in some form a recognised institution of the Law of Nations, and until the freedom of neutral commerce was in some form guaranteed. The institution of blockade dates from 1584 and 1630, when the Dutch Government declared all the ports of Flanders in the power of Spain to be blockaded; but it has taken several hundred years for it to reach its present condition, since, until the beginning of the nineteenth century, belligerents frequently made use of so-called paper blockades. These are no longer valid, a blockade now being binding only if effective. It is on account of the practical importance of blockade to the interests of neutrals that it is more conveniently treated with neutrality than with with stone, the question arose whether a so-called stone blockade is lawful. There ought to be no doubt-see below, § 380-that such a stone blockade is not a blockade in the ordinary sense of the term, and that neutral ships may not be seized and confiscated for having attempted egress or ingress. But, on the other hand, there ought to be no doubt either that this mode of obstructing an enemy port is as lawful as any other means of sea warfare, provided the blocking of the harbour is made known, so that neutral vessels can avoid the danger of being wrecked. See Wharton, iii. § 361a; Fauchille, Blocus, pp. 143-145; Perels, § 35, P. 187. 1 S$ 173-174. 2 As regards the so-called 'longdistance blockade,' see below, $$ 390a-390b. See Fauchille, Blocus, pp. 2-6, and Westlake, Papers, pp. 325-337. war. But blockade as a means of warfare must not be confounded with so-called pacific blockade, which is a means of compulsive settlement of State differences.1 Apart from the stipulation of the Declaration of Paris that a blockade to be binding must be effective, no conventional rules concerning blockade are in existence, nor is the practice of the States governed by common rules covering all points. Articles 1-21 of the Declaration of London did indeed offer a code of the law of blockade; but this declaration remained unratified, and although, as has already been stated,2 at the outbreak of the World War the Allies adopted all these articles with certain modifications relating to presumed knowledge of the existence of a blockade, the British Maritime Rights Order in Council of July 7, 1916, and the corresponding French decree, abandoned the declaration altogether. Strategic § 369. A blockade is termed strategic if it forms part Blockade, of other military operations directed against the coast and Comwhich is blockaded, or if it be declared in order to cut mercial. off supplies from enemy forces on shore. In contradistinction to strategic blockade, one speaks of a commercial blockade when it is declared simply in order to cut off the coast from intercourse with the outside world, and no military operations take place on shore. That commercial blockades are, according to the present rules of International Law, as legitimate as strategic blockades, is not generally denied. But several writers 3 maintained before the World War that blockades which are purely commercial ought to be abolished as not being in accordance with the guaranteed freedom of neutral commerce during war. 1 See above, §§ 44-49. 2 Above, § 292. 'See Hall, § 233, and Westlake, VOL. II. Papers, pp. 313-361; but later 2 K Blockade to be Uni versal. Blockade, § 370. A blockade is really in being when vessels of all nations are interdicted and prevented from ingress or egress. Blockade as a means of warfare is admissible only in the form of a universal blockade, that is— to borrow the language of Article 5 of the unratified Declaration of London-it must be applied impartially to the vessels of all nations.' If the blockading belligerent were to allow the ingress or egress of vessels of one nation, no blockade would exist.1 On the other hand, provided that a blockade is universal, a special licence for ingress or egress may be given to a particular vessel and for a particular purpose,2 and men-of-war of all neutral nations may be allowed to pass to and fro unhindered. Thus, when during the American Civil War the Federal Government blockaded the coast of the Confederate States, neutral men-of-war were not prevented from ingress and egress. But a belligerent has a right to prevent neutral men-ofwar from passing through the line of blockade, and it is entirely within his discretion whether or not he will admit or exclude them; nor is he compelled to admit them all, even though he has admitted one or more of them. § 371. As a rule, a blockade is declared for the purpose Outwards of preventing ingress as well as egress. But sometimes Inwards. only ingress, or only egress, is prevented. In such and cases one speaks of 'blockade inwards' and of 'blockade outwards' respectively. Thus the blockade of the mouth of the Danube declared by the Allies in 1854, during the Crimean War, was a 'blockade inwards,' since the only purpose was to prevent supply reaching the Russian Army from the sea.4 1 The Rolla, (1807) 6 C. Rob. 364; The Franciska, (1855) Spinks 287. See also below, § 382. 2 This exception to the general rule was not mentioned by the un 3 ratified Declaration of London. Recognised by Article 6 of the unratified Declaration of London. The Gerasimo, (1857) 11 Moore P.C. 88. |