mencement. Instruction can merely, while circling round the shrines of morality and religion, describe and glorify their treasures; the pupil can be made a partaker of them only through that more lively and more penetrating activity which constitutes education.

2. Education through instruction.-Through the investigations of the previous paragraph, we are now in a position to give a definite answer to the question if instruction can educate, and how far. Of all the evolutions of our mind there remain behind traces, and these traces are powers, and so far, therefore, there is through all instruction an inner or subjective shaping of the mind produced, the very thing at which education aims. But the question then occurs, Whether this inner shaping, this formation of the subjective, is important and joyful; whether the traces which remain behind, have the adequate strength, liveliness, and intensity which make them desirable developments of the inner mental being; whether they mingle and work together with one another in relations promotive of progress; and whether in this way all kinds of inner progress which education aims at, are to be attained?

In order to gain perfect exactness in the determination of these questions, we must distinguish three things: the education which is attached to instruction immediately and essentially; the education which comes alongside of the instruction, or takes place through that which the teacher says or does in addition to what properly belongs to his duties as an instructor; and, finally, we have the results that may arise from special arrangements which are made for instruction, such, for instance, as are made in instruction in schools.

Of these three elements, we can take no notice of the last. The second is seen at the first glance to be entirely different in different circumstances. It depends on the individuality of the teacher whether it appears at all, and in what way and to what extent; and it also depends, on the other hand, not less on the individuality of the scholar. To take a nearer view of this matter, we can bring the influences that bear on it under four general heads.

First, an educating influence can be exercised on the scholars in immediate connection with the objects of instruction by the zeal of the teacher, by the liveliness and continuity which he displays, and by the scientific spirit which in forms his instructions, for these qualities are transferred to the scholars, sometimes unconsciously and instinctively, and sometimes in more conscious representation and feeling. While he has these qualities of his teacher continually before him, he forms them in himself along with the objects of instruction, by means of that which he possesses in an elementary state similar to these; and the traces which remain behind of these, become gradually in him permanent qualities. It is plain from this that this training may be often of greater importance than the subject matter which the instruction communicates. Hereby there is introduced into the scholar a special power of estimating the moral worth of things, which, according to the measure of its strength, its purity, its liveliness, and its harmonious agreement with other motives, may exercise an exceedingly important moral influence for the whole of life.

But, secondly, the teacher, besides what he may introduce immediately into his teaching from his inner being, is something more. He has a character, an individuality, and these can manifest themselves during instruction in the most manifold ways, and can also be reflected in the scholars where the preparatory capabilities exist. It is these that principally determine the tone of the teacher;

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the expression of the united intellectual and moral individuality and disposition of the teacher. It is well known that teachers differ much from each other, in this respect. While many, during instruction, simply let the object speak through itself, others continually are mingling up with it themselves or their personality more or less, relating the circumstances of their lives, their adventures, their feelings, and their doings. Where the special subject of instruction has little, or perhaps nothing to do with this, we must unquestionably consider this as a mistake, according to strict didactic rule; and it may take place to a degree where it becomes a mistake which can in no way be excused. But in many circumstances the advantage preponderates. Through the foreign admixtures, more is gained in respect of moral tone and character than is lost in respect of instruction, where there exist in the scholars the preparations. Even didactically it can sometimes have a beneficial influence, by breaking the uni formity of the instruction, and giving more spirit and life to it, which is a decided necessity for some individualities.

Thirdly, there is the attention which the teacher can pay to the moral indi viduality of the scholar. Also in this respect we come upon a similar diversity. Many teachers do not trouble themselves about this matter. They give their lessons, they take care that there be quiet and attention during these, and that the necessary preparations and work be done for them. Every thing beyond this, they imagine, is of no concern to them. Others, on the contrary, regard the moral effect on the scholars as the principal matter. While they give intense attention to the scholars in this respect continually, they take the opportunity presented of something faulty occurring either in the regulation of the instruction, or in conduct, to introduce, with great earnestness, representations and admonitions, which, in consequence of the way in which they proceed from them, receive a penetrating character; and what they have once begun in this way, they follow out with systematic zeal.

To these educating agents have to be added, in the fourth place, those which are determined by the relations, and especially the likes and dislikes which arise between teacher and scholar. Love begets love, confidence elevates and strengthens; on the other hand, cold repulsive behavior on the part of the teacher chills the pupil, creates ill-will, and may inspire even hatred. The results in this case are often of great importance for the whole education; and unquestionably special consideration is to be given in the selection of a teacher, not merely to the amount and kind of knowledge he may possess, but to the circumstances now named, and more especially to the many relations of agreement or of opposition which can bring the scholar to willing association; or, on the other hand, to an often invincible repulsion.

We have yet to discuss the first of those points suggested in the beginning,

- the educating power immediately and essentially attached to the instruction. With regard to it, we expect that there will be more certainty in carrying it out, because it is conditioned by its more close connection with instruction; and a full examination confirms this expectation. We can have no doubt as to its nature in general. The traces which remain behind from the comprehension of the instruction, give rise to powers for the comprehension of that which lies in the same direction with it,-powers of perception, and observation, of memory, understanding, and judgment of the most manifold kind, as well as the habits of attention, of diligence, and of perseverance. It is plain, at the

first glance, that this training will be the more valuable, the greater the liveliness and intensity with which these traces are collected, provided only the mind do not be wearied out.

And then to these are attached further workings out of that which has been already comprehended. To these belong, especially in an objective point of view, the regulating laws, which not unfrequently extend their operations beyond the special circumstances in connection with which they were first formed; and subjectively, there is the elevating and bracing feeling of power in one's self which urges on the scholar, and later the youth and the man, from one intellectual height to another, and gives him the energy requisite to the attainment of his aims.

The truth of this remark will become exceedingly evident if we look at it, as it were, through a magnifying-glass, in that education which the previous ages give to those that follow. Let us take, for instance, the influences which proceed from our more recent speculative philosophies. It has often been believed, that even although these brought no advantage in respect of the matter which they supply to the mind, inasmuch as they establish no knowledge that promises to last, yet they deserve the highest praise in a formal point of view, or in respect of the mental, gymnastic, and intellectual exertion and strengthening which they guarantee. But exactly the reverse is unquestionably the result; for since these speculative systems move in distorted, often purely fanciful forms, the formation of the mind, or the education which is produced by them, must bear a distorted and perverted character. They impress on the mind fanciful laws of knowledge, they set up pictures of a progress in which there can be no real progress, but merely the fancy that there is progress. And since these pictures and laws work as misdirecting powers, the intellectual training must necessarily be radically corrupt. And so also the moral training. On the one side, they establish presumption and superciliousness in reference to that worthless and perverted acquisition. On the other hand, they depress and unnerve, where they ought to give courage and spirit, namely, in striving after knowledges which, established in the right way, possess sufficient tenacity to remain truth for all time.

This, then, is the full extent to which instruction can and ought to act with an educating power, independently of special arrangements which may be added for the purpose. Most decided is its action in that which is immediately attached to it; and then in that which lies near to it, at least so far as a special individuality is not presupposed for it. Every thing else is in and for itself, not in its power, but can be drawn into it only so far as already a mental preparation has been made for it through the immediate action of the relations of life. The relation to the teacher is assuredly a relation of life, but only a single and limited one. On this account it can have an educating power (in an elementary way) fresh and lively, but only so far as it affects the mind in this character. And this statement already furnishes us with the answer to the question, in what way schools are fitted to extend this influence. It is plain, without further investigation, that they are in a position to do this so far, but only so far as they can introduce new relations of life which shall act immediately on the inner development of the scholar.

MONTESQUIEU.-OF THE LAWS OF EDUCATION.

MEMOIR.

M. DE SECONDAT, Baron Montesquieu, was born in 168, of an ancient and noble family, at the Chateau de la Brede, near Bordeaux. He early devoted himself to literature and civil law. In 1714 he was made councilor of the parliament of Bordeaux, and in 1716, its president. In 1721 appeared his Lettres Persannes; in 1728 he was elected to the Academie Français, and about the same time he visited Vienna, attached to the embassy of Lord Waldgrave, and, soon after, Italy, Switzerland, Holland, and Great Britain. On his return he meditated and wrote the Causes of the Grandeur and Decline of the Roman Empire, which was published in 1733, and followed in 1748, by his Esprit des Loix, which was translated into the different languages of Europe. An English translation appeared then, which went through many editions. The extracts which follow, on Education, being from the sixth edition issued in 1772. Ile died in 1755.

EDUCATION SHOULD BE IN HARMONY WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

I. The laws of education are the first impressions we receive; and, as they prepare us for civil life, each particular family ought to be governed pursuant to the plan of the great family which comprehends them all.

If the people in general have a principle, their constituent parts, that is, the several families, will have one also. The laws of education will be therefore different in each species of government; in monarchies they will have honor for their object; in republics, virtue; in despotic governments, fear.

II. In monarchies the principal branch of education is not taught in colleges or academies. It in some measure commences when we enter the world; for this is the school of what we call honor, that universal preceptor which ought every where to be our guide.

