consuls there. It has, further, always been usual for the blockading Government to notify the fact diplomatically to all neutral maritime States. And some States, such as France and Italy, have always ordered their blockading men-of-war to board every approaching neutral vessel, and notify her of the establishment of the blockade. But Great Britain, the United States of America, and Japan have not considered notification to be essential for the institution of a blockade. They have held that the simple fact that the approach was blocked, and egress and ingress of neutral vessels actually prevented, is sufficient to make the existence of a blockade known, but when no diplomatic notification had taken place, they did not seize a vessel for breach of blockade if her master had no actual notice of the existence of the blockade. English,1 American,2 and Japanese 3 practice, accordingly, have made a distinction between a so-called de facto blockade and a notified blockade. If the Declaration of London had been ratified, Articles 8 to 12 would have created a common practice, for the Powers came to an agreement upon the following rules : (1) There was to be a declaration as well as a notification in order to make a blockade binding (Article 8). (2) A declaration of blockade was to be made either by the blockading Power, or by the naval authorities acting in its name, and was to specify (a) the date when the blockade began; (b) the geographical limits of the coastline under blockade; and (c) the period within which neutral vessels might come out (Article 9). If the commencement of the blockade or its geographical limits were given inaccurately the declaration was not to be valid, and a new declara 1 The Vrouw Judith, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 150. Articles 39-40. See Japanese Prize Law, Article 2 See U.S. Naval War Code, 30. tion was to be necessary in order to make the blockade binding (Article 10). If no mention was made of the period within which neutral vessels might come out, they were to be allowed to pass out freely (Article 16). (3) Notification of the declaration of blockade was at once to be made. Two notifications were to be necessary (Article 11): (1) by the Government of the blockading fleet to all neutral Governments, the purpose of this notification being to enable neutral Governments to inform merchantmen sailing under their flag of the establishment of a blockade; (2) by the officer commanding the blockading force to the local authorities, whose duty it was to notify the foreign consuls at the blockaded port or coastline. The purpose of this notification was to enable neutral merchantmen in the blockaded port or ports to receive knowledge of the establishment of the blockade, and to prepare to leave the port within the period specified in the declaration of blockade. If this notification had not been made, neutral vessels were to be allowed to pass freely out of the blockaded port (Article 16). (4) The rules as to declaration and notification of blockade were to apply to cases where the limits of a blockade were extended, or where a blockade was re-established after having been raised (Article 12). But, as has been already explained, the Declaration of London remains unratified, and though the Allied Governments adopted the greater part of it at the outbreak of the World War, later they fell back upon 'the historic and admitted rules of the Law of Nations.' 1 Time for Vessels. § 377. As regards ingress, a blockade becomes valid Length of the moment it is established; even vessels in ballast Egress of have no right of ingress. As regards egress, it has Neutral always been usual for the blockading commander to grant a certain length of time within which neutral vessels might leave the blockaded ports unhindered; 2 1 See above, §§ 292, 368. Recognised by implication in Article 9 of the unratified Declara- End of but no rule exists respecting the length of such time. Fifteen days have frequently been granted,1 but in the blockades during the World War, the periods granted were very short, namely, four days in the case of the blockade of German East Africa, two days in the cases of the blockade of the Cameroons and of the Bulgarian coast on the Ægean Sea, and three days in the case of the blockade of the coast of Asia Minor. § 378. Apart from the conclusion of peace, a blockade can come to an end in four different ways. It may, in the first place, be raised, or restricted in its limits, by the blockading Power for any reason it likes. In such a case it has always been usual to notify the end of blockade to all neutral maritime States.2 A blockade can, secondly, come to an end through an enemy force driving off the blockading squadron or fleet. In such a case, the blockade ends ipso facto by the blockading squadron being driven away, whatever their intention as to returning may be. Should the squadron return and resume the blockade, it must be considered as a new blockade, and not simply the continuation of the former blockade, and the steps necessary for the establishment of a blockade must again be taken.3 The third ground for the ending of a blockade is its failure to be effective.4 The fourth ground is the capture and occupation of the blockaded port or coast by the blockading force. It was indeed held in the American Civil War in the case of The Circassian, that this did not end the blockade; 1 According to U.S. Naval War Code, Article 43, thirty days were to be allowed 'unless otherwise specially ordered.' 