of France, and to imitate us would produce a mere hybrid. Politically they profess to follow non-Latin examples; their constitutions are an imitation of the English via the United States, but they are worked by Spanish and French methods; their elections are much after the fashion of the plebiscites in favour of Napoleon III, and their preference is for dictatorships and management." In fact, it is the attempt to follow unworkable "Anglo-Saxon models that is responsible for much of the turbulence and revolutions which have made Latin-American politics a bye-word. Now that the Latin methods are asserting themselves, and capital has poured into most of the republics making stability and order desirable, South America is at last making peaceful progress.

We have then several different kinds of influence at work in South America. There is that of the United States. From the first this influence prescribed the constitution of each republic; but for many years the influence of the United States lay dormant ; the northern republic was developing itself and had no leisure for outside affairs. But the expansion of North American trade and the opening of the Panama Canal made the political influence of the United States a matter of great moment to South America. And of late years the depression of other Powers, owing to the war, has made the United States the main object of prepossession to South America, if not its bug-bear. The United States pursues the most illiberal commercial policy of any nation in the world. At the recent ill-reported Pan-American Congress this was a subject of strong complaint. But this matter is insignificant in comparison with the fact that the South American republics feel an ever-present dread of the overgrown power of their neighbour. They see the action of the States in Mexico and Central America ; they dread a similar experience for themselves. At the same time the traditional secluded and jealous individualism of SpanishAmerica makes concerted action on the part of the republics very difficult.

Again, there is the influence of France-fruitful and beneficent. Like to like, and Latin to Latin, the influence is shown in every feature of everyday life. It is natural and it will endure. Then there is the influence of Great Britain-foreign, but long established. It has been of great material value to the South Americans and has ever been directed in support of their concord and independence. From various causes it has declined in

recent years, but it is reviving, and its revival ought to be assisted by every means in our power. The time for supine diplomacy has long since gone by. Our government ought to hold itself as befits the paramount foreign Power in South America. It must secure fair play for our trade, and for our shipping; it must be master in our own colonies and not allow foreign firms to decide where our ships shall call. This is not to say that it must interfere at every step, multiply officials, and lavish subsidies. On the contrary it should allow our traders a free hand, but it should secure them a fair field, and its representatives in every Spanish-American land should be well-housed and make a good appearance. Above all other nations, the SpanishAmericans value externals.

The above considerations have been put forward in the hope of making thoughtful and cultivated persons turn their attention to this important matter. Our predominance in South America necessarily waned through stress of the war, and there, as in many other fields of action, recovery was slow owing to the lassitude following an unexampled exertion. There are encouraging signs that the recovery is in progress and there is little doubt that, if we pay due regard to the conditions of the South American republics and improve our knowledge of the temperament and affairs of their inhabitants, we shall again become the leaderno intrusive or dictatorial leader but the friend and helper-of the young republics, and we shall improve our own position in South America.

W. A. HIRST

PEACE IN THE PACIFIC

SINCE the Great War it has become the fashion to say that

the next war will be in the Pacific. Certainly around the Pacific circumstances point to the imminence of great changes. In this area are vast undeveloped territories, and large resources of man power, utilized only to satisfy the most primitive needs. There are many millions of people, capable and industrious, who have been accustomed for long ages to living in dire poverty. They have for centuries acquiesced in the tyranny of nature. The scourges of flood, drought, famine and pestilence have never been overcome. On the other hand no enduring State has been built up. Into the minds of these peoples Western ideas have now entered and are working like a ferment. There is a determination in many of them not to remain under the servile conditions of the past. Out of these dynamic factors change must come. But because things must change, is it necessary that there should be war? Can war ensure that the changes will follow the line of reason? The Americans have begun to take an intense interest in Pacific problems, and indeed it is from the writings of American scholars and publicists that we get the larger proportion of our information on Pacific questions. There is a call in the United States for a new policy for the Pacific-pacific in fact as well as in name.