Here it is that we constantly see and hear three things: "that we should have a certain nobleness in our virtues, a kind of frankness in our morals, and a particular politeness in our behavior."

The virtues we are here taught, are less what we owe to others, than to ourselves; they are not so much what assimilates us to, as what distinguishes us from, our fellow-citizens.

Here the actions of men are not judged as good, but as shining; not as just, but as great; not as reasonable, but as extraordinary.

When honor here meets with anything noble in our actions, it is either a judge that approves them, or a sophist by whom they are excused.

It allows of gallantry when united with the idea of sensible affection, or with that of conquest; this is the reason why we never meet with so strict a purity of morals in monarchies as in republican governments.

It allows of cunning and craft, when joined with the idea of greatness of soul or importance of affairs; as for instance, in politics with whose finesses it is far from being offended.

It does not forbid adulation, but when separate from the idea of a large fortune, and connected only with the sense of our mean condition.

With regard to morals, I have observed that the education of monarchies ought to admit of a certain frankness and open carriage. Truth therefore in conversation is a necessary point. But is it for the sake of truth? By no means. Truth is requisite only because a person habituated to veracity, has an air of boldness and freedom. In fact, a man of this stamp seems to lay stress only on the things themselves, and not on the manner in which others receive them.

Hence it is, that as much as this kind of frankness is commended, so much that of the common people is despised, which has nothing but truth and simplicity for its object.

In fine, the education of monarchies requires a certain politeness of behavior. Men born for society, are born to please one another; and a person that would break through the rules of decorum, by shocking those he conversed with, would so far lose the public esteem as to become incapable of doing any good.

But politeness, generally speaking, does not derive its original from so pure a source. It rises from a desire of distinguishing ourselves. It is pride that renders us polite: we feel a pleasing vanity in being remarked for a behavior that shows in some measure we are not meanly born, and that we have not been bred up with those who in all ages have been considered as the scum of the people.

Politeness, in monarchies, is naturalized at court. One man excessively great renders everybody else little. Hence that regard which is paid to our fellow subjects; hence that politeness, which is as pleasing to those by whom, as to those towards whom it is practiced; because it gives people to understand, that a person actually belongs, or at least deserves to belong, to the court.

A court-air consists in quitting a real for a borrowed greatness. The latter pleases the courtier more than his own. It inspires him with a certain disdainful modesty, which shows itself externally, but whose pride diminishes insensibly in proportion to its distance from the source of this greatness.

At court we find a delicacy of taste in everything, a delicacy arising from the constant use of the superfluities of an affluent fortune, from the variety, and especially the satiety of pleasures, from the multiplicity, and even confusion, of fancies; which, if they are but agreeable, are always well received.

These are the things which properly fall within the province of education, in order to form what we call a man of honor, a man possessed of all the qualities and virtues requisite in this kind of government.

Here it is that honor interferes with everything, mixing even with people's manner of thinking and feeling, and directing their very principles.

To this whimsical honor it is owing, that the virtues are only just what it pleases, and as it pleases; it adds rules of its own invention to everything prescribed to us; it extends or limits our duties according to its own fancy, whether they proceed from religion, politics, or morality..

There is nothing so strongly inculcated in monarchies, by the laws, by religion, and honor, as submission to the prince's will; but this very honor tells us, that the prince ought never to command a dishonorable action, because this would render us incapable to serve him.

Grillon refused to assassinate the Duke of Guise, but he offered Henry III. to fight him. After the massacre of St. Bartholomew, Charles IX. having sent orders to all the governors in the several provinces for the Huguenots to be murdered, Viscount Dorte, who commanded at Bayonne, wrote thus to the king: "Sire, among the inhabitants of this town, and your Majesty's troops, I could only find honest citizens and brave soldiers, but not one executioner: we jointly therefore beseech your Majesty to command our arms and lives in things that are practicable." This great and generous soul looked upon a base action as a thing impossible.

There is nothing that honor more strongly recommends to the nobility, than to serve their prince in a military capacity. In fact, this is their favorite profession, because its dangers, its success, and even its misfortunes, are the road to grandeur. And yet this very law of its own making, honor chooses to explain; and if it happens to be affronted, requires or permits us to retire.

It insists also, that we should be at liberty either to seek or to reject employments; a liberty which it prefers even to an ample fortune.

Honor therefore has its supreme laws, to which education is obliged to conform. The chief of these are, that we are allowed to set a value upon our fortune, but it is absolutely forbidden to set any value upon our lives.