2 Article 13 of the unratified Declaration of London stipulated that the voluntary raising of a blockade, as also any restrictions in its limits, must, in the same way as the declara tion of a blockade, be notified to all neutral Governments by the blockading Power, and to the local authorities by the officer commanding the blockading fleet. 3 See Article 12 of the unratified Declaration of London. 4 See below, § 382. but the Mixed Commission on British and American Claims, set up after the war, considered that judgment to be wrong, and awarded compensation to all the claimants.1 III EFFECTIVENESS OF BLOCKADE See the literature quoted above at the commencement of § 368. in contra Fictitious § 379. The necessity that a blockade should be Effective made effective by the presence of a blockading squadron distinoof sufficient strength to prevent egress and ingress of tion to vessels became gradually recognised during the first Blockade. half of the nineteenth century; it became formally enacted as a principle of the Law of Nations through the Declaration of Paris in 1856, and was recognised in Article 2 of the unratified Declaration of London. Effective blockade is the contrast to so-called fictitious or paper blockade, which was frequently practised during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and at the beginning of the nineteenth century.2 Fictitious blockade consists in declaring and notifying that a port or a coast is blockaded without, however, posting a sufficient number of men-of-war on the spot to be really able to prevent egress and ingress of every vessel. It was one of the principles of the First and of the Second Armed Neutralities that a blockade should always be effective; but it was not till after the Napoleonic wars that this principle gradually found universal recognition. During the second half of the nineteenth century, even those States which had not acceded to the Declara 1 However, in 1899 during the Spanish American War, the Supreme Court of the United States in The Adula (176 U.S. 361) held the case of The Circassian to be decisive. 2 See Fauchille, Blocus, pp. 74109. of Effec tion of Paris did not dispute the necessity of a blockade being effective. Condition § 380. The condition of effectiveness of a blockade, tiveness of as defined by the Declaration of Paris, is its mainBlockade. tenance by such a force as is sufficient really to prevent access to the coast. But no unanimity exists respecting what is required to constitute an effective blockade according to this definition. Apart from differences of opinion regarding points of minor interest, it may be stated that in the main there have been two conflicting opinions. According to one opinion, the definition of an effective blockade pronounced by the First Armed Neutrality of 1780 is valid, and a blockade is effective only when the approach to the coast is barred by a chain of men-of-war, anchored on the spot, and so near to one another that the line cannot be passed without obvious danger to the passing vessel.1 This corresponds to the practice followed before the World War by France. According to another opinion, a blockade is effective when the approach is watched-to use the words of Dr. Lushington 2 by a force sufficient to render the egress and ingress dangerous, or, in other words, save under peculiar circumstances, as fogs, violent winds, and some necessary absences, sufficient to render the capture of vessels attempting to go in or come out most probable.' According to this opinion, there need be no chain of anchored men-of-war to expose any vessels attempting to break the blockade to a cross fire; a 1 See Hautefeuille, ii. p. 194; Gessner, p. 169; Kleen, i. § 129; Boeck, Nos. 676-681; Dupuis, Nos. 173-174; Fauchille, Blocus, pp. 110142. Phillimore, iii. § 293, takes up the same standpoint in so far as a blockade de facto is concerned: 'A blockade de facto should be effected by stationing a number of ships, and forming as it were an arch of circumvallation round the mouth of the prohibited port, where, if the arch fails in any one part, the blockade itself fails altogether.' In his judgment in The Franciska, (1855) Spinks 287. |