It is obviously impossible to gather within the space of one article all the various factors in this complicated subject; but it may be possible to analyse some of the international problems which are growing in the Pacific, and to see what opportunity there may be for controlling them in the direction of peace and progress. To analyse one set of factors among many may seem to invite a result which will be unreal; but it is often useful to isolate different aspects of great and complex problems, and to approach them from the regional point of view. The British people rejected the Protocol because it treated all European relations as on one single basis; they agreed to the Locarno Pact, which affected the part of Europe in which England was specially interested. Questions which have been found obstinate,

when considered from a general point of view, may yield solutions when considered as regional matters.

If there is any validity in the regional method of approach it must surely apply to the affairs of an area so huge and so different from the western world as the Pacific. At present the statesmen of the world view these problems through a focus adjusted to Europe. But the circumstances of Europe differ in every essential respect from those which appertain to the Pacific. In Western Europe we see a tremendous concentration of powerful nations living close together, separated in space only by lines on the map, but deeply separated otherwise by language and nationality. Their history has been one of almost constant wars, due in the first place to competing dynastic claims. Out of this history many disturbing elements still arise. This situation might have been considerably changed for the better under modern democracy, but for two radical factors of instability. One is that all the nations of Western Europe are highly industrialized; they depend for their existence on supplies of food and raw material from the outer world, and on markets in that world for manufactured products. These supplies must, as a rule, pass along trade routes converging in narrow seas. Such a situation causes competition for sources of supply and for markets. It induces in the minds of statesmen a nervous anxiety about security, and keeps alive old hostilities. The other factor is a geographical one. These nations are within striking distance of one another; no nation is out of reach of a sudden blow. Indeed, with modern armaments the whole of modern strategy centres round the sudden blow. If the German leaders had not been convinced that a speedy triumph could be obtained by a sudden blow they themselves would hardly have advised war. The underlying strategy of the League of Nations is directed to securing that such a sudden blow cannot be struck.

It is important to note that neither of these factors of instability exists in the Pacific. The Pacific is a spacious area, and in its spaciousness is security. From San Francisco to Yokohama is 4,600 miles, from Honolulu to Shanghai 4,000 miles, and from Sydney to San Francisco 6,500 miles. Such dangers as arise from the mere proximity of great and powerful nations are almost entirely absent from the Pacific. It is true that Japan is highly industrialized, and that owing to her congested population she

has to import food and raw materials and requires foreign markets for her industries. The weakness of China is no doubt a very considerable element of instability, but with a slightly improved organization China would be as difficult to conquer as Russia. Japan has once or twice threatened an aggressive policy towards China; but it looks as if such measures were now abandoned. Japan is certainly not exercising the paramount influence in China which her naval and military power would enable her to exert if she had imperialistic leanings. It seems that Japan would welcome a strong Chinese State, provided that certain economic advantages which are vital to her were conceded.

It has, however, to be realized that there are many interests in the Pacific which are almost undefended. Hong Kong, the Philippines and the Russian portion of the Far East are within the strategic area of Japan, and could not hold out for a week if the Japanese wanted to take them. The Dutch East Indies and the various colonies of European nations in the Pacific have no defences whatever. Australia has always exhibited a keen interest in questions of defence and is spending up to seventeen shillings per head on her navy alone. But her ships are quite inadequate for any positive naval action, unless they co-operate with a strong British fleet. Fortunately Australia is so remote from the nearest danger-point that a military expedition in sufficient force for an effective invasion would have a rather remote chance of success, provided that a minimum of local defence were available.

It will thus be seen that the specific dangers from which Europe suffers are absent from the Pacific. The principal countries are there far apart, and generally speaking they are self-supporting and self-contained. But where one nation is powerfully armed and another is unarmed even distance will not protect the latter. It is therefore necessary to glance at the armaments in the Pacific at present and see what part they play.

The rôle of the Japanese fleet is perfectly clear. Within the strategic area of Japan and her possessions the Japanese fleet is supreme beyond challenge. But it has no bases beyond that area, and, apart from special expeditions against defenceless communities, it could not fight away from its bases. It could not strike a vital blow outside the north-western Pacific, nor compel an opponent to conform to its will. Against what is this fleet defending Japan? Are there any other fleets which could